VETERANS AFFAIRS 2018

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USA TODAY SPECIAL EDITION

ECHOES FROM VIETNAM

JOHN OLSON

His fatigues shredded by an explosion, Marine Staff Sgt. Bob Thoms directs an attack on the strategic Dong Ba Tower in Huê, Vietnam, in February 1968.

A Split Decision Repercussions of Tet not as straightforward as prevailing narrative By Edward Miller

H

ISTORIANS OF THE VIETNAM

War have long cited the Tet Offensive as a major turning point. Most scholars assert the wave of attacks launched by Vietnamese communist forces in January and February 1968 resulted in a kind of split decision. Although the communists suffered devastating losses during the fighting, the mere fact that they had mounted those attacks convinced a majority of Americans that the war was unwinnable.

Tet is thus seen as a military victory for the United States and its South Vietnamese allies, and an even greater political victory for the communists. According to this narrative, the communists’ political feat forced U.S. leaders to adopt a strategy of disengagement and withdrawal, paving the way for North Vietnam’s eventual conquest of South Vietnam in 1975. On closer inspection, however, neither the military or the political results of Tet seem as straightforward as this view suggests. Indeed, the “victories” of 1968 may have been far less decisive and far more costly to both sides.

From a military standpoint, the communists fell far short of what they aimed to achieve in the operation they called “General Offensive, General Uprising.” Communist leaders expected that their attacks on high-profile urban targets would trigger a popular rebellion, which would lead to the quick collapse of the South Vietnamese army and of South Vietnam itself. Although the military strikes in Saigon and other urban centers were spectacular, they did not produce the anticipated uprising. In fact, the overall effect of these operations was diminished by rushed planning and poor execution.

In Saigon, the initial assaults were conducted by small “special attack” units that had infiltrated the city in advance. Once the offensive began, these units were supposed to be backed by regular combat forces. But many of the regular units did not receive orders in time to join the fight. Even in Huê, the only South Vietnamese city that was attacked and occupied by large numbers of communist troops during the offensive, the “General Uprising” failed to materialize after the General Offensive. As a senior communist commander later admitted, CONTI NUED


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