aptain Joshua Barney emerged as a hero of the War of 1812 after his successfu l defense of the strategically vital Chesapeake Bay es tu ary using a n unconventional nava l unit. In 181 2 , he was already a Revolutionary War hero who had served in the French navy as the co mm a nder of a squadron . In 1802 he returned to his native Baltimore to reestablish a business and dabble in Maryland politics. A t the outbreak of anot her war ten years later, the fi fr y-four-year-old former Continental Navy officer volunteered to serve his country again, but as a privateer rather than return to naval service. A group of eleven Baltimore businessmen armed a 98-foot schooner, the Rossie, with ten 12-pound ca rronades and persuaded Barney to accept a letter of m arque and command of the vessel. H aving fought against the British since he was a teenager in the A meri can Revolution, Barney held them in contempt a nd readily agreed to fight his old adversary once again. On 11 July 1812, just weeks after war was declared, he sailed the Rossie out of Baltimore and headed for the mouth of the C hesapeake . Within ninety days of his depart ure, he had seized eighteen British m ercha ntmen worth approximately $ 1.5 milli on a nd captured 217 prisoners who could be ransomed. American privateering as a whole proved to be a lucrative bu siness in the War of 181 2, one that greatly impac ted British shipping. In addition , the British West Indian merchant fleet was forced to sail in convoys under the protection of a ship of the line, a fri g-
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ate, and at leas t two sloops of war-Royal Navy vessels that might h ave been otherwise deployed against the Americans. 1 By 1813 the port of Baltimore had become the third larges t city in the United States, a center for shipbuilding, maritime commerce, a nd the homeport of more privateers than any other American port city. The British considered Baltimore a pirate's nest a nd thus a prime target. Therefore, the city at the head of the C hesapeake was under constant threat, and its defen ses were inadequate and n eeded strengthening. On 4 July 181 3 Barney sent Secretary of the Navy William Jones an unsolicited detailed pl an for the defense of the C hesap eake Bay. Barney noted that "the enemy has on his station, 11 ships of the line, 33 frigates, 38 Sloops of wa r and a number of schooners &c." These vessels carried approxi mately 8,000 m en , giving the enemy suffi cient m a npower and armament to attack both Washington a nd Baltimore. Ba rney also reported that Admira l John Borl ase Warren, Britain's commander-in-chief of the N orth American station, had left Bermuda. I co nceive he is now go ne to m eet the Marines a nd Royal A rtill ery from England [and] there to organize and prov ide everything necessa ry for the Campaigne .... I am therefore of the o pinion the only defence we h ave in our power, is a Kind of Barge o r Row-galley, so co nstructed , as to draw a sm all draft of wa ter, to carry Oars, light sails, and One h eavy long g un, these vessels, may be built in a short time, (say three weeks) M en m ay be had , the C ity of Baltimore could furni sh Officers & Men fo r twenty Barges, without difficulty.... [Each] boat ought to carry 50 officers & Men, and 25 soldi ers; A Squadron of twent y Barges would require 1000 officers and m en , and 500 Officers and Soldiers, which in a few hours could be transported to any given point .. .. le t each boat h ave one 24 Po under, and small arms compleat .... The expense of the Barges wo uld not be great, they wo uld cost about 3000 $ [sic] each,
and after the service was perfo rmed might be sold to ad va ntage for Coas ters, having but a deck to put on rhem. 2 Since the Thomas Jefferson adm inistration of 1801- 1809, the US Navy la rgely consisted of oar-powered gunboats that carried one or two long 32-pounders plu s p erh aps a number of swivel guns. These vessels co uld be m aneuve red in shallow or restricted waters where sailing was difficult for larger ships. The vagaries of tide and wind were much less of a problem for them than for larger vessels, yet a single hit from a frigate co uld demolish a gunboat. Stil l, a fri gate facing multiple gunboats in the co nfines of an estuary might suffer serious damage befo re it could destroy all of its attackers. Adding weapons to gunboats was easy a nd proved cost effective. At the start of the W ar of 1812 , approximately 175 of these gunboats were at the ready for use by the US Navy; the larger n aval vessels comprised seven frigates, three brigs, and one sloop. 3 Included in Ba rney's plans was a penand-ink sketch of a barge that was consistent w ith the naval defensive strategy of the time. Each barge was designed to be 100 fee t long and fifteen feet wide, w ith three feet of freeboa rd above the ports for the oars. The boats would seat m en on twe nty thwarts, with twenty oars per side and a fifteen-foot flush deck forwardstrong enough to support a cannon- together with a similar stout deck at the stern . Secretary Jones needed both a plan to defend tidewater Maryland and a leader capable of executing the schem e. Joshua Ba rney, a Revolutionary War ve teran who was generally admired by those who served with him, h ad ea rned a reputation for being spirited , aggressive, resourceful, a nd valiant in battle. He was also known to be outspoken a nd short-temp ered , and he occasionally disrega rded orders he co nsidered unw ise. Aware of Ba rney's military accomplishments, Jones ass umed that with the passage of thirt y years, Ba rney h ad m atured a nd that his military experience outweighed his more yo uthful fl aws. A disquietin g incident indicated that some of the impetuosity might not be totally behind him. During Barney's hearin g
SEA HISTORY 147, SUMMER 2014