Pellew's contemporaries to speak on his behalf. The book is chock-full of endorsements to Pellew's bravery and ski ll from peers, subordinates, and his superiors. Commendably, the author does not shirk from his duty to illumi nate the man's flaws. Making reference to a wide range of correspondence, Taylor demonstrates that Pellew developed a habit of being impertinent with those in authority, especially in matters concerning the fortunes of his fami ly and close associates. Nonetheless, it is always clear that Taylor admires Pellew, and the critical accounts ofPellew's beh avior are often tempe red with efforts to explain them within a context favorable to Pellew. Above all , Commander is an enjoyable tribute to a deserving officer. Whi le sometimes repetitive in reco unting praise bestowed upon Pellew, and in elaborating the composition of his commands, Taylor avoids belaboring most points and the book Aows very nicely from one remarkable event to the next. Ir is well crafted and recommended to anyone with an interest in the histories of war at sea or the Royal Navy, or in search of a biography of a truly extraordin ary individual. CHARLES STEELE, PHD
1863 involving USS WJoming and a Japanese fort. My one criticism of the book concerns its final essay, where the author asserts that the US Navy won the C ivil War. The Union navy contributed significantly to the Con federate defeat, but to state that it wo n the war is an overs implification. The blockade was certainly a major factor, bur as other historians have poimed out, it was porous-nor surpris ing, considering that rhe ships had to cover more than 300 miles of coastline to effect the blockade. Union naval power was nonetheless impressive, bur other than New Orleans and Norfolk, no major southern port was captured until near the end of the war. The author concludes that Admiral Farragut's capture of New Orleans in Apri l 1862 was decisive, but I have challenged this before in some of my writings. No one questions that it was a major blow to the Confederacy, but it was no more decisive than Gettysb urg or Vicksb urg, for example. As is emphasized in a number of other works, the Confederacy was defeated because it could not persevere against overwhelming odds. William N. Still, Jr. G reenville, North Carolina
t~cfiumbia Trading Co. Nautical Books and Artifacts
Free Mail Order Book Catalog On-line Shopping Cape Cod Store Open Year 'Round We buy Maritime and Naual Book Collections
1022 Main St. (Route 6A) West Barnstable, MA 02668 508-362-1500 • Fax: 508-362-1550 info@columbiatrading.com
www.columbiatrading.com
Colorado Springs, Colorado
A Dog Before a Soldier: Almost-Lost Episodes in the US Navy's Civil war by Chuck Veit (Lulu Enterprises, Inc., and Ch uck Veit, N. Attleboro, MA, 2012; 199pp, photos, notes, biblio, index, ISBN 978-0-55737-497-7; $2 1.50pb) Th is brief book includes vignettes of what the author considers Ii ttle-known even rs/incidems during the American Civi l War. A number of the essays have previously been published in the US Naval lnstiture's magazine, Naval H istory, with the book including a final chapter in which the author opines, "How the US Navy Won the American C ivil War." Veir's research is certain ly adeq uate, although he made little use of unpublished sources, instead relying upon published sources such as Official Records ofthe Union and Confederate Navies; he does consulr log books of various naval vessels. There are ten well-written essays, most of them quite imeresring. Perhaps the most unusual one is tided, "The Barde of the Straits of Sh imonoseki," which relates a battle in
SEA HISTORY 142, SPRING 20 13
Churchill and Seapower by C hristopher M. Bell (Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, 432pp, photos, maps, notes, biblio, and index, ISBN 978-0-19-9693573; $34.95hc) Another book on Wi nsto n C hurchill? Christoph er M. Bell plows gro und already pulverized by scholars before him in search of C hurchill's views of seapower that others have hidden in broader studies or ignored. His focus-seapower in the broader C hurchillian spectrum. His aim-to clarify and correct accepted conclusions. As one example, he argues that Churchill was not the driving force behind the Dardanelles campaign of World War I, but that he favored action in the North Sea instead. Was Grear Britain's disaster in the Far East at the beginning of war with Japan Churchill's responsibility? Bell, critical of the prime minister, examines the logic behind his policy. Considering the options, risking Asian holdings was reasonable, but Churchill nevertheless underest imated Japan's wi llingness to risk war with the
MARITIME
BOOKS 1806 Laurel Crest Madison, Wisconsin 53 705-1065 (608) 238-SAIL FAX (608) 238-7249 Email: tuttlemaritime@charter.net http://tuttlemaritime.com
Books about the Sea, Ship & Sailor Catalogue Upon Request 61