Partide æi societate the former regime. The narrative it developed in response to this situation excluded many potential supporters and although it went on to overcome this barrier, Democratic Convention leaders chose not to invest in the kind of state building that might have protected it from cynicism and anti-state sentiments when it faced difficulties in government. The radical nature of nationalist politics made it difficult for the CDR to assimilate the narrative of nationalism into its appeal and the strength of nationalist parties in the majority and minority communities gave rise to viable alternative homes for voters. The electorate was nervous of the impact of economic reform and when the CDR government failed to deliver policy benefits in terms of economic growth and the tackling of corruption, the electorate rapidly lost faith with the coalition. CDR politicians were divided more on questions of strategy and personality than on matters of policy and some found it difficult to adjust to working in a coalition setting with more pragmatic and fleet-footed partners. Democratic Convention leaders failed to invest in party-building measures with the result that voters and members felt few constraints in seeking exit options when the benefits of loyalty began to dissipate. Ultimately, the Democratic Convention collapse appears due to its failure to both broaden and deepen its support base and structures. It is telling that the mantle of the centre-right has been taken up by an alliance between the National Liberals and the arch political entrepreneurs, the Democratic Party.
NOTES Another National Peasant leader, Corneliu Coposu, claims Iliescu refused him entry to the Central Committee building (the hub of the revolution) as early as 22nd December 1989 – see Gallagher 2005 – and offices of the opposition parties were attacked following protests against the Front’s registration as a party. 2 An IRSOP poll in August 1991 showed just 11% support for restitution of a monarch as head of state compared to 78% support for a republic (Nelson, 1992). 3 Katherine Verdery offers the seminal work in this area but the approach is generally followed by most commentators. Shafir, for example, seeks to identify a growing constituency for ideological nationalism as part of the explanation for the PRMs success in 2000, see Shafir, 2001. 4 Even in the local elections of that year, PRM candidates polled a fraction of Tudor’s tally in the later election. 5 Pop (2006) quotes a World Bank report showing only 11% of households based their views of corruption on direct experience with public officials and research by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi that showed 79% of Romanians thought most or all officials were 1
corrupt while only 14% always bribed to get things done. 6 Comments made by Traian Basescu (transport minister at the time) and quoted in Gallagher (2005) which provides a full narrative account of the CDRs time in office. 7 Isarescu was backed as Presidential candidate in 2000 by the National Peasants, the lead party of the Democratic Convention. By that stage the decay of the Convention was well advanced and no fewer than four candidates entered the field backed by parties which were part of the governing coalition. 8 One study found that 56% of municipalities reported having a PSD organisation in their area with a penetration of close on 100% in urban areas. This contrasted with 37% of municipalities having a Democrat Party organisation, the National Liberals having a presence in one third and the National Peasants in less than 20%. Soos, Toka and Wright, 2002 9 As has been mentioned, the influence of the Ceausescu legacy has been widely explored by academics. The role of charismatic political leaders such as Ion Iliescu in building enduring political vehicles would appear significant. And, although constitutional crafting has been relatively uncontroversial in Romania (outside of the field of inter-ethnic relations), it is ironic that changes made by the CDR government contributed to its own downfall when a rise in the electoral threshold led to the exclusion of CDR2000 from parliament.
BIBLIOGRAPHY DIACONESCU, I. (2003), Dup` Revolu\ie, Bucharest, Nemira GALLAGHER, T. (2005), Theft of a Nation, London, Hurst & Co. LAZAROIU, S. (2005), in Ucen, P., and Surotchak J., (eds), Why we lost – explaining the rise and fall of the Center Right parties in Central Europe, 1996-2002, Bratislava, International Republican Institute LEWIS, P. (2001), Party Development and Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe, London, Frank Cass MUNGIU, A. (1995), Romania Dupa ’89, Bucharest, Humanitas NELSON, D. (1992) Romania After Tyranny, Westview Press POP, L. (2006), Democratising Capitalism, Manchester, Manchester University Press, ROPER, S. (1998), From Opposition to Government Coalition, Unity and Fragmentation Within the Democratic Convention of Romania, East European Quarterly, 31/4, January 1998 SHAFIR, M. (2001), The Greater Romania Party and the 2000 elections in Romania, “Romanian Journal of Society and Politics”, 1/2, November 2001 SOOS, TOKA & WRIGHT (2002), The State of Local Democracy in Central Europe, Budapest, Local Government Initiative STAN, L. (2005), From Riches to Rags: The Romanian Christian Democrat Peasant Party, East European Quarterly, 39/2, 2005 SZCZERBIAK, A., & HANLEY, S. (2006), Centre Right Parties in Post Communist East-Central Europe, Abingdon, Routledge VACHUDOVA, M. (2001), Right-Wing Parties and Political Outcomes in East Central Europe, APSA paper, San Fransisco
ED MAXFIELD - holds a Masters Degree from Birmingham University’s European Research Institute and is currently carrying out doctoral research into centreright parties in Central & Eastern Europe and Sussex University in the UK.
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