DEFENDING THE HUDSON RIVER, 1776-1777
penetrating and, in addition, to main rain a channel of communication above Forts Washington and Lee.
Forcing the Hudson River Passage By early October, General Howe was again convinced that Washington wo uld require downriver supply for his army. To prevent this, the General and his brother, Admiral Richard Lord Howe, ordered Captain Parker to undertake a second penetration. They issued the order only after an informant offered to pilot the ships through the unfilled gap in the line of obstructions. After waiting six days for a favorable wind and tide, Parker, in Phoenix, made for the barrier at the head of a squadron which included another 44-gun frigate, Roebuck (Captain Andrew Snape Hamond), and the 14-gun Tartar, as well as the schooner T ryal and the tenders Howe and Pembroke. As Parker's squadron approached Fort Washington on 9 October, the informant beside him on the quarterdeck failed to identify the deep channel markers. Taking fire from both forts, Parker had two choices: he could turn his squadron about against contrary wind and tide and make way as best he could until out of cannon range, or he could make straight for the waters close by Fort Washington where he had brought his squadron through safely on 18 August. Parker opted for the latter. His squadron experienced greater damage this time around and indeed some casualties, but none serious enough to keep him from his mission. If the Americans had been relying on downriver supply, he might have succeeded, but the main body of the American army withdrew from northern Manhattan on 17 October, leaving behind a small but well-stocked garrison to hold Fort Washington "as long as possible. " On 27 October, Admiral Howe ordered two 32-gun frigates, Pearl and Repulse, to provide fire support for a British army attack on Fort Washington. This was the first time British wars hips were called upon to drop their anchors and ride upon their cables within range of the American batteries on both shores. The frigates got the worst of this exchange. The American gunners soon threw enough shots into both ships to compel them to withdraw down river. Repulse, which had moved up closer than Pearl to the chevaux de frise, was forced to cut her anchor cables and rely on
lO
her own and Pearl's boats to row her out of harm's way against a ride that was still running on weakening flood. General Nathanael Greene, the American commander, was certain the gunners would have sunk Repulse "had the tide run at flood one half hour longer. " T he frigates contributed nothing to the attack, which was eventually called off for reasons unrelated to naval support.
The Final Defense of Fort Washington On 6 November 1776, Captain Thomas W ilkinson in Pearl achieved the third and las t naval penetration of the lower Hudson before the British army seized the high gro und at Fort Washington. His mission was to accompany two supply ships,joseph and British Queen, to Dobbs Ferry, where the main body of the Bri rish army was then encamped. In passing the American batteries, Pearl sustained extensive but not crippling damage, with one man killed and several wounded. Since Wilkinson's mission was time driven, he could not wait upon an optimal conjunctio n of wind and tide. With three hours of flood remaining he started his upriver run at 3PM. He had only just gotten out of range when contrary tides brought him to a halt. Ir took Wilkinson about 29 hours, two changes of tide, and heavy use of the ships' boats to cover the ten miles to Dobbs Ferry. At the battle of Fort Washington on 16 November, Pearl came downriver to provide fire support for the army, which attacked the Americans in overwhelming numbers from the north, south and east. Captain Benjamin Caldwell in Emerald, 28 guns, came upriver under orders to cut off any Americans attempting to retreat across the river. From 7 to 10:30AM, Pearl, riding on her cables, "raked the woods" on Mount Washington 's north face, but soon, "much damaged" in her hull and rigging, she weighed anchor and returned upriver. Caldwell came abreast of Fort Washington's lower defensive lin es at 9AM. As soon as he observed the Americans wheeling cannon into position to engage him at sea level, he immediately warped back down river. Both Pearl and Emerald left the scene before the ground attack began in earnest. Four days after taking Fort Washington, General Howe ordered his second in command, General Charles Cornwallis, to cross the Hudson with 5,000 men and
attack Washington's army in New Jersey. After landing at C loster dock, a few miles north of Fort Lee, the British slogged up a steep narrow path to the crest of the Palisades. W ithin hours, Cornwallis had driven the Americans from Fort Lee. Dismayed by the apparent ease with which British warshi ps had defied their riverine defenses, Generals Washington and Greene reluctantly conceded that the British effectively controlled the lower Hudson, or could easily do so. Historians have generally agreed and, for that reason, have strongly criticized both men for their fa ilure to evacuate Fort Washington before disaster struck on 16 November. But the question of who controlled the lower Hudson in 1776 is a matter of perceptionborh then and now. The British perceptions of their riverine operations in 1776, long neglected, are well worth considering. Admiral Shuldham was unrepentant in his judgment of Parker's initial upriver foray as a "fruitless expedition." Captain Snape Hamond, who participated in the second penetration, took much the same view of what he characterized as a tedious upriver "confinement" with little to do except play cards and drink toasts to the King. Admiral Howe assigned no particular significance to riverine operation except to commend Parker and Wallace for their initiative and courage in getting up and back without major misadventure. In his official report to London, General Howe unequivocally attri buted his all-out assault on Fort Washington to "the importance of this post which, with Fort Lee on the opposite shore of Jersey, kept the enemy in command of the navigation of the North River. " For the British, it seems, there could be no real control of the lower Hudson unless and until the Americans and their batteries were run off Mount Washington and the Palisades. By their stubborn five-month defense of the lower river, the Americans insured that this did not occur until the British campaign at New York was in its final phase. By that time, the season for campaigning was nearly over and the British were abo ut to lose their best chance to wi n the war militarily. J,
Dr. Deary is retiredfrom the US Department of State and earned a post-retirement Doctorate from George Washington University in 1996. SEA HISTORY 98, AUTUMN 200 1