Eric Nash, Texas A&M University

AB S T R A C T

In his Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau offers a theoretical account of how political communities form, operate, and evolve to meet the challenges created by their changing circumstances. For him, the form of any particular government should not be static but mutable. Prior to analyzing the basic structure of a state, Rousseau postulates why civil societies exist in the first place. Human nature is observed to identify the existential needs of the individual person, which Rousseau determines requires living within a civil society to satisfy. Once a group of individuals comes together to form a people, legitimate leadership is established in the form of government, which comes in three basic forms: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Among these, there is no ideal or objectively ‘correct’ form of government. Rather, for maximum efficiency and proper governance, a state must adopt the form of government that is best suitable for its population size

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In his Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau offers a theoretical account of how political communities form, operate, and evolve to meet the challenges created by their changing circumstances. For him, the form of any particular government should not be static but mutable. Prior to analyzing the basic structure of a state, Rousseau postulates why civil societies exist in the first place. Human nature is observed to identify the existential needs of the individual person, which Rousseau determines requires living within a civil society to satisfy. Once a group of individuals comes together to form a people, legitimate leadership is established in the form of government, which comes in three basic forms: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Among these, there is no ideal or objectively ‘correct’ form of government. Rather, for maximum efficiency and proper governance, a state must adopt the form of government that is best suitable for its population size

Although Rousseau may never explicitly analyze representative democracies; in this text, there is an implicit analysis of such modern, Western nation-states. By utilizing various sections from Books I, III, and IV of the Social Contract, there is reasonable identification of a United- States-like society, an examination of its constitution, and a positing of its potential weaknesses. By understanding the shape, function, and vulnerabilities of modern-day societies, we may be able to predict and prepare for the type of challenges these states will face in the near future. The particular challenges these societies are destined to face are not within the scope of this paper (and, as will soon be explained, cannot be anticipated anyway), however, the sources of them are. Today, civil societies face a phenomenon wholly unique to the current era: globalization. From globalization comes an unprecedented quantity of unknowable crises; convoluted, interconnected problems; and pan-national threats. Such concerns are not factors in Rousseau’s political thought, but, when discussing the proper model of a state, can still be influential in the formation of a government.

Through an exegetical approach to Rousseau’s Social Contract, this paper will come to a conclusion about whether or not the modern, democratic nation-state remains a viable form of government in the twenty-first century. Before diving into the text of the Social Contract, I will delineate exactly what globalization is, how it came to be, and identify the problems to civil societies it presents. Though this paper is meant to strike at problems of representative democracy in general, I will repeatedly elucidate these points through the example of the United States of America.

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Prior to adequately meeting the challenges in the twenty-first century, a government must be capable of satisfying its essential purpose. Since Rousseau is a person of modernity, it is important to note that, to him, civil societies are human-made and not a product of nature.1 The social contract flows from the actions of humankind itself and thus is oriented around fulfilling humankind’s purpose. Any end that the government may have is simply derivative of human beings’. Rousseau’s observations of human nature draw out two existential concerns for the entire species, which compels it into entering a social contact. All governments, no matter their form, ultimately operate under a social contract. Since freedom, as will soon be explained, is of the utmost importance for the flourishing human life, it is necessary to differentiate a leader of a society (i.e., those in government) from a master of slaves, and to understand their legitimate accession. Once the concept of leadership is put forward, I will explain Rousseau’s definitions for the different parts of the state, and describe how and when these parts come together to create the three main forms of government. Though Rousseau discusses monarchy and aristocracy in depth, I will only focus on his understanding of democracy for this paper.

Once I have analyzed Rousseau’s democracy, I will introduce what I call the two vulnerabilities of fixed democracy: inconsistency and slowness to act. When present, these two problems should be detrimental to the state. Despite this, many democratic institutions of the twenty-first century still somehow exist alongside them. I will explain why this is possible and consider whether or not these governments can continue subsisting in a globalized world. I will demonstrate how the two vulnerabilities of fixed democracy behave in the current global climate and discuss whether or not a resolution — such as the evolution of modern democratic governments — is necessary. By the end of this paper, I hope to offer a thorough application of Rousseau’s political philosophy to the current democratic state and observe how the arc of humanity’s development affects the formation of the political community.

Globalization describes the current phenomenon of heightened interconnectedness between the nations of the world. Though international affairs have existed as long as states, globalization is unique to the twentieth to twenty-first centuries. It has, most importantly, rendered the traditional Westphalian notion of states

1. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter I.

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untenable. Ending the Thirty-Years’ War, the Peace of Westphalia established the international principle of state sovereignty—each state has total and utter control over its domestic affairs; no other state can infringe on this autonomy.2

However, with the onset of globalization, the Westphalian rights of nations cannot be exercised without inevitably infringing on those very same rights of others. Due to modern advancements in international transportation and instantaneous communication technologies, the internal affairs of one state can seriously affect other nations. It is characteristic of the twentyfirst century that, “Little now stays local; just about anyone and anything, from tourists, terrorists, and refugees to e-mails, diseases, dollars, and greenhouse gases, can reach almost anywhere.”3 Globalization, in conjunction with extraordinary t 3 echnological advancements, gives rise to the three categories of problems threatening the modern nation-state: unexpected crises, interconnected problems, and pan-national threats. It is important to note that, though globalization might give rise to these problems, it is not itself the problem and should not be resisted. Rather, the issues lie within how modern civil societies plan to independently and collectively address these novel effects of a modern, globalized world.

Unexpected crises are devastating events that, for the most part, are not (and many times cannot be) anticipated. The spontaneous use of WMDs by a hostile state or non-state actor, the spread of a global pandemic, or prolonged seasons of severe drought can all fall into this category. Keep in mind these issues can be prepared for, but can rarely be anticipated prior to their imminence. These issues have always existed for civil societies, but due to heightened levels of global contact, widespread use of cyberspace, and the creation of quickly deployable weapons, unexpected crises can happen at (quite literally) any moment. Take for example the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 or the sudden onset of coronavirus in 2019. Neither event could have been faced with a comfortable degree of certainty, but nevertheless resulted in major national security threats. Rather than trying to predict every possible danger on the horizon, governments must now accept these high levels of uncertainty and be prepared to act quickly and efficiently once unexpected crises occur.4 Interconnected problems and pan-national threats are the other two dangers exacerbated by globalization. The former concerns the domestic issues of one state affecting the domestic or international interests of another. For

2. Haass, World Order 2.0, 2. 3. Ibid. 4. Cohen, The Big Stick, Chapter 8.

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example, if one nation were to have its economy collapse, a refugee crisis is created for other states, which, in turn, causes social turmoil within them. Pan-national threats, on the other hand, are problems that are non-discriminating and reach all—or nearly all—nation-states. Pan-national threats cannot be resolved by a single state (no matter how powerful that state may be) but require the cooperation of a plurality of international bodies.5 Climate change, terrorism, global health, and t 5 he proliferation of nuclear weapons all fall into this category. Both categories of problems require healthy international relationships to resolve. Multilateral commitments must be made from one nation to another if these globalized problems are to be eliminated, or at least sufficiently mitigated. Common defense systems, trade agreements, and international legislation are possible ways of ameliorating these issues, but (like any other plausible solution) demand trust and international cooperation to succeed.

The modern representative democracies of the West have already dealt with issues generated by globalization. It must be clear, though, that globalization itself is not a problem to be resolved, but rather a fact of modern life. A highly interconnected and technologically savvy world is not going away any time soon, which means that globalized issues are not either. The question remains whether representative democracies can effectively handle these twenty-first-century issues and if they can, can they do so repeatedly? Before this can be answered, we must understand why governments exist and what their primary function is. By considering the teleological role of civil societies alongside the problems of globalization, we can determine whether modern democracies remain viable forms of government or if they must evolve into other forms.

Rousseau maintains that social order does not come from nature but is instead enacted by humankind. Human beings are not naturally political animals but become so out of convention. It is through a combination of reason and natural motivation that humankind decides to associate with one another. This reasoning begins with the nature of human beings: “Its first law is to see to his maintenance; its first concerns are those he owes himself.”6 An individual is concerned with, first and foremost, following and satisfying their private will. In the state of nature,

5. Haas, World Order 2.0, 2017. 6. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter II.

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humankind can achieve this through their endowed natural liberty, or the ability to freely and without recourse satisfy his/her desires with the only limitation being his/her own capabilities.7 No individual will consensually forfeit this liberty unless it is in exchange for some utility that satisfies humans’ first law. In other words, we will only give up our freedom for safety (broadly understood) in return. If an individual loses their natural liberty without utility given in return, it is through an act of force and constitutes slavery.8 In this 8 instance, the individual is not led but subdued. They are thus not properly the citizens of a state, but the slaves of a master.

In the formation of a singular people, there is a vital difference between an aggregation and an association. The aggregation is controlled by the master, while the association is led by a leader. In the former, the private will of an individual controls the movement of the group and is the equivalent of tyranny. Meanwhile, in the association the general will—the will of the group as determined by itself—controls the group. The individuals that constitute an aggregation are each connected to a single common point, the master. After the demise of the master, the aggregation would naturally and instantly cease to exist, its individuals reverting back to a state of natural liberty. In the association, though, the individuals are connected to one another through identification with and as the sovereign, or the group of individuals as understood as a single volitional entity. If the leader of a sovereign were to pass away, the sovereign still remains. It follows that individuals must come together as a sovereign prior to having a legitimate ruler.9 However, the formation of the sovereign must be done in such a way that it does not make slaves (but human beings) out of its members.

It seems that in the state of nature humankind is merely an animal susceptible to one of two transformations. Depending on involvement with an aggregation or an association, a person will either become a slave or a human being respectively. These differences come down to the ability to satisfy the first law of human beings. However, the only way a person can see to their own maintenance is through two existential concerns: possessing individual freedom and possessing property. Forcefully depriving an individual of these deprives them of fulfilling their nature, and transforms them into a slave. Meanwhile, in the social contract, these two elements are the progenitors of a civil society. Preserving individual liberty and

7. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, Chapter VIII. 8. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter II. 9. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter V.

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securing the use of property are that with which all forms of legitimate government are basically concerned.

Due to the precarity of the state of nature, the human race would surely perish if it did not bring itself out of it.10 The only way to rise out of this condition, a 10 nd sufficiently face the dangers it contains, is to unite the forces each individual possesses and direct this sum through a single moving power, or a single will. Hence, humankind must “[f]ind a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”11 A proper social contract, no matter its government’s form, must fulfill this requirement. The key to this act of association is the total and willful “alienation” of each individual person to the entire community. If the alienation is made with reservation, done by means of external force, or performed by only a portion of the community, the social contract will disintegrate and no state will remain. Since this act is committed by every member of the group, the individual receives the equivalent of everything he or she loses, plus the force needed to establish secure use of his or her property.12 Moreover, each member who is a part of this act of association has a say on the direction in which the assembly goes—no one is a mere slave to the community, but a part of its general will. There is now a transformation of natural liberty into conventional liberty, and the sovereign has formed while avoiding concerns of master-slave relations.

When introducing government into the civil society, Rousseau divides action into two parts: the desire to act and then the act itself. Take for example the act of walking from point A to point B. Before an individual can undertake this act, she must will it to be so. This desire brings about action and moves the body. In the state, legislative power is the equivalent to the will to act, and executive power is that which makes the desired action occur. The legislative power should be vested in the general will, and thus belongs always to the sovereign. However, the sovereign cannot maintain both legislative and executive power, so it requires an agent—the government—to manage the latter. Government is meant to fulfill three roles on behalf of the public force: unify the sovereign as to get it working in accordance with the directions of the general will, serve as a means of communication between the state and the sovereign, and bring about the actions to fulfill the general will.13

10. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter VI. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, Chapter I.

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Just as the individuals 13 of a sovereign collectively create a single sovereign, the members of government collectively create a single government. For Rousseau, the members of the government go by one of two names: kings or magistrates. For the purposes of this paper, these members will henceforth be called magistrates. Meanwhile, the entire body of magistrates is referred to as the prince. The magistrates are distinct from the master in that they are employed “as simple officials of the sovereign [that] exercise in its own name the power with which [the sovereign] has entrusted them.”14 Moreover, the sovereign can limit or modify the magistrate’s power however and whenever it pleases. Simply put, the magistrates form the government by the consent of the public and are charged with the legitimate exercise of executive power.

Now that the elements of a state are laid out, it is possible to explain the different possible forms of government. The shape a government takes is wholly dependent on the number of individuals constituting the prince. A single magistrate creates a monarchy; a number of magistrates less than half of the sovereign’s size, but more than one, is an aristocracy; and a number of magistrates between half to the complete size of the sovereign, is a democracy. Rousseau gives both a descriptive and prescriptive account of government formations. The form a government actually takes and the form a government ought to take are two different matters.

Though the ratio of magistrates to sovereign determines the actual form of a government, Rousseau does not believe any single form is suitable for every set of circumstances. A state’s size determines the form of government it ought to utilize. As a people continues to grow in numbers, the ratio between the individual citizen and the sovereign widens. If a sovereign consists of 100 members, then the single citizen holds one-hundredth of the sovereign authority. If the sovereign grows to 10,000 members, then the single citizen holds one-ten-thousandth of the sovereign power with no less subjection to it than before. It follows that “the larger the state becomes, the less liberty there is” for the individual, and the more private wills and the general will become unaligned.15 So that the balance can be maintained as the gap between these two wills widens, the executive power needs more repressive force. Rousseau boils this relationship down to a basic principle: “in order to be good, the government must be relatively stronger in proportion as the populace is more numerous. . . For often the government that is best in itself will become the most vicious, if its relationships are not altered according to the defects of the body

14. Ibid. 15. Ibid.

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politic to which it belongs.”16 In other words, as a state 16 expands, its number of magistrates should shrink. The ultimate logical conclusion is that, as the state grows continuously, its government’s final form is embodied in the single monarch.

Peculiarly, against the logic of Rousseau, many large states of the modern world are not monarchies. In fact, they are a variation of what Rousseau would claim is the worst form of government given their size: democracy. Even though the United States is a democracy, it is far from true democracy as Rousseau envisioned it. In a true democracy, the government is the sovereign and each citizen is a magistrate. Everyone has a say in the general will, which is now synonymous with the corporate will.17 Rousseau believed that a democracy could only function under a certain set of circumstances. All, as will see, are not present in nations such as the United States, which makes the modern democratic state even of more an anomaly in Rousseau’s eyes. First, the democratic state must be small enough for citizens to easily gather together and for all to know all. Second, social customs must be so simple so that the prince is not caught up in contentious or derisive discussions. Third, there must be equality among citizens so there is an equal exercise of sovereign/corporate authority for each member. Lastly, there can be no luxury, since the existence of luxury mandates the existence of wealth, which classifies and fragments society.18 If democracy is practiced by us inherently flawed humans, and without the four societal requirements, it will fall prey to the first vulnerability of fixed democracy: inconsistency. Rousseau maintains “no government is so subject to civil wars and internal agitations as a democratic or popular one, since there is none that tends so forcefully and continuously to change.”19 A democracy is subject to the whims 19 of the citizens, who, in their mortal imperfection, are liable to conflate the corporate will with their private ones. The direction prescribed by the legislative power, and now enacted by that same entity since it is also the executive power, changes erratically and for individualistic advantages.20 While some efforts may be made by the general will, there is too much space for private wills to dominate the body wielding executive power. If a democracy becomes ‘fixed’ and refuses to evolve and

16. Ibid. 17. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, Chapter IV. 18. Ibid. 19. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, Chapter IV. Emphasis added. 20. When discussing the founding of Rome, Rousseau describes democracy as “a form of government that is always uncertain and adrift” Book III, Chapter X.

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thus limit the number of magistrates in proportion to the number of citizens, the problem worsens. The viciousness of human beings will infiltrate and destroy the state through its own government.

Inconsistency is particularly prominent in any democratic government, and therefore increasingly threatens the democracy fixed in form but growing in size. However, the second issue of these governments is not unique to them alone but applies to every fixed government. Rousseau never explicitly cites slowness to act as a state’s downfall but does think it symptomatic of a poorly functioning government. Despite this, there are several points in the Social Contract that bring me to establishing slowness as a primary weakness of fixed democracies. When discussing the inverse correlation of magistrates to sovereign size, Rousseau claims “It is also certain that the execution of public business becomes slower in proportion as more people are charged with the responsibility for it.”21 The more voices there are in government, the more opinions must be heard before a decision is made, the longer the bureaucratic process is drawn out, and the slower the executive power can act on the general will. When discussing democracy, Rousseau considers dividing the government into branches or “tribunals”. He lays down “as a principle” that when the functions of a government are split, the tribunal with the fewest members will eventually gain the greatest authority, only because of its natural ability to “expedite public business” the best.22 It is a natural consequence of having fewer people in power that power is exercised more quickly. If a government continues to grow but refuses to adjust its number of magistrates accordingly, it will become inert, acting on legislative power more and more slowly.

A simple look at the democratic governments of today reveals them to be fixed democracies. They do not continue to exist because the two vulnerabilities of fixed democracy are gone, but because their severity has been eased by the institutions’ unique structure. By designing its government as a representative democracy, the United States has artificially constrained the number of magistrates while still preserving the political power of each franchised citizen. Representation simply introduced an extra, mediating level in the government’s system. Rather than having each citizen serve as a magistrate, citizens have the power of electing a

21. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, Chapter II. 22. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, Chapter IV.

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representative to act on their behalf in their legislative power, or Congress. America’s population of 331 million has effectively been transformed into 535. This is not an aristocracy — a group of magistrates less than a majority of the sovereign — but still a democracy because the 535 members essentially are the 331 million citizens, not the legitimate leaders of them. Representation in the legislative power has decreased the number of voices in the assembly and ameliorated the two weaknesses of fixed democracies to a reasonable degree. Inconsistency still exists in the institution but to a far lesser extent expected of Rousseau’s democracies. Moreover, Congressmen and women are dependent on their constituents to remain in power, and so orient their private wills toward satisfying the general will; this intention may be skewed, but the effect is still the same. This government is still slower to act than one consisting of fewer magistrates, but considerably quicker than if the entire sovereign weighed in. Prior to globalization, the remaining burdens of the two weaknesses have been within an acceptable range to allow for the perpetuation of representative democracies.23 However, it appears that the pressures created by a globalized world are drawing out and dangerously testing these shortcomings of fixed democracies.

Pan-national threats and interconnected problems strike at the remaining trends of inconsistency in nations such as the United States. Inconsistency becomes a serious issue when considering the partnerships of the United State. Recently, President Donald Trump’s principle of ‘America First’ prioritized the safety of the United States far beyond that of its allies, and, according to Dr. Richard Haass, “Alliances depend on treating the security of others as seriously as one’s own.”24 This drove the United States to withdraw 24 from multiple treaties and organizations that were ultimately premised on common safety (e.g., the Paris Accords, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the UN Human Rights Council, etc.). Trump’s behavior toward American allies deviated greatly from previous cycles of the democratic state, giving the impression that the United States could turn on its commitments in the span of a mere four years. What is more, just as America stopped honoring its allies’ safety, they will stop ensuring the United States’. These doubts become especially dangerous given the volatility of modern-day affairs. Many of the prob-

23. Rousseau does consider the possibility of representative governments in The Social Contract, but deplores them as a practice: “Once public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizens, and they prefer to serve with their wallet rather than with their person, the state is already near its ruin”. The metonymy of a wallet refers to citizens hiring representatives to advocate for them in the sovereign. Once representative government begins in a state, Rousseau believes that state is consider lost. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, Chapter XV. 24. Haass, World Order 2.0, 5.

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lems threatening civil societies today, such as pollution or global health, can only be resolved via international cooperation. The creation and widespread availability of instantaneous communication technologies and doomsday WMDs make reliability among allies invaluable. On this account, representative democracy—and by extension, the entities that practice it—may be seen as too unpredictable to provide reliable safety any longer. This inevitably forces them to overcome pan-national threats or interconnected problems alone, which, by the very nature of these issues, is impossible to do.

Though the inconsistency of democracy is serious, its slowness to act in the face of unexpected crises is, in my opinion, the bigger worry. The voices within the United States legislature are still so numerous with power so diffuse that the organization becomes paralyzed when met with unexpected and contentious problems. The desire of the sovereign is debated through its representatives prior to any action being taken. This causes immediate responses to be rare and sufficient action to be tardy; greatly lowering the chances of any executive act being both swift and efficient. Acting quickly is characteristic of fewer power sources and is necessary to meet the dangers of a globalized world. This assessment is given credence by the COVID-19 pandemic. While the Chinese Communist Party was able to organize and handle the crisis quickly, America was slow to respond due to partisan struggles. For the United States, this resulted in serious human and economic damages. If the state were to repeatedly suffer damages equivalent to these, its eventual fall is likely. Rather than regarding COVID-19 as a once-in-a-lifetime event, modern nations ought to regard it as representative of the type of problems they will face in the coming years. Globalization allows for unexpected crises to occur much more quickly and at a much higher rate than ever before. The situation requires states to establish governments capable of swiftly responding to these crises and minimizing their damages. However, it seems that the nature of fixed representative democracy does not allow for such expedited decisions, and casts a shadow of doubt on this governance style for the modern, globalized world. At this point, it does well to return to the basic principle of civil societies. Every legitimate government must preserve individual liberty and the security of property in an effort to allow citizens to satisfy the first law of humankind’s nature. If a fixed democracy were to succumb to its weaknesses, it would fail to exist and thus obviously fail to fulfill its intended purpose. Now that globalization has rendered inconsistency and slowness to act detrimental to fixed representative democracies, something must be done to protect the interests of their citizens from future twenty-first-century threats.

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If a state is suffering from its legislative power’s inconsistency, Rousseau would claim that the problem lies in its size being incompatible with its governance style. Though a representative democracy artificially shrinks the size of the sovereign, the fact that it remains a democracy alone predisposes it to inconsistency. In response to this, Rousseau’s philosophy bites the proverbial bullet and calls for a true restriction in the number of magistrates, rather than a symbolic one. To find consistency, there must be a shift away from democracy toward either aristocracy or monarchy. Though Rousseau does not provide a set threshold for a state transforming from an aristocracy to a monarchy, given the enormous size of the United States of America’s sovereign, the shift would likely be toward monarchy in Rousseau’s mind—this is barring any of Rousseau’s complaints against representative governments in general.25

Decreasing the number of magistrates in proportion to the state’s size would similarly resolve the slowness of state action. Tardiness is simply the result of too many decision-makers within the prince. Evolving the government toward a monarchy eventually decreases the number of magistrates to one. With these changes, not only is the behavior of the legislative power more consistent but also swifter and better at managing unexpected crises. Though this seems like the obvious answer (and certainly the one Rousseau gives), I believe there is an alternative. The United States could elect to maintain a representative democracy but further restrict the number of its representatives in Congress. Once the legislative power is transferred to a smaller set of representation, it is again possible for the state to move quickly. For Rousseau, this would be the equivalent of putting a band-aid on a

25. In actuality, prior to addressing the 25 problems of fixed democracy, Rousseau would criticize the United States for utilizing a representative form of government. The legislative power must always represent the general will, which itself is not capable of being truly represented. Oddly enough, to resolve this Rousseau advocates for introducing slavery into the state. He maintains that, if the citizens of a state had slaves, then they would be freed from quotidian tasks and could participate in the legislative power: “There are some unfortunate circumstances where one’s liberty can be preserved only at the expense of someone else’s, and where the citizen can be perfectly free only if the slave is completely enslaved. . . As for you, modern peoples, you do not have slaves, but you yourselves are slaves. You pay for their liberty with your own. It is in vain that you crow about that preference. I find more cowardice in it than humanity.” Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book III, Chapter XV.

Earlier in The Social Contract, Rousseau states that, just as it is within the nature of a man to die, it is within the nature of all states to fall. The state, like everything else, yields to entropy. It “begins to die from the very moment of its birth, and carries within itself the causes of its destruction.” With this in mind, there is another implicit decision that Rousseau believes our current states could make before utilizing slavery. The people may adamantly adhere to their mores, and allow their representative states to pass away in order to secure the higher ordered value of not utilizing slavery.

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fatal wound (see footnote 24) and would fail to adequately resolve the problem of America’s form of government. Nevertheless, it is a possible method of speeding up the government’s reaction to crises in the twenty-first century thus diminishing the damages later globalized threats may cause.

When a democratic-type government is faced with growth such that Rousseau’s model would suggest transformation, refusal to evolve will naturally lead to two negative consequences. These are, what I call, the two vulnerabilities of fixed democracy. The first is inconsistency, and the second is slowness to act. States utilizing a system of fixed representative democracy have discovered how to mitigate the two associated weaknesses in such a way that allows for their governments to remain the same despite state growth. The issues of inconsistency and slowness have been reduced to a point where Rousseau’s initial concerns are no longer fatal to the democratic governments of today. However, the issues are not eliminated; they simply exist in an era that makes allowance for them. Unfortunately, this is a period of human history that is steadily coming to an end and being replaced by one that puts crippling amounts of pressure on the soft spots of fixed representative democracy.

Globalization combined with advances in technology has created an unprecedented global state of precarity. With the increasing severity of pan-national threats, interconnected problems, and unexpected crises inconsistency and slowness are no longer merely inconvenient to the fixed democratic state, but detrimental to it. On one hand, inconsistency naturally leads to distrust among nations. When multilateral commitments can be made in one phase of a democratic state only to be overturned in another, pan-national threats and interconnected problems become impossible to manage. On the other hand, slowness to act proves to be ruinous in the face of unexpected crises, which are characteristic of the current international environment.

This paper is not meant to completely resolve the issues of fixed representative democracy in the globalized world, but to provide an analysis of the problems surrounding it. By understanding Rousseau’s theory of civil society and applying it to modern nation-states, we are able to better understand the basic structures of the current Western order. Though Rousseau does not attempt to explicitly address these issues himself, his Social Contract can still be used to draw out the essential

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elements of fixed representative democracy and uncover its underlying weaknesses. Clear contemplation of their deeper, underlying flaws allows for us to address the true problems of these governments rather than hyper-focusing on their particular manifestations. All of this is done in an effort to prepare for the problems civil societies are bound to face in the near future. With this understanding, we can discover how current forms of government can best be manipulated to adequately address those threats while preserving their original function of maintaining human freedom.