10 percenr German, and 5 percenr French. At the outset of the war, US shipyards launched only 200,762 tons, almost entirely for foreign owners, while the United Kingdom, an island nation dependent upon the sea to maintain its worldwide empire, was sending off 1,683,535 gross tons. Now the Allies stood to lose the war through sheer att rition of its merchanr shipping at sea. With growing concern over America's possible entry into the war, Wilson's secretary of the treasury, William McAdoo, independently conceived of a shipping corporation that the federal government would own. In 1916 the Shipping Bill was passed by Congress, creating the United States Shipping Board (USSB), charged with the promotion and regulation of American water transport, and even the commandeering of private lines in the public interest or for national defense. In 1917 Germany's campaign of unrestricted subma rine warfare, which was now threatening mass starvation in England and France, as well as entirely hamstringing the Allied war effort itself, sparked a review of the Shipping Board 's function. When Wilson asked the British government what America's most significant and immediate contribution to the war might be, Prime Minister David Lloyd George responded: "The road ro victory, the guarantee of victory, the absolute assurance of victory, has to be fo und in the word 'ships,' and in a second word, 'ships,' and a third word, 'ships."' America was, unfortunately, as is often the case, entirely unprepared for immediate engagement in every arena. The US Army deployed from March 1916 to April 1917 against Pancho Villa in Mexico, numbering just 15,000 men, and the National Guard comprised 156,000 part-timers, spread all across the nation, bur primarily in the west. There were only 285,000 Springfield rifles, 400 light field guns, and 150 heavy field guns in all of rhe national arsenals combined. In the Ai r Service section of the Signal Corps, there were only sixty-five officers and 1,000 men, only thirty-five of whom could fly. Of the fifty-five planes, fifty-one were obsolete. The US Navy was in better shape, but st i II considerably behind the Allied and Central powers, and
SEA HISTORY 158, SPRING 2017
unprepared to meet the submarine offensive. The logistical, organizational, and industrial demands to field a major army of millions overseas was, of course, enormous. Even more daunting was the challenge of simply how to get chem there and keep them-and rhe Allies-fed and supplied . As General John ]. "Black Jack" Pershing so clearly pointed out: "To maintain an army of 1,000,000 men with supplies, including munitions (guns, ammunition, and aviation), would call for the daily delivery in France of at least 25,000 tons of freight and continuous berthing for 20 to 25 vessels ... Many new berths had to be built. ..and we expected to expand our force to 2,000,000 men." From a largely rural national population of just 92,000,000 Americans, rhe demands to field an army, and the means to get chem to rhe front and keep them, as well as our allies, fed and provisioned, would be challenging to say the least. San Francisco attorney and Democratic Party leader William Denman had been selected by the president to head the USSB. Within hours of the declaration of war against Germany, Denman announced a goal of producing no fewer rhan 1,000 wooden steamships-all supposedly built cheaply and easily-in eighteen months to meet the crisis head on. Acting under provisions of the 1916 Shipping Act, the USSB formed a stock corporation, the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC), with $50 million in capital (wh ich quickly grew to $3 billion). The planned fleet was heralded as "Pershing's Bridge to France."
There were incredible organizational problems from the start, nor the least of which was bureaucratic in-fighting between Shipping Board Chairman Denman and General George Goethals, the famed builder of the Panama Canal and now general manager of the EFC, charged with the actual construction program, over whether to build wooden or steel ships. After months of delay caused by the Denman-Goethals clash, both men were replaced. Edward N. Hurley, a Chicago insurance man, became head of rhe USSB, and Admiral Washington Lee Capps, chief constructor for the Navy Department, was named general manager of the EFC. Though fraught with myriad organizational and logistical obstacles, the program finally pressed forward. Innovations in methodology, training, and standardization became the order of the day. The industrial concepts a nd innovations pioneered by Ford, Firestone, Ed ison, and ochers were hastily adopted and perfected, despite difficulties with the emerging national labor movement. From a labor force of fewer than 50,000 men engaged in any shipbuilding or related industries nationwide, rhe war emergency now required no fewer than half a million men who had to be trained in the art of ship construct ion, fabrication, and replication, nor to mention another halfmillion men in building and operating the lumber and steel mills, machine shops, and ocher industries in order to provide rhe shipyards with the materials for construction. New rail lines had to be built 29