Somalian pirates do not discriminate between vessel types if there is possibility of a ransom payment. lhe luxury cruise ship Seabourn Spirit came under attack off the coast of Somalia in November, 2 005. lhe ship escaped capture, but not injury-the remnant of a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) is lodged in the hull ofSeabourn Spirit. Personnel assigned to the US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Eight (EODMU-8) D etachment 4, boarded the ship while still at sea to remove the RPG. and the ransoms being garnered were hefty. The freighters with UN food aid were netting the pirates about $ 100-150,000, while the tankers were worth three times as much. H appy times had arrived for Somali pirates, and they were more than ready to take advantage of the situation . One incident in April of 200 5 gives some idea of the ruthlessness of Som ali pirates, and it is by no means an isolated example. While steaming sixty miles off the east coast of Somalia, the bulk carrier MV Tim Buck was approached by two speedboats just past noon, local time. At 53 1 feet in length, the Tim Buck was as long as oneand-a-half football fields, much large r rhan the riny pirate craft . The ship's captain immediately took evasive maneuvers, increasing his speed, sending our a distress call on the radio and ordering rhe vessel into a lockdown mode. For the next ren minutes, rhe pirates circled aro und rhe Tim Buck and peppered rhe ship with rounds from their automatic weapons. When this failed to slow the vessel, they began firin g grenades at the ship, hitting a lifeboat and destroying it. With a portable ladder, pirates climbed aboard from their speedboats and tried to enter the ship's acco mmodatio ns, only to find all the entranceways locked. A gro up then targeted the wheelhouse from rhe main deck, firing round after round where the captain and helmsman were crouching. After an hour of shooti ng up the ship, the pirates finally gave up trying to commandeer the Tim Buck, leaving her fri ghtened crew to
head as far o ut to sea as possible and limp away to a safe port. 1he degree of skill required to carry out these attacks speaks volumes abo ut the manner in which the Somali pirates managed to organize their operations. Pirates in Somalia are just one element in a gro up of well-organized criminal organizations that are the business and political elites of the country. These warlords control huge parts of the economy, wi th interests in the agricultural, telecommunications, retail, banking, transportation, and fishing industries. And no one engages in piracy without the consent of the local warlord. It is believed that there are four main pirate gro ups operating from within the country, though they morph and intermix to varyi ng degrees. In the southern part of Somalia, just across the border from Kenya, is a gang that likes to call itself the National Volunteer Coast Guard (NVCG). Believed to be under the command of warlord Garaad
Mohamed, the NVCG is based primarily out of Kismaayo and prefers to operate close to shore, where they can prey upon small boats and fishing vessels. Further up the coas t, near Mogadishu, can be found the Marka groups, so named because they are based around the town of Marka. They operate further offshore than the NVCG and engage in piracy, sea robbery and smuggling, using vessels that in some cases have deck-mounted guns. 1he Marka gro ups are allied to Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad Inda' ade, a warlord in the Lower Shabelle district (though it should be no ted that Inda'ade has told the m edia he is not personally involved with piracy operations.) In the northeastern part of the country is found what are called the Punt!and gro ups, named after the semi-autonomous state in which they live. Mos t of these sea bandits are older men, drawing upon a tradition of piracy and smuggling that goes
Working from small boats, pirates are able to overtake large, but slower, ships. (right) Pirates come and go from MVFaina, while they negotiate a ransom with the ship's owners.
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SEA HISTORY 127, SUMMER 2009