Terroristen
Beat ‘em to the punch: is preventive war legitimate in the age of terrorism? Imagine a situation in which the high-level official of a given country announces that a number of chemical weapons may be unaccounted for but thus far there is no exact information to provide the public. The administration fears that, should these weapons not be safe, they could be used against the civilian population or sold to a neighbouring state and, worryingly, there are no exact data on who is in current possession of the weapons or even what – if any – weapons have disappeared. Alba I. León
U.S. Army Soldiers put their gas masks on for a simulated chemical attack during a training mission near Camp Ramadi, Iraq, Sept. 25, 2007. Foto’s: flickr.
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his nightmarish scenario was presented to U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta in late September of 2012, during an update on the situation in Syria. His country’s intelligence had lost track of chemical weapons believed to be in possession of the Assad regime, and was unable to confirm what had happened to them.1 For this reason, the declarations of President Assad that he would not use chemical weapons against the civilian population have been received with caution by the international community, amidst an already complicated internal situation.2 While the responsibility for the safe storage and the eventual destruction of chemical arsenal falls to states, one question undoubtedly surfaces when looking at situations like Syria: would it be legitimate, or even legal, to pre-empt rogue countries or terrorist groups from obtaining this arsenal through the use of preventive strikes?
Preventive war in the limelight
The eradication of chemical weapons has been a priority since the end of World War I and has gained new relevance in light of the risks of those weapons falling in the hands of groups which could use them to commit terrorist acts. The legal regime that governs over these matters, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the agency in charge of implementing its provisions, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), have met with great success: around 74% of all chemical weapons known to be possessed by the states parties have been destroyed to date.3 However, there are six states around the world that have refused to sign and are therefore not party to the Convention nor member of the OPCW, among which Syria.4 The country is currently in turmoil and, even though suspicions that groups other than the government may obtain chemical or biological
JASON Magazine * Nummer 1 2013
Caroline test The Caroline test establishes that in order to justify the use of force as anticipatory self-defence, there must be a necessity due to the imminence of the threat and the lack of peaceful options. Moreover, the response of the party must be proportionate to the impending threat.
weapons have thus far proved unfounded, there is a possibility that the scenario becomes real, leading to uncertainty within in the region. The government of the United States has been concerned with finding a solution to the possibility of rogue groups or governments obtaining certain types of weapons. Already in 2002, in the US National Security Strategy presented by the G.W.
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