Im agin e Jo n es's reac ri o n w he n he learned a sho rt rime after rerurning fro m rhis voyage rhar, despire his norable successes, he had been ranked eighreenth on rhe lisr of Co nrinental N avy cap rain s se r by C ongress in O ctober 1776 and that ranked above him, at sixteenth o n the list, was Hoys teed H acker. T his ranking caused Jones to launch a letter-writing campaign aim ed at advancing himself and discrediting several of the captains ra nked above him , particularly Hacker. Obvio usly Congress, in co nstructing rhe senio ri ry lisr, was mo re drive n by political consideratio ns and the abili ry of officers to arrract seamen recruits than with proven command abiliry, andJo nes's belief that he must sully the repuratio ns of others to advance his own chances of command jibes with crirics' accusations of preferment. Ir is impo rtant to no te, however, th at Jo nes was included on the list and did ger a command. Jo nes was a recent immigra nt to Am erica, havin g arrived in thi s country in 1773 after fleeing Tobago under threat of prosecuti o n for having killed an alleged mutineer o n a merchant ship he com manded. Once in Am erica, Jo nes changed his name fro m John Paul, his birth name, to John Paul Jones. Given rhese circum stances and his lack of political connecti o ns and influence in any one colony, Jo nes may not have had a comm and ar all had rhere been no C ontinental Navy. W ithout a national navy, therefore, it is possible that the fin est fi ghting co mm ander the United States produced during th e Revolutio n would never have had a chance to demonstrare rhar abiliry. Imagination, Initiative, and Audacity In 1777, while pressing his case fo r adva ncement, Jones advocated a new strategy for rhe Navy that demonstrated imaginatio n, iniriative, and audaciry. It was also a strategy rhat neither state navies no r privateers, the alternati ves to a Continental Navy, could have executed . Understanding thar the small Am erican navy was not strong eno ugh to protecr the country's coas tssom ething that the state navies attempted unsuccessfully to do-and that there was minimal strategic advantage in naval ships acting as privateers and preying o n Brirish co mmercial shipping, he and Robert M orris, a delegate to Co ngress, m ember of the Marin e Committee, and a Jones patron, advoca ted a different role for the Continen-
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tal Navy. As srared by Morris in alerter to Jo nes, they believed that the Navy's m issio n should be to "attack rhe Enemies defenceless places & thereby oblige them to Station more of their Ships in their own Countries or to keep them employed in fo llowing ours and either way we are relieved so fa r as rhey do ir. " 3 In other words, the Navy should attack the Bri tish where they leas t expected it and we re m ost vulnerable. Jones firsr suggested executing th is strategy by his lead in g a fl otilla to Africa to prey on the "English .African T rade which wo uld not soon be recovered by not leaving them a M as t Standing on that Coast. " 4 M o rris, speakin g for Co ngress, endo rsed the main o utlines of Jo nes's plan but o rdered rhar the attack be against Bri tish pos ts in the Caribbean , Wes t Florida, and near the mo uth of the M ississippi Ri ver. T his expeditio n never took pl ace, however. Jones blamed rhe jealo usy and backwardness of th e commander of the Co ntin ental Navy, Esek Hopkins; H opkins cited the inability of rhe N avy to man rhe ships needed forrh e pro posed expediti on. Instead , Jo nes was given command of Ranger, a sloop of war rhen under constructi o n at Portsmourh, New Hampshire, and was o rdered to Euro pe. As ir turned o ut, this assignment gave Jo nes rhe perfect o pportuni ry to execu te his plan of attackin g rhe Bri tish where they leasr expecred it. Befor e that co uld happen, however, Jo nes had to spend several mo nths readying Ranger fo r sea. His experi ence validates what the critics co ntended, thar rhe Co ntinental Navy was a significant fin ancial burden to th e new Am erican governmen t, which lacked the power to rax. Because building ships was so expensive, co nstructio n of naval vessels such as Ranger were marked by eco nomi es th at delayed completio n, affected vessel perfo rmance, and fo rced officers to beg and cajole for the materials needed. Jon es later wro te rhar completing and ourfitting this "small ship" was "mo re rro ubl e" and cosr him "m ore anxiery and U neasiness th an all the other duty" th at he "perfo rmed in the service. " 5 Even when rhe vessel was completed, Jo nes was dissatisfied with it. H e decided that it was too lightly built to carry twen ry canno n and reduced its armam enr to eighteen. Also, in order to save mo ney, secondhand m aterials had bee n used, incl uding spars intended fo r a larger vessel. As a result, the ship was over-sparred, a judg-
ment that was confirm ed by the voyage to France, d urin g w hich Ranger, acco rding to Jones, sailed "ve ry C rank. "6 To co rrect this defect, Jo nes, while anchored in the Ri ver Lo ire in D ecember and January, o rdered rhe spars shorrened , added th irry to ns of lead to the ballas r, and had th e sa il s recur. H e then, as a test voyage, rook Ranger in to the ro ugh winds and wa rers between Q uiberon Bay and Bres t, after which, in April and May 1778, Jones ordered further alterations to the vessel ho ping to imp rove its abili ry to sail to windward. H e set th e mas ts fa rther aft, sho rtened the sails on the lower spars, and repositio ned the ballas t. H e also had his crew scrape and clean the vessel 's botto m, maximizing its speed . With all of th ese alterarions, Ranger was as ready as Jo nes co uld m ake her to fulfill his srraregic plans. In the midstof rhese preparatio ns, Ranger had the hono r to be the first vessel flying the Stars and Srripes to receive fo rm al recognition . On 13 Februa1y, Jo nes anchored at Q uibero n Bay where a squadron oflin e-ofbattle ships and rhree fri gates under the command of Admiral La Motte-Picquet of France we re at anchor, giving Jones the oppo rtuni ry he had long coveted to exchange salu res with a French fl ag officer. Jo nes inform ed La Mo tte-P icquet thar he was prepared to discharge a thi rteen-gun salute if the French admiral wo uld "return G un fo r G un ." Jo nes was insul ted when La Motte-Picquet responded rhar he wo uld reply with a salu te of nine guns, but was mollifi ed o n learnin g rhat nine guns was the sa me salute that was offered to "an Admi ral ofH olland orofanyo rher Republic. " Jones also saw ir as an important sym bolic mome nt because the salute was rhe fi rsr ti me rhe fl ag of Ameri ca was "recognized in rhe fullest and amplest m anner by the Flag of France" and ir was "an Acknowledgement of Am eri can Independence." 7 In this exchange, the Co ntinental Navy was playin g a ro le-representati ve of rhe new rep ublic-that could not have been performed nea rly as well by no n-Navy vessels. Ar about the sam e time, Jo nes received orders concern in g his m ission fro m Benjamin Franklin , Silas D eane, and Arthur Lee, the.American co mmissioners in France. Jo nes had sailed to Europe antici pating that he wo uld receive a frigate, L 1ndien, which th e America n government had arranged ro have buil t in a Durch shipya rd. T he British learn ed of these plans, how-
SEA HISTORY l 00, SPRING 2002