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JACK SIEGEL Texas Bar No. 24070621 SIEGEL LAW GROUP PLLC 4925 Greenville, Suite 600 Dallas, TX 75206 Telephone: (214) 790-4454 Email: Jack@siegellawgroup.biz Admitted Pro Hac Vice IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA Tina Weeks, Michael McDonald, and Cassandra Magdaleno, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00884-SPL v. Matrix Absence Management, Inc., an Arizona Company, Defendant. REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR STEP-ONE NOTICE PURSUANT TO THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
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1. Introduction: Plaintiffs Have Met Their Low Burden Under Campbell As shown below, based on Matrix’s admissions and Plaintiffs’ evidence—jointly and severally—Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that they and all CCEs (which Matrix collectively refers to in its response as “claims examiners”)—share similar issues of fact and law material to the disposition of their claims that Matrix classified them as exempt from overtime. Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018) (Ex. A). Nothing more is required. In fact, Plaintiffs’ evidence arguably satisfies the much higher predominance requirement under Rule 23 by illustrating that common proof will show that Plaintiffs and other CCEs do not satisfy the “directly related” prong of the administrative exemption. Matrix’s own admissions evidence that all salaried CEEs produce the claims processing and administrative services that Matrix is in business to provide to its customers as a third-party administrator, as opposed to an insurance company that sells and/or underwrites insurance, further belying Matrix’s opposition to Notice. See Answer, ECF 12, ¶ 2, ECF 33 (“Response” or “R”), p. 2 (Matrix’s business consists of “adjudicating” leave of absence and disability claims and “claims examiners” are responsible for “adjudicating” claims in Matrix’s “claims handling process”); Scott Wetzel Services Inc. v. New York State Bd. of Indus. Appeals, 252 A.D. 2d 212, 215 (1998) (summary judgment granted on directly related prong where employer’s business was “the administration, settlement and payment of worker’s compensation and general liability claims while the examiners' function was to independently administer and settle the claims within the limits of their delegated authority,” and rejecting inapposite case law involving companies that sold insurance) (Ex. B); Williams v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 290 F.R.D. 600, 611 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (Ex. C) (granting notice exclusively based on evidence negating the
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administrative exemption’s “directly related” prong). Accordingly, notice to the similarly situated salaried CCEs should be granted. Ex. D (revised notice); Ex. E (redlined notice). 2. The Response Admits Plaintiffs & Salaried CCEs Are Similarly Situated Plaintiffs’ Motion requests that the Court authorize notice to a defined group of Matrix’s employees that Plaintiffs have collectively referred to as “Claims Examination Employees” or “CEEs.” “CEEs” are Matrix’s “salaried, non-management employees” employed to “process disability and leave of absence claims under various job titles that include the terms ‘Absence Management Specialist’ or ‘Claims Examiner.’” ECF 26 (“Motion” or “M”), p. 3. The Motion sought Notice to this group: All individuals employed by Matrix as Claims Examination Employees in the last three years who were paid on a salary basis and classified as exempt from overtime compensation. This definition specifically includes all individuals employed in CEE job titles in the last three years. M, p. 5. The Response admits CEEs are similarly situated, but collectively refers to the CEEs as “claims examiners” in the Response. Specifically, Matrix admits to employing Plaintiffs and a collective group of “claims examiners” under four categories of job titles containing the terms “Absence Management Specialist” or “Claims Examiner”—and specifically “Leave of Absence (LOA) examiners, Short Term Disability (STD) examiners, Long Term Disability (LTD) examiners, and Absence Management Specialist (AMS) examiners”—to “adjudicate” (a fancy word for “process”) disability and leave of absence claims (in accordance with predetermined policies, standards, and guidelines) as part of Matrix’s own-defined “claims handling process.” See ECF 33 (“Response” or “R”), Background §§ A-C, pp. A-B. Matrix also admits to relying on the “claims examiners’” common job duties—including that they all exercise independent judgment in “adjudicating claims—to uniformly classify Plaintiffs and all 3
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“claims examiners” (CCEs) as exempt administrators based on their common job duties— specifically the exercise of discretion and independent judgment See R, p. 3 (“Given their [common] duties and discretion to independently adjudicate claims, Matrix classifies these claims examiners as exempt.”).1 These admissions provide sufficient grounds to grant conditional certification because it shows that “Plaintiffs and [“claims examiners” or CEEs] are similarly situated and may proceed as a collective because they “share a similar issue of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claims.” Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018). While not dispositive, a comprehensive job classification system like Matrix’s supports certification, even in the context of Rule 23. See Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 946 & n.14 (9th Cir. 2009) (while not dispositive, uniform application of an exemption to employees can be one factor supporting class certification). Indeed, [I]t is manifestly disingenuous for a company to treat a class of employees as a homogenous group for the purposes of internal policies and compensation, and then assert that the same group is too diverse for class treatment in overtime litigation. In re Wells Fargo Overtime Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Unlike the Rule 23 context, the differences cited by Matrix between job titles are irrelevant here. Campbell, at 1114 (even at step-two, as “long as the proposed collective’s ‘factual or legal similarities are
While Matrix claims to assign different levels to each of these four job titles, the different levels do not impact the ability to determine the legal question of whether they exercise sufficient independent judgment and discretion to qualify for the administrative exemption See ECF 34, ¶ 8 (the “independent judgment and discretion utilized by a Level I employee is no different from that utilized by a Senior-level employee.”). 1
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material to the resolution of their case, dissimilarities in other respects should not defeat collective treatment.”). Instead, in the event the differences between the different [CCEs] prove so significant that their claims cannot be decided as a class, [Matrix] may ask the Court to decertify the class or the class may be divided into subclasses. However, such a determination is better suited to the second stage.” Schroeder v. Humana Inc., 12-C-0137, 2012 WL 5931886, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 27, 2012) (rejecting that alleged differences in the type of benefit or procedure being reviewed; guidelines applied; job titles; job duties; locations worked; management; production standards; workloads; and authority to deviate from guidelines precluded notice and granting notice to all “clinical advisors,” regardless of which of job title, based on five declarations stating all positions performed same basic job function of comparing “information to guidelines in order to make approval determinations” by using “standardized guidelines that determine the outcome of … authorization decisions.”). Accordingly, Matrix’s admissions alone justify Notice to the group of salaried CCEs that Matrix admits to uniformly classifying as exempt administrators.2 Plaintiffs have clarified the class definition to reference the four job titles that Matrix admits are substantially similar to add clarity in the revised notice attached as Ex. A. 3. The Response’s Analysis is Irrelevant: Matrix Chose to Ignore the Ninth Circuit’s Binding Precedent Regarding the Similarly Situated Requirement
Notably, Matrix has also already admitted in this case that all of the CCEs in this case were classified as exempt based on their shared job duties, including at page 3 of the Parties’ Joint Case Management Plan: “Defendants’ Position: Matrix denies Plaintiffs’ claims. Matrix helps its clients manage and administer leaves of absence. Plaintiffs and other “Claims Examination Employees” (as Plaintiffs define that phrase) were properly classified as exempt because they received more than the minimum salary requirement, their primary duties are integral and directly related to the management of Defendant’s policies and business, and they regularly exercised discretion and independent judgment when analyzing and applying various state and federal leave laws and regulations.” ECF 37. 2
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In 2018, the Ninth Circuit in Campell lowered the already low burden required for certification. As one court recently explained, Read as a whole, Campbell requires a much lower showing than the two-step approach district courts previously employed. Under Campbell, the named plaintiff and putative plaintiffs are “similarly situated” when “they share a similar issue of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claim.” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1117. If plaintiff makes a plausible showing that such a similarity exists, the district court should grant first-stage certification. Id. at 1109-10 (endorsing “plausibility standard” for first-stage certification). Importantly, Campbell specifically eschewed the practical considerations of manageability or efficiency that permeated prior district court FLSA certification jurisprudence. Instead, the district court may take into account those considerations only at the second-stage, and even then, those considerations only support decertification when the collective mechanism is “truly infeasible.” Id. at 1117. (a district court “cannot reject party plaintiffs' choice to proceed collectively based on its perception of likely inconvenience.”).3 Notably, even at stage two,4 “as long as the proposed collective’s ‘factual or legal similarities are material to the resolution of their case, dissimilarities in other respects should not defeat collective treatment.’” Campbell at 1117. Matrix’s decision to “pretend that [this] dispositive authority against [its main] contention[s] [do] not exist” is sanctionable. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1081 (7th Cir. 1987). This failure is the why the Response makes arguments, such as claiming a movant has the burden to show that an employer’s misclassification scheme actually violates the law at step-one (R, pp. 11-12), which lack any legal support. Ferguson v. Smith, 2020 WL 5731821, at *7 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2020) (“Plaintiffs are
Campanelli v. Image First Healthcare Laundry Specialists, Inc., 2018 WL 6727825, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018). 4 The Court should ignore Matrix’s citations to Pfohl v. Farmers Ins. Group, 2004 WL 554834, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2004); Blaney v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp., 2011 WL 4351631, at *10 (W.D.N.C. Sept 16, 2011) where courts applied a second stage standard only after substantial discovery had already been conducted, which is not the case here. 3
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not yet required to produce evidence that his claim will succeed on the merits or that FLSA violations actually occurred, only the limited showing of a common policy or plan.”). Unable to rebut Plaintiffs’ evidence that CCEs are similarly situated, Matrix argues the merits of its administrative exemption defense in contravention of its own-cited case law. Colson v. Avnet, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925 (D. Ariz. 2010). It also contends that its exemption defense will require individualized inquiries, but these differences do not form a basis to deny conditional certification (and no longer form a basis for decertification) under Ninth Circuit precedent. Campbell at 1117. Given the admitted similarities between salaried CCEs, the differences cited by Matrix between job titles are really distinctions without a meaningful difference at Step-One. Indeed, Matrix fails to distinguish or discuss any of the many cases cited in Plaintiffs’ brief at page 16, which reveal that courts routinely grant Notice to groups of workers who process claims in compliance with pre-determined guidelines, even when in overlapping job titles: Allen v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 616CV1603, 2017 WL 3701139 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2017) (granting notice to nationwide group of “Analysts” who processed disability insurance claims under 41 different job titles based on declarations stating they primarily processed disability claims, performed regardless of title, were paid a salary while regularly working over 40 hours a week without overtime pay, performed their work in accordance with strict policies and procedures, had no authority to negotiate claims, and had their work frequently reviewed by superiors); Hart v. U.S. Bank NA, CV 12-2471 , 2013 WL 5965637, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2013) (granting notice to nationwide group of Automobile underwriters and RV/Marine underwriters based on showing that they had the same primary duty of making underwriting decisions by applying internal credit guidelines when making underwriting decisions and worked over 40 hours per workweek); Neary v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609 (D. Conn. 2007) (granting notice to Field Adjusters, Field Appraisers and/or Outside Adjusters based on Plaintiffs’ testimony that “he and the putative collective action members are similarly situated in that they all held the same or similar position and had the same or similar responsibilities and daily tasks."); Baldozier v. Am. Family Mutual Ins., 375 F.Supp.2d 1089, 1092–93 (D. Colo. 2005) (granting notice to nationwide group of 7
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vehicle damage claim representatives treated as exempt and denied overtime pay based on affidavits asserting that all representatives had same job function regardless of location or title); Clark v. Centene Corp., No. A-12-CA-174-SS, 2013 WL 12108138, at *4 (W.D. Tex. May 8, 2013) (granting notice to … “nurses working in ‘utilization management’” whose job duties included “applying predetermined criteria and guidelines to a patient’s medical data in response to requests … authorization of services”).56 Despite admitting salaried CCEs are similarly situated, Matrix attempts to attack the credibility of Plaintiffs’ allegedly “cookie cutter” declarations and job descriptions, despite its position being contradicted by its own case law: The Court does not resolve factual disputes regarding the [employees'] job descriptions or job duties at this first step of the certification process…. Where, as here, plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to meet step one's ‘extremely lenient standard’ for conditional certification, evidence offered by the defendant purporting to show plaintiffs are not similarly situated to absent class members, while significant after discovery and during the step-two analysis, does not compel denial of conditional certification…. In addition, despite averments to the contrary, "the declarations submitted by defendants have a “‘heightened potential for coercion because where the absent class member and the defendant are involved in an ongoing business relationship, such as employeremployee, any communications are more likely to be coercive.” Longnecker v. Am. Express Co., 2014 WL 4071662, at *4-5; Kuzich v. HomeStreet Bank, 2018 WL 3872191, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 15, 2018) (rejecting Matrix’s argument). As one court put it, “How are Plaintiffs to allege that they all suffered the same injury as a result of the same corporate policy if they cannot make the same factual allegations? The notion borders on the
See also Benedict v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 13-CV-00119-LHK, 2014 WL 587135, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) (“courts routinely grant conditional certification of multiple-job-titleclasses in misclassification cases”) (collecting cases). 6 Courts also certify collectives in cases where employers attempt to hide behind arbitrary job titles where the positions perform similar job duties. See e.g. Clark, 2013 WL 12108138, at *3 (where employer denied existence of “Utilization Review Nurse” job title, granting notice to workers applying “predetermined criteria and guidelines to patients’ medical data in response to requests … for authorization of services”). 5
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absurd.” Other courts agree. Noble v. Serco, Inc., 2009 WL 3154252, at *3 (E.D. Ky Sept. 28, 2009) (when “declarants have had similar experiences, [they need not] come up with a creative way to state the same allegations.”).7 4. Plaintiffs’ Evidence Also Independently Justifies Conditional Certification Plaintiffs’ 11 declarations and 29 job descriptions for the at-issue jobs establish the following facts material to the disposition of their misclassification claims: • Matrix is a third-party administrator “that processes leave of absence and disability claims for its customers” that employed Plaintiffs and “other non-management employees (“CCEs” or “Claims Examination Employees”) to produce the ongoing, day-to-day processing services it sells to its customers.” • CCEs, regardless of specific titles, primarily perform “Claims Examination Work,” consisting of processing insurance claims8 in accordance with predetermined guidelines within specific timeframes. • CCEs perform Claims Review Work in accordance with Matrix’s policies, procedures, guidelines and criteria—and could not significantly deviate from them in performing their work. CCEs lacked the authority to deny claims for failure to meet coverage criteria because Matrix had a strict policy that required their
Matrix’s argument that the declarations are weakened because Plaintiff’s counsel has represented clients in similar cases involving similar insurance claim workers is likewise flawed. First, the declarations cited by Matrix are not the same. Regardless, it is only logical that cases involving similar jobs jobs in the same industry would involve similar factual allegations. Headspeth v. TPUSA, Inc., 2020 WL 3818922, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 2020) (“Indeed, ‘[t]here is no rule that requires plaintiffs to compose affidavits in their own words, without the assistance of counsel. In that light, the fact that many plaintiffs can agree on a single formulation as accurately describing their job duties is a strong indicator that certification is appropriate.’ Moreover, as noted above, the Court at this point “does not generally consider the merits of the claims, resolve factual disputes, or evaluate credibility.”’) (quoting Mathews, 2009 WL 2591497, at *5). 8 While Matrix makes a semantic argument that “leave of absence” claims are not “insurance claims,” its merits argument is wrong and is not ripe at the conditional certification stage here. bit.ly/WebstersInsurance (defining insurance as “a means of guaranteeing protection or safety) (last visited Oct. 8, 2020); Price v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 321 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating the FMLA “insure[s] the availability” of the “broad protections for employees who need to take [reasonable leave for medical purposes][,]” and “affords employees protection…”). 7
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supervisors—at all times—retain ultimate authority over whether Matrix would deny a claim based on failure to meet criteria. • CCEs had no role or involvement in creating the policies, procedures, guidelines or criteria that they were forced to follow in performing their work, but instead had to strictly and timely apply these decision-making tools in order to meet Matrix’s production and accuracy requirements. Failure to do so would have resulted in poor performance reviews, corrective action, and potential termination. • CCEs regularly worked over 40 hours per week, but were not paid overtime because Matrix paid CCEs pursuant to its OT Misclassification Policy that misclassified CCEs as exempt, paid them a salary, and denied them overtime pay for their overtime work. See ECF 27, Ex. A-L. These allegations are corroborated by the many documents evidencing the nature of Matrix’s business as a licensed third party claims administrator (ECF 27, Ex. MS): Matrix is not an insurance company and holds no licenses to write insurance policies or sell insurance; instead, its core business involves contracting with its customers to administer and process insurance claims. See M, § 1, A. Notice to salaried CCEs is warranted based on the reasoning employed in granting notice to mortgage underwriters working for a mortgage lender in Williams, 290 F.R.D. at 611: [W]ork is “directly related to the management or general business operations” if it is “directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a). That is, the essence of the exemption is that the mortgage underwriters must be engaged in, or least assist in, “the running of a business,” including the determination of “its overall course or policies.” Bratt v. County of Los Angeles 912 F.2d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir.1990) (interpreting an earlier version of the regulation) …. This does not include merely “the day-to-day carrying out” of the business’s affairs. Id…. [P]laintiff’s evidence is that the decisions about who will get a loan is made by the defendant, through its lending guidelines and policies. The mortgage underwriters… compare the documentation … against the guidelines and policies set out for them, to determine whether the loan applicant meets the requirements of the guidelines and policies. On its face, this is evidence that the mortgage underwriters—all of them—are not engaged in running the business or setting underwriting policy, but simply carrying out the day-to-day determinations of whether Applicant A meets guidelines B, C and D. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.704 (“The section 13(a)(1) exemptions are not available … for 10
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employees who simply apply well-established techniques or procedures described in manuals or other sources within closely prescribed limits to determine the correct response to an inquiry or set of circumstances”). According to plaint’ff's evidence, the mortgage underwriters follow the policies, procedures and guidelines applicable to their work…. The prospective class members do not create or modify these policies, procedures or guidelines. They do not price the loans…. While there is some “flexibility” or “variance” in how the mortgage underwriters carry out their jobs, “[a]s part of the day-to-day duties, the variance would be limited to guidelines given to the underwriters.”. None of the prospective class members determine what type of loan would be offered…. The above evidence [is] sufficient to show that the [collective is] “similarly situated” in respect to whether they are running a business, or simply engaged in the day-to-day carrying out of the business. Here, Plaintiffs’ evidence shows that all CCEs follow policies, procedures and guidelines— which they do not create or modify—to provide the claims processing service that Matrix, as third-party claims administrator, is in business to provide to its customers.9 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden for Notice to show that they and other salaried CCEs have similar issues of fact and law relevant to assess the administrative exemption’s second prong. 5. The Court Should Reject Matrix’s Notice Arguments
Matrix argues the merits of the “directly related” prong of Rule 23 in the response by citing to Miller v. Farmers Ins. Exch., which is inapposite because essential to Miller’s decision turned on the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s “business is not limited to claims adjusting; it also sells insurance products.” 481 F.3d 1119, (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). The analysis is different here because Matrix lacks the legal ability to either sell or write insurance products. Scott Wetzel Services Inc. v. New York State Bd. of Indus. Appeals, 252 A.D. 2d 212, 215 (1998) (granting summary judgment where employer’s business as “the administration, settlement and payment of worker’s compensation and general liability claims while the examiners' function was to independently administer and settle the claims within the limits of their delegated authority” because claims examiners were production workers inasmuch as they produce the product petitioner offers to the public” and explaining that while “petitioner points to holdings that an adjuster for an insurance company is an administrative employee…., our finding is not in conflict since such adjusters are not involved in producing insurance policies, the commodity that an insurance company exists to produce and market.”) (emphasis added) (attached as Ex. B). 9
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Matrix argues that a 45-day notice period is proper, notice should be limited to mailonly notice, notice should include information about discovery obligations/litigation costs, and requests a third-party administrator to issue notice. First, there is no reason to limit the opt-in period to 45-days, as a “60-day opt-in period… is common practice under the FLSA.” Castillo v. Perfume Worldwide Inc., 2018 WL 1581975, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (collecting cases). Second, while Plaintiffs will compromise and agree not to send notice via text message, there is no “valid reason why the parties should not agree to e-mail notice in the year 20[20].” Butler v. TFS Oilfield Servs, LLC, 2017 WL 7052879, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2017). Third, a third-party administrator is unnecessary. Krott v. New Directions Behavioral Health, LLC, 2020 WL 5492992, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 10, 2020) (“Typically class counsel is responsible for distributing notice” except when there are “circumstances of misconduct or where there are confidentiality or integrity concerns”) (quoting THE FAIR STANDARDS ACT § 17.III.B.5.b.(iii) (Kearns, 3d ed. 2015). Fourth, contrary to Matrix’s out-of-circuit case law, Ninth Circuit courts routinely reject requests to inform potential opt-ins of (1) litigation obligations because “individual discovery is rarely appropriate in collective actions” and (2) of costs because the "potential chilling effect of defendants' proposed warning outweighs the realistic likelihood that any future opt-ins would be required to pay a portion of defendants' litigation costs." Prentice v. Fund for Pub. Interest Research, Inc., 2007 WL 2729187, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007); Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc., 2012 WL 556309, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012), aff'd, 501 Fed. Appx. 713 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court should accordingly authorize Plaintiffs to send the revised notice attached as Exhibit D via email and regular mail. 6. Conclusion
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Regardless of whether the proposed collective is referred to as a collective group of “CCEs” or “claims examiner” employees, Matrix’s admissions and Plaintiffs’ evidence— jointly and severally—show that Plaintiffs and all salaried CCEs share similar issues of law and fact material to the disposition of Matrix’s administrative exemption defense. Accordingly, conditional certification of and court authorized Notice to this group of salaried “CCEs” or “claims examiners” who worked in “Absence Management Specialist” or “Claims Examiner” job titles while providing Matrix’s claims administration and processing services is compelled under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent. Respectfully Submitted, /s/ Jack Siegel JACK SIEGEL – TX BAR NO. 24070621 Texas Bar No. 24070621 STACY THOMSEN – CA BAR NO. 274282 Siegel Law Group PLLC 4925 Greenville Avenue, Suite 600 Dallas, Texas 75206 P: (214) 790-4454 Jack@siegellawgroup.biz Stacy@siegellawgroup.biz TRAVIS M. HEDGPETH – TX BAR NO. 24074386 Texas Bar No. 24074386 THE HEDGPETH LAW FIRM, PC 3050 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 510 Houston, Texas 77056 Telephone: (281) 572-0727 travis@hedgpethlaw.com CLIFFORD P. BENDAU, II – AZ Bar No. 030204 The Bendau Law Firm, PLLC P.O. Box 97066 Fax: (480) 382-5176 cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com Phone: (480) 382-5176 13
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ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record through the court’s ECF system as of the date file-stamped thereon. /s/ Jack L. Siegel JACK L. SIEGEL
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