Uninvited Guests

Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 34 (August, 2017)

New Delhi responds to increasing presence of Chinese navy in Indian Ocean

Vijay Sakhuja

Indian aircraft carriers INS Vikramaditya (R33) and INS Viraat (R22), during Vikramaditya’s maiden voyage to her home port at INS Kadamba, Karwar.

photo: Indian Navy

In recent years, China has become much better positioned to project naval power in the Indian Ocean. Its naval presence is characterized by the near-continuous presence of its warships, frequent forays by submarines, and the building of a naval base and access arrangements for its navy at various ports in friendly countries in the region. The above initiatives are also supported by the sale of naval hardware, including submarines, to regional countries at friendly prices, and an aggressive training program for government functionaries at various levels, particularly the navy.

Beginning with an inconspicuous visit in 1992 by the training ship Zhenghe which made port calls to Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy visits to the Indian Ocean have graduated from benign goodwill visits to joint naval exercises with friendly countries, military operations other than war (MOOTW) such as the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya and Yemen, and combat operations in support of counter-piracy operations against Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Since 2009, the PLA Navy has deployed 26 naval task groups in the Gulf of Aden for escort missions. The total number of ships used in these missions comes to 83 vessels, with task groups typically composed of a mix of frigates, destroyers, amphibious landing ships and logistics vessels. The total number of sailors used in these missions comes to roughly 22,000, including a number of Special Forces personnel. Over the course of these missions, the PLA Navy has escorted over 6,400 merchant ships, including those belonging to the United Nations World Food Program.

The deployment of nuclear and diesel-electric submarines individually, or in combination, in the Indian Ocean is a new dimension of the PLA Navy’s operational strategy for distant water operations. The first submarine deployment was reported in December 2013 when a Shang-class nuclear-powered submarine carried out operations for nearly three months in waters around India. This was followed by the deployment of a Song-class diesel electric submarine for three months between August and December of 2014. In 2015, a Han-class nuclear-powered submarine was detected, and shortly thereafter a Yuan-class diesel-electric submarine docked in Karachi harbor.

Last year, China deployed both a Han-class nuclear submarine and a conventional submarine in the Indian Ocean. Early this year, on April 19th and 20th, a Yuan-class submarine was detected by an Indian Navy Poseidon-8I (P-8I) long-range maritime patrol aircraft soon after it transited the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean, making it the seventh such submarine interception.

Pattern of incursion

A clear pattern of deployments has emerged involving nuclear submarines followed by a conventional diesel-electric submarine and, more recently, a combination of both types of vessels being simultaneously deployed in the Indian Ocean. This new activity is in line with the 2015 Chinese Defense White Paper which encourages the PLA Navy to “gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to a combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,’ and to build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure.” In order to achieve these objectives, the PLA Navy is engaged in enhancing “capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive support.”

Naval officers from India, the United States and Japan pose for a photograph during the opening ceremony of Exercise Malabar 2017.

photo: Deanna Gonzales

For regional support to Chinese submarine patrols, there are at least two ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan where Chinese submarines have docked, and two naval bases in Djibouti and Gwadar that can potentially provide special facilities for long-term deployment support. Colombo harbor in Sri Lanka has been a popular destination for port calls by the PLA Navy and Chinese submarines have been sighted in the harbor on a number of occasions. In September 2014, a Chinese Type 925 submarine and Changxing Dao support vessel docked at the Chinese-run Colombo International Container Terminal in Sri Lanka during a stopover in Colombo harbor for refueling, as well as for rest and recreation for the crew, before heading to the Gulf of Aden in support of international efforts to fight piracy.

The Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, purchased from the Ukraine and retrofitted, sits at anchor in Hong Kong harbor during a training deployment.

photo: Baycrest

Likewise, port calls at Karachi, Pakistan are important for PLA Navy submarines because the base is also home to Pakistani Navy submarines and is fully equipped to provide special support for the Chinese boats. China and Pakistan have signed a contract for construction of eight conventional diesel-electric submarines, four of which will be constructed in China, and delivered by 2023, and the rest will be assembled in Pakistan.

The Pakistani port of Gwadar can potentially serve as a safe haven for PLA Navy submarines, particularly for operations in the Arabian Sea. Gwadar Port has been developed with Chinese financial and technical assistance, and is an important seaward node of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor which is closely linked to the 21st century Maritime Silk Road that passes through the Indian Ocean.

Mediterranean reach

Similarly, Djibouti is now being developed by China and the port will also be used to support PLA operations in the region. It is also a springboard to the Mediterranean Sea and strategic engagements with Russia in the Black Sea, which in recent times have progressed exponentially through enhanced capacity building, naval interoperability and joint exercises to respond to maritime security threats and challenges in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

There are three primary reasons for China to deploy submarines in the Indian Ocean. First, these platforms are most suitable for surveillance missions and the PLA Navy is anxious about the growing naval capability of the Indian Navy. It is also possible to monitor US naval operations and other Western naval activity, including the United Kingdom and France, who have naval bases in the Persian Gulf.

Second, submarine operations are inherently data-intensive and it is critical for submarines to understand the key characteristics of seawater, such as temperature and salinity, which affects its density and impacts a submarine’s ability to detect other submarines. This information is essential for offensive and defensive submarine operations. The Pakistan Navy, which has collected an enormous amount of underwater data on the Arabian Sea over the decades, may have shared this data with their Chinese counterparts.

Third, a Chinese naval presence is considered critical for the security of Chinese flagged merchant vessels operating in the Indian Ocean, which carry strategic materials such as gas and oil and other cargo. Sea lane security is an increasingly important mission for the PLA Navy. Chinese submarines can also play a major role in the safety and security of Chinesebuilt infrastructure in friendly countries.

Djibouti is now being developed by China and the port will also be used to support PLA Navy operations in the region.

The presence of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean has been the subject of intense debate and frequent discussion in the international strategic community, particularly in India. Indian naval planners have carefully monitored Chinese naval activity in the region. Discussion has recently become more intense after a July 2017 Indian media report which stated that the “Indian naval satellite Rukmini (GSAT-7), long-range maritime patrol aircraft like Poseidon-8I and warships have monitored at least 13 Chinese naval units in the Indian Ocean over the last two months.”

A Pakistani border guard, left, and his Chinese counterpart hold hands at Khunjerab Pass. The two nations have become close, much to India’s chagrin.

photo: Anthony Maw

The Indian government has responded to these developments by pledging that Chinese submarines are being “minutely and continuously” monitored and the Indian Navy is ready to respond to any challenges they could pose. According to Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba, “As far as the People’s Liberation Army Navy ships and submarines are concerned, the Indian Navy keeps a close eye and monitor their movements. We launch surveillance missions in the form of aircraft and ships to keep a track of them.”

India has made anti-submarine warfare operations in the Indian Ocean a top priority and has acquired a number of platforms—including ships, aircraft, submarines, and satellites—to monitor Chinese submarine activity through surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Additionally, the Indian Navy, along with the US Navy, has conducted joint anti-submarine warfare exercises which involve ships and aircraft, including the US-made P-8Is.

The presence of the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean is a reality and Chinese submarines will soon be a common sight in the region. It is fair to argue that the presence of submarines in the Indian Ocean is also an expression of China’s aggressive political posture, and a tool for signaling coercive intent to a potential contestant.

Sustained Chinese naval presence in the region will help the PLA Navy understand Indian Ocean underwater topography and obtain hydrographic data for future operational support. This will be critical for enhancing the ability of the Chinese submarines to detect targets, particularly boomers operated by the United States, Britain, and France, as well as India’s diesel-electric and nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines.

Cmdr. Divaya Guatam of the Indian Navy examines a patient aboard the hospital ship USNS Mercy.

photo: Ryan Clement

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is CEO and co-founder of The Peninsula Foundation, India. He is a former naval officer and former director of the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. He can be reached at sakhuja.v@gmail.com