Hell With the Lid Off!Lt. Hobson and the Sinking of the Merrimac at Santiago, Cuba, 1898 by CAPT Patrick Grant, USN (Rec.) s Spanish patrol boats scoured the dark surface of Santiago Harbor with searchlights, rifles at the ready, eight sailors clung precariously to a piece of a wooden catamaran, trying not to be seen or heard. The men had just escaped with their lives, surviving gunfire, explosions, and the sinking of their ship as they carried out one of the most dangerous missions ever attempted by a US Navy crew. Fear of capture or being shot rivaled dying from exposure or shark attack, but they would live to tell the tale. Although their mission had failed, the story of their courage wo uld take its rightful place among the heroic tales that are the grist of United States Naval history and tradition. Newspaper headlines across the United States soon heralded their daring. Towns, babies, a waltz, and a cigar wo uld be named after the yo ung lieutenant who had planned and carried out the raid. To the American citizenry, Lieutenant Hobson would become the third member of a gallant triumvirate of Spanish American War heroes, achieving the heroic stature of Colonel Teddy Roosevelt and Admiral George Dewey. In the early days of the war with Spai n, the US Navy's primary task was to blockade the sea approaches to Cuba and Puerto Rico, paying parti cul ar at tention to ports the Spanish navy might use to resupply its army. On 29 April 1898, Naval Intelligence alerted No rth Atlantic Fleet commander, Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, that a contingent of Spanish wa rships, four armored cruisers and three torpedo boat destroyers under the command of Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, had departed the Cape Verde Islands with the Caribbean as a probable destination. The Navy's immediate objective was to confront this force at sea and prevent it from disruptin g American military operations in C uba and Puerto Rico. After several port ca lls on the periphery of the Caribbean, Cervera's squadron steamed into the harbor of Santiago de C uba on 19 May 1898 .
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Sampson had concentrated his blockading ships at the more likely destinations ofHavana, San Juan, Matanzas, and Cienfuegos, where the Spanish might readily bunker and reprovision. By excluding Santiago from the blockade, he enabled Cervera to avoid a confrontation at sea. The presence of Spanish warships at Santiago de Cuba was not confirmed until 29 May. The blame for the ten-day delay lay at the feet of Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, commander of the US Navy's Flying Squadron. When credible intelligence reports and specific orders from Secretary of the Navy John Davis Long and Ad miral Sampson to surveil Santiago de C uba harbor reached Schley, he ignored them. Instead , his erratic decisions and delays provided enough time for Cervera to replenish his ships and escape back out to sea, but the Spanish admiral did not take advantage of the opportunity. W ith the eventual arrival of Schley's force, Cervera was now trapped in a semicircle of US wa rships, four miles out from
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Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, Spanish Navy (1839-1909)
Admiral William T Sampson, USN (1840-1902) the channel entrance. That he would engage in an open-ocean battle was extremely unli kely, although Sampson still held out hope that Cervera's sense of national honor would prompt him to come out and fight. Assessing the situation, Sampson concluded that the physical and defensive nature of the harbor precluded a forced entry. While the harbor was deep and wide within, the entrance from sea followed a winding, narrow chan nel, with El Morro fortress at the top of the cliffs to starboard and a rising bluff to port. T ides, swirling currents, and unpredictable wi nds wo uld require slow passage, leaving them vulnerable to attack from the gun batteries from shore on either side. Provided that the navigational challenge could be overcome, the narrowness of the chan nel would necessitate entry in single file, through two electrically fired minefields, past gun batteries and two Spanish warships. G un batteries on the Morro cliffs were believed to be sighted out to sea; however, the batteries on the bluff, inner harbor, and aboard the Spanish ships were positioned to fire directly down the channel. The Admiral's major concern was not the gauntlet of shelling he would be forced SEA HISTORY 155, SUMMER 2016