International Partnership to Monitor Space Debris

Nathan Ciatti

Since the first satellite was placed into space by the Soviet Union in 1957, space debris began to accumulate in the seemingly never-ending final frontier (Weeden 2017). There are now an estimated 500,000 pieces of so-called “space junk” in the Earth’s orbit today, with 21,000 larger than four inches in diameter, many of which carry the potential to strike the 1,500 artificial satellites vital to states’infrastructure (Mosher and Lee 2018). Space debris colliding with a satellite is comparable to icebergs striking ships, yet with much higher stakes considering a state could lose crucial defense capabilities and possibly fall to Earth, as China’s Tiangong-1 space station recently did (Mosher and Lee 2018). Satellites vary in capability, including for astronomical research, observation of Earth, weather, reconnaissance or missile defense (Weeden 2017). These satellites are not only used for advancing state capacity, but also within the private sector by a plethora of companies such as DirecTV and Globalstar, especially for communications (Mosher and Lee 2018). In addition, prestigious private space pioneers like SpaceX and Boeing are expanding their involvement in the space community and share the sameconcern over space debris (Space.com 2011).As space exploration and satellite development has increased exponentially, with over 80 states now utilizing space, the creation and impact of space debris has also continued to grow (Space.com 2011). Former commander of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Joint Functional Component Command for Space Lt. Gen. Susan Helms notes that it is impossible for a single state to monitor all space debris threats simultaneously from an infrastructure and information perspective, stating, “We must partner with other nations and enterprises to achieve mutually beneficial goals, and at the top of our priorities is the development of comprehensive SSA(Space SituationalAwareness)” (Space.com 2011).

The space debris issue is nothing new to the international community, yet has recently moved from the hidden to the systemic agenda for many states as space has become less foreign of an environment. The international regime for space debris monitoring and mitigation can aptly be described by the following three leading institutions. Of course, space debris is also a focus of each state’s individual space agencies. The United Nations Office for Outer SpaceAffairs (UNOOSA) developed its “Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” which details UN protocols for the mitigation of space junk (United Nations 2010). The InterAgency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) includes 13 states’space agencies and was founded in 1993 as an inter-governmental forum to combat space debris (IADC n.d.). While the IADC does somewhat focus on the coordinated exchange of research information, coordinating mitigation policy is the primary objective (IADCn.d.). It is also notable that the world-leading United States NationalAeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA) has abstained from joining the IADC (IADC n.d.).As part of PresidentBarack Obama’s 2010 National Space Policy, USSTRATCOM’s Joint Space Operations Center increased its screening system for possible debris collisions to all commercial and foreign satellites and provided warnings for close conjunctions to all involved operators (Weeden 2017).This Space SituationalAwareness (SSA) Data Sharing Program involved 285 member organizations and directly contributed to 128 satellite avoidances through 2016 (Weeden 2017). This program has been considered a success, but must be scaled to include more information from all the member organizations to truly ensure exceptional monitoring practices. Currently, only NASA provided intelligence to the other members and the program

included few of the larger state actors in space (Weeden 2017). The current institutions have been quite successful in drawing attention to the issue, but, apart from the SSA Data Sharing Program, have mainly focused on executing mitigation practices and limiting the creation of space junk to decrease the number of harmful objects in orbit, rather than monitoring the threats that are already present (Space.com 2011). Mitigation offers great long-term advantages but does not successfully address the ongoing issue at hand for the satellites already operating in space (McCormick 2013).

It is integral to consider space debris as an environmental issue requiring a response with infrastructure. While the literature generally describes Earth’s environment as within the constraints of the lower atmosphere, as innovative projects and the number of satellites in space continue to grow, the traditional environmental boundaries are constantly being pushed farther away from the planet (McCormick 2013). It is undeniable that humanity’s influence in space will only continue to grow, so promoting clean and preventative practices in the limitless void surrounding Earth is no different than protecting the oceans or forests close to home (Mosher and Lee 2018).

Successful destruction of all hazardous objects in space would inherently solve the problem, but the current state of global space technology and infrastructure consequently makesit absurdly expensive, if not physically impossible (McCormick 2013). Therefore, minimizing the potential of future space debris creation, decreasing the current amount of space debris and monitoring all current space debris are realistic short-term goals by which to measure success. The most important of these objectives is strongly monitoring current space debris, as the present threats are not going anywhere any time soon. If every hazardous space object can be identifiedand further monitored, the international community could celebrate a degree of success.

There is an obvious need for the development of the International Partnership to Monitor Space Debris. This global public-private partnership would integrate state space agencies and private space companies to promote the exchange of information about current space debris and satellites to allow for the greatest possible coordination of monitoring efforts.A“public-private partnership project generally involves the design, construction, financing and maintenance (and in some cases operation) of public infrastructure or a public facility by the private sector under a long-term contract” and therefore would produce an exceptional response to the issue of space debris (Hodge and Greve 2007).A20 to 30-year contract would be developed and negotiated between the 80-plus countries and corporations operating artificial satellites, followed by bidding between several private space companies. The time frame is essential; the agreed upon length must allow enough time for international mitigation policies to be implemented and executed to begin to rid the orbital environment of the actual problem. These companies may also be involved in the sharing of information too; there is no conflict of interest in creating the database and promoting security of its own satellites. In fact, this would encourage the contracted company to produce a better program for the need of protecting its ownsatellites. The private sector of the space industry will bid on the construction of a database for all member institutions to share their space intelligence and data, as well as the integrated communications pathways required to transmit this sensitive information. Once operational, the private company will continue to maintain the day-to-day operations and security of the databaseto ensure that everything is running smoothly. This effort would initially be spearheaded and managed by NASA, Russia’s Roscosmos State Corporation for Space Activities, the China National Space Administration and the European Space Agency, which consists of 22 states (IADC n.d.). The involvement of these four leading space agencies is critical to the success of the IPMSD; they combine for the management of the clear majority of artificial satellites and have the most established and longstanding space programs (Mosher and Lee 2018). The IPMSD will function solely as a platform

to improve space situational awareness bysharing all data concerning each member’s satellites and information and research regarding each’s knowledge of hazardous space debris. Once obtaining any pertinent information to an individual state’s or company’s satellite, the entity may choose how to proceed. This may include eliminating the threat or altering the satellite’s trajectory to avoid a collision; these actions are made possible by the development of a state’s capacity to increase its space situational awareness. Lt. Gen. Helms manifested that coordination “directs us to collaborate with other nations, the private-sector and intergovernmental organizations to improve our space situational awareness – specifically to enhance our shared ability to rapidly detect, warn of, characterize and attribute natural man-made disturbances to space systems” (Space.com 2011).

It is integral to the success of the IPMSD that each space agency and company involved in the space environment participate in the partnership. The more institutions involved, the greater amount of information that can be shared, and with greater information lessens uncertainty surrounding space debris threats and between state interactions within the realm of space (McCormick 2013). Each institution also has access to different specialized data about the artificial and natural objects in space, furthering the need for as much exchange of information as possible to decide the most correct response to each threat. The resources allocated to the IPMSD are minimal, as they primarily consist of the data produced by already established space debris monitoring programs. Outside of states developing the formal processes and paperwork while negotiating and finalizing the partnership, it only becomes the financial burden of the states to finance the contracted private company to develop and maintain the database.Each member institution will financially contribute the costs proportional to the number of satellites they have in space at the time. Traditional public-private partnerships focus on the allocation of project risks among all members (Bagal 2008). Economist Satish Bagal illustrates, “The optimum rule of risk allocation is that the partner who is most suited to assume a particulartype of risk is assigned that risk” (Bagal 2008). The participating members with a greater space presence have more developed space programs that are better funded and equipped to acquire therisk burden.

As a public-private partnership, there is no need for a command structure or voting rules. The IPMSD is purely focused on providing access to information for space actors and nothing more; the IPMSD should complement the existing space debris regime as a specialized partnership and not as a separate actor. The UN Office for Outer SpaceAffairs would largely deal with other space issues and it would be expected that states would continue bilateral and multilateral space agreements (Weeden 2017). When considering compliance and enforcement procedures, the consequences of free-riding and not providing information are inherent; not sharing information may lead to a state losing access to valuable functions via satellite collision. Even if one state or organization withheld information with the intent of harming another, the possibility arises that the aftermath of a satellite collision means a dangerous object hurtling into Earth’s atmosphere, with little predictability of where it will land, which could include the original problem state (Mosher and Lee 2018). This alone should suffice as discouraging member states from not participating considering that all parties involved stand to gain from theexchange of information.

When considering monitoring space debris as an infrastructural matter, a public-private partnership is the most logical institution to respond with. Economist Mohamed Ismail Sabry promotes, “Infrastructural services are public goods with positive externalities; they are also natural monopolies, not subject to competitive market concerns” (Sabry 2015). This makes government involvement essential to a public-private partnership’s success with the combination of private investment (Sabry 2015). For the IPMSD, the investment from the public and private sectors alike is primarily in the form of information rather than traditional financial investments, but that is

simply because of the nature of the issue (Sabry 2015). Furthermore, as private companies continue to lead the 21st century’s new generation of space exploration, Sabry states, “Private investment in a public-private partnership can encourage investment in other economic activities,” specifically other space exploration projects in the future (Sabry 2015). Research Triangle Institute’s Jennifer and Derick Brinkerhoff summarize public-private partnerships as having “jointly determined goals,” “shared accountability for outcomes and results” and “trust- based and informal as well as formalized relationships” (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). These objectives to enhance governance effectiveness through a partnership that enhances efficiency and effectiveness, as well as creating win-win situations for all parties, are necessary elements for a successful IPMSD (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011).As space becomes less of the final frontier and more of Earth’s backyard, space services will more often require infrastructure and capacity-building partnerships that decrease project risk but still offer incredible opportunity (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011).

It is also important to consider that the public perception of a “partnership” versus “privatization,” “outsourcing” or “contracting out” is quite influential when states are decidingto join public-private partnerships, and the IPMSD especially (Hodge and Greve 2007). In the beginning of the IPMSD, the public may voice the concern of sharing space intelligence with many other nations, and more importantly, combining state-ran efforts with the private sector. For a successful strategy to be implemented, it is critical that governments take advantage of the “language game” when pursuing policy votes; of course, this is no new process for those already involved in the public-policy making process (Hodge and Greve 2007). The aura surrounding government-business linkages must be clarified; for the IPMSD, the partnership focuses on greater efficiency and ensuring the safety of space satellites rather than an “economic wealth- creating activity” through simple information gathering and sharing (Hodge and Greve 2007). General attitudes towards public-private partnerships often lead to critiquing the government and its contractors as only pursuing political and economic advancement rather than truly focusing on the needs of the public (Hodge and Greves 2007). Yet, the mandate of the IPMSD is so narrow in scope that it is difficult to imagine ways for partnerships to be taken advantage of for external gains unrelated to monitoring space debris. The private sector only has the opportunity to participate in two roles: being contracted to develop and maintain the database and participatein information-sharing with the other space actors. The partnership allows for minimal variation from the primary purpose of coordinating information, alleviating the concerns raised by Hodge and Greves (Hodge and Greves 2007).

Apublic-private partnership is often the most influential policy option in “successful execution of complex policy projects, such as public services … or infrastructures” (Heldeweg and Sanders 2013). Oftentimes, publicprivate partnerships precipitate the shift from government to governance in the name of public interest legitimacy (Heldeweg and Sanders 2013). Secure World Foundation TechnicalAdvisor Brian Weeden classified space debris as a “super wicked problem” with “no central authority providing guidance or support” in 2014 (Lewis 2015). The leadership and central authority that Weeden seeks has not been found in IGOs like the UNOOSA, particularly because most actors lack the resources and technology to sufficiently contribute to the mitigation of space debris (Lewis 2015). It is currently an incredibly expensive and inefficient process, especially for smaller states that may have only several satellites in orbit, and therefore a much smaller interest compared to a space leader in the U.S. or China (Weeden 2017). Therefore, a network public-private partnership is the best possible response as it aims to develop a commission to formulate a joint strategy (Heldeweg and Sanders 2013). Heldeweg and Sanders describes these entities in “Good Legal Governance in Authoritative Public-Private Partnerships”:

In such arrangements, public and private parties retain their own tasks, powers and responsibilities, so that implementation of the strategy by formal decisions to this effect remains a matter for government. It is, however, the intention behind the joint strategy that it serves to reciprocally tune the activities of all partners involved, so as to enhance the chances of realization (Heldeweg and Sanders 2013). This contrasts with market and authoritative public-private partnerships because of the scope of its goals, as the international space regime is not yet ready to implement placing a space debris project into effect (Heldeweg and Sanders 2013). The focus on “concerted strategic coordination” in network PPPs regarding powers and responsibilities of all members, public andprivate parties alike, differentiates from the other PPP types, which are formed to act immediately upon agreement (Heldeweg and Sanders 2013).

An IGO, especially like the United Nations with its incredible number of state members, could be considered a better response to the space debris issue (McCormick 2013). Indeed, cooperation within an IGO will be pertinent to any long-term successes in many space dilemmas as participation in space becomes more widespread and space development evolves into a paramount part of all states’agendas (Mosher and Lee 2018). Yet, IGOs will present several critical problems to lessening the problem in the short term. First, IGOs would ignore the private sector and not allow them to have direct input in decision-making. As the private sector continues to increase its market share in the space industry and satellite control moves away from state-run space agencies, the private sector will grow into a major actor that requires considerable input (McCormick 2013). Without their intelligence regarding space debris and satellite location tracking, states are immediately decreasing their space situational awareness (Weeden 2017). Second, as previously stated, the circumstances of the space debris issue requirespace agencies to focus solely on information sharing to avoid space debris; there is little decision-making to be had in the short term when the distribution of intelligence is the only function in IPMSD’s mandate. Utilizing a public-private partnership inherently limits organizational capacity and IGOs seemingly offer more organizational potential, but currently the limited capacity is all that is needed (Walker and Jackman 2006). Third, states may be skeptical of participation in an IGO because multilaterally sharing intelligence directly with otherstates could be performed inefficiently and ineffectively considering the complexities of IGO bureaucracy (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The application of a contracted private company’s database provides a high- profile, industry leading coordination platform that makes the distribution of information simple. The private sector has greater resources and expert specialization than states’ space agencies and therefore they would promote more trust and participation than an IGO (Greve and Hodge 2007). Regarding concerns about participation within the database, it is in each state’s best interest to share their pertinent information to the database without reservation, as they would want other states to do the same in case there is a discrepancy, leaving an unidentified threat hurtling towards their own satellite.

When considering joining the IPMSD, states and companies alike must consider the partnership as a stepping stone for greater international cooperation in the future. In 2011, the National Research Council classified the “current orbital environment” as having already reached “a tipping point whereby the amount of debris currently in orbit has reached a threshold where it will continuously collide with itself … increasing the amount of debris faster than the rate at which atmospheric drag can remove the debris” (National Research Council 2011). The proliferation of space debris cannot be ignored any longer, as eventually space will once again become as unutilized as it was a century ago, harming an astounding amount of humanity’s technological capabilities and crushing progress as a society (McCormick 2013). The first step is to alleviate the stress that space debris currently has on artificial satellites by coordinating private and domestic monitoring space debris programs. This will ease the issue

for the time being, allowing time for true international mitigation policy to be implemented and executed. Public-private partnerships offer a simple, efficient and effective coordinating entity to include all actors involved. The IPMSD platform for intelligence distribution to increase space situational awareness will be the first in creating the opportunity for greater space satellite usage,research and exploration, furthering humanity’s advancement within the solar system and beyond.

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