
33 minute read
FUTURE OF CONFLICT Page
FUTURE OF CONFLICT
The paradigm of Future conflicts will likely originate from four vectors, namely Counterterrorism, Grayzone conflicts, Asymmetric fights, and Unmanned combats.
Advertisement
Tobby Simon is the Founder and President of the Synergia Foundation and a member of the Trilateral Commission.
Critical Emerging technologies are changing the hieroglyphs of combat. Expeditious advances in unmanned systems, robotics, data processing, autonomy, networking, and other advanced technologies have the potential to give fresh impetus to an entirely new warfighting axiom. Both state and non-state actors will seek to profit from these new technologies, many of which are impelled by the market dictates of innovation in information technology.
The impending is replete with uncertainties, and any realisation of combat is an onerous task. Several vectors will shape conflicts, including geopolitical, societal, technological, economic, spatial, environmental and military trends.
In deliberating warfare, we often gravitate to prepare for the last war, think of using military concepts or technology that may be outdated or focus on previous battle-winning strategies, which are, or will soon be, outmoded. Both great and middle powers are investing not only in offensive capabilities but also in asymmetric warfare tools like cost-effective drones. It is possible to conceive that the military and civil societies might end up being the prime target in a future conflict.
A deeper understanding of the contours of future conflicts helps fundamentally align the interest of the buyer, the manufacturer, the strategist, and the vendor. It would not be in the interest of any of these stakeholders to plan or build inventories without visualising how the theatre of conflict will pan out in the coming years. When Synergia Foundation quizzed several vendors, buyers and policymakers on what they felt would be the future conflict in the region, few had good answers.
The understanding of the future of conflict helps fundamentally align the interest of the buyer, the manufacturer, the strategy picker, and the vendor.
LOOKING BEYOND THE CURVE
A few fundamental features of conflict will remain unchanged in the future.
First, conflict is, and will remain, an unprecise science; it will remain unpredictable and uniquely human activity. Second, the qualitative advantage can no longer be assumed in the future. Third, RMA or revolution in military affairs focused on concepts of rapid effect, leading to a belief in the late 20th and 21st century that major powers could define wars; this, too, might not hold in the future.
Fourth, adversaries will be able to achieve tactical success because of their access to cheaper technology, whose rate of adoption will be faster even by non-state actors and low-income countries. Fifth, the motives for engaging in conflicts have been described as the concept of pure honour and national interest; In the future, countries are likely to use military instruments for reasons of fear.
Sixth, the centrality of influence could be essential in the coming years. If the character of a nation’s military prowess were defined by its ability to conduct precision strikes on
enabled platforms and command modes, conflict outcomes would likely focus more on the centrality of influence in the future.
Our adversaries have already recognised the importance of influencing public perception and will continue to develop this and use it increasingly in a battle of the narrative. This is not just a matter of improved public affairs or perception. This takes place in a decentralised network and free market full of ideas, opinions, and even a set of raw data, which will immediately weaken the influence of mainstream news media.
Breaking events will be increasingly transmitted to individuals at an ever-higher tempo, often without government or editorial filters or legal sanctions and safeguards. Although propaganda is well-established and frequently demonstrated, modern technology will amplify its shock. Future conflicts will be primarily determined by ‘whose narrative wins.’
Seventh, technology affects how a force can fight and the credibility of that force to deter. However, the vanguard of technological development is shifting towards the commercial sector, which, typically, is more agile than the military it supports, and it is moving to the East. Eighth, the prime driver of innovation is not technology but people.
Ninth, Procurement programs that take decades may be obsolesced in an afternoon by new technological innovations. Tenth, the most significant military danger here is unplanned escalation. If satellites fail to communicate and operational personnel sitting in their underground command bunkers can’t be certain of ground realities, it would be extremely hard to calibrate the next move.
CONCLUSION
The future of conflict will challenge military forces structured and prepared for an industrial age war between global powers.
Conflict is evolving but is not getting simpler: the range of threats is expanding. Some seemingly inferior adversaries will be able to achieve tactical success because their access to alternative sources of technology will improve, their rate of adaptation will be faster, and the cost will be significantly lower.
The future of National Security shall be based on technological deterrence. The strength of the economy and military are both based on technological edge.
BRIG GEN R. MAZZOLIN (RETD)is the Chief Technology Strategist at the RHEA Group.
A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Space and cyber domains have emerged as the new strategic enablers for any nation aspiring for great power status and remain the key to national security for military and economic reasons. In the globalized world, there is competition between commercial interests and national interests. The Cold War between the U.S. and China reflects the same. Within this spectrum, there is a wide array of actors, both state and non-state with a variety of interests- economic, military and ideological.
SPACE AND CYBER LINKAGES
Societal dependence on networks results in an increased number and sophistication of attacks targeting critical infrastructure and institutions. Especially worrying is the asymmetric capabilities that are within reach of non-state actors and the hybrid nature of modern warfare. Cyber threats manifest themselves against space systems through Kinetic-Physical, Non-Kinetic Physical, Electronic, and purely Cyber, making their counters extremely complex to design and apply. This increases the aperture of access to space systems from both state and non-state actors, especially since, unlike other critical infrastructures (CI), space systems are not as well a protected environment.
THREATS TO SPACE INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY
The nascent space industrial base is increasingly important to national and global economies. It is particularly vulnerable to malevolent actors since the overall efforts to protect national capacity are not sufficiently integrated. Potential adversaries recognize the importance of assured space capabilities and thus would attack such capabilities with cyber and other means. Controlling key supply chains feeding space capabilities is even more important since these are now distributed over a large geographical area. Since space research represents an important segment of national security innovation bases, this, too, is endangered by multifaceted threats.
LT GEN PJS PANNU PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) is a former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff responsible for Integrated Military Operations.

AIR MARSHAL ANIL KHOSLA, is PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC who served as 42nd Vice Chief of the Air Staff
NEW DOMAINS: A REALITY
New Domains in the conduct of warfare have opened new vistas in the defence industry. Warfare being as old as mankind itself has evolved, just like the human race. This has been enabled by a regular dose of technological innovations. Being genetically a quarrelsome species, man has needed little cause or incentive to seek combat, be it for basic survival, for ego, or the greed for resources.
Man’s inquisitiveness has driven him to seek new domains to conduct the deadly game of war. It was a natural transition for warfighting to transcend from the terrestrial battlefield to air, to space, the oceans, and the depth of the oceans, and now even into ethereal cyberspace. AI, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and robotics, singly and in combination, are giving rise to unmanned platforms of various sizes and capabilities with the ability to operate in the air, surface, sea, and subsurface.
EMERGING DOMAINS
Space was seen as the new frontier for the betterment of mankind; a natural corollary being its militarisation by the few and the powerful ones.
Space is considered critical for communications, navigation, targeting, etc., and has tremendous potential for military applications. Space-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is a prerequisite for any military campaign, as is being showcased in Ukraine and other conflicts. Hypersonic weapons placed in orbiting platforms or transiting through space are the next-generation missiles coming online.
Not surprisingly, the counters to such space-based weapons are also being developed at a frenetic pace. The airpower of yesteryears is now upgrading itself to aerospace power.
Similarly, cyber, which influences every aspect of our lives, has been weaponized. Cyber warfare is conducted surreptitiously and continuously without the declaration of a state of war between nations. There are no frontiers nor recognizable combatants- a teenager with a powerful laptop can be an equally deadly adversary! Offensive cyber operations are characterized by ambiguity and deniability.
The lines are blurred in this kind of conflict, referred to as the grey zone operations. Their counter would require consistent monitoring of systems backed by AI, robust concepts, and standard operating procedures to safeguard assets. The difficulties associated with operating at great depths of the oceans had kept man’s war outside this domain. But now, things are changing as technology has given us the capacity to go deeper and stay longer at ever-increasing depths.
The vast resources of untapped natural wealth hidden in the depths of our oceans invest in deep-sea exploration technology worth the cost. Ocean depths act as conduits for the carriage of marine cables carrying internet signals, and data, as also, increasingly, gas pipelines transferring energy from one continent to another.
New platforms are being developed, both manned and unmanned, which can reveal the depths of secrets and help colonize the ocean beds for exploitation and military applications.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY
Unmanned platforms are needed to wage warfare in every domain- on land, air, sea, sub-surface, and space. In military aviation, the concept of a loyal wingman is gathering traction where the advantages of both manned and unmanned platforms are exploited.
Drones have established themselves as a dominating weapon system in all battle conditions, and the race is now on to find an effective antidote for them. Manned platforms are still relevant, and advanced nations are already looking at 6th and 7th -generation fighters that possess immense computing power and can operate in all the emerging domains.
In the modern networked battlefield, sensors play a vital role. Multi-domain sensors powered by AI to handle a large amount of data are now coming up for ISR. AI will have a role in almost all weapon systems, especially in network operations for data collection, analysis, planning, dissemination, and monitoring. Training is another area requiring integrated solutions of live, virtual, and simulated because physical on-ground training is becoming exorbitant.
Greater emphasis is being given to protective infrastructure for individual soldiers and the sophisticated systems and platforms from kinetic and hypersonic weapons and more lethal chemical, biological, and radiation weapons. All electronic systems must have military-grade hardening from EMP. Underlying all this development is the need to be self-reliant in the defence sector. R&D is important, and that too capable of continuous technology infusion as weapons systems become obsolete rapidly.
In a country like India which lacks a private-run military-industrial complex, there must be a fusion between the defence industry and the civil segment. Dual-use technology must be processed on parallel tracks so that its application in military and civil domains is seamless. This will also ensure better interoperability between the two sets of equipment.

SHRINKING BATTLESPACES
SYNERGIA FOUNDATION
RESEARCH TEAM
The outer space battlefield is no more science fiction and hypersonic anti-glide missile is harder to detect on radar than a ballistic missile. Today there is a clear connection between space and warfare. Watching the war unfold in Ukraine while sitting in your home on TV, beaming satellite/ drone imagery gives a clear sense of this linkage.
Space borne sensors make it impossible to hide. If the enemy is caught in the open, existing sensors can bring to bear long-range precision strikes at a moment’s notice. Technology has enabled the control of the three-dimensional battlespace in ways that were not possible, or even imaginable, a few years back. The implications of such a capability are clear in Ukraine, where fast-moving mechanized columns are being picked up and destroyed in detail as easily as in a video game. In terms of warfighting concepts, it has a profound impact, forcing warfare into ever- diminishing spaces..
One key implication is that if you can match long-range strikes and the ubiquitous sensors that can see everywhere, it forces opposing sides into close spaces. The best example of this was the operations jointly conducted by Iraq and its American allies to push ISIS out of northern Iraq. This was largely a battle for a series of cities and vast open spaces where western coalition airpower and, of course, space sensors could see and, with precision strike, pulverise anything in the open.
The only way that ISIS could equalise the battlefield was to withdraw into closed spaces. Only once in the closed spaces could they coalesce, form organised bodies, and then resist retaining control of the terrain. Pundits of strategy tend to predict the dominance of long-range strikes coupled with ubiquitous sensors and supported by operations in the electro-magnetic spectrum, in space and in cyberspace. These systems are being projected as networks with the power to link the optimal sensor to the optimal available effector to attack the optimal target for the optimal effect- a kind of ‘battlefield of internet of things’.
IMPACT ON THE MARITIME DOMAIN
The other implication is if you translate the idea to maritime spaces and given the emerging range and precision of land base strike and anti-ship weapons, the outcome could be equally disruptive. There is a potential now for landbased systems to strike out to a thousand kilometres at sea; potentially, you can exercise not just a denial but sea control from the land.
That becomes important because if once naval forces had the luxury of disappearing into the vastness of the open ocean and then reappearing in unexpected places, this cannot happen anymore. The land-based attacker with missiles has the advantage. Also, land-based missiles can be dispersed while the same cannot be done on a floating platform like a missile destroyer. Thus, we may be witnessing an advantage of the land domain over the maritime domain. This has significant consequences for a primarily land-based power like China.
manoeuvre to the sea and land battlefield, how do you get across these new ‘no man’s land’ or anti-access area denial bubbles? How do you move through those safely? If defence enjoys an edge over the offence, where does it place huge, expensive, and powerful platforms like nuclear-powered aircraft carrier groups that are the backbone of U.S. power projection capacity? Are their days over? Should we look for solutions to problems like the operational dilemma militaries faced along the Western Front in World War I to get over the frozen fronts and get through the crust of hardened defences into depth areas?
THE FUTURE OF CONVENTIONAL LAND FORCES
Pundits of strategy tend to predict the dominance of long-range strikes coupled with ubiquitous sensors and supported by operations in the electro-magnetic spectrum, in space, and cyberspace. These systems are being projected as networks with the power to link the optimal sensor to the optimally available effector to attack the optimal target for the optimal effect- a kind of ‘battlefield of internet of things’.
Defining the vision of future warfare as ‘neat, technical, distant and inhuman’ creates an impression that conventional warfare capability is made redundant. In some critics’ minds, there is little, or no role for forces designed for ground combat other than minor stabilization operations done in conjunction with the UN like the Solomon Islands and Timor, especially in the context of the Indo-Pacific. The question frequently being asked is why engage in close combat when you can simply destroy your enemy from a stand-off distance?
Five broad assumptions lead the experts to such a conclusion. These are first, the tendency to conflate battle and war. Second, the discussion about future wars is largely a context-free zone. The third is to overestimate the capacity of human imagination without giving credence to our inability to read the future accurately. Fourth, is to take a superficial view of the effect of new and emerging technologies on warfare. And fifth, making the geography of a particular area a restrictive factor for the development of conventional land forces, even if that force may at times be deployed in other geographies.
Let us not ignore the fact that technological advances in the 20th Century that were expected to diminish the importance or necessity of close combat did not do so. To that end, those like Julio Douhet and airpower theorists of the 20th Century who hoped that technology would preclude long and bloody wars in the future
Speedy and relatively bloodless victory in war through sophisticated targeting and long-range strikes is likely to prove just as elusive as all previous attempts at the same. New and emerging technologies might, like the technologies of the First World War, just as easily contribute to a new form of long and bloody wars of attrition.
As we have already discussed, missiles, sensors, and the other things we now call multi-domain capabilities - things like space, cyber and electronic warfare – dominate contemporary thinking about warfare, which is right, to a point. But it is not the whole picture. There has been too much focus worldwide on the systems themselves and their immediate and superficial consequences rather than how the combination of new technologies will affect warfare.
Long-range precision missiles, combined with advanced sensors, give the defender the potential to create killing zones with enormous depth encompassing the air, sea and land. We have seen in Eastern Ukraine and in Nagorno-Karabakh, how the density of modern sensors and strike systems might mean that in the future they could become resilient against long-range precision counter-strikes and other methods of neutralisation. Tactics that once allowed an attacker to maneuver in the face of fire and close with an enemy might become too expensive and uncertain to attempt.
There is a lot of discussion on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict where it is claimed that drones and precision munitions won the war for Azerbaijan. But there is another perspective to it; the precision strikes and real time intelligence from drones set the conditions for light infantry and special forces to physically clear the trench line and capture territories.
A lodgement on a shore protected by an enemy armed with a sophisticated ‘kill web’ might be all but impossible without incurring decisive losses of people and machines. So, if this new-age strike complexes do favor the defender so decisively, perhaps the most difficult and important challenge is working out how to manoeuvre in the face of an adversary’s anti-access envelope. How to restore the balance in warfare between the defender and the attacker back to a more neutral setting? One way, of course, is to seize the initiative and hold the key terrain from the outset. The future for manoeuvre forces looks a lot like small infantry/ tank teams operating in intimate cooperation.
One key implication is that if you can match long-range strikes and the ubiquitous sensors that can see everywhere, it forces opposing sides into close spaces. If you translate the idea to maritime spaces and given the emerging range and precision of land base strike and anti-ship weapons, the outcome could be equally disruptive.
MAJOR GENERAL CHRIS SMITH is the Deputy Commanding General in the U.S. Army Pacific Command located in Hawaii. He has earlier served as the Director General of Operations of the Australian army.




INDIA & NEW WARFARE DOMAINS
Future conflicts will occur in outer space, the deep ocean and the cyber world, with technology driving the change.
Air Marshal Anil Chopra, PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM is a retired Indian Air Force retired officer and former Administrative Member of the Regional Bench of the Armed Forces Tribunal at Lucknow. Air and space will be the primary means of prosecuting wars in the 21st century. For many decades, one who controls air and space controls this planet.
Outer space holds out the promise of resources and vantage points, while hidden, uncharted natural resources lie in the depths of the ocean. The cyber-world is a parallel universe where all action takes place at the speed of light with near-instant effects on our world. Combined or standalone, all three domains have economic, geopolitical, and military linkages. Indian security calculus must consider the vast technological changes that are taking place almost daily in all these domains.
AEROSPACE & INDIA
Air and space will be the primary means of prosecuting wars in the 21st century. Space will support situational awareness, communication, navigation, and targeting, and the the dominance of aerospace will be a war-winning factor.
The Indian space programme is almost as old as modern India, having been established as a research institution soon after independence. Acknowledging its importance, the Department of Space was placed directly under the Prime Minister’s office.
Consequently, today, India is one of the only six countries in the world with full launch capability and the ability to deploy cryogenic engines, launch extra-terrestrial missions and operate large fleets of satellites. As an upcoming space-launching entity, India has launched 346 satellites for 36 countries, with 114 for domestic use alone. The GSLV Mark III using a cryogenic engine can put 4000 kg in geostationary orbit and 8000 kg in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Although this pales before the Chinese Long March rocket that can take nearly four times or more of payload, it is still a significant achievement. More powerful rockets are under development.
An advanced space research group has been formed to give direction to space research. There is a well-developed network for space operations, tracking, and analysis called NETRA. It will help the country track intercontinental ballistic missiles, anti-satellite weapons, and possible spacebased attacks. Meanwhile, we are excitedly waiting for India's first human spaceflight and the Indian Space Station by the end of this decade.
The Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (NAVIG) currently has eight of the eleven satellites in place, and it covers all of China, Pakistan, and most of the Indian Ocean. The Global Indian Navigation System (GINS) with 24 satellites is a work in progress. Indian military satellites provide a reasonably good day and night picture resolution to serve the security needs of the defence services. In 2019, India became the fourth nation to carry out a successful an-
Space is fast getting crowded with satellites with over 3500 nano or cubeSATs that have been launched for scientific data, radio relay, networking, ISR, and other military applications. A small satellite constellation can be launched rapidly using less powerful launch vehicles to build constellations of 1000-plus satellites or nanosatellites. India joined the race last month by ferrying 36 satellites of New Space Indian Ltd in its LVM3-M2, the most powerful launch vehicle in its stable.
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY
Electric and nuclear propulsion for satellites and spacecraft is evolving, and plasma thrusters would cut down the spacecraft’s weight. Radio isotropic, thermoelectric generators, and atomic batteries to power the spacecraft are new action areas
India now has a significant number of private players and start-ups. The Defence Innovation The unit will help facilitate interaction between the armed forces and private industry. The Defence Space Agency based in Delhi will ultimately mature into a Space Command.
India needs more satellite launches for continuous coverage, faster revisit, and redundancy in its surveillance. There is a need to enhance jam-proof ISR elements and EW capability
India is wary of the Chinese space programme that is making rapid progress. China has more annual orbital launches than the U.S. and all Asian countries combined.
They placed a rover on Mars in 2021 and their Yaogan satellite templates allow the Chinese military to maintain constant surveillance across the South China Sea, Western Pacific, and Indian Ocean. The Chinese Global Navigation Satellite System is operational, and their Tiangong space station is coming up very quickly. Eyeing the trillion-dollar industry, resource-hungry China is rapidly developing technology for asteroid hunting.
ARCTIC CONTESTATIONS
The maritime domain includes the surface and yet unexplored ocean depths, resource-rich ocean beds, and undersea mountains. The bulk of international trade passes through the seas. Since the natural resources and manufactured goods are available in geo clusters,
Two areas are seeing increased international tension: the South China Sea, where China has usurped nearly 3 million sq. km of EEZ by creating or all claiming islands, and the Arctic region.
The Arctic covers over one-sixth of the earth’s land mass and is set to play an increasing role in shaping the course of world affairs. The still-less-explored region is rich in exploitable natural resources, especially gas, oil, and marine life. Global industrialization has raised the temperatures. Therefore, the glaciers are rapidly melting. The 2021 minimum sea ice extent was around4.7 to 4 million km², which is around a 1.6million km² lower than the long-term average.
The Arctic Sea ice reduction has been at a rate of around 13 percent per decade, which is very high. Some Arctic countries want to exploit the resources, especially oil and natural gas uncovered by the melting ice.

The melting ice is also creating more maritime routes. Normally they should be treated as natural waterways, but territorial claims may restrict open access. It could open a sea route in the northern parts of Canada, connecting the Pacific and the Arctic Ocean in the summer months.
It will certainly shorten some sea routes and reduce transportation costs. Both Russia and the United States have for long placed weapons, including nuclear weapons, in the Arctic region and have a significant surveillance system in the region.
With the West and Russia drawing into a fresh showdown, the once cooperative approach is tending to break down. China has become a significant player in the Arctic and is reportedly spending more on its
Arctic endeavors than even the U.S. It has been building military and other capabilities to defend its interest in the region and has an aggressive Arctic policy.
China plans a solar silk route through the Arctic to help expedite global shipping delivery. China considers itself a near-Arctic state and a major stakeholder. In 2018, Shanghai-based Cosco Shipping Corporation made eight transits through the Arctic between Europe and China.
Through the Arctic shipping route, the maritime shipping distance from Shanghai to Hamburg is around 7000km shorter than the southern route, which passes through the Malacca Straits and the Suez Canal.
India has a permanent Arctic research station in Norway. Since July 2008, India’s ONGC Videsh has been interested in investing in Russia’s Arctic liquefied natural gas projects.
Though the Arctic Sea route does not significantly reduce the sailing time for Indian shipping, the deep sea around the Arctic is rich in silver, gold, copper, manganese, cobalt, and zinc. The new robotics and AI solutions minimize environmental damage and improve the economics of extraction.
However, since deep-sea mining is a relatively new field, the complete consequences of full-scale mining operations on the ecosystems are still unknown. Some researchers claim that removing parts of the sea floor will result in disturbances to the benthic layer and increase the toxicity of the water column.
Assessment
Space, the open ocean, and the cyber are always considered global property for free usage. However, the militarization of space, arbitrary claims and control over open seas, serious offensive action, and cyber threats have muddied the water.
It requires coordinated rule-based international action to rectify the situation. Appropriate treaties need to be reworked and implemented based on natural justice and not on might is right. For this, the UN and the International Courts must be given greater power and teeth. COLONEL BALJINDER SINGH, is director of Aerospace and Defence of the United States-India Strategic Partnership Board. He served for 29 years as a soldier-engineer in the Indian Army in various terrains.
Space and Cyber domains present opportunities to field formidable new instruments for attaining power parity among nations. Unfortunately, space is accessible to only very few countries. The space capabilities of countries vary; the U.S. and Japan have been into it for a considerably long period and have already gained a lead by creating National Space Forces; Russia, China and, lately, India has a demonstrated anti-satellite capacity in space.
In the 19th Century and the early part of the 20th Century, sea powers ruled not only the waves but also the continental world. Even today, deep oceans and air have become a strategically important combination for technology adoption. The availability of rare minerals in the deep oceans and rising demands for fish as a source of food have added stress in the maritime domain. The consumption of fish per capita in 1960 was 97 kg per head; today, it has dipped to 30 kg.
Manganese is available in pea plants off the coast of New Guinea. The reserves are said to be almost 8 per cent as compared to 0.6 per cent available on land. Gold’s availability on the seabed is reportedly three to five times higher than on land. Marine cables for intercontinental communications and data connection are highly susceptible to sabotage. In 2013, two divers on the Egyptian coastline had sheared off certain cables, which blacked out many Arab countries. Such periods of communication blackouts could be exploited to launch physical attacks.


UNDERSTANDING THE MARITIME DOMAIN
Without clearly defined rights, oceans are susceptible to competition, confrontation and conflict.
Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, PVSM, AVSM is a retired Indian Navy Flag officer, who served as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Naval Command from 2014 to 2015.
The Seas have been a tangible medium for humanity since the dawn of man. Upon them have plied global trade and food and energy supplies sustaining the world, as also invading armadas and powerful carrier groups projecting military power to every corner of the planet.
COOPERATION & COMPETITION
Themaritime domain has been and always will be vital for the prosperity and security of all nations and for its ability to influence or even dominate others. The seas have always been a Global Commons, albeit a contested one. The acceptance of parts of the maritime domain, such as territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZ), is now restrictive to some extent.
However, elsewhere, the freedom of navigation remains enshrined, both under international law and as an age-old custom amongst seafaring nations. There are no property rights at sea, and the ocean does not belong to any country, organisation, or company. In the absence of Rights, it is natural that the seas are susceptible to competition, confrontation, and conflict. And this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
The potential for maritime cooperation is regrettably always eclipsed by militaries pursuing their nations’ interests for access to resources, energy, and markets. Military conflict leads to instability at sea and impacts the ongoing trade. Even those not party to the conflict are affected by rising shipping costs because of uneconomical routing, and increased insurance outlays on commercial shipping. It is, therefore, in the interest of all nations to strive for a peaceful oceanic environment and general maritime security.
AN EVOLVING DOMAIN
Over the past hundred years, the maritime domain has been transformed by two distinct developments.First is the replacement of customary and traditional international law by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into force less than three decades ago in 1994. UNCLOS grants state legal rights to various zones adjacent to their coastline.
It lays down a comprehensive regime for governing maritime activities. However, this territory realization of the seas has given rise to many disputes, differences in interpretations, and transgressions, most visibly in the South China Sea.
ganization (IMO) have the authority but not the means to enforce the convention. Consensus between nations on contentious clauses is necessary for unanimous acceptance and ratification.
Secondly, and most tellingly, the humongous impact of exponentially accelerating technology; has completely revolutionized maritime battlespace and warfare as well as marine transportation and communications. Since the advent of the 20th century, starting with radio and then through radar and satellites, the maritime environment has become increasingly transparent. It has become easier to detect, identify and track ships, submarines, and aircraft operating at sea. Furthermore, weapons and ammunition have vastly increased in range, speed, accuracy, and lethality.
Seagoing platforms are now more accessible to kinetic action from the surface, subsurface, and airborne dimensions. Even from land-based weapon systems, the vulnerability of platforms has increased. But concurrently, sea platforms using a variety of hard weaponry and soft countermeasures, including stealth technology and damage control, have enhanced their survivability. The same, however, cannot be said of commercial shipping.
MAJOR TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS
The immediate and near future at sea will undoubtedly be shaped more by multiple technological advancements than by treaties and conventions. Six technological developments have been the most impactful.
Firstly, the increasing overlay of the maritime domain by space and cyber mediums, which are being rapidly militarized. Modern surveillance, communication, disruption, and deception capabilities impact all aspects of the detection, identification, targeting, and destruction cycle, which drives all military operations. Secondly, real-time Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) encompassing aerospace, surface, and subsurface elements has become all-important.
States with MDA dominance will erode the traditional freedom of maneuver of other naval forces, both enemy and neutral. Thirdly, and most consequentially is the development of autonomous weapon platforms powered by AI, such as the next generation of UAVs, operating on, above, or below the sea surface. Operating without/with minimal human interventions, these platforms are emerging as game changers making manned and re-
mote-controlled platforms obsolete.
Fourthly, the return of mass or quantity to warfare. Contemporary naval ships, submarines, and aircraft or enormously expensive and are manned by equally expensive, highly trained manpower. As the cost soars, it becomes unaffordable to field them in large numbers, even for superpowers. Autonomous uncrewed platforms are far cheaper and could be inducted literally in hundreds, operating in swarms to overwhelm enemy defenses. Fifthly, long-range precision weapons at hypersonic speeds, striking deep Inland from the sea, making almost every urban center targetable from the sea at short notice by platforms operating in international waters. Last but not least, directed energy weapons using high-power lasers to destroy targets at the near instantaneous speed of light.

THE WAY AHEAD
Sinceinternational institutions, such as the United Nations, have neither the requisite authority nor the enforcement capability to maintain global security, the occurrence of military conflict will depend on nations; propensity to abide by the sanctity of borders. Respect for sovereignty, which has been fundamental to the Westphalia system of a nation- states since the 17th century must endure.
There’s a need to reform both the UN and the United Nations Security Council and legislate a convention that governs the imposition of automatic penalties, including economic sanctions upon states which do not adhere to the accepted rules of international law. However, in the real world, this is easier said than done. The only mechanism that works is a balance of power strong enough to deter rogue nations from resorting to the illegal use of force.
Due to the nature of the medium, it is impossible to create barriers between military and civilian domains at sea. Commercial shipping and other civilian assets are fair targets for belligerents locked in combat at sea. The un-demarcated battlespace will invariably lead to collateral damage to the commercial assets of neutral nations, including fish- ing trawlers and scientific re- search ships. As the Ukraine war has shown, offshore supply chains will be disrupted, bringing chaos to global commerce and manufacturing.
Peace on the waves needs a global and regional balance of power that will encourage deterrence through mutually assured destruction. Mutual economic interdependence could be another way to dissuade hostilities, as there are no winners in an all-out war. Lastly, a coalition of willing must take on the task of enforcement of the rule of law, as was seen when piracy threatened international waters.

SYNERGIA FOUNDATION
RESEARCH TEAM
INDIA’S INDIAN OCEAN?
The Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming a potential zone of conflict as strategic competition spills over from the Pacific and the South China Sea.
As the economic balance of the global market shifts to the East, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has increasingly gained prominence and strategic importance. After all, the Indian The ocean is the most heavily used link between the West and the East, with around 80 percent of the global sea-borne trade transiting through its choke points. Many experts believe that being sandwiched between the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has generally been ignored. While the Freedom of Navigation has been emphasized in the IOR, especially by the U.S. Navy, from time to time, there have been areas that have lacked a strategic focus, like the increasing frequency of violent acts of piracy and pollution.
CHALLENGES IN THE IOR
The geography of the Indian Ocean presents two significant challenges for maritime enforcement of peace and freedom of navigation. Littoral countries have extended coastlines of over 200 nautical miles generating massive EEZs. Even small nations like Mauritius and Seychelles can stake claim to EEZs which are amongst the top 25 globally. This makes maritime security operations complex and difficult to coordinate with the littoral. The second challenge is maintaining a robust maritime domain awareness (MDA). Due to the massive size of the maritime domain of many of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) member countries, the very heavy density of traffic on its sea lanes of communications (SLOC), the blurred line between legal and illegal activities on international waters, and the small/ nil maritime capacity of many of the nations, MDA is difficult to achieve by any single power.
Therefore, the load for MDA would devolve upon a few nations; Australia, India, Iran, Malaysia, Thailand, and the UAE, which have capable maritime forces (naval and coast guard) in terms of quality and quantity.
INDIA’S CALL
The strategic vacuum in the IOR was not destined to last indefinitely. The rise of China, the increasing presence of the PLAN off the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations, growing Chinese maritime capabilities (like the development of carrier groups), and engagement with IOR countries started ringing alarm bells. The possibility of the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea spilling over into IOR is now a distinct possibility. India has a stake in its security as a major geographical constituent of the IOR. India is uniquely positioned to influence the Indian Ocean maritime domain from its bases on the West and East coast. Perhaps our greatest asset is the archipelago of the Andamans and Nicobar group standing like a fortress at the mouth of the choke point of the Malacca Straits, enabling surveillance and interdiction in an all-out conflict.
However, increased Chinese naval presence in Hambantota port on our southern extreme, at Djibouti and perhaps in Myanmar, means the Indian Ocean is not as we tend to believe. Last year while speaking at the United Nations Security Council’s high-level debate on maritime security, Prime Minister Modi very aptly described India’s challenges in this domain. “Oceans are our shared heritage, and our maritime routes are the lifelines of international trade.