Hollow Purview

Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 34 (August, 2017)

China’s Central National Security Commision lacks clear role and function

Charles Yang

Senior Chinese leaderships meets for the 18th National Congress of the People’s Republic of China.

photo: Dong Fang

In 2013 the Communist Party of China (CPC) established the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) during the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress. The CNSC was designed to build a strong platform to coordinate national security work and to strengthen unified leadership of national security at the central level. The new commission has not achieved its purpose on diplomatic issues, though it has increasingly affected the crossstrait relationship.

There are two explanations for why the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established the commission. A common explanation for the establishment of the CNSC is that President Xi Jinping has aspirations for more power and seeks to undertake “big power diplomacy” in world affairs. This is an extended argument of the China Threat thesis. Another explanation is that the old decision-making process was mired in bureaucratic procedure and jealous turf competition (the tiao-kuai system). This explanation suggests that the motivation to establish the CNSC had more to do with overhauling PRC bureaucracy and less to do with aggressive foreign policy aims.

In theory, within the CPC, the critical decision-making authorities are the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. Each member is designated responsibility for a specific policy area and various “leading small groups.” The paramount leader is designated to lead on foreign and military affairs, which gives him an unparalleled position in determining the country’s national security policies.

President Xi Jinping, seen above in a meeting with Russian leaders, has stated his intention to seek to undertake big-power diplomacy in world affairs.

photo: Kremlin.ru

On key national security affairs or those deemed ‘strategically important,’ Chinese leaders are to hold discussions as broadly as needed and to make decisions through consensus-building.

After Deng Xiaoping, power in the PRC regime has been anything but absolute. Generally speaking, the more important the issue, the broader the discussion. This process is influenced by institutional characteristics, as well as regime and culture issues. At the same time, no leader wants to risk taking sole responsibility for a major, critical policy decision in case that decision fails and backfires, jeopardizing his own career and, in a worst case scenario, the whole system. On key national security affairs or those deemed “strategically important,” Chinese leaders are to hold discussions as broadly as needed and to make decisions through consensus-building. This decision model was best summarized by then-President Jiang Zemin at the 16th Party Congress in 1999 when he called it “collective leadership, democratic centralism, individual preparation, and decisions made at meetings.” This model has often displayed a number of shortcomings which include: diffused decision-making authority, lack of a core national security coordination team, unstable civil-military relations, narrow agency interests, struggles between objectivity and existing guidelines, and legal problems.

Difficult situations

These problems have contributed to a lot of difficult situations for PRC leadership. For example, according to former Taiwan’s Deputy Minister of National Defense Chong-Pin Lin, there is no coordinating institution between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. At times, key individuals like Zeng Qinghong, who served during Hu Jintao’s first term, have been able to play a key role in coordination between the Foreign Ministry and the PLA.

After Zeng retired in 2008, however, there ceased to be smooth communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and military. This lack of proper communication contributed to Beijing’s clumsy approach to establishing its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in 2013, which led to international criticism of China. Thus Xi’s motivation to establish this commission is to avoid situations such as this, which result largely from poor communication.

According to available information, the current CNSC is composed of 20 members. Twelve are politburo members and eight come from the State Council, the military, diplomatic circles, the People’s Bank, etc. One of the members, Sun Zhengcai, was politically purged, so the current number may stand at 19.

In terms of mission and function, Xi Jinping further defined the mission of the CNSC in 2016 and stipulated that it should handle national security issues in 12 areas: political security, homeland security, military security, economic security, cultural security, societal security, scientific and technological security, information security, ecological security, natural resource security, nuclear security, and overseas interest security.

It appears the CPC leaders in Xi’ Jinping’s inner circle wield significant influence in the CNSC.

Sailors aboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt prepare to move an F/A -18E Super Hornet to the deck during operations in the Pacific.

photo: Rachel Treon

It appears that CPC leaders in Xi’s inner circle wield significant influence in the CNSC. According to a government news release in 2015, Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun said that he will obey Meng Jianzhu and Li Zhanshu’s order to conduct anti-terrorism work. Meng is secretary of the Committee of Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee, so he is Guo’s supervisor. But why should Guo obey Li Zhanshu? This suggests that Li is likely the administrative officer of the CNSC.

US and Philippine marines practice movement ashore during bilateral exercise “KAMANDAG” at Marine Barracks Gregorio Lim in the Philippines.

photo: Nathan Maysonet

Communication shortcomings

Since its inception in 2013, it appears that the CNSC may not be functioning as well as hoped. A number of incidents suggest that it may have shortcomings in its ability to coordinate and communicate with all segments of the military. Some observers note that there are no navy or air force generals in CNSC. This raises the question of whether the commission will be able to effectively manage incidents in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

Much of the PRC’s response to rapidly developing world events still depends on institutional inertia, rather than the will of the paramount leader.

In June 2017, India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj announced that there had been an incursion by Chinese military forces at the border near Barahoti in Uttarakhand. This was a symbolic and sensitive incident because Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping were scheduled to meet in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Heads of State Council Meeting in Kazakhstan on June 8th and 9th. PRC leaders rarely put themselves in this kind of embarrassing situation. Incidents such as this suggest that Xi may not be able to smoothly communicate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PLA.

The emergence of the CNSC has mixed implications for cross-strait relations. In the past, the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs had responsibility for coordinating cross-strait policy. Its deputy head, Yu Zhengsheng, has not joined the CNSC. It suggests that the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs still plays an important role. The CNSC also has an important role because Li Zhanshu, along with other members of the group, attended the historic 2015 meeting between Xi and Taiwan’s then-President Ma Ying-jeou. This creates an embarrassing situation for officers of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. No one from this group sits on the CNSC, and their coordination is also questionable.

Recent incidents such as the one involving Lee Mingcheh, a former employee of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, who “disappeared” after crossing into China from Macau, raise doubts as to the coordination between the two offices. Although Lee disappeared on March 19, the PRC government announced only 10 days later that Lee had been detained for engaging in “activities endangering national security.” When his family asked to see him, the office initially indicated that it did not know where he was.

According to China scholar David M. Lampton, the CNSC’s focus is heavily weighted toward internal and periphery security, but it also is an institutionbuilding response to new global and transnational issues. The CNSC will play an increasingly important role in the cross-strait relationship because it has more resources. It could lead to a more rapid response and tough policies towards Taiwan, primarily because there are military members in the institution. Still, the CNSC does not have the capability to handle new global and transnational issues. The PRC’s problems were shaped by culture, regime, and institutions. Much of the PRC’s response to rapidly developing world events still depends on institutional inertia, rather than the will of the paramount leader. It is questionable whether the CNSC will be able to function and operate as it was intended to.

Taiwanese human rights activist Lee Ming-cheh’s wife Lee Ching-yu and supporters at March 2017 press conference ask China to release her husband.

photo: VOA

Charles Yang is a graduate of National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of National Development.He specializes in the political-economic development of China. He can be reached at d88341003@ntu.edu.tw