Rapoport Journal for Peace, Conflict and Justice Vol.1

Acknowledgements We would like to thank the members of the journal committee. Without such a strong team, the journal would not have been possible. We would like to extend our gratitude to the Arts and Science Students’ union, for their financial support which facilitated this publication.

Additionally, we would like to thank our program director Professor Wendy Wong who served as our faculty advisor.

Her experience and guidance made the project manageable.

Finally, we would like to thank the family of the late Anatol Rapoport.

We are humbled to be able to acknowledge his crucial contribution to our program and to continue his legacy by naming the journal in his honour.

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Journal Committee Editors in Chief

Sebastian Dutz & Abeera Khan

Senior Editors

Aditi Ratho & Archana Ravichandradeva

Junior Editors Simone Garcia, McKinnley Morris, Mikhael Haberer, Klea Vrapi

Design Editors Jennifer Eensild & Stephanie Tran

Copyright Sian Last

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Letter from the editors A Peace, Conflict and Justice Studies Journal has been years in the making.

Finally last year, a concrete plan to establish a journal was brought forward

by Leah Thompson and Julia Wilton, the Co-Presidents of our society. It has been our great honour and privilege to realise their vision. We are pleased to present the inaugural edition of the Rapoport Journal for Peace, Conflict, and Justice.

Launching a journal from scratch was no easy feat. From organising a committee to reviewing several excellent submissions, it has been a journey of difficult decisions. As Editors-in-Chief, we were overwhelmed with the high number and quality of submissions in our first year. We believe this speaks to the strength of the University of Toronto’s undergraduate students.

The diverse works we have selected broach innovative topics such as climate change, drug conflict and securitization. The interdisciplinary nature of the submissions reflect the core foundations of our program. Although the submission and selection process was completely anonymous, that the majority of pieces selected are authored by students within the program is a testament to the value and diversity of the viewpoints students are exposed to within PCJ. Although it has been a demanding and challenging process, our final product has made the journey worthwhile. Along the way, we have learned valuable lessons about the production of a high quality academic journal, which we hope to share with our successors. We hope that the Rapoport Journal becomes a hallmark of the Peace, Conflict and Justice program. Our aim was to set the bar high for the many future issues to come.

We hope you find this issue as compelling, engaging and informative as we do. Hope you enjoy the first volume of the Rapoport Journal of Peace, Conflict and Justice.

Sebastian Dutz & Abeera Khan Editors in Chief

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Table of Contents The Spectre of the Holocaust: How the Israeli Government has Securitized Iran’s Nuclear Program

5

Amir Fleischmann

International IGOs and the Mishandling of Justice: A Call For Regionalization

11

Leah thomson

The Politics of humanitarianism An Imperfect Offering: Humanitarian Action in the 21st Century by James Orbinski

18

Charlotte Connolly

An Exercise in Futility Policy Dimensions of Peace and Drug Conflict in Latin America

22

Kaleem Hawa

Unending War: Securitizing Climate Change at the Security Council Ben Donato-Woodger

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30

The Spectre of the Holocaust:

How the Israeli Government has Securitized Iran’s Nuclear Program

Amir Fleischmann Although many countries have labelled the Iranian nuclear program a threat to international security, not one has condemned it as vehemently as the state of Israel has. Israel’s leaders have pushed the issue of Iran’s supposed pursuit of nuclear weaponry to the forefront of their security concerns. Despite the fact that Iran’s nuclear program does not seem to be an existential threat to Israeli sovereignty, it has been labelled as such. By invoking imagery of the Holocaust, Benjamin Netanyahu is able to successfully and continuously securitize the Iranian nuclear program in the eyes of the Israeli public and political elites, as well as the international community to a lesser extent. Although the prospect of nuclear-armed Iran only threatens Israel indirectly, securitizing the issue has allowed the Israeli government to respond to the moderate threat of Iran’s nuclear program more aggressively than otherwise warranted.

There are three leading interpretations of what constitutes a national security issue. In the objective view, security is the absence of an existential threat to state sovereignty, whereas in the subjective view, security is the absence of fear for state sovereignty.1 The discursive understanding of security

suggests that security is a speech act invoked by political actors to make an issue one of state sovereignty. Thus, calling something a security issue makes it a security issue.2 In this process, called securitization, a securitizing actor initiates the speech act, which is then either accepted or rejected by the audience. The aim of securitization is for the sovereign to be granted the use of extraordinary measures to counter the issue at hand. In the case of the Iranian nuclear program, Iran is threatening the state of Israel; Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli government are the securitizing actors; and their audience is both the Israeli and Jewish political elites and the Israeli public and international community.

Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the war with Iraq that followed, isolated Iran from the international community. A lack of international support during the war, despite Iraq’s aggression and use of chemical weapons, has caused Iranian leadership to be weary of international institutions and to believe that only they can take care of themselves.3 This mentality, as well as a need for alternative energy sources, has caused Iran to grow its nuclear program in the years following the war. In defiance of several Security Council resolutions, Iran continues to Page 5

enrich uranium, which can be used for either nuclear reactors (as Iran claims) or warheads (as Israel and other countries claim).4 Evidence, such as Iranian designs for a nuclear warhead,5 seems to suggest that Iran is developing nuclear weapons capabilities. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency says there is no evidence of an Iranian weapons program, that discussion finds itself beyond the scope of this paper.

The Israeli government is extremely concerned with the prospect of nucleararmed Iran and the many implications it would have for Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu, the current prime minister of Israel, has labelled the Iranian nuclear program a threat to Israel’s security to the highest degree. Netanyahu believes that Iran does not represent a rational actor and will not be deterred by Israel’s own nuclear arsenal. According to him, Iran’s religious fervour and hatred towards the Jewish people and the state of Israel may motivate its policy more than the fear of mutually assured destruction, ultimately leading to a nuclear strike against Israel.6 In this view, the Iranian nuclear program is a direct, existential threat to the state of Israel.

Netanyahu has been able to successfully securitize the Iranian nuclear program by drawing upon Israel’s collective memory of the Holocaust.

Netanyahu frequently brings up the Holocaust in his political speeches, usually in tandem with the Iranian nuclear program. Objectively, Israel seems fairly secure, as it is among both the wealthiest

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and best-armed countries in the Middle East. Moreover, Israel is the only country in the region to possess nuclear weapons, giving it a significant advantage in any conventional war. Subjectively, however, Israelis seem to feel very insecure.

Although 85% of the population has faith in the Israel Defense Force’s ability to defend them, a comparable number fear being the victim of a terrorist attack.

Furthermore, more than 40% of Israelis fear an unconventional attack, such as a nuclear strike. 7 Despite having knowledge of the prowess of their military, it is clear that many Israelis remain fearful for their personal and national security.

Daniel Bar-Tal explains this contradiction using a socio-psychological approach to (in)security. In this understanding, security is subjective but is heavily shaped by discursive factors and how a society understands its history. According to Bar-Tal, “… part of the reasons for the insecurity … lie in the cultural-societal-political climate of the society as reflected in the information provided by leaders … [and] the imparted collective memory.”8 This collective memory is heavily influenced by the shadow of the Holocaust, which has permeated Israel’s political rhetoric since the state’s inception in 1948. This has created a ‘siege mentality’ within both the state and in the Jewish diaspora, which manifests itself as a belief in a constant existential threat towards the Jewish people. By maintaining the view that they are the victims, the Israeli government is able to justify morally questionable acts in

the name of self-defence.

In order to successfully securitize the Iranian nuclear program in the view of the Israeli public, Netanyahu frequently invokes Holocaust imagery. Even in a speech for Holocaust Remembrance Day, Netanyahu said that; “a nuclear armed Iran is an existential threat to the state of Israel.”9 He brings up the topic of Iran here, not only to securitize it, but to also apply the lessons of the Holocaust to it.

These lessons are twofold: Firstly that the life of the Jewish people is at stake, and secondly, that Israel cannot rely on anyone else for help.10 Applied here, this means that a nuclear-armed Iran means the death of the Jewish people and that only the state of Israel can be trusted to stop that. The obvious implication, therefore, is that Israel should be willing to act unilaterally against Iran, even without the support of the United States.

It is important to note the significance that Israeli leaders play in the securitization process. Israeli politicians represent one of the largest sources of information on security for the Israeli public. 82% of Israelis rely on the political leadership for this information.11 What is considered a security issue by the Israeli public is largely dependent on what their leaders securitize, which emphasizes the extent to which the speech act of securitization has power..

Netanyahu is not the only one to use this kind of rhetoric; President Shimon Peres has said that when dealing with Iran, Israel “must learn the lessons of the Holocaust.”12 The analogy tries to

demonstrate that just as Hitler’s hatred towards the Jews was irrational, so is Iran’s hatred towards the state of Israel.

This is meant to show that Iran will not be deterred by the prospect of mutually assured destruction and that Israel must do everything in her power to prevent them from constructing a nuclear weapon.

This discrepancy also illustrates that Peres and the other securitizing actors do not sincerely believe that Iran represents an existential threat and are simply using Holocaust rhetoric to securitize the issue.

Although the Iranian nuclear program certainly poses a threat to the state of Israel, it does not do so in the total and existential way described

by Netanyahu. The Iranian leadership and selectorate are not irrational, as Netanyahu claims, and it is highly unlikely that they would launch a nuclear strike against Israel without extreme provocation. The main impetus for the Iranian nuclear program is self-defence.

The program was started as a response to the Iran-Iraq war and currently seems to be aimed at deterring aggression from the United States and Israel.13 Launching an attack against Israel would mitigate this deterrence, as it would certainly be met with a severe response by both the United States and Israel.

To say that Iran would risk its own total annihilation in order to attack Israel is tantamount to saying that Iranian leadership Israel’s destruction above all else. This line of thinking, purported by the Israeli government, is as absurd as it is self-important. Even if one were to

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take statements made by former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggesting that Israel should be “wiped off the map”14 at face value, the destruction of the state of Israel could still not be the sole motivating factor for the existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The fact that the Iranians are willing to negotiate over their nuclear program15 suggests that they value the easing of sanctions over nuclear capabilities. Iran may seek Israel’s destruction, but there is nothing to suggest that it would risk its own obliteration in order to achieve it.

There are other implications of a nuclear-armed Iran, however, that are very problematic for Israel. The deterrence provided by a nuclear arsenal will embolden Iran and allow it to act with impunity in the region. Although it is unlikely that Iran would attack Israel itself, Iranian proxy groups like Hezbollah would likely increase their activity against Israel.16 In addition, Iran would greatly expand its regional influence, which could upset the interests of Israel and the nation’s allies. Lastly, if Iran were to gain a nuclear weapon it could set a dangerous precedent in the region and could cause competing powers, such as Saudi Arabia, to seek nuclear weapons of their own. It is against these threats that Israeli leadership is seeking to defend itself. Once Iran attains a nuclear weapon it will be impossible to reverse the situation. Thus, in the view of the Israeli leadership, it is imperative that they do everything in their power to prevent Iran from successfully building such a weapon.

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In order to have all of his options on the table, Netanyahu instead needed to successfully securitize the issue as one of existential importance.

This process of securitization, undertaken

by Netanyahu and other members of the Knesset, seems to have succeeded.

Moreover, AIPAC, the preeminent Jewish lobbying group in the United States and an excellent bellwether of what issues are of greatest concern to the Jewish diaspora, ranks Iran as one Israel’s foremost security concerns. According to their website “a nuclear armed Iran would pose a direct threat to … national security interests”17 of the state of Israel.

Barack Obama has acknowledged that the Iranian nuclear program is one of the primary concerns of AIPAC, when he discussed the issue in his 2012 address to the group. Obama not only emphasised his administration’s efforts to avert Iranian acquisition of a bomb but also said that “a nuclear-armed Iran is completely counter to Israel’s security interests.”18 Obama put so much focus on the Iranian nuclear program because the Israeli leadership has been able to successfully securitize it in the eyes of both Israel and Israeli and diaspora Jews, which include members of the AIPAC.

The Israeli government has worked tirelessly to securitize the Iranian nuclear program in order to justify using any means necessary to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon. Although the Iranian nuclear program does not directly represent an existential threat to the state of Israel, Netanyahu has

securitized it as such so that he can do everything in his power in order to stop it. He has succeeded in securitizing the issue through the use of numerous speech acts and constant analogies to the Holocaust, which resonate very strongly with Jews, both at home and abroad. This allows both himself and his allies in the United States to act unilaterally against the moderate security threat that is the Iranian nuclear program. Specifically, it has caused both Israel and other nations to strongly oppose negotiation over Iran’s nuclear program, working to ensure that no negotiation is reached.

Bibliography AIPAC, “The Iranian Threat.” Last modified June 2008. Accessed October 14, 2013. http:// www.aipac.org/~/media/Publications/Policy and Politics/AIPAC Analyses/Issue Memos/2008/06/ FAQsThe_IranianThreat.pdf.

Allin, D. and Steven Simon. The Sixth Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010 Bar-Tal, D., Magal, T., and Halperin, E. “The paradox of security views in Israel: Socio-psychological explanation.” Existential Threats and Civil Security Relations (2009): 219-247 Buzan, Barry, and Lene Hansen. The Evolution of International Security Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 8-38 Charbonneau, Louis, and Fredrik Dahl. “Iran, powers aim to seal deal on ending nuclear standoff.” Reuters, November 7, 2013. http://www. reuters.com/article/2013/11/07/us-iran-nuclearstart-idUSBRE9A60G920131107.

Chubin, Shahram. “Does Iran Want Nuclear

Weapons?” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 37, no. 1 (1995): 86-104.

Fathi, Nazila. “Wipe Israel ‘off the map’ Iranian says.” The New York Times, October 27, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/ africa/26iht-iran.html?_r=0 (accessed November 18, 2013).

Kam, Ephraim. A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007.

Netanyahu, Benjamin. “Holocaust Remembrance Day Address” Speech, Jerusalem, April 18th, 2012. Times of Israel. http://www.timesofisrael. com/text-of-netanyahus-holocaust-remembrance-day-speech/ Netanyahu, Benjamin. “UN General Assembly Address” Speech, New York, September 27th, 2012. Policymic. http://www.policymic.com/articles/15409/ netanyahu-speech-at-un-general-assembly-full-transcript-and-video Nili, Shmuel. “The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust: Israel, Iran, and the Shadows of Auschwitz” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 1 (2011): 37-56 Obama, Barack. “AIPAC Address” Speech, Wachington, March 4th, 2012. Politico, http:// www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73588.html Peres, Shimon. “Holocaust Remembrance Day Address” Speech, Jerusalem, April 18th, 2012. Haaretz. http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/ the-axis/on-holocaust-remembrance-day-peresand-netanyahu-s-iran-dispute-is-brought-tolight-1.425385 Sommer, Allison. “Peres: Israel can’t make Mideast peace with open eyes, we must forget the past.” Haaretz, June 21, 2012. http://www. haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/peres-israel-can-t-make-mideast-peace-with-open-eyeswe-must-forget-the-past.premium-1.440157

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Waever, Ole. “Securitization and Desecuritization” in On Security, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46-86. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

11 Daniel Bar-Tal, Tamir Magal, and Eran Halperin, “The paradox of security views in Israel: Socio-psychological explanation,” Existential Threats and Civil Security Relations 232

Endnotes

12 Shimon Peres, “Holocaust Remembrance Day Address” (Speech, Jerusalem, April 18th, 2012.), Haaretz. http.//www.haartez.com

1 Barry Buzan, and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 32 2 Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, (ed.), On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 51 3 Shahram Chubin, “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 37, no. 1 (1995): 87 4 Dana H. Allin and Steven Simon, The Sixth Crisis. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 21 5 Ibid, 17, 22 6 Benjamin Netanyahu, “UN General Assembly Address” (speech, New York, September 27th, 2012), Policymic. http://www.policymic.com/ 7 Daniel Bar-Tal, Tamir Magal, and Eran Halperin, “The paradox of security views in Israel: Socio-psychological explanation,” Existential Threats and Civil Security Relations 225226 8 Ibid, 231 9 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Holocaust Remembrance Day Address” (Speech, Jerusalem, April 18th, 2012.), Times of Israel. http://www.timesofisrael.com 10 Shmuel Nili, “The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust: Israel, Iran, and the Shadows of Auschwitz” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 1 (2011): 39

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13 Ephraim Kam, A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done, (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007). 51 14 Nazila Fathi, “Wipe Israel ‘off the map’ Iranian says.” The New York Times, October 27, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com 15 Louis Charbonneau and Fredrik Dahl. “Iran, powers aim to seal deal on ending nuclear standoff.” Reuters, November 7, 2013. http://www. reuters.com 16 Ephraim Kam, A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done, (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007).55 17 AIPAC, “The Iranian Threat.” Last modified June 2008. http://www.aipac.org 18 Barack Obama, “AIPAC Address” (Speech, Washington, March 4th, 2012.), Politico, http:// www.politico.com

International Igos and the Mishandling of Justice: A Call for Regionalization

Leah Thomson At the end of the Second World War, the international community became aware of the importance of protecting human rights and securing justice on a global scale. As a result, international organizations were formed, and charged with the task of defining human rights.

States were supposed to ensure that these definitions were then incorporated into domestic policy. International organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, hold a prominent position in the pursuit of global justice, and argue that they promote “universal” human rights that are applicable across the globe.

These international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) wrongly assume that there is a consensus among states on how human rights ought to be defined and protected. Moreover, these IGOs are fraught with structural and political problems that weaken their ability to address human rights abuses. In order to more effectively promote global justice, there should be a decentralization of power. Specifically, regional IGOs should be given a more meaningful role in the definition and protection of human rights.

Section A of this paper will address some of the major problems with the current

system of human rights protection, citing the UN’s lack of meaningful action in Rwanda as an example. Section B will propose a new course of action— regionalization—and describe how this practice will improve cultural sensitivity, increase the representation of non-state actors in decision making processes, and prevent powerful states from misusing human rights policy. Section C will address some of the potential problems with regionalization, and suggest ways to mitigate these problems.

A – THE PROBLEM: UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL IGO INVOLVEMENT Current efforts in the pursuit of global justice are centered on the promotion and protection of human rights. While this in itself is an admirable goal, there has been a tendency to promote universal human rights, which are meant be the same for all people across borders, cultures, and political systems. While this sounds like a promising concept, there is no real consensus regarding the definition of human rights. As Debra DeLaet suggests, human rights are not simply “the rights one has because one is human,” because the very definitions of “human” Page 11

and “rights” are contested.1 Societies disagree over how rights should be enjoyed, and who should enjoy them. The how refers to whether basic human rights should be enjoyed collectively by groups, or by individuals.2 The who refers to which members of society are entitled to rights, and asks whether women, members of certain ethnic groups, and criminals should be included.3 As DeLaet argues, the answers to these questions are not concrete. Rather, the “process of defining human rights is inherently political,” since it requires those in power to choose who is entitled to certain social benefits.4 Moreover, the definition chosen can either constrain or require state action regarding the protection of rights.

In addition to disagreement over how to define human rights, some states also disagree about which rights ought to be protected. Some states and cultures value predominantly civil and political rights, such as the right to vote in fair elections; while others value social and economic rights, which promote equality.5 Yet others value “solidarity rights” such as the right of a group to self-determination.6 States often disagree on what combinations of these rights

should be protected. Moreover, they disagree about which rights should take precedence over others when competing rights claims are present.

This disagreement regarding the definition of human rights did not make it easy to establish international institutions in the post-WWII period. As a result, the states which founded these institutions began to appeal to “human dignity” as the basis for human rights and global justice.7 While states did not agree on the substance of human rights, they could more easily agree that humans were entitled to basic respect.

This appeal to the broader idea of human dignity made it easier for states to reach the “overlapping consensus” needed to establish an international human rights regime.8 By appealing to the broader universal concept of human dignity, international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) began to form, and agreements outlining the definition of human rights were developed.

These international IGOs have become major players in the protection of human rights. Large scale organizations that include almost all of the world’s states deliver declarations and pass 1 Debra L. DeLaet, The Global Struggle for Hu- binding treaties that dictate how states man Rights. (Toronto: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 11. ought to view human rights and global 2 DeLaet, The Global Struggle for Human justice. It is important to note, however; Rights, 12-13. that IGOs are problematic for two 3 DeLaet, The Global Struggle for Human main reasons. Firstly, they are subject Rights, 12. to bureaucratic and procedural speed 4 DeLaet, The Global Struggle for Human Rights, 14.

5 DeLaet, The Global Struggle for Human Rights, 19.

6 DeLaet, The Global Struggle for Human Rights, 19.

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7 Jurgen Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights,” Metaphilosophy 41, no. 4 (2010), 467.

8 Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity,” 467.

bumps which can inhibit their ability to protect human rights. Secondly, IGOs are not representative of the people whose lives their decisions affect.

Bureaucracy – Organizations comprised of multiple actors with a wide range of interests are bound to experience problems. Given that international IGOs are reliant on their member states for funding, personnel, and legitimacy; important decisions can take a long time to be made. Moreover, IGOs have to maintain their credibility among their member states and the international community. In order to do so, IGOs institutionalize rules and practices to ensure that the organization is consistently behaving in a way that will satisfy its member states. In 1993 for example, the UN adopted new “rationalized criteria” governing its peacekeeping operations. It did so in order to preserve its reputation in the international community, save face after the failure in Somalia, and keep members states on board with UN goals.9 As a result, the UN bound itself to only take on cases wherein there was a “reasonable chance of success.”10 When the Rwandan genocide took place, some UN experts argued that this case did not have a reasonable chance of success. As a result, the UN’s institutionalized rules prevented it from intervening to protect human rights.11 The most prominent IGO in the international community did not and could not intervene as these atrocities 9 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 43-45.

10 Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 47.

11 Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 48.

took place.

Lack of Representation – While most international IGOs contain member states from across the world, membership does not guarantee adequate representation.

Predominantly, negotiations take place between state governments, which means that a wide range of non-state actors in the domestic sphere are left out of the discussion. Moreover, while there is de jure equality between states in IGOs, most states do not enjoy de facto equality. Larger, more developed member states have a greater degree of leverage in negotiations than smaller, developing states. For example, larger states can use preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to influence the behaviour of the states that wish to trade with them. By adding additional terms to these agreements, states can coerce their trading partners to adopt certain economic and/or social policies.12 While PTAs can be used to encourage the protection of human rights, they can also be used to further the interests of powerful states. While states in the global North may be under the same “one state, one vote” rule, they have a clear advantage over states in the global South. More glaringly, the existence of five permanent members on the UN Security Council gives veto power to the states that were victorious in WWII. This veto power over the entirety of UN operations puts these five states in a non-negotiable position of power over other member states. This prevents 12 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression,” International Organization 59, no. 3 (2005), 597.

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smaller states from having a real impact on international agreements. The current approach to the protection of human rights, which centres heavily around IGOs, is highly problematic.

B – THE REMEDY: REGIONALIZATION

What is needed to improve the protection of human rights is the decentralization of global justice processes. The decision-making and implementation power needs to be taken out of the hands of international IGOs and transferred to regional organizations. Rather than having the UN draft protocols, regional IGOs such as the African Union should be charged with the task. By no means should the UN become entirely divorced from the human rights and global justice discussion.

However, international IGOs should not be the default medium through which such decisions are made, nor should international IGOs have the ability to override or disregard the preferences of regional organizations.

The regionalization of global justice processes would have three main benefits. Firstly, it would give a more prominent position to the social and cultural preferences of member states.

Secondly, it would allow non-state regional actors to play a greater role in the decision-making process. Thirdly, it would prevent powerful states from using the human rights regime as a means to further their own interests.

Granting regional bodies increased control would allow the definitions of human rights and approaches to global justice to be tailored to the social, Page 14

cultural, and political nuances of each situation. Regions would be allowed to strike the balance between individual and collective rights for themselves, in accordance with their own preferences.

Moreover, decisions regarding difficult trade-offs between contending goals will become simpler, since fewer member states will be involved in the decision.

Decisions regarding the balance between stability, truth-telling, peace, and justice, will no longer be based on a compromise between the interests of 100+ member states.

The decentralization of decisions concerning global justice and human rights would also allow key non-state actors, as well as expert practitioners in a given situation; to have a say in what processes are implemented. Instead of forcing one-size-fits-all rules from international IGOs onto local and regional situations, regional actors should play a predominant role in deciding how issues of human rights violations are dealt with.

Regional organizations, being smaller and more in tune with the needs of a given locale, can help give a voice to these key players. Regional IGOs should also be charged with deciding which transitional justice measures should be implemented in conflict-ridden and postconflict societies. For example, in the case of Uganda’s long-standing trouble with the LRA, regional rather than international proposals would be more effective.

There is much debate over the impact that the ICC’s arrest warrants for LRA leaders will have on the establishment of peace and stability in Uganda. While

some scholars, such as Sikkink, believe that the peace vs. justice debate is a false dichotomy, it is important to consider how these two goals influence each other.13 As was suggested in the documentary The Reckoning, there are a wide range of opinions regarding the interplay of peace and justice in Uganda.

International law insists that punitive measures are necessary; some locals argue that amnesty should be granted to all combatants; and other locals call for LRA leaders to be tried in a national court.14 It is not necessarily the case that the Ugandan national government, who authorized ICC intervention, adequately represents the desires of the Ugandan people. Giving power to a regional body that could actively contend with the ICC would allow local and regional preferences to be more adequately expressed.

The regionalization of human rights and global justice would also serve to mitigate the potential for what Habermas refers to as the “imperialist misuse” of human rights.15 Habermas argues that human rights policy has been used by powerful states to promote their own interests in a surreptitious way. While human rights have been institutionalized by the UN, states “misuse [human rights policy] to legitimize the usual power

politics” and justify the contravention of sovereignty.16 Working through smaller regional organizations, such as the African Union, eliminates the potential for UN Security Council members to use their veto power to block action. Moreover, it prevents states in the Global North from directly interfering in the implementation of global justice processes in the Global South. The regionalization of these processes gives smaller, less powerful states more of a say in the furtherance of global justice and protection of human rights. Additionally, local populations are given a greater opportunity to influence the decisions that are made.

C – POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

The regionalization of global justice processes and human rights protection would not come without risk. One main issue is that regional organizations are still subject to some of the key structural flaws that plague international IGOs. Another is that states could potentially use the lack of consensus regarding the definition of human rights to justify questionable behaviour. These potential problems are not entirely unsolvable, and they are still a drastic improvement from the problems which arise from the current international global justice regime.

13 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Structural Flaws – It is possible that Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Polisome of the same bureaucratic and tics. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011), 144.

14 The Reckoning: The Battle for the Internation- institutional problems that weakened al Criminal Court, dir. by Pamela Yates (2009; Skylight the UN around the time of the Rwandan Pictures). Film.

15 Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity,” 477.

16 76.

Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity,”

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genocide could also inhibit the efficacy of regional institutions.17 Standard operating procedures may be institutionalized if a regional institution fears a loss of credibility or funding. In addition, regional institutions are not free from the influence of state interests. As Moravcsik suggests, both authoritarian regimes and established democracies are likely to be opposed to multilateral agreements which impose limits on their sovereignty.18 Non-democratic states have little interest in improving their human rights practices, since they gain from the repression of their citizens.19 Established democracies, which tend to promote and protect the human rights of their citizens, are also hesitant to enter into such agreements, since these agreements would impose increased limits on their behaviour without providing any major benefits.20 As a result, it is wrong to assume that regional organizations would be able to make decisions without any opposition from member states. The same opposition that the United States consistently demonstrates towards the UN could be mirrored on a smaller scale by another state in the African Union. These structural limitations, though problematic; are an acceptable risk to adopt since they would happen on a smaller scale in 17 Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 33.

18 Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000), 229.

19 Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes,” 229.

20 Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes, 229.

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regional organizations. With fewer actors and fewer Great Powers involved in the decision-making process, these obstacles will be easier to overcome.

Questionable Definitions of Human Rights – If questions concerning the definition and protection of human rights were relegated to regional bodies that encouraged the inclusion of cultural values, any state could potentially use the “cultural factors” argument to justify human rights violations. Under this new arrangement, a state could argue that they are not required to protect certain rights, and attribute this decision to cultural and social factors. For example, a repressive regime could argue that their society values stability and cooperation, and that a free press serves as a direct threat to those values. Thus, the regime could argue that the right to free speech does not need to be guaranteed to their citizens. If one adopts a culturally relativistic view of human rights, as extreme proponents of regionalization might argue, it would be difficult to tell such a regime that they were not justified in disallowing certain rights.

The solution to this problem would need to involve a degree of coordination between regional IGOs and international IGOs. Regional organizations would still take a leading role in the definition and protection of human rights, but they would have to be held accountable to a larger international body. This international body should not have absolute veto power over the decisions of regional IGOs. Instead, the international body should be equipped with some sort

of multilateral review board that could assess any cases deemed questionable by members of the international community.

If such a system is implemented, the possibility for repressive regimes to justify human rights violations with the “cultural factors” argument would be decreased significantly.

The regionalist remedy is also problematic because it assumes that regional organizations will be more able than international IGOs to achieve a consensus on the definition of human rights. This is an assumption that has yet to be empirically demonstrated, and it relies on the belief that states in close geographic proximity to one another will have similar values and interests.

It may be the case that member states in regional organizations may disagree sharply about how best to achieve global justice and protect human rights. The regional approach does not eliminate the ever-present trade-offs that exist in the global justice discourse. Member states in regional organizations will still have to make compromises when trying to balance competing objectives and interests. However, the involvement of fewer actors in the decision-making process will make this balancing act easier.

The regionalization of global justice initiatives and human rights protection is not without flaws. Yet, the improvements that this remedy would bring about are worth taking some risks for. The decentralization of human rights protection and transfer of power to regional IGOs would allow differences

in cultural values to be more adequately expressed. In addition, key nonstate actors would be granted a more prominent place in the discussion of what global justice processes are implemented.

Moreover, the transfer of power from international to regional bodies would mitigate the potential for powerful Northern states to misuse human rights policy. The pursuit of global justice is both noble and important. Thus, it is integral that the processes implemented by a multiplicity of actors bring about the best possible outcomes.

Bibliography

Barnett, Michael. Eyewitness to A Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.

DeLaet, Debra L. The Global Struggle for Human Rights. Toronto: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006.

Habermas, Jurgen. “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights.” Metaphilosophy 41, no.4 (2010): 464480.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression.” International Organization 59, no. 3 (2005): 593-629.

Moravcsik, Andrew. “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe.” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): 217-252.

Sikkink, Kathryn. The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics. New York: W.W. Norton, 2011.

Page 17

The Politics of HUmanitarianism: An Imprefect Offering: Humanitarian Action in the 21st Century

By James Orbinski

Charlotte Connolly

An analysis of humanitarianism in the post-cold war period brings to light the escalating risks that complex emergencies pose for aid agencies. The use of humanitarian pretexts to legitimize military intervention in failing states and the growing involvement of states in relief-oriented activities has weakened the distinction between humanitarianism and political life. As a result, foreign aid workers are increasingly viewed as a threat and are tied to Western imperial interest, thus limiting their ability to provide relief. In An Imperfect Offering: Humanitarian Action in the 21st Century, James Orbinski aims to identify the appropriate relationship between politics and humanitarianism.

Orbinski stresses the imperative of adhering to the principles of humanitarianism in order to enhance the ability of the enterprise to aid victims of conflict in the face of choices and challenges. While this emotional and detailed book succeeds in its objective, it is limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of humanitarianism in creating possibilities for social justice.

Nonetheless, in light of Orbinski’s extensive field experience in conflict zones and his engagement in protecting humanitarPage 18

ian space, the book marks an excellent contribution to the human security perspective of international politics.

An Imperfect Offering is a powerful narrative about James Orbinski’s political journey over the last 20 years as a humanitarian doctor. Orbinski led Médecins Sans Frontières missions in Zaire and Rwanda and served as medical coordinator in Afghanistan and Somalia. The book provides a rich and detailed description of the political landscape navigated by contemporary humanitarian ideas, principles and practices. Orbinski’s aim is to identify the appropriate relationship between politics and humanitarianism. Initially, he sees humanitarianism as above politics and “as challenge to political choices that kill and allow others to be killed.” However as the book progresses he realizes that humanitarianism in war has “to reckon with politics without becoming apart of it”. In other words, humanitarians must maintain their independence and neutrality. At the same time, they must work and negotiate with political actors in order to create humanitarian space, that is, the capacity to extend assistance to populations in need

without impediments from governments or armed factions.

Unfortunately, as the book demonstrates, humanitarian assistance is often abused by the politics and interests that surround it. Orbinksi assesses the ability of humanitarianism to deliver aid given the challenges posed to it by national and international politics. For example, the increasing tension between Sudan and the United State, a major funder of Operation Lifeline Sudan, resulted in tighter aid restriction, subsequently provoking Khartoum to be more aggressive in the South, which included the bombing of an MSF hospital. As Orbinski states, “Humanitarian issues were tied to political issues, leaving millions vulnerable not only to the politics of war between the government and the rebels but also to the great power interests at play between the two sides”.

By examining the role of international dynamics and interests in each region of conflict, Orbinski reveals the implications these political realities have for humanitarian action. The prominence of states in relief-oriented activities has evidently weakened the distinction between humanitarian and political actors, effectively compromising the ability of aid agencies to provide relief due to a lack of humanitarian space.

powers whose national interests are at stake. For example, during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the US combined the air-drop of bombs with humanitarian packages. MSF saw this association as a dangerous confusion since the Taliban saw no difference between the relief organization and the occupying military. He believes the rules of neutrality and independence are being eroded as the boundaries between humanitarian assistance and the political objectives of intervening states blur. In order to resolve this problem, Orbinski emphasizes the need to maintain the distinction between short-term relief and the longer-term political responsibility for protection and security. However, he does not provide an explanation as to how such a distinction could be made, never mind maintained.

Moreover, Orbinski fails to discuss the parallels between military and humanitarian actors. They share many structural similarities including the same temporality of emergency and both are distinct from the local people and live in separate, guarded quarters. Most often, both actors enter and exit the country simultaneously.

This discussion would have added to the reader’s understanding of why belligerents do not always differentiate between humanitarian and political actors. Perception is extremely important, yet Orbinski is somewhat naïve in believing that humanitarian actors can remain separate from the intervening states.

Orbinski tries to reclaim humanitarian identity and practice, which he believes has been co-opted by governments with ulterior motives. Here, he highlights

Additionally, Orbinski assumes that the use of humanitarian reasoning to humanitarian activities could grow and justify military intervention by Western succeed only if kept away from political

Page 19

intermingling by the UN and Western interests. Yet, in most conflict zones, MSF depends on the active protection of states and armed factions in order to create corridors for humanitarian assistance, which in effect compromises their independence and neutrality. For example, sending MSF medical supplies to Kosovo required the logistical capacity of NATO. Orbinski fails to address this contradiction.

In principle, Orbinski adequately identifies the appropriate relationship between humanitarianism and politics through his emphasis on the humanitarian organizations’ independent, impartial, and neutral provision of relief. However, in practice, he fails to clearly distinguish humanitarianism from other areas of political life that are populated by various interest driven actors, including states. Similarly, it is difficult for foreign aid agencies to be perceived as inherently impartial and neutral given the West’s history of colonialism, neoliberalism, and more recently, the US led war on terror. In this context, humanitarian aid, regardless of its intentions, cannot be divorced from Western political agendas.

justice to mean that a society respects the value of human dignity and equality. Unfortunately, the book provides a less than satisfying answer, stating: “We suture, we record the events, we tell the world. We struggle daily with private thoughts of whether or not we (MSF) make a difference. The ultimate solution may be political, anonymous and nebulous, in some remote teak conference room. But I have seen the blood, the people cry in pain and the people laugh in hope. And I know we need to be there.”

As evinced by this quote, MSF’s apparent strengths are in directly meeting medical needs, its clear application of humanitarian principles, and its commitment to bear witness. While practicing humanitarianism as the independent, impartial, and neutral provision of relief allows for the creation for humanitarian space, it also important to address root causes of conflict and to engage in post-conflict transformation. While humanitarianism can save people who are at risk, if political conflict continues, they will remain vulnerable. In this way, humanitarianism is an imperfect offering, as there is no humani Orbinksi’s critical evaluation of the tarian solution to humanitarian problems. relationship between humanitarianism to Humanitarian problems require a political politics and power in the international sys- solution that aims at changing the structem enhances the ability of the humanitar- tural conditions that make people vulnerian enterprise to aid victims in the face of able. Justice requires us to confront the challenges and choices mentioned above. causes and conditions of suffering that Given the challenges posed by politics persist in destroying dignity. Simply proto humanitarian action, Orbinski quesviding relief and demanding that internations whether, or how, MSF can practically tional humanitarian law be respected is change human rights practices and bring a Band-Aid solution. Orbinski fails to exabout social justice. Orbinski understands plore how humanitarian morality can unPage 20

derpin other fields of social and political practice, including development, democracy promotion and peace-building, which are aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict and creating a more just and peaceful world.

While we share a common humanity, we do not share a common human condition. Although human rights are declared universal, the risk of having one’s rights violated is not universal. The life of Dr. James Orbinski is an example how we can go beyond the ideals stated in the United

An Imperfect Offering demonstrates Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the influence and impact of humanieffect real change. This book is valuable tarian organizations and transnational to scholars of Peace, Conflict, and Justice networks on domestic and international because it offers a human security perpolitics, specifically surrounding the issue spective of international relations, one of human rights. While states remain the that is based on universal solidarity and dominant force in both protecting and that emphasizes the influence of shared violating human rights, MSF is altering our values and norms in world politics. understandings of the scope and limits of sovereign authority. MSF attempts to Works Cited alter human rights practices by exposing Orbinski, James. An Imperfect Offering: violations of humanitarian law, thus sham- Humanitarianism in the 21st Century. Toing states and pressuring them to change ronto: Doubleday Canada, 2008. Print. their practices. They bring to the forefront the understanding that basic rights are not the exclusive domain of the state but a legitimate concern of the international community. The ability of humanitarian organizations to shape public policy is a testimony to the increasing influence of non-state actors in world politics. NGOs are occupying more political space than ever before, as evidenced by MSF’s role as the voice for victims of conflict. Conversely, governments are increasingly becoming targets, rather than actors. Civil society will continue to challenge the preeminence of state, calling for new models of advocacy and representation that empower them to speak across borders. This book is a testimony to the emergence of a global political culture founded on the shared values of a common humanity.

Page 21

An Exercise in Futility:

Dimensions of Peace and Drug Conflict in Latin America

Kaleem Hawa

Few contemporary crises in international relations have a wider variety of consequences and implications than the Mexican drug wars. Representing the specter of northward drifting crime syndication, the drug wars pose complex policy questions surrounding the flow of drugs, illegal migration, inequity of economic development, and arms movement. This research paper will explore American and Mexican policies in the face of the drug wars with particular emphasis being placed on their impact on domestic politics and local communities.

While the “war on drugs” is typified by the ongoing conflict between rival drug cartels and the Mexican government starting in 2006 by President Felipe Calderón, it will be important to explore the roots of the problem that stem from as early as the Nixon presidency. This essay will structure its policy analysis into four topics, each being explored from both the Mexican and American perspective. The policy areas that will be analysed include border control, gun trafficking, corruption, and failed repression policies. The overall conclusion to be derived is that US-Mexican relations suffer from an obtuse sense Page 22

of unilateralism and that many of the enacted policies have failed to contend with the global nature of drug trade or the intrinsic domestic impediments of corruption and arms trafficking.

One of the largest misconceptions about Mexico’s drug wars is that the regulatory framework process is solely a product of American policy action. Isaac Campos argues in the penultimate chapter of Homegthat Mexican drug laws and ideology are fully in step with the United States and Britain and that, in many ways, Mexico exceeds these nations in commitment to prohibitory actions against drugs.[1] With this knowledge, it becomes especially important for this essay to explore the duality of Mexican and American policy because both have significant parts to play in the drug war process.

Border control is the first prominent issue in the analyzing the drug war conflict. Richard Nixon was the first US President to speak of a “war on drugs.”

Shocked by the use of heroin by US soldiers in Vietnam, and deeply opposed to the values and culture associated with drug use, Nixon initiated a tough, enforcement-oriented approach to

narcotics. His 1969 “Operation Intercept” cracked down on the drug trade along the US-Mexico border by virtually sealing off transport to and from the two nations and by implementing rigorous checks of vehicles attempting to cross the border.[2] Yet after Nixon’s ouster as president, the war on drugs receded into the background until the presidency of Ronald Reagan, where it was forced back into the national consciousness.

The pervasiveness of drug crime and corruption in Miami in 1982prompted Reagan to establish a “Vice-Presidential Task Force on South Florida,” headed up by George H.W. Bush, to fight the ever-growing problem. Numerous federal law enforcement agencies became involved, including the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), FBI, and Customs. At the same time, the explosion of the “crack epidemic” in the 1980s made the war on drugs a politically charged issue for the Reagan administration exacerbated by the increasing burden of high crime rates and drug use in American’s inner cities.

[3] This resulted in an increased focus on immigration and border control issues as well.

Ultimately, the war on drugs under Reagan took on an international dimension when he too, like Nixon, adopted more restrictive border control measures to limit the transport of drugs into the nation. In this way, it becomes clear that the issue of border control is central to any analysis that is done on Mexican drug wars.

One of the most significant authorities on US-Mexican border control

issues is Tony Payan, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas. In his book The Three US-Mexico Border Wars, Payan argues for the existence of two significant modern eras in which American border policy can be grouped. The law enforcement era from 1982 to 2001 established strong support for regulating the flow of immigrants across the US-Mexico border as part of a strategy specifically targeted at limiting drug access in the nation.

This cemented itself as policy in 1992 when Operation Hold the Line (Texas), Operation Safeguard (Arizona) and Operation Gatekeeper (California) were all implemented through the utilization of “military-style operations and […] added patrolmen and technology.”[4] In contrast to this, Payan identifies post-9/11 America as the national security era. A focus on limiting the crossing of illegal immigrants was viewed as a facilitative measure to reduce potential security threats to American institutions and citizens. This mentality led to policies like the 2005 National Intelligence Reform Act that almost doubled the existing number of border patrol agents by adding another 10,000 to the US-Mexico border.[5] While the rationales behind the border policies in these two eras differ, the results manifested themselves in the same way: more restrictive border regulation.

All these policy developments are particularly relevant to our study of this issue when contextualized from the ground-level perspective of the Mexican working class. In many circumstances, young Mexican men moved from various Page 23

regions across the country to try to cross the border into the United States have faced unprecedented challenges from the 1980s onwards. Oftentimes, border crossing was too dangerous or difficult due to American policy initiatives and these migrants were forced to remain in border cities where the cartels were powerful.[6] In Tijuana - a city that lies exceptionally close to the American border – the population rose from 460,000 in 1980 to 1.2 million in 2000.

This build-up in population without a subsequent increase in employment opportunities facilitated the cartels preying on the desperation of new migrants to use them as smugglers.[7] In this way, it becomes clear that the border is one of the most significant policy areas for the Mexican drug war conflict. It remains the point of contact for drugs being smuggled across the border and often reinforces social inequities that strengthen the cartels recruitment efforts.

Gun trafficking is another significant issue that factors into the drug war policy calculus. In his testimony before the House of Representatives, Jess T. Ford, Director of International Affairs and Trade at the United States Government Accountability Office famously derided the US government’s oversights by claiming that available evidence indicates 90% of the firearms fueling Mexican drug violence originated in the United States.

[8] Thus, gun trafficking can be seen to have an opposite direction of flow than drugs; Guns flowing into Mexico reinforce and strengthen the cartels who then utilize them to mitigate enforcement Page 24

pushback, terrorize local populations, and control means of production domestically.

In this way, America can be seen as providing both the means of violence and its source.

The violence stemming from the use of guns has a significant impact on the Mexican populace and is essential to the cartels’ ability to intimidate and control. In To Die in Mexico, journalist John Gibbler offers a portrayal of the work being done by the Mexican media in the face of corruption and murder. He depicts journalists in the profession as being fearful about publishing stories about drug-related killings because it can cost them their lives. He claims that in the past fourteen years, 13 journalists were slain in direct relation to their reporting on the drug killings with another 14 dying under unclear circumstances.[9] He even recounts a story of how the editorial board of the Primera Hora newspaper in the Culiacán region was called directly by a cartel leader and threatened in order to take down a story depicting the gruesome details of their latest murder.[10] His anecdotes reinforce the importance of gun trafficking in the maintenance of cartel power and the systemic intimidation of domestic and international media.

Furthermore, Sidney Weintraub argues in his book Unequal Partners, that trafficked weapons are not only utilized to stop potentially incriminating stories, but are often used to brutally put-down police initiatives and investigations that represented the core of President Felipe Calderón’s hardline narcotics policy.[11] For example, only a few hours after his

acceptance of the position of police chief in Nuevo Laredo, Roberto Alejandro Balmori Garza was murdered by the cartels. Directly following, on March 3, 2008, soldiers and police battled drug traffickers in Tijuana to no avail and found themselves held at bay by the cartel’s consistent supply of ammunition.[12] In nations like Mexico that lack significant or lasting legal recourses, the use of military and police forces are significant in combatting the cartels and it is clear that gun trafficking only serves to make this task more difficult and dangerous.

In the context of law enforcement policy, it is important to note that Mexican drug cartels are not homogenous, and that a significant factor that contributes to violence in the drug war is conflict between the various cartels. The ArellanFélix Organization (also known as the Tijuana cartel) was the first of the cartels to begin a militarization process in the early 1990s. This was done in order to protect itself from the Sinaloa Cartel, which was attempting to infringe on its perceived “territory”.[15] The Los Zeta (Gulf Cartel) is the most heavily armed of Mexico’s major cartels and is also well known for utilizing trafficked American weapons in trying to carve out transport routes and distribution centres from neighboring cartels. The net impact of all this inter-cartel violence devastates Mexican youth and low-income neighborhoods, leaving a heightened sense of fear and obedience that enables cartel operations.

While the policies on border control, guns have had some effect,

much of the blame on the slow response to drug trafficking must be placed United States policymakers. The InterAmerican Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunitions, Explosives and other Related Materials (CIFTA) is an international firearms treaty whose stated goal is to establish a regional standard for the control of gun trafficking.[13] The United States, while a signatory of at the treaty since 1997, is the only remaining member of the Organization of American States to not have ratified the policy through the Senate despite Barack Obama’s pledge to do so in 2008.

[14] This form of inaction is precisely what has weakened drug control efforts in Latin America by sending a message of complacency and deadlock on some of the issue’s most meaningful attributes..

The third policy area relevant to discussion of the drug wars is corruption, which is possibly the most significant impediment to meaningful narcotics policy in Mexico. During the 1970s, the Mexican government developed an increased interest in controlling the flow of drugs by the cartels. This was largely due to spikes in violence and drug consumption domestically, which transformed the issue from a largely American-driven initiative to one that affected both nations more significantly.

The first plan of action, Operación Cóndor, was taken by Mexican president Luis Echeverría in the mid-1970s. The program, staffed with ten thousand soldiers under the command of General José Hernández Toledo, utilized targeted Page 25

herbicide in order to defoliate drug crops in Central Mexico.[16] While the operation successfully destroyed numerous marijuana plantations, this reduced supply lead to a significant increase in marijuana prices which only incentivized the cartels to continue production. [17] Furthermore, it resulted in unprecedented human rights violations that came from wanton destruction of non-drug crops and human health defects.

Evidence suggests that the initiation of this policy was the product of a widescale corruption in the upper tiers of the Mexican government. The drug cartels are estimated to receive between $13.6 and $48.4 billion [18] in revenue from the sale of narcotics to the US. Thus, it is easily understandable why low-level operatives, bureaucrats, and soldiers are likely to accept bribes in the context of their meager government salaries.

What is more difficult to accept but has consistently been shown to be prevalent is corruption within cabinet members and prominent political leaders. Following the arrest and conviction in the late 1990s of military General Jesús Gutierrez Robello for his protection a powerful drug cartel leader, President Felipe Calderón decided to implement policies in order to crackdown on police corruption. He purged 284 police commanders from the force and instituted drug polygraph tests for all their replacements.[19] While it is unlikely that the measures taken had significant impacts on levels of internal corruption within the Mexican police, it represented a step in the right direction by the Mexican leadership.

Page 26

Corruption also plays a significant role on the American side of the border. Payan argues in his book about border control that, due to the immense risks involved with crossing the border through the wilderness that exists between each American port-of-entry (POE), most drug smuggling occurs through the legal entry points specified by the border control agencies.[20] One of the most powerful ways the cartels can implement this is through paying off U.S. border officials to allow vehicles (called clavos) containing hidden stashes of drugs to pass through undeterred.[21]

In response to this growing strength of organized crime in Mexico, the Mérida initiative was jointly initiated by the Calderón and Bush administrations in 2007. The goal of the initiative was to provide funding and equipment to the Mexican government in order to help combat organized crime and saw increased cooperation between the two nations’ intelligence agencies.[22] This is one of few existing examples of policies enacted jointly by the two nations in a non-unilateral fashion that have proven to be effective. With the United States providing the technological capacity that Mexico necessarily lacked and the Mexican administration providing the law enforcement officers with local knowledge that the US necessarily lacked, a more productive union was formed.[23] Information sharing also helps transcend the impediments produced by national bureaucracies and leads to more effective strategy building.

Finally, it will be important to

assess some of the failed repression policies undertaken by the United States.

Alfred W. McCoy argues in US Narcotics Policy: An Anatomy of Failure that, on the aggregate, American policy towards the global drug trade has largely been ineffective due its focus on the primacy of repression. He claims that by “treating global narcotics trafficking as if it were a localized vice such as pornography or prostitution, US agencies apply a policy of repression without an awareness of the intricate dynamics of these global systems.”[24] Essentially, this means that the emphasis placed during the Nixon eras on eradicating the trade and repressing drug production abroad (about 70% of the $13 billion in federal funding allocated)[25] ignored the political and economic reality of the drug trade. The global nature of the drug trade means that disrupting and reducing trade in one area without perceptibly reducing demand for drugs at the global level will only incentivize the formation of new cartels or the establishment of novel methods of distribution by existing cartels.[26]

To elaborate, Guadalupe Gonzalez and Marta Tienda conducted research in The Drug Connection in US-Mexican Relations and discovered a verifiable link between global drug production increase and Nixon’s drug repression policies.

Between 1979 and 19981, production of marijuana in Mexico decreased from 1500 to 500 tonnes and the share of Mexican marijuana in the United States dropped from 11% to 4%.[27] This decrease corresponded directly with the defoliation

and herbicide treatment programs of the Nixon administration. This fall in Mexican supply did not significantly lower overall supply in the United States.[28] There are various reasons for this but the most likely is that Colombia and domestic US sources of marijuana compensated for Mexico’s drop in market share by producing more marijuana. By failing to recognize the global dimensions of the issue, billions of US dollars were wasted with little lasting impact and as the livelihoods of Mexican citizens on the ground level were devastated by the targeted herbicidal strikes, an increasing number of individuals were driven towards the drug trade from more traditional manufacturing employment.

In order to contend with the reality that drug supply cannot be the harbinger of change, US policymakers have attempted to reduce domestic demand as well. The city of New York is divided in to six narcotics districts, each of which was assigned a “narcotics arrest quota” by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). This emphasis on imprisonment without a focus on rehabilitation became extremely problematic because it failed to reduce demand in any meaningful way and because it led to a focus on the low-level street dealers without any time for sophisticated investigations into true distributors and syndicate leaders.[29] Furthermore, the American prison systems oftentimes enhance drug addiction and compound criminal activity in their inmates – something that causes considerable damage to efforts at combating drug distribution at home.[30] Page 27

To conclude, the US-Mexico story has been one tainted with significant setbacks. Restrictive border control legislation enforces the formation of social enclaves and drives the recruitment efforts of the various cartels. Widespread arms trafficking has not been successfully limited by either actor and continues to reinforce local violence and the silencing of dissident parties in Mexico. Debilitating and rampant corruption weakens the execution of public policy and makes smuggling all the more simple. Finally, poor utilization of law enforcement and military repression tactics fail to contextualize the global nature of the drug trade and the base-level impacts that initially spur demand.

This is not to say no successes have been had. What must be understood though, is that they have only occurred through cooperation between the Mexican and American administrations – not through a unilateral exertion of will. This essay has explored many of the dimensions behind the drug war and the various policy prescriptions utilized in order to solve the problem.

The overarching message that becomes clear from the analysis is that a bilateral framework of cooperation between the US-Mexico is oftentimes the only way to produce positive results for both US domestic consumption and ground level impacts on Mexican civilians.

Bibliography Campos, Isaac. Homegrown. Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press, 2012.

Page 28

Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Cooperative Mexican-US Antinarcotics Efforts. By Duncan Wood.

Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2010.

Gibler, John. To Die in Mexico: Dispatches from Inside the Drug War. San Francisco: City Lights, 2011.

GonzĂĄlez, Guadalupe, and Marta Tienda.

The Drug Connection in U.S.-Mexican Relations. San Diego: Centre for U.S.Mexican Studies, 1989.

Grayson, George. Mexico: NarcoViolence and a Failed State?. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009.

Marshall, Jonathan. Drug Wars: Cooperation, Counterinsurgency and Covert Operations in the Third World.

Forestville: Cohan and Cohen Publishers, 1991.

McCoy, Alfred, and Alan Block. US Narcotics Policy: An Anatomy of Failure .

Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Payan, Tony. The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, immigration and Homeland Security. New York: Praeger Security International, 2006.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges: Testimony by Jess T. Ford.

111th Cong., 2nd sess., June 18, 2009.

Weintraub, Sidney. Un-Equal Partners: The United States and Mexico. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010.

Endnotes

[1] Isaac Campos, Homegrown, (Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 181.

[2] Guadalupe Gonzรกlez, and Marta Tienda, The Drug Connection in U.S.-Mexican Relations, (San Diego: Centre for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1989), 79.

[3] Richard Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion: A Global History of Narcotics, 1500-2000 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001), 354.

[4] Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, immigration and Homeland Security, (New York: Praeger Security International, 2006), 12.

[5] Tony Payan, 18.

[6] John Gibler, To Die in Mexico: Dispatches from Inside the Drug War, (San Francisco: City Lights, 2011), 96.

[7] Jonathan Marshall, Drug Wars: Cooperation, Counterinsurgency and Covert Operations in the Third World, (Forestville: Cohan and Cohen Publishers, 1991), 53.

[8] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges: Testimony by Jess T. Ford.

111th Cong., 2nd sess., June 18, 2009.

[9] John Gibler, 35 [10] John Gibler, 65 [11] Sidney Weintraub, Un-Equal Partners: The United States and Mexico, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 70.

[12] Sidney Weintraub, 71.

[13] Sidney Weintraub, 72.

[14] Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Cooperative Mexican-US Antinarcotics Efforts by Duncan Wood. (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2010), 17.

[15] Cooperative Mexican-US Antinarcotics Efforts, 62.

[16] Sidney Weintraub, 68-69.

[17] Cooperative Mexican-US Antinarcotics Efforts, 17.

[18] Jonathan Marshall, 91.

[19] Sidney Weintraub, 70.

[20] Tony Payan, 32.

[21] Tony Payan, 60-61.

[22] Cooperative Mexican-US Antinarcotics Efforts, 68.

[23] George Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?, (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 68.

[24] Alfred McCoy and Alan Block, US Narcotics Policy: An Anatomy of Failure , (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 11.

[25] George Grayson, 17.

[26] Alfred McCoy and Alan Block, 3.

[27] Guadalupe Gonzรกlez and Marta Tienda, 48.

[28] Guadalupe Gonzรกlez and Marta Tienda, 49.

[29] Alfred McCoy and Alan Block, 55.

[30] Alfred McCoy and Alan Block, 56.

Page 29

Unending WArming:

Securitizing Climate Change at the Security Council

Ben Donato-Woodger (such as health, security, and property) war to the ‘warming war’, in which regularly and unintentionally threaten chimney stacks and exhaust pipes are the livelihoods of people who are not the weapons, and it is a chemical war of socially insured (Duffield 2007:2-3). immense proportions.”

When this creates what David Harvey Afelee F. Pita [Tuvalu delegate calls crises of dispossession—meaning before the UN Security Council] (Sindico human catastrophes people cannot avoid 2007:29) because of their poverty such as conflict In 2007 the United Nations Security or mass population displacements— governments that represent insured Council held its first debate about the relationship between climate change and peoples’ interests intervene so that the instability does not eventually threaten security (Sindico 2007:29-30). According insured people themselves (2007:34to a theoretical framework known as 35). The ongoing instability described the Copenhagen School, reframing an by unending war is thus a useful tool issue like climate change as a threat to to understand the Security Council’s states’ security will change how climate position on climate change. By analyzing change is managed (Buzan, Weaver, and the Security Council’s 2007 and 2011 de Wilde 1998:21). Paradoxically, while sessions on climate change and security, countries such as America and China I will argue that climate change has been accept that climate change matters to securitized at the Security Council. I will international peace and security they then argue that the Security Council’s do not accept that their rising CO2 discursive securitization of climate emissions are a security issue (UNDPI 2011). The security scholar Mark Duffield’s change does not include securitizing the implications of climate change because theory of ‘unending war’, can explain climate change is being treated as part of this contradiction. Duffield’s theory of the strategic situation Duffield refers to as unending war argues that the lifestyles unending war. of people whose biopolitical functions In saying that climate change is are provided by their governments “The world has moved from the cold

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securitized, I will argue that climate change has gone through a process called securitization. The Copenhagen School argues securitization happens when a referent object, something that is subjectively valued, is discursively made to seem vulnerable to a threat (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilfe 1998:3637). The actors securitizing a threat are called securitizing actors (1998:36-37).

These actors perform securitizing speech acts that declare the referent object is vulnerable to the threat (1998:36-37).

The securitization process succeeds if an authoritative audience accepts the securitizing actors’ framing (1998:3637). Securitizing climate change matters because it allows the Security Council to take significant unprecedented actions in relation to climate change (1998:21). The Security Council is an important audience to discursively securitize climate change to because it can pass a resolutions that violate states’ sovereignty and is mandated by the UN Charter to protect states’ security (Security Council 2013).

The Security Council can pass a resolution that violates state sovereignty if a majority of its 15 members support the resolution, and the resolution is not vetoed (2013).

The referent object actors are connecting climate change to is international peace and states’ security.

States link climate change to peace and states’ security in ways that reflect their geostrategic interests. For example, the United States argues climate change risks instigating more violent resource conflicts, African and Asian states argue climate change will worsen droughts and

food scarcity, and low-lying island states warn rising sea levels will submerge their territories (UNDPI 2011). This variety reflects how a changing climate will create many new types of risks to different security sectors such as individuals, cultures, military interests, and physical territories (Barnett 2007:7-8). These concerns also reflect how climate change is based on objective risks. As the security analysts Kurt Campbell and Sharon Burke note, by 2100, current climate change projections and emissions trajectories imply that the world will warm by more than 5.6°C, that sea levels will rise by more than 2 metres, that 3.2 billion people will face with water scarcity, and that 120 million people will face food scarcity (Campbell and Burke 2008: Table 9.1).

The United Kingdom was the first actor to argue climate change threatens international peace and states’ security on the Council (Sindico 2009:29-30).

The United Kingdom pushed for the Security Council to debate climate change in 2007 after over two decades of growing concern about climate change among NGOs, government scientists, and alarming publications by the International Panel on Climate Change (2009:29-30). The United Kingdom was then Security Council’s rotating president, and circulated a concept paper among Security Council members about climate change and security. This paper precipitated the Security Council’s first debate on climate change and security (2007:30). During this debate, European Union countries, Page 31

Bolivia, Ecuador, and low-lying island states performed securitizing speech acts by demanding that the Security Council recognize climate change as an inherent threat to international peace (2007:3032). However, G-77 countries, China, and Russia, argued climate change should instead be addressed by the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and United Nations Framework on Climate Change (King 2013). The United States neither supported, nor rejected the United Kingdom’s move (Scott 2012:226). Despite the Council’s failure to reach consensus, Francesco Sindico, a scholar of international climate change law, argues the discussion itself was an accomplishment because the meeting set new precedents for discussing climate change as a security issue (2007:33).

The Security Council’s 2007 disagreements did not discourage states that argued for climate change’s securitization. In 2009, a report commissioned by the Security Council speculated that climate change could become a “risk multiplier” – because it could make existing threats to states’ security worse (King 2013). The Security Council then reached a consensus that climate change matters to international peace and states security in 2011 when Germany, the then main securitizing actor and Security Council’s then-president, held a second session on climate change (UNDPI 2011). The same North-South divide emerged in this debate, however the United States—now under the Obama administration—strongly supported securitizing climate change (Scott Page 32

2012:226). This session saw the audience recognize climate change as a security issue when a Presidential statement was issued, supported by all the Security Council’s members, which stated that climate change has “security implications” for the “drivers of conflict” and would challenge the Council’s mandate to protect international peace and states’ security (UNDPI 2011).

The Security Council’s third meeting in February 2013 illustrated my argument that climate change has been securitized when Pakistan and the United Kingdom cooperated to initiate a third Security Council session on climate change and security (King 2013). Essentially, climate change is now a recurring topic on the Security Council’s agenda. As a result of these meetings, the Security Council has discussed whether “green helmets” —a term used to describe UN peacekeepers deployed in areas where climate change provokes conflict—might be needed in this century. The United Nations Secretary General has also been asked to investigate climate change’s contextual role for future security-related reports to the Security Council (King 2013, and UNDPI 2011).

However, while climate change is now seen as a legitimate state security issue, the processes exacerbating climate change—avoidable CO2 emissions—have not yet been securitized. The Security Council cannot yet legitimately demand that countries reduce their CO2 emissions (Scott 2012:226). This inaction can be described using the environmental sociologist Marie Kari Norgaard’s concept

of implicatory denial. Norgaard defines implicatory denial as the process by which actors accept that anthropogenic climate change is happening but deny logical consequences such as their responsibility to reduce their emission (Norgaard 2006:352). The Security Council’s position currently embodies implicatory denial. For while the Security Council has agreed that climate change threatens to international peace and security, it is failing to securitize the CO2 emissions causing climate change. Furthermore, the Security Council is rejecting proactive measures such as Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon’s 2011 request for the Security Council to initiate preventative diplomacy in severely resource scarce areas (UNDPI 2011). The security scholar Angela Oels provides insight on this contradiction by arguing that there is an ongoing “climatization of security” as security sectors are increasingly sensitive to the unavoidable implications climate change will have for their operations (Oels 2013: 26). Another way of describing the Security Council’s position is that it has committed to manage climate change related crises but does not recognize climate change as a crisis itself.

While the Security Council’s position can be described as implicatory denial, the council’s stance can also be understood as part of the security situation the security scholar Mark Duffield describes as unending war.

Duffield’s theory of unending war is based on the premise that people live as either insured life on uninsured life (2007:17). Insured life refers to people

whose healthcare and income to afford life necessities are guaranteed by their governments. Uninsured life refers to people who are not protected by their governments and must provide for themselves (2007:5). Duffield argues that approximately 80% of people in North America and Europe can be classified as insured life, while only 10% of people in Asia and Africa are sufficiently protected by their governments (2007:17).

Unending war implies governments will protect insured peoples’ ability to consume resources because their access to resources is seen as part of their state’s strategic security interests (2007:162).

Unending war also implies insured peoples’ ability to consume resources will create crises of dispossession (2007:11). For example, rising sea levels will deprive mostly uninsured people of land and resources, and this will create crises where emergency humanitarian aid will be essential to prevent uninsured populations from dying (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009:59).

Unending war can be adapted to climate change. The people Duffield defines as insured life are responsible for causing climate change. Globally, the insured 20% of humanity is responsible for 70% of humanity’s global resource consumption, while the 80% of people Duffield would define as uninsured account for 30% of humanity’s resource consumption (Boff and Hathaway 2009:20). This inequality matters to climate change because this resource consumption requires fossil fuel combustion (2009:20). Unending war Page 33

implies that insured life’s ability to emit CO2 will be protected, while the dangers of CO2 ,such as 3.2 billion people who may face water scarcity, will not (Campbell and Burke 2008: Table 9.1).

Duffield’s analysis captures what climate change’s securitization at the Security Council. The politicians who securitized the threat of climate change are insured life—as political elites, they are not at the greatest risk from climate change. Thus, while the Security Council has accepted that climate change’s role will be integrated into future considerations about international security issues, the Security Council will not yet act against the processes exacerbating climate change. In short, the Security Council is protecting insured peoples’ ability to consume, while the uninsured are effectively expected to provide for themselves or await emergency relief as the climate destabilizes.

This interpretation is useful because it explains why the Security Council has securitized climate change, without securitizing the processes perpetuating climate change. For example, a critical reading of the Security Council’s 2011 climate change and security debate’s transcript reveals Security Council members selectively discussed climate change related threats that would directly affect consumerist lifestyles. For example, India raised concerns about water scarcity, the United States discussed the likelihood of resource conflicts, Bangladesh’s emphasized the dangers of rising seas, and China’s called for more green-technology transfers (UNDPI 2011).

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Only low-lying island states, Bolivia, and Ecuador called for drastic CO2 emissions reductions (2011). States are thus managing how climate change might threaten their economies but not the processes driving climate change.

In conclusion, the Security Council’s securitization of climate change is failing to mitigate climate change’s risks to international peace.

While the Copenhagen School provides useful tools to understand securitized issues, understandings of security will always be restricted by what people in political systems are willing to do.

While the Copenhagen School argues issues should ideally not be securitized (Buzan and Hansen 2009:216), climate change is different. Unless governments dramatically change how much CO2 emissions are generated within their borders, potentially irreversible runaway climate change will begin in this century (Rockström 2009). What unending war makes clear is that there is a tradeoff between conspicuous consumption, CO2, emissions and the number of people who will die because of climate change.

CO2 emissions risk massive human catastrophes; the processes endangering the climate should be securitized.

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