19 minute read
LESSONS FROM UKRAINE Page
LESSONS FROM UKRAINE
The war in Ukraine has been a test bed for many new weapon systems and concepts.
Advertisement
Maj. Gen. Moni Chandi is the CSO at Synergia Foundation & a former Inspector General of the elite National Security Guard.
It is quite challenging to understand the ‘Future of Warfare‘ because while factors like International Relations, Geopolitics, and Geo-Economics build the environment for conflict, the actual prosecution of the war is dictated by National Security, Technology, and the Art of War. The Ukraine war has made this exercise much easier as many insights are available from the conflict zone..
At the war’s commencement, Ukraine and Russia had a similar inventory of Soviet-era weapons. However, as the war progressed, 31 nations of the Western Alliance, led by the The U.S. provided a wide range of weapons & equipment to Ukraine. From a technology- demonstration point of view, the Ukraine War provided a live test bed to arms manufacturers. Leading arms manufacturers from the Western Alliance have used the opportunity to demonstrate & field test a wide range of weapons, equipment, and technologies.
LESSONS AT THE GEOPOLITICAL LEVEL
Space for Conventional War under Nuclear Overhang. After the bombing of Hiroshima Nagasaki in 1945, there was abundant caution for nuclear powers engaging in a conventional war that could trigger a nuclear exchange. However, in 1999, during the Kargil operations, India & Pakistan, both nuclear powers, engaged in an intense border skirmish. The Kargil War, as we refer to it, demonstrated there was geo-political space below the nuclear threshold for nuclear powers to engage in conventional wars. That lesson seems to have come home to roost in Ukraine. Seven months into the conflict, Russia, a superpower, is being bled into a conventional war by Ukraine, logistically supported by 31 Western nations. The lesson here is while aggressive superpowers may hope for quick, decisive victories, smaller nation-states can bleed them in prolonged conflict, provided they can absorb the initial shock & awe and continue to receive the backing of their citizens and war material from abroad.
Propaganda War. Propaganda is a legitimate tool of war. It is normally used to raise the morale of the home side and lower the morale of adversaries. In the Ukraine War, both Russians & Americans devoted considerable resources to building narratives and influencing public opinion. The U.S. did a much better job than the Russians in the propaganda war. The way European public opinion was molded to muster support for the economic sanctions against Russia despite the economic pain was impressive. In the Information Age and particularly in democratic societies, it is important to build control a public narrative that supports the war effort.
Nations must be prepared for the entire spectrum of conflict. No nation, however rich, has enough resources to create different kinds of forces to meet all threats; hence be adaptable and versatile in your force structures, equipping and training so that you can best adapt to what the fog of war throws at you ultimately.
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LESSONS
Cyber Warfare. At the war’s commencement, Russia successfully knocked out Ukraine’s internet & communications systems. Russia was also able to hack & disable the US
VIASAT, which provided commercial communications to Ukraine. Russia also carried out attacks on government websites utility services (banks & power). However, within weeks, with international support, Ukraine was able to restore Internet, communications, and services. More significantly, Space X’s Starlink restored full Internet coverage over the whole country. Internet coverage in Ukraine, in addition to civil communication, has also been used for military applications.
The lesson here is while offensive cyber operations could be initially successful, cyber systems will NOT only be restored but Internet-based military applications for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and artillery control can also be developed quickly. Drones. If Vietnam is remembered as the first televised war, the Russo-Ukraine war may be remembered as the first war where both adversaries avidly used drones. In 2016, during the annexation of Crimea, Russia used a wide range of drones to support their land invasion (Zala KYB, Eleron-35, Orlan-10, Kronshtadt Orion).
However, in 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces contested the Russian invasion with a range of homegrown drones to thwart Russian progress. Three drones have performed well: the Turkey-supplied BAYRAKTAR TB-2 medium-range long endurance (MALE), which carries four weapon pods, and Ukraine’s indigenous A-1 SM Furia and Leleka-100 drones, which were used for aerial reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment.
Loiter or Kamikaze Ammunition. An important variation of drones is Loiter munitions, which fired over a target area to loiter over the space (30-60 minutes), to acquire a target, and then execute the kill by flying into the target. Both Russia and Ukraine used a variety of loitering munitions. While Ukraine had its own indigenously developed munitions (RAM II and ST- 35 Silent Thunder), they were also beneficiaries of a variety of loitering munitions from other countries, including the U.S. produced, Switchblade (AeroVironment) and Phoenix Ghost (Aevex Aerospace). Loiter munitions will have a fundamental impact on the future battlefield. Firstly, by attacking the relatively vulnerable top of the vehicle, it questions the the primacy of the tank on the battlefield; secondly, mechanized advances, the primary component of offensive-maneuver will now have to find practical means to counter the new threat; and thirdly, loiter munitions will accentuate the non-linear threat of the future battle, by making assets otherwise distant from the front lines like AD weapons sites, logistic hubs, communications centers, and tactical HQs, increasingly vulnerable, to precision attacks.
MANPADS in the TBA. MANPADS (Man Portable AD Systems) are surface-to-air missiles designed to be carried and fired by a single soldier. STINGER MANPADS (produced by Raytheon, US) was used with effect by the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and substantially dented the Soviet control of the airspace. Ukraine has received significant quantities of the more contemporary, US-manufactured FIM-92 STINGER, the Thales-manufactured STARStreak and the South Korean-manufactured CHIRON KP-SAM Shinguang. The proliferation of MANPADS in Ukraine severely impeded Russia’s helicopter operations in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) as well as close air support operations by fixed-wing aircraft at altitudes below 4.5 Km.
Long Range Precision Fires. There has been much publicity about the M-142 HIMARS (Lockheed Martin) rocket-missile system, with a range of 80-300 Km. The qualitative improvement of this weapon system is that it is capable of firing either multiple (6) unguided rockets over limited ranges (80 Km) or a single guided missile over extended ranges (300 Km). With its precision
accuracy and enhanced range, this weapon system is believed to have been used for attacks inside the Crimean Peninsula, namely the Saki Air Base, the ammunition facility at Mayskoye and Kersh Bridge. Long-range precision fires further accentuate the non-linear nature of future battlefields. The tactical battle area in Ukraine extends 300 Km from the front lines, and all assets in the TBA are fair game.
SHOULD INDIA BE WORRIED?
India has always maintained that even when both adversaries are nuclear-armed, there is scope for the conduct of conventional war. This has been practised by both India and Pakistan in some form or other since the Kargil war of 1999. However, both sides have taken special measures to calibrate the escalatory ladder so as not to cross red lines.
This underscores the efforts of the Indian military to maintain a significant conventional deterrent for a two-front conflict, despite the high cost involved. However, the level of conventional weaponry needs to be constantly upgraded to match global standards, preferably through indigenous efforts.
Offensive cyber capacities are attractive, but their effects may only be transitory in a full-scale war. Also, with the advent of small & microsatellites, Internet capacities can be rebuilt even enhanced within days. Both these aspects need to be attended to urgently in the Indian context.
Drones are a game-changer in a conventional war. Loiter munitions will challenge 3rd Generation warfare, which advocates manoeuvring on the battlefield with mechanised forces. The Indian military is investing in upgrading its drone capability, including swarms and kamikaze drones, with the help of the private sector, especially startups. However, a great deal of ground has to be covered as the Indian armed forces have very little experience in the combat employment of drones in significant numbers offensively, whether conventionally or in counter-terror opera- tions.
The proliferation of MANPADS, which require low-level skills (and can be fired by a civilian), has transformed the airspace over the TBA. Helicopter operations and Close Air Support below 4.5 Km altitude need to be reworked for the new hostile environment. Even the most modern air forces have no answer to this threat except resorting to stand-off attacks using precision ammunition. Indian military aviation is fully sensitive to this threat and would be evolving suitable tactics to combat them.
Precision long-range fires delivered by guided missiles will be a strong characteristic of future warfare. AGNI, PRITHVI, and BRAHMOS are commendable indigenous efforts, but more improvements are needed for adequate quantities and targeting qualities. Longrange fires are effective only if married to a sophisticated satellite-supported Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) system. We need to develop cyber capacities to creatively manipulate public opinion of domestic, international and target audiences so that our national interests receive the appreciation they deserve.
INDIA’S ATMANIRBHAR (SELF-RELIANT) FOCUS
India India has been placing great importance on developing indigenous capability in the Defence Sector. However, given lessons drawn from Ukraine, certain focus areas must be prioritised for the Atmanirbhar drive.
Counter-Drone Warfare. While drones continued to hold sway in the Ukrainian Battlefield, what was missing, was a viable counter to them. It does not make sense to use a high-cost surface-to-air missile, say the S-400 missile (costing millions of dollars), to neutralise a comparatively low-cost drone threat. Indian Armed forces need a reliable (accurate) shoulder-fired ‘drone-killer’ that can shoot down drones at ranges of up to 4 Km. Even better, a man-portable jammer, that can jam the drones’ command telemetry would be ideal.
Space-based SATA. SATA is a military acronym for Surveillance and Target Acquisition. The architecture of future defensive systems should be based on three parameters. Firstly, real- time monitoring threats to our land & maritime borders from space. Secondly, target analysis allocation of weapon systems is done from a secure location, well-removed from the battlefield. And thirdly, the target is engaged with a precision-guided munition at stand-off distances from the battlefield.
Counter to MANPADS. Unless we find a counter to MANPADS, the primacy of the tank on the battlefield and the ability of mechanized formations to lead advanced operations will stand undermined. Even artillery assets deployed in the depth areas will remain highly exposed to drone attacks. Long Range Precision Fires. Long-range precision fires are key to the future of warfare. This is called the stand-off battle in military parlance, and precision fires from some weapon systems have reached
LT. GEN. ASIT MISTRY PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd) is that Director of School of Internal Security, Defence and Strategic Studies at the Rashtriya Raksha University.
DEBUNKING SOME MYTHS
We are still too close to the war in Ukraine to arrive at conclusive deductions about weapon systems and doctrines. TV imagery flashed on our home screens can be delusionary and make us draw lessons without authenticated objective data or unbiased analysis. To see tanks being blown up by precision strikes and deduce that the armoured fighting vehicle era is gone is perhaps a bit premature.
All military technology has an evolutionary cycle, which stands true for the tank. Right from the first world war, where the tanks first came onto the battlefield, there is a continuous competition between tanks and anti-tank. And when a particular technology to defeat the protection levels in the armour is found, tank protection is upgraded, mobility is enhanced, and thus, survival levels go up.
Going back to the 1973 Yom Kippur war, anti-tank guided missiles made their maiden appearance on the battlefield producing a devastating effect when used in swarms. Back then, the end of the tank had been predicted, but that didn’t happen.
Tank designers came up with compound armour, and the modern tank endured. When the side and the frontal armour became too strong, anti-tank munitions were designed for a top-attack profile. It can be assumed that some years down the line, tanks will adapt to the new battle environment. Work is already on hand.
The same theory can be applied to drones (now so much in the news as the ultimate weapon) and their counters. This cyclic process of the law, a new technology emerging and creating a disproportionate effect till something counter to it is discovered or invented, is a continuous process. So, while drones today may swarm targets in numbers too large to be neutralised or utilised in different configurations, from the ISR versions to command drones and the kamikazes, their counters will soon make appearances on the battlefields. These will not be million-dollar missiles but something far more affordable, matching the drones dollar to dollar.
This kind of race is a continuous evolution in warfare. Therefore, it would be premature to assume the extinction of a particular type of weapon system that has withstood the test of time and the rigours of the battlefield.
Information Warfare is another segment that merits closer attention, especially in the context of the Ukraine war, where there are two very stark examples. One side is trying to dominate the information space with a massive bombardment of information through social media, Internet TV etc. The other side, in contrast, is hardly saying anything domestically or externally. Ukraine has certainly managed to sustain its national morale through its information warfare efforts and ensured that western support does not falter.
However, the West had predicted that an increasing number of body bags arriving in Russia would sap the national morale; the ground-level support for the ‘special military operation’ shows no sign of lagging after almost eight long months despite the sheer absence of a propaganda blitz by the Kremlin.
It almost appears that Mr Putin pays little importance to such modern gimmicks, despite being bombarded by slickly produced visual productions predicting the demise of the Russian army in the morass of Ukraine. So, what is the lesson that policymakers draw from these two examples?
Undoubtedly, there are some clear lessons. To support your propaganda war, you need to have a narrative, but you must also create something on the ground so that the narrative is credible. All sides, including the larger world, have means to get transparency, and fake news can be unmasked.
Dedicated portals make a living doing fact checks and can effectively separate the chaff from the wheat. Furthermore, the narrative must have an objective purpose to influence the behaviour or shape the perception, both internally and externally. In open democratic societies, blocking information is difficult, but this flood of information itself sometimes becomes a problem.
Therefore, the lesson is to build a credible narrative that is not built on silos but can relate to the actual ground situation.High-tech precision strikes and longrange weapons with immense destructive power have a place on the battlefield (and are most popular on YouTube).
Still, they cannot substitute for the physical closing in, and the ultimate capture of the objective done in a manner that has not changed for centuries. The Ukrainian counter-offensive shows that an army that cannot hold on to captured ground despite all its modern arsenal is hardly worth its salt.
We are still in the midst of the conflict in Ukraine, and it may be too premature to decide conclusively on the effectiveness, or otherwise, of certain weapons systems and warfighting principles. Ukraine may not necessarily be a template that can be applied globally to all conflicts.The conclusion could be to be prepared for the entire spectrum of conflict.
No nation, however rich, has enough resources to create different kinds of forces to meet all threats; hence be adaptable and versatile in your force structures, equipping and training so that you can best adapt to what the fog of war throws at you ultimately.
OUTER SPACE AS A KEY CONFLICT DOMAIN
Air Marshal Rajiv Dayal Mathur, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC is a former officer in the Indian Air Force. He was the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C), Eastern Air Command from 1 March 2019 to 30 September 2020.
Space, not surprisingly, is highly congested, with over 6,400 satellites in orbit. They’re almost 50,000 pieces of space debris of measurable size, i.e., ten cm plus. Space has become a part of our lives-GPS, weather bulletins, DTH TV and now satellite broadband being provided by market leader Starlink even in war-torn Ukraine. At present more than 80 countries have space launch programmes.
TRANSFORMATIONS IN SPACE
Communication satellites have evolved over the last decade. Earlier, they used to be primarily in geostationary earth orbit but now have been moved to low earth orbit because of the lower latency and better revisit frequency. Many positioning constellations beside the GPS are being deployed in space.
While the majority are operated by the U.S, Russia, China, the European Space Agency, Japan and India have also joined the club. The private sector has emerged as a major player, especially since 2009. SpaceEx is already a household brand and global private investment in space exceeds USD 25 million. tions. These are cheap to manufacture and launch and being power efficient, last longer in orbit. Space X is developing reusable launch vehicles which will further bring down cost per launch. Space tourism is growing despite the astronomical costs.
It’s expected that the space industry could become a trillion-dollar industry in the next two decades. There have been technological improvements as well, which have improved satellite communications. Satellite applications will become more secure because LASER technology enables higher data rates. Also, remote sensing solutions are improving daily for electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar. Today, it’s commonplace to see 40 cm resolution; soon it could come down to 10 cm.
CONFLICT POINTS IN SPACE
Satellite servicing vehicles are a concept already under consideration by the European Space Association, which would be used to refurbish, replenish, refuel and move satellites that have come down into a lower orbit and re-boost them into higher orbits. Counterpoint Transportation over the surface of the Earth over large distances is a concept that SpaceX is looking at.
Space mining of asteroids and the Moon for rare earth metals, as well as iron, nickel and cobalt, is being planned. This, too, would create possible friction points for future conflicts of interest.Active debris removal missions are al-
ready in the pipeline. Of course, this was being done by the space shuttle earlier but at a much smaller scale. Now the intent is the removal of excess debris in scale, through autonomous robotic removal in the lower orbits.
Space has always been considered the ultimate high ground and has been militarily active but perhaps more covertly. Space military activities now include proximity operations with space-based lasers as anti-ballistic missile weapons or against surface weapons/ targets. There are also military programmes that include kinetic anti-satellite weapons.
Most armed forces have reorganised their military formations to cater for space operations like the U.S. Space Forces and Unified Space Command. Russia and China are likely to follow suit soon. India has raised the Defence Space Agency which is predicted to turn into the Indian Space Command one day.
Space networks are vital for a nation’s economic growth and military potential. Satellites, as we’ve seen, have predictable orbits, and they work on congested channels and can be tracked. Therefore, they are vulnerable as targets. Space assets have long been used to support activities on Earth-remote sensing, ISR, ballistic missile tracking and for command and control of all operations in all domains.
Most space technologies are dual use; GPS is used for navigation on the ground, air and sea, and at the same time for precision weapon targeting. Space-derived services, be it telecommunications, navigation, or weather forecasting, could be interrupted, and this interruption could, even if unintentional, lead to conflict. Spacebased systems have become a major target because they affect a nation’s economic and military potential. There are also certain key orbital slots in space.
These are called LaGrange points which are points of relative stability where satellites can be parked for prolonged periods. But these are limited in number, and, therefore, a potential cause for conflict between nations vying for them.
Space dominance requires space situational awareness, a field in which the U.S dominates. There is a general sense that if there was greater transparency in orbital activities, it would lead to more equitable utilisation of resources and fewer chances of a conflict.
However, while technology has grown exponentially, regulations have not been able to keep pace. Therefore, there is a need for new regulations where we have many more private sectors as part of the agreement process so that agreements reached are universally adhered to. A ban on the intentional destruction of satellites and other objects in orbit is an essential prerequisite to reduce space debris in orbit. Again, all nations need to get together to get through the congestion that is taking place right now, especially in low earth orbit, by facilitating active debris removal mechanisms.
The existing system has become outdated. There is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, Liability Convention, the Restriction Convention, and the Moon Treaty. All these date back to the Cold War era and do not address today’s problems in space. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) is tasked to review and foster international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space and to consider legal issues arising from exploring outer space. It currently has 95 members and convenes annually in Vienna and has legal and scientific departments. All that is agreed upon by this body is through consensus, which makes it almost impossible to address real hardcore issues.
What is needed is an organisation that perhaps addresses all the existing problems and caters to the future participation of private players on a much larger scale in all space operations, including space situational awareness, space travel management and space congestion and space debris. The competition in space is inexorably leaning towards conflict. And therefore, it’s essential to follow the rules of the road formulated through a new foundational space treaty. Achievement of global prosperity through space commerce could be the greatest incentive for nations to jointly keep outer space secure and peaceful.
