Hunter Roy, Texas A&M University

Present in the feminist movement is a contradiction between its nominal expression and its intentions. Mapping out the development of feminism through post-colonial discourse and contemporary discourse, as well as through their own experiences as a feminist, Olivia Leroux presents a compelling argument as to why the word feminism is no longer beneficial. The central argument of this paper relies on two essential premises: that feminism’s eurocentrism is inherently exclusionary, and that feminism’s exclusivity fails to address the issues of gender-oppressed groups. In this response I will focus on summarizing the essential claims of the paper while exploring the implications of laying blame on the nominal for issues relating to a lack of humanism in feminism.

The first section of the paper intends to demonstrate the exclusionary nature of the word feminism. An important observation the author makes is that language presents to us a unique difficulty that arises not from the words available to us but instead from the meanings that are assigned to our words. By illustrating that the meaning of political language—such as feminism—can be manipulated to benefit specific groups, the author prepares us for a critique. An example that further demonstrates the failures of words to serve their original purpose is emergence of intersectional theory in feminist thought. In intersectional theory, key identities such as race, gender, and class are argued to affect one’s day-to-day lived experience. The conflict described in the text revolves around the failure of a Western feminist to perceive other key aspects of a Muslim woman’s identity, such as religion, culture, and political circumstances. As a result, the woman’s choice to wear a veil is misunderstood as oppression and not an expression of religious agency. If womanhood as agency is a definition limited to European forms of expression, then certainly there are internal issues in feminist thought that need attention. Yet, I hesitate to cast blame on language. The manner in which feminism is characterized in the text seems to refer to feminism in the West and not in other parts of the world. If the chief concern is the Eurocentric influence on Western feminism, it appears that this feminism should be our area of focus and not feminism globally. In the text

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there are non-Western authors quoted that articulate their disagreement not with feminism but Western feminism and its colonial ambition. Perhaps the assumption that a Eurocentric influence on feminism devalues the word may falsely assume that it is permissible to speak of feminism in such a globalizing manner. While I do not intend to take away from the author’s central claim of feminism as a humanism, I do want to stress the importance of identification in a Western context when global claims are made. That being said, the author’s claims are still deserving of further attention in that they lead us to consider the development of Western feminism against the backdrop of Eurocentrism. Further, the concluding claim that feminism should reorient itself in a humanistic direction is still quite pertinent.

The second section of the paper aims to reveal the manner in which the word feminism further contributes to the exclusion of gender-oppressed people. The central claim of this section is that if feminism inhibits the fight against all forms of gender oppression, it should not be used to describe the movement taking place. The author argues that in the background of feminism’s inability to serve all gender oppressed groups is the question of what defines womanhood and who is welcome to participate in the feminist movement. This leads to two issues: first, that the oppression of non-binary, gender-fluid, and transgender individuals is ignored, and second, that cisgender men often become excluded as well. It would then seem that the use of the term feminism serves to only complicate the process of liberation from the patriarchy. The experience of the word feminism may lead to exclusion both as it is perpetrated by some feminists and affects gender-oppressed groups and cisgender men. I am interested in seeing further discussion on the manner in which feminism both as a movement and a label is perceived in non-Western cultures and whether that would inform our judgment moving forward.

The author concludes with some remarks about the humanistic goals that feminism should be oriented towards. It is certainly the case that traditional Western definitions of gender and gender relations affect our perception of these relations in other parts of the world. However, this may not entirely indicate that genderoppressed peoples are denied participation in global feminist discourse and action. Should feminism undergo a global humanistic evolution, I am concerned that this would then allow us to then ignore the issues caused by Western influence as the author mentioned. Should the humanistic position be stressed excessively, I wonder how the movement’s ability to address issues of gender oppression will be transformed. Perhaps we are not quite ready to leave a gender-focused mode of analysis in the rearview.