Human Rights’ Impact on International Relations Between the U.S. and China

Clare Ennis

Today, in the midst of a massive trade war, it is natural to think of the Chinese- American relationship in a financial and political context. With the world’s two largest economies, the implications of their interactions can have great impacts on the rest of the globe. While the two countries have clashed over these issues and more, one cannot discount the consequence of human rights in their interactions. With a lengthy history of abuse, China has created tensions with all of the Western world, but with the United States in particular. Even President Trump, who has shown little interest in the subject as a whole, has admonished China by signing a bill supporting pro- democracy groups in Hong Kong. China’s recent interactions with Hong Kong only underscore the importance of this issue within the countries’relations. While human rights may not be the focal point as frequently as economic or military issues, human rights are an important part of international relations, especially when the two nations have a contentious relationship. Human rights violations are added to the list of grievances between the countries, coloring all of their relationship and their interactions.

China has shown a disregard for human rights since the Communist victory of 1949. Chairman Mao persecuted his own people via the scare tactics of the Cultural Revolution, the genocide of the Great Leap Forward, and the omnipresent fear of party purges. Since this ignominious beginning, China has continued to infringe on the rights of workers, religious and ethnic minorities, journalists, human rights lawyers, and anyone that dare disagree with the Communist party. In the simplest of terms, China is an authoritarian state where rules must be followed, so one may argue that this behavior is expected. Why then, does China make considerations for human rights and become angered when the rest of the world denigrates their human rights record? It would appear that outside pressure has caused the current commitment to human rights rather than any altruistic desire from within the country. The United States is inarguably China’s most important trade relationship, as we represent 19.2% of China’s exports (Workman 2019). Logically, one would then sumise that the United States, a leader in human rights and international institutions, is the primary reason China cares at all about the topic. I argue in this paper that this fact is true – that the integral economic relationship between the two is the primary reason we see any commitment to protecting and promoting human rights in the authoritarian nation.

However, there are always different opinions on any issue. One could claim that China came to this commitment from internal pressures from their people. While Chinese actions show the contrary, one cannot simply discount this view without investigation. Others may opine that China has indeed created legislation focused on human rights because of outside pressures, but from international institutions, not the United States. Others may conclude that China has simply arrived at this focus naturally as a side effect of their continuing economic democratization. I will inspect all of these contrary arguments as I seek to understand China’s changing focus on human rights in the context of its relationship with the United States.

CHINAAND ITS HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

I argue that the source of China’s new emphasis on human rights stems from the pressure from the United States. To understand why this situation is so, one must first know the history of the disagreement between the countries on this topic. From the beginning, the two nations have differed in how they view human rights and their importance to a government. The idea of “human rights” is a Western concept, beginning with Greek and Christian philosophy (Zhou 2005, 112). While in the West, human rights are meant to protect infringement of the individual by the government and others, Chinese see these rights as something the government should provide. The government is entrusted with the care of its citizens; the authority is not considered something from which the people should be protected (Zhou 2005, 113). Therefore, the state decides what rights can and cannot be given. Because of this background, China has decried U.S. demands for rights as something that does not apply to them or hold worth. Their history clearly shows this lack of care. Beginning with Mao, China has long ignored the rights of its people. Mao’s Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward caused millions of deaths and widespread devastation for his people. Overall, Cheng Li, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. from Shanghai, called the China of the 1960s and 70s a “prison” (Billitteri 2008). However, improvement was slow going following Mao’s death.

By 1989, China still viewed the concept of human rights as “propaganda or Western hypocrisy” (Billitteri 2008). This view is clear when one recalls the atrocity of Tiananmen Square, where pro-democracy protestors were violently quashed by the military when the government declared martial law (Seymour 1980, 67). Troops with assault rifles and tanks fired on protestors, killing around several hundred to several thousand. Defining the end of the decade, China proved its unwillingness to allow any dissent of any kind. Entering into the 1990s, China began its ‘Strike Hard’Campaign against the Uyghur people in the Xinjiang region. Having tired of unrest beginning with the Baren riot in 1990, China began striking against the ethnic and religious minority groups with mass roundups, quick trials and executions, and the seizure of weapons (Hastings 2011). Since that initial crackdown, China has continued to repress the group to this day. This past March, accounts claimed that over a million Uyghurs were interned in “reeducation” camps with no trials or end date to suppress their clamoring for greater autonomy (Castets 2019). While years have progressed, the treatment of this problem has not. Despite China opening up economically in the new decade, human rights would barely improve.

China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, leading many to believe that greater democratization would follow. However, this failed to occur. Instead, China ushered in a period of further human rights abuses, such as imposing the death penalty on a high number of non-violent crimes, repressing religious freedom, and imprisoning those who spoke out against the government (Billitteri 2008). Prior to the Olympic Games, a time where soft power and international respect should grow, the government forcefully removed people from Beijing it viewed as “undesirable,” such as sex workers, migrants, and beggars. Those who protested against this action were frequently intimidated, imprisoned, and put on house arrest (Human Rights Watch 2008). In 2009, China unveiled the National Human RightsAction Plan, appearing to finally show a true internal commitment to human rights. However, its achievements were moderate and mixed. The greatest progress from this report was its simple recognition of human rights as something worthy of attention (Human Rights Watch 2011). Despite enmeshing itself further in international organizations, China continued to violate the rights of its people up until the modern day. Xi himself has pushed China into an even greater state of repression as he has focused his leadership on suppression and centralization of the Party-state.

Xi has proved indifferent to the rights of his people, seen by his crackdown on human rights lawyers, journalists, and further actions against the Uyghur minority (Economy 2018, 46-47). In June 2015, over 300 lawyers were imprisoned, undergoing trials behind closed doors (Economy 2018, 47). Xi has begun to use legal reform to allow his administration to provide the opportunity for “‘torture and terror’ of public interest lawyers, women’s rights activists, labor activists, and journalists” (Economy 2018, 47). Even for those Chinese showing no political subversion or minority status, general rights, such as privacy, have been all but eradicated. The internet, once a bastion of free thought and a way to criticize the government, has been highly censored and controlled by the government. Many activists have been removed from websites, and social media platforms such as Facebook have agreed to censor themselves to please the government.

Even more concerning has been the development of a social credit system, which ultimately allows the government to monitor, rate, and shape the behavior of participants in a way that advances ethical behavior (Economy 2018, 79). By collecting data on the internet and developing a rating system, the government hopes to reward good behavior and penalize bad. People labeled bad or “trustbreakers” could ultimately be punished by failing to receive a job promotion or being unable to purchase a house (Economy 2018, 79). In 2016, the government released a law that allowed censors to delete and block content that violated Chinese laws and regulations and even cut off internet access in certain areas during times of unrest (Economy 2018, 74). Overall, a U.S. Congressional study concluded in 2018 that China’s human rights protections have been on a “downward trajectory by virtually every measure” (Asia News Monitor 2018). Xi has continued to focus on strengthening his party and appears to hold little regard for the rights of those who disagree with him. Concluding a storied history of horrific rights violations, one can see how unwilling China is to honor the rights of its people. However, despite apparent internal disregard, China still has signed more international rights conventions than the United States, created the National Human RightsAction Plan (NHRAP), and takes part in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Why does it seek to do any of the above when the country clearly cares little for the rights of its people and desires the supremacy of the state overall? The answer is clear – international pressure.

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

While China and the United States have feuded for decades, the two understand the necessity of their partnership.As Wendy Dobson asserts in her book Partners and Rivals, “the relationship between China and the United States is central to any strategic view of the world of the twenty-first century” (2013, 3). Possessing the world’s two largest economies, the nations hold great sway over one another’s actions and dealings. Understanding the importance of this relationship will shine light upon why the United States is able to impact human rights in China to such a high degree.

Economics has always been at the core of the Sino-American relationship. For China, nearly all interactions abroad serve to strengthen the domestic economy and maintain authoritarian rule (Dobson 2013, 4). While the two previously cooperated closely against the Soviet Union under the Nixon administration, the relationship has grown contentious (Dobson 2013, 3). For the two, economic ties force the nations into constantly searching for compromise. However, with disparate worldviews and goals, tension often develops, as one can see today with the ongoing trade wars and the strained Hong Kong situation. However, despite growing tension, the economies of the two countries have become more intertwined, making each other integral to the wellbeing and future of the other.

After the 2008 global financial crisis, China continued its accelerated growth as other nations, including the United States, faltered. Today, China still continues to far outpace the growth of the United States, although it has begun to slow from the rapid 10 percent it once had (Dobson 2013, 21). With China potentially catching up to the United States in economic influence by 2026, the U.S. and the rest of the globe have begun to wonder what China may do with its increasing power (Dobson 2013, 22). The U.S. currently holds a large amount of power over international institutions. Will China bend to these established mandates and behaviors or try to alter the current standing of the world? China has prompted worry across the globe by creating theAsian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which some view as a Chinese-created competitor to established institutions such as the World Bank. While China has claimed that the AIIB and other Chinese-proposed institutions are meant not to “challenge the existing international order but rather to complement it,” the U.S. and others still hold doubt over the validity of these statements. With aggressive behavior and opaque governance, China does not bring trust, but rather worry to other powers, especially the United States. Questions like these create discord between the two as the U.S. worries about its international primacy.

Amid this worry is the co-dependence between the countries. While the two certainly feel a sense of competition, most clearly seen by the ongoing trade war under Trump, they also require each other for the prosperity of their respective economies. The U.S. is China’s largest national market by far. Further showing their interdependence, theAsian nation also possesses a significant percent of U.S. Treasury Security holdings, peaking at 25 percent in 2011 (Dobson 2013, 30).As Dobson asserts, China requires “a stable environment if the country is to continue to rise. To that end, the relationship with the United States is key” (2013, 6). While China may be climbing, the United States remains the largest economy in the world and an immensely important global community member. China has, does, and will continue to require the United States to succeed. However, as stated before, the two differ in many ways. While they now cooperate frequently in international institutions and economic matters, they still hold vastly disparate world views.Although this tension causes continuous strife, their interdependence requires both nations to consider one another in domestic matters.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

Human rights have frequently arisen as a source of contention between the two nations. However unwilling, China must at least consider the viewpoint of the United States and its criticisms or fear swift economic backlash. I argue the reason we see any attention to human rights in China is solely due to international pressure led by the United States. While China has primarily undergone policy change of a form rather than substance, these policy changes at all show the impact of outside pressure (Foot 2000, 4).As a democratic nation and the undisputed global leader, the United States has frequently involved itself in world affairs, from the Iraq War to the Ebola Virus. The United States has continued this practice of involvement to include China, whether that be in the South China Sea with territorial disputes or the issue of human rights violations.

1989, the year of Tiananmen Square, proved to be the first year where the two nations substantively clashed over the subject of human rights (Zhou 2005, 107). To show its displeasure with the abuse of protestors, the United States imposed sanctions on China and tied the most-favored-nation status, which offers the best trade terms from a country, to its human rights record in 1990 (Zhou 2005, 107).As a result, some of the most advantageous economic conditions would be bound to their ability to demonstrate proper treatment of its citizens. For China, Tiananmen

Square showed the “significance of human rights as a legitimate subject for both domestic and international policies” (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 14). The subject became a source of “structural weakness” that China would have to diplomatically solve to maintain its relationships abroad (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 15). Having undergone sanctions by the U.S. andAmerican requests to halt all new loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, China began to study and issue papers on human rights in 1991 (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 15). While the matter did not become important through any merit of its own to the Chinese government, the American economic relationship forced the issue upon the Asian nation.

Following this disaster, the U.S. government has frequently called on China to improve in the field. In 1995, Hillary Clinton criticized China’s abuses at the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing; President Bill Clinton presented Chinese President Jiang Zemin a list of political prisoners and demanded their release (Zhou 2005, 109). The administration also organized international opposition to China holding the Olympic Games due to their lackluster human rights record (Zhou 2005, 109). However, Clinton also removed the connection between most-favored-nation status and the Chinese human rights record, showing a desire to link the subject to other issues in dispute between the nations, such as military buildup, intellectual property rights, and Taiwan (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 15). While this decision may appear to show a lack of interest in the subject, human rights have continued to be an important part of the U.S.- China relationship. George Bush continued this emphasis, focusing on religious freedom, while Barack Obama concerned himself primarily with political dissidents such as Liu Xiaobo, human rights activists, ‘draconian’foreign NGO laws, and the Dalai Lama (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 15). Trump has continued this emphasis on human rights, but through a focus on internet freedom.

Both the president and Congress have maintained public hearings on China and openly called on the authoritarian state to perform better. In 2015, Obama’s ambassador to China, Max Baucus, told the world in his address on International Human Rights Day, “We call on China to dedicate itself to upholding its international human rights commitments and the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as called for in the Universal Declaration” (Asia News Monitor 2015). The State Department has criticized Chinese internet control and released a joint statement with European countries on the Asian nation’s declining human rights record (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 15). China has responded to some of these calls, as seen by its creation of the National Human RightsAction Plan in 2009 (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 15). Clearly, theAmerican emphasis is powerful and impactful on China.

The United States continues to pressure China in this field. Following reports of mass incarceration and high-technology surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities in Xinjiang, the United States recently added 28 Chinese companies and public security bureaus to a list of entities barred from making purchases from U.S. companies without approval and refused to issue visas to Chinese government and party officials “believed to be responsible or complicit in the detentions and surveillance of Muslims in Xinjiang” (Su 2019). Public hearings have also been held in Congress regarding the autonomy and democracy of Hong Kong, religious freedom, and China’s effect on the spread of authoritarianism (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 16). These actions show a steadyAmerican commitment to enforce and pressure China to consider human rights to maintain its trade relationships.

REFUTATIONSANDALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS

I will consider three other potential answers to why China has begun to consider human rights in its policies. One alternate explanation I will entertain is that China has simply begun to consider these rights as it has moved further towards a more open society with its market reforms.

Many nations have believed this theory to be true; under the radical leadership of Deng Xiaoping, many outsiders had expected an eventual turn to democracy (Wang 2018). However, this transition has yet to occur. China has revealed itself to be quite reluctant in true substantive democratization, and recently has shown a desire to regress. Tiananmen Square shows this fact quite well; while economic policies may have become liberal, the party still demands full obedience from its people and primacy over all. President Xi Jinping has shown an even greater dedication than past administrations to strengthen the party and ignore the globe through a variety of measures.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which grant the Chinese government greater control over businesses, have long been a source of contention for China. Despite having promised reform that would eradicate many of these and allow for more foreign competition, China has either failed to bring substantive change or in some cases, regressed. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan, created in 2011- 2015 under Xi, “almost exclusively focused on strengthening SOEs to become national champions, capable of competing internationally” (Economy 2018, 104). While these SOEs are not as economically profitable as private companies, they allow the government to maintain high levels of control over the economy. For Xi, any kind of liberalization is the enemy if it harms the power of the central authority.

Even past sources of liberalization have been closed, such as the internet. Previously, firewalls were easy to circumvent and the internet acted as a place of activism where people could criticize their government and see true action (Economy 2018, 62-63). However, Xi has painted this Western style of the internet, focused on the free spread of information, as “anathema to the values of the Chinese government” (Economy 2018, 59). Xi has limited the internet to such a degree that it has morphed into the “Chinanet” he desires, where the government will maintain strict control over the discourse and goings-on of its users. Xi appears to have no interest in democratizing China. Clearly, this idea of further liberalization has yet to materialize and cannot be cited as a reason for China’s involvement in the protection of human rights.

The second idea I will entertain is the concept that the Chinese people themselves have created a strong enough force within the country to spur change. As they have received greater rights, one might expect the citizenry to demand greater freedoms and liberties. However, as we have seen before, this idea is initially flawed simply from how the Chinese historically view human rights – a privilege provided by the government (Zhou 2005, 112). While Westerners see these rights as inalienable, imbued within one’s humanity, the Chinese feel differently. Even when people have demanded freedom, the government has refused to listen. Instead, it has harshly quashed any domestic movements against the government.

Since the bloody crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989, China has consistently jailed and killed those who spoke out against the government. Xi has only expanded this practice by jailing lawyers, journalists, bloggers, women’s advocates, minority rights campaigners, and religious believers (Puddington 2018). Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo serves as a notable example; after serving eight years in prison for his writings against the Communist leadership, he died behind bars (Puddington 2018). However, Liu is simply one of many. Stories like

his, of prison sentences without due process, of familial persecution as retribution, and other horrors are common in Xi’s China.

Due to frequent persecution and surveillance, a mass movement is extremely difficult to create. The closest thing we have seen are the ongoing protests in Hong Kong, which lies off the mainland and has escalated into chaotic violence. However, China has been steadfast in its refusal to grant the democratization demands the tiny island has called for. The outside world has been waiting for the moment when China decides to finally repress the movement. The clashes between protestors and police have continued to only grow more violent and more worrisome. With Xi at the helm in Beijing, one would guess that he will refuse political freedom to the island; he would rather Hong Kong lose its position as a liberal financial hub than cede any control (Ze Yu 2019). Xi has demanded obedience, making this idea of the Chinese people as the cause of developing human rights in the nation incorrect. Deng Xiaoping himself, the liberalizing force behind the electric economic reforms, also harshly repressed the Tiananmen protests. Since the beginning of its reforms, China has never shown any desire to yield power to its people; they have always been forced into submission. They simply do not have the power to cause the substantive change that we see in China.

With these two positions appearing impossible as the source for China’s growing attention to human rights, the only other remaining option would be the pressures of international institutions, such as the United Nations. This objection to my argument has the most support, as it ties into the United States. However, I would claim that many of these institutions are led by the U.S. The American government has had a hand in creating many of these institutions, often holds great influence, and financially sustains them. In many cases, the United States has been the initiator of disputes with China within these very institutions and has been the one who called for their involvement with theAsian nation, granting these institutions power (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 13).

However, one cannot deny the usefulness of these international institutions, namely the United Nations. It serves as a strong deterrent to outright disobedience, and as Hun Joon Kim writes, “for authoritarian states, their participation in international institutions has ‘the most significant causal influence on future compliance” (2018, 15).Additionally, Rosemary Foot, Professor of International Relations at Oxford, asserts that these international institutions encourage China to support human rights by “rais[ing] the profile of the issue area and the level of active diplomacy engaged in by those who suspect their records might come under scrutiny, whether or not their practices actually lead to the formulation of draft condemnatory resolutions” (2000, 9). The power and global support of these institutions add only more weight to their demands of China in the field of human rights. One can clearly see this influence in how China has attempted to substitute private debate over the U.N. public condemnatory route and active efforts after 1995 to preclude resolutions being passed by the U.N. against its human rights record (Foot 2000, 9 and Hun Joon Kim 2018, 14).

Additionally, international institutions receive support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which can provide “alternative points of authority in the global system because of their economic, informational, and intellectual resources, which have given them enough clout to assume authority over matters usually within a state’s area of responsibility” (Foot 2000, 8). They provide information on whether states are adhering to compliance directives and in stimulating governments, organizations, and domestic audiences to act against violators, like China (Foot 2000, 8). The two can cooperate in ways that a single nation cannot hope to, and NGOs can often receive greater access than a single competing nation like the United States. Additionally, these NGOs and

institutions come from a place of neutrality, making these nations more likely to conform.

Despite all of these positive attributes, these two groups face many problems in regard to China. The former United Nations Commission on Human Rights (now Council) cannot dedicate itself solely to resolutions on China; human rights abuses occur all throughout the world. Also, as a committee, the organization has a lack of funding to “engage in thorough fact-finding missions” (Foot 2000, 38). Therefore, it relies almost exclusively on NGOs to find information in China. While the U.N. can drum up support for measures like these, it does not truly wield the power; the nations who take part have all the control. Because of this inherent lack of true punitive power, the U.N. must rely on a system of “public exposure to try to tame offenders” (Foot 2000, 39). This fact alone is troubling, as China could simply ignore the directives and face no true punishment. Only states that directly interact with China in matters of economics and politics can truly affect change, giving these institutions their power.

Rosemary Foot emphasizes the fact that these institutions have come to see NGOs as indispensable partners (2000, 39). This reliance becomes problematic when one observes how China has begun decreasing the power and involvement of NGOs within the country. In his tenure, Xi has worked to reduce the influence of NGOs within China, seen most clearly by the adoption of the Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations in 2017 (Economy 2018, 41). The law forces all foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security, formally affiliate with a Chinese government entity to hold oversight responsibility over the NGO’s projects, and stop raising money within China (Economy 2018, 41). Due to these harsh strictures, the registration process has reportedly broken down. According to Elizabeth Economy, fewer than one hundred foreign NGOs out of several thousand had been accepted for registration within the first six months of the law’s implementation (2018, 41). This makes it far more difficult for these NGOs to enter into China and gain information that can be given to the U.N. and other institutions. Domestic NGOs also became disallowed from receiving funding outside the country. As one activist said, “The real purpose of the foreign NGO law is to restrict foreign NGOs’ activities in China and to restrict domestic NGOs’rights in China” (Economy 2018, 178). Xi dislikes NGOs and their ability to help these institutions publicly shame China. While they have previously filled a gap, Xi is closing access, making both NGOs and international institutions less important in the international conversation on human rights. While I certainly concede that international institutions play a role in China’s relationship with human rights, I still assert that the United States possesses the greatest force to pressure China on this topic it wishes to disregard entirely.

CONCLUSION

While other institutions and countries certainly support movements against China, the United States is inarguably the leader. With both the greatest amount of power and the deepest interest, theAmerican pushback against China has made the greatest impact on theAsian nation. The U.S. has frequently been the source driving these international institutions, such as when the “United States played a ‘leading role’ in sponsoring and lobbying U.N. resolutions criticizing the practices of China and requesting political change in 1995” (Hun Joon Kim 2018, 14). The United States continues to write reports on China each year, showing its dedication to the issue.

Additionally, the United States possesses two items of great influence – economic and political power.As the world’s greatest super power and China’s largest trading partner, the United States holds such great influence that China cannot refuse to listen or undergo consequences in areas they hold great interest. The evidence shows long running and consistent disregard from the Chinese government for human rights; without some kind of check, the

nation would make no efforts to emphasize or create any sense of human rights in the nation. However, China cares deeply about economic and strategic matters, to which the United States frequently ties its human rights-related problems, forcing interest in a disinterested nation. While China still commits atrocities each year, it has been forced to consider human rights within its overall goals, as seen by the 2009 National Human Rights Action Plan and its participation in organizations like the U.N. Human Rights Council. The American efforts against China have led the rest of the world to shame the nation for its problems. This global attention now forces China to consider outside opinions in its internal affairs, such as with Hong Kong, where China has shown uncharacteristic restraint. China has been pushed into a position where the government must consider human rights and outside appearances as it works to grow in the world due to American guidance. The opinion of its greatest trading partner and the globe’s leader matters, forcing the authoritarian nation to begrudgingly consider the West’s appreciation of human rights in its decisions and actions. While we may consider these nations’connection primarily through the lens of economy or military, we must not forget the issue of human rights and how it impacts this tense, powerful relationship.

REFERENCES

Billitteri, Thomas J., Tienchi Martin-Liao, and James A. Dorn. “Human Rights in China: Should The U.S. Use Trade SanctionsAgainst China to Promote Human Rights? (United States.)” CQ Researcher 18, no. 26 (July 25, 2008).

Castets, Rémi. “What’s Really Happening to Uighurs in Xinjiang?” The Nation, The Nation Company LLC, March 19, 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/china-xinjiang-uighur- oppression/.

“China: Olympics Harm Key Human Rights.” Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch,August 6, 2008. https:// www.hrw.org/news/2008/08/06/china-olympics-harm-key-human-rights#.

“China/United States: Human Rights Day Statement by Ambassador Max Baucus.” Asia New Monitor. Bangkok: Thai News Service Group, January 8, 2015. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1642656246/.

“China/United States; China’s Human RightsAbuses Increasing Under Xi.”Asia News Monitor. Bangkok: Thai News Service Group, October 12, 2018. http://search.proquest.com/docview/2117924099/.

Dobson, Wendy. Partners and Rivals: The Uneasy Future of China’s Relationship with the United States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013.

Economy, Elizabeth. The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Foot, Rosemary. Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Hastings, Justin V. “Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest.” The China Quarterly no. 2018 (2011): 893-912. www. jstor.org/stable/41447781.

Kim, Hun Joon. “The Prospects of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructivist Understanding.” International Relations of theAsia-Pacific 20, no.1 (August 17, 2018): 91-118. doi:10.1093/irap/lcy020.

“Promises Unfulfilled:AnAssessment of China’s National Human RightsAction Plan.” Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, January 11, 2011. https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/01/11/promises-unfulfilled/assessmentchinas-national- human-rights-action-plan.

Puddington, Arch. “China: The Global Leader in Political Prisoners.” Freedom House, July 26, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/article/china-global-leader-political-prisoners.

Qi, Zhou. “Conflicts over Human Rights between China and the US.” Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 1 (February 2005): 105-24. http://search.proquest.com/docview/20843708/.

Seymour, James D. The Fifth Modernization: China’s Human Rights Movement, 1978-1979.

Standfordville, NY: Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980.

Su, Alice. “U.S. Hits China over Human Rights. Beijing Says It’s Just a Distraction from NBA, Trade Talks.” Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, October 9, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/worldnation/story/2019-10-09/us-china-human-rights-trade-talks.

Wang, Yanan. “Xi Jinping’s Rise Shatters Hopes for Democracy in China.” Chicago Tribune. Chicago Tribune, March 12, 2018. https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-xi- jinping-china-rule-20180312-story.html.

Workman, Daniel. “China’s Top Trading Partners.” World’s Top Exports. Wordpress, December 7, 2019. http://www. worldstopexports.com/chinas-top-import-partners/.

Ze Yu, Shirley. “China Would Rather See Hong Kong Lose Its Economic Role than Cede Control.” South China Morning Post. South China Morning Post, October 15, 2019. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/ article/3032733/china-would-rather-see-hong- kong-lose-its-role-financial-gateway.