POST WAGNER RUSSIA

Russia’s ‘special military operation has turned the security paradigm of Europe on its head. There are several nagging questions as to what direction the security structure in Europe will take as and when the fighting in Ukraine grinds to a halt and the role of various stakeholders, especially Russia. The Russian perspective is especially important in light of the recent Wagner ‘mutiny’, which caught the whole world, and perhaps even Russia, by surprise. The views expressed below are based on a discussion between Synergia Foundation and Mr Vasily.

UKRAINE CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW

The Ukrainian conflict is unique. It is the biggest conventional armed conflict in the world since the Iran-Iraq War. But in many aspects, this conflict exceeds even the Iran-Iraq War. In some ways, it could qualify as the biggest and the bloodiest conflict since Korean War. In brief, it is a major high-intensity conventional war.

Ukraine war brings us back to the basics of warfare and military economy, as they used to be understood in the first half of the 20th Century. The intensity is comparable to World War II in terms of the type and scale of artillery systems and ammunition of calibre, such as 122 mm and above expended. In the first year of the war in Ukraine, the artillery ammunition was comparable to the use of similar ammunition by the Soviet forces in World War II, even though the numbers of combatants involved were much smaller. Basically, it is a very traditional high-intensity conflict, a product of the new global situation where great powers are willing to take risks and dedicate significant resources when they deem fit. Concurrently, several new and disruptive technologies are introduced in warfare, like space-based intelligence, which provides rapid and real-time targeting information, widespread use of small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and loitering ammunitions. In particular, longrange artillery plays a key role, especially when firing precision-guided ammunition.

Now it is clear that it will no longer play any major role in the fighting. Wagner operatives will either be included in the regular Russian forces or used for Russia’s overseas commitments, like in Central Africa, where they have proved to be a very effective and valuable asset.

This has changed the dynamics of war. We are looking at a situation akin to the beginning of World War I when the combatant nations had to deal with the reality of technology outpacing conventional military tactics. This has led to a situation where both sides are experiencing major difficulties in the conduct of manoeuvre warfare, so essential to break any stalemate on the battlefield. This aspect is clearly visible from the stalled Ukrainian counter-offensive, which appears to be failing. However, in the future, like World War I and II in their later stages, the outcome of the war in Ukraine, too, would largely depend upon the ability of one side or the other to innovate warfighting methods to revert to manoeuvre warfare. This intensive fighting will continue until the Ukrainians run out of resources and both sides revert to a defensive posture. This will probably take place around the end of August. Beyond that, how the stalemate will be resolved remains unclear.

WAGNER ‘MUTINY’ & ITS AFTER EFFECTS

Fortunately for the Russian side, the ‘situation with the Wagner group’ was quickly resolved. The Wagner group was expanded rather quickly during the difficult period of intense fighting in the summer and autumn of 2022 to compensate for the ‘temporary difficulties’ arising from mobilisation in Russia. Later when the Russian Army had managed to stabilise the military situation and increase its manpower, it was felt that the Wagner Group was no longer needed. Some of the Wagner commanders were too ambitious and made this ‘armed demonstration’, which was swiftly suppressed.

The Wagner group was basically a paramilitary organisation connected to the Russian Ministry of Defence. Initially, it was a compact organisation (around 3000-4000 operatives before they expanded for the war in Ukraine) designed to operate strictly abroad in places like Syria and Africa. They were quickly expanded to meet the dire situation in Ukraine to boost the regular Russian forces, rising to their current strength of close to 20,000. However, over a period of time, nearly 50,000 operatives have served in the Wagner Group since its inception.

The recruitment into the Wagner Group was done in haste without the existing military regulations and bureaucratic norms, as a result, many criminals serving prison sentences were granted pardons and inducted on the condition of serving for at least six months on the front lines. For some time, Wagner’s forces were the most effective combat elements on the front lines, although, in retrospect, it may appear that the impression was probably exaggerated. As they grew in importance, the leadership tried to portray themselves as more effective than the regular military and started com - peting for the resources of the Min-

Wagner Group was no longer felt. When the Russian government tried to cut their resources, the differences were exacerbated. Mr Prigozin, Wagner Chief, then launched into a propaganda campaign against the defence minister to pressurise the political leadership, including President Putin, to release more resources to further expand the Group and create for himself and the Group a greater role within the framework of the Ukrainian war. However, just about 1/3rd of the Group participated in the mutiny.

Now it is clear that it will no longer play any major role in the fighting. Wagner operatives will either be included in the regular Russian forces or used for Russia’s overseas commitments, like in Central Africa, where they have proved to be a very effective and valuable asset. The majority of the personnel will be retained.

However, the Group will be restructured to ensure a tighter command and control within the overarching organisation of the Russian military operating in Ukraine. Mr Prigozin, along with his close coterie and some units, have moved to Belarus, where they will train with the Belarusian military, which has no combat experience since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Wagner operatives are all combat veterans and perhaps amongst the best infantry soldiers in the world, and they can assist in turning the Belarusian Army into an effective fighting force.

There is little danger in the Wagner Group being enticed by forces inimical to Russia for the lure of money, as was done with mercenary forces between the 14th to 16th Centuries in Europe, who frequently changed sides to the highest bidder. For one, 21st Century Europe vastly differs from the 16th Century, and the Wagner Group has always demonstrated a strong ideological component. A great deal of effort was devoted to the ideological indoctrination of every recruit. Also, the organisation developed a very strong subculture (as happens when military units undergo combat hardships together), and as an organisation, they are very attached to the Russian state.

As the regular Russian Army grew in size and equipment (at the start of the war, it had a very small ground component numbering around 280,000 troops), the need for the

They generally have very hard-line nationalist views, and it is hard to imagine them switching sides for any reason. A typical Wagner operative is someone who used to work in the military or police but was fired for insubordination or some other misdemeanour. The organisation and its subculture are very appealing to some segments of Russian society. This is why, despite the mutiny, the Russian government has blamed the leadership and not the rank and file. Even President Putin has consistently underlined the heroic nature of the Wagner operatives deserving of respect. The Wagner group is a valuable organisation with some special people who think-out-of-the-box who have proved in-

VASILY KASHIN Senior Research Fellow, Director:Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs.

valuable in a war-like situation. However, they are very difficult to control.

THREAT TO POLITICAL STABILITY?

While in the Western media, an impression was being generated that the political hierarchy in Russia has been weakened, the fact is that the Wagner operatives have never questioned the authority of the President. The grievances were only directed at the Minister of Defence. Of course, one could imagine they would develop some kind of political ambition, but the Wagner Group and its leaders have a very limited support base. Now they have been crushed as an organisation that will operate under the Russian military and Russian security services. Perhaps, if the Wagner Group had been allowed to grow, one could imagine such a situation in the distant future. Of course, the Group will continue to exist; it will attract a specific kind of people who will be very closely watched and controlled.

The Wagner ‘mutiny’ did not impact the situation on the front line because the Russian leadership did not divert any major forces from the frontlines to suppress the revolt. Of course, it was a significant political shock for the Russian public. Basically, the Russian public was quite frightened for a while. And, of course, it made quite a strong impression on the Russian political leadership. some decisions were made to increase oversight, increase security, and stop relying on paramilitary forces while fighting in Ukraine.

The Russian political system demonstrated significant resilience, with all its components immediately expressing support to the President. There was no support for the mutineers except by a few bloggers. But of course, the lesson is learned, and it will affect Russian policies in the future as it was a significant shock.

The Trajectory Of The War In Ukraine

Russia is steadily improving its position. This is visible from the growing number of new weapons systems which are being introduced on the front line for the first time, including a new generation of glide bombs, new types of loitering munition and increased number of precision artillery. Russians have clearly managed to inflict very severe losses on the Ukrainians. And the recruitment campaign is going on rather fast. The Russian economy is stable. In the first half of this year, had a modest GDP growth while the Ukrainian economy was destroyed. A closer is possible around the end of this year, with some negotiations on a ceasefire agreement. But the ceasefire will only be possible if Russia achieves a few minimal goals. Otherwise, technically, Russia is capable of fighting a war like this for another two to three years by investing only limited resources in warfighting.

The war of attrition is being won by Russia simply because of the distraction of the Ukrainian economy and the depletion of Ukrainian manpower resources. The Ukrainian manpower losses are significantly more severe than the Russian losses. And Ukrainian resources of manpower are much more limited. So what Russia is doing is gradually killing out the Ukrainian military while the Ukrainian military is trying to attack and achieve some results as quickly as possible. So, the best-case scenario is some kind of ceasefire agreement closer to the end of this year. If not, there is a danger of protracted war for another couple of years.

The Nuclear Overhang

All the discussions about Russia using nuclear bombs in Ukraine are a product of Western military propaganda. Russia did threaten the use of nuclear weapons, not against Ukraine, but against NATO in case NATO gets involved in the Ukrainian conflict. This was in response to statements made by some NATO leaders about the involvement of NATO forces in Ukraine. With this scenario in mind, Russian nuclear forces were placed on alert early in the war. There were also threats by NATO to create no-fly zones in Ukraine, but they did not dare to do so. Now the conventional field is improving for the Russian Army, and nuclear weapons will only be a diplomatic disaster. In contrast, the military effectiveness of the nuclear option in Ukraine would be highly questionable.