-the Balance of Power in Europe and the Perils of a Peripheral War in Spain and France paled into insignifica nce alongside the massive allied armies gathering on the Rhine for the invasion of France. The central E uropean perspectives of Austrian C hancellor Metternich, Czar Alexander I, and the Prussians, along with the parochial concerns of Swedish Crown Prince Bernadotte, led them to view Iberia as a mere sideshow and the Am erican wa r as a distraction and a weakness they could exploit to limit British influence. Lo rd Castlereagh 's diplomacy was dominated by Britain's refusal to compromise on the issue of maritime belligerent rights, the very core of the A nglo-Am erican struggle. He recognized that Russia was anxious to re-open the subject-and not to Brita in's adva ntage-when a post-war E uropean Congress assembled to redraw the maps and charters of the world. A nticipating a future clash w ith Britain, Russia wanted to push the American/ French claim that neutral ships made the cargoes neutral- thereby disarming sea power. This h ad been the purpose of the Russian offer to broker peace in 1813. Cas tlereagh m ade the British position very clear and did not hesitate to issue a scarcely veiled threat. "Great Britain may be driven out of a Congress but not out of her maritime rights, and if the continental Powers know their own interes ts they will not hazard this." He also crushed Napoleon's malicious suggestion tha t the A m ericans sho uld be invited to any congress. In September 1813, Cas tlereagh restated the British position . There wo uld be no con gress until m a ritime rights had been take n off the agenda, and he wo uld not allow the American war to be discussed at a general European settlement. In December 1813 , the cabinet instructed Castlereagh that if the E uropea n powers raised the subject he could state that Britain was prepared to m ake peace with the United States on the principles of the status quo ante bellum. These terms had been available, in fac t, from the first day of the war-the A mericans wo uld sign them on 24 December 1814. To this end, Castlereagh carefully courted Austria as a counterweight to Russia, making concessions to Vien na on Central E uropean issues beyond the reach of sea power. The Anglo-Austria n accord pre-empted
SEA HISTORY 145, WINTER 2013- 14
Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh was the British foreign secretary charged with brokering peace negotiations between Great Britain and the United States at the close of the war of 18 12, while simultaneously serving as Britain's chief diplomat in the Congress of Vienna, which redrew the political map ofEurope in 1815 at the close ofthe Napoleonic wars. French , American, or Russian attemp ts to alter the rules of war at sea. Having secu red their freedom to deal w ith the U nited States and m ari time questions w itho ut E uropean interference, the British could wai t for Madison to recognize th e inevitable. America n obduracy meant negotiations wo uld begin only afte r Napoleon had abdicated. From an Am erican perspective, it seemed obvious that once Great Britain escaped the overriding demands of the E uropean war, a bankrupt and beaten United States could not hope to secure improved terms. H avi ng ag reed to talks, the British Vice Consul forwarde d the American mail bag to London, to be opened and deciphered by the Post Office's secret "Black C h amber."
The Americans con ceded Britain's core war a ims-marit ime belligerent ri ghts and impressment-at the start of negotiations: h avi ng failed to conquer Canada, they had nothing to trade. The only question for the British was how far the blockade and coastal operations could be translated into more positive outcomes. The cabinet showed little interest in anything beyond that. Castlereagh 's aim had been to keep the American and European conflicts in separate, hermetically sealed boxes. H e had no intention of allowing any E uropean power to take a role in the process . By contras t, Britain had little ability to influence the negotiations at G hent by military force. Three weeks after the end of the European conflict, Melville advised Castlereagh that the Admiralty was short
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