Robert Jenkinson, Lord Liverpool roo m for m aneuver was limiced by che Vienna negociacions and che w idespread feeling among European powers th acBritish interests at the Congress could be ignored because of che American wa r. While Earl Bachurst favored an Indian buffer state, Liverpool recognized the impossibility of m aking terms ro cover semi-nom adic peoples. In mid-September 1814, mini sters sensed the circumsta nces might perm it some useful minor border recrificacions of a stracegic character, but instability in France and uncertainty at Vienna m ade peace imperative. Bardes and outcom es at Washingron, Baltimore, and Placrsburg mattered because Britain needed peace with America to secure the benefits of peace in Europe. The deach of Roberr Ross and the humiliating fiasco ac Pl attsburgh broke the spell of A nglo vicrory, bringing a n air of rea lity to British thin king. Prevosr's debacle at Platts burgh proved huge ly emba rrass ing and, far worse: ic broke the run of success that was pressurin g the A merica ns imo concessions. Victory in Vermom was hardly going to win the wa r, but it mighc have been enough to make the Am ericans concede. Instead , che defeat at Plattsburg cost the British a ny leverage for border rectifica tion or attempts to create an India n territory. Liverpool moved quickly to limi t the damage: che Chem commissioners muse ensure thac the A mericans understood Britain wo uld rec tify recent fa ilures a nd p rosecute the wa r wich more vigor.
SEA HISTORY 145, WJNTER 2013- 14
In rruch, Liverpool was bluffi ng; he had m any reasons to avoid anot her year of wa r. H e was nor oprimi stic che Americans could be bro ughc to see reason , d ireccing che cabinet to pl a n on the basis char che war would continue, and he was especially a nxious thac Russia and Fra nce might exploic che con fli er. No r was he convinced the country wo uld be happy fi nd ing another ÂŁ10,000,000 "fo r the pu rpose of securing a better fro ntier fo r Canada." If Europe had been seed ed, he could have faced the A merican con fl ict "with some degree of confidence," bu t the need to prepare for the new sess ion of Pa rliam ent with so much rem ainin g uncertain preyed on his mind. The m os t press ing concern-securing a fresh governmem loan on suitable terms-would be impossible as long as the Am erican war continued , and Europe rem ained unsettled. His o utlook was dominated by the ala rm ing state of France; credible intelligence sugges ted Bo napartist fa natics pla nned to assassin a te th e Duke o f Wellin g ton , ch e A mbassado r in Pari s. To re m ove the duke from Paris without excicing suspicion, Liverpool considered sending him to Vienna to provide military advice to Castlereagh or to comma nd in Norrh America, "with full powers to ma ke peace or to continue the war, if peace should be fo und impraccicable, with renewed vigour." H e had little do ubc that Wellington
Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke o/Wellington
wo uld p refer the V ienna appoimment. W hile always ready to do his duty, che d uke was anything but enthusias tic. Liverpool did nor insist. W ith in months, Wellington wo uld be che C hief British envoy at V ienna, and rhen Commander in C hief of an allied army ac Waterloo. America Concedes The key to Briri sh victory lay not in military mighc, but in the slow, rem orseless pressure of the naval economic blockade. After December 1813,Am erican econom ic warfa re, both internal measures to block exports and attacks on British seaborne trade, were simply irrelevant. By co nc rasc, the New England blockade beginning in the summer of 1814 immediately pu shed up commodicy prices by 4 0%, devastacing nacional reve nue and sending much of the capiral into factor ies or across the border into Bricish government bo nds. O n 4 October, the United States government was in solvent. O n 11 Nove mber, it defa ulted on paymem s due on the national debt and the Lo uisiana Purchase . The national credit racing hit an all-time low, the full consequences of which were only avoided by the Treaty of G hent. In June 1814, A lbert Gallatin acknowledged chat the best terms available wo uld be stacus quo a nte. Attacks on Balci mo re and New O rleans were quite unnecessary to defeac the U niced Scates: che scandard British strategy of sea control and econ omic warfare had proven perfectly effective. W h en che draft Trea cy o f C h em reach ed Lo nd o n, a relieved Liverpool explained: "Yo u know how a nxious I was thac we should get out of this war as soon as we could do so w ith honour." Canada could not be defended economically with 7.5 million A mericans and only 300 ,000 Canadia ns in North A merica. Faced with such numbers, ch anging che frontier wo uld avail litde. Live rpool was satisfied because rhe Americans had waived their m aritime claims. "As fa r as I h ave any means of judging our decision is generally approved ." H e rem ained deeply concerned about the negociacions at Vienna; "chis consideracion itself was deserving of so me weighc in deciding che question of peace wich Am erica." Fortunately, a secrec article in che Treacy of Paris had seed ed che fuwre of the stracegically viral Low Countries. Ir
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