DEFENDING THE HUDSON RIVER, 1776-1777
mand broad stretches of river norrh and so uth, the best ground for rhar purpose south of the Hi ghlands. Was hington 's offshore defe nses in cluded armed row galleys, fireships, and physical obstructions in rhe river to impede the passage of ships. Wind and ride limited the acti vi ties of ships des igned for operations in the open ocean or in offshore waters. To move against ride or wind in a river, such ships had to be rowed by longboats or warped on a kedge anchor atrached by cable ro a capsran. Armed row galleys, however, could maneuver even in the poorly charred North American rivers. Shallow-draft row galleys, with 24- or 32pounder guns in the prow, co uld navigate the riverine envi ronment, and, with two rowers per oar and a lateen sail to catch a fo ll owing wind, rheywere far less inhibited by ride and wind than their larger prey. When ci rcumstances required a ri verbound warsh ip to fight ship-on-ship or, worse still, to engage rather than run through fir e from ashore, the ship usually had to stop dead in rhewarer and ride upon its anchor cables to transfo rm itself into a stable firing platform and bring its guns to bear in broadside. By alternately raking up and paying o ur slack on two cabl es attached to a single anchor bur to separate capstans, it was possible to hold a ship steady against moderate winds and rides. T he underwater obstructions, or chevaux de frise, which Washington hoped would halt enemy ships, were woode n timbers tipped with iron points, submerged in a frame filled with ballast, and intended to breach ships' hulls badly eno ugh to insure des truction by surrounding batteries. Al-
though warships alone were usually no m arch for shore-based fortifications in a stand-up cannon duel, under full sail they could run through heavy fire. Successful use ofobstrucrions required precise knowledge of the river's depth. Early experience in obstructing the D elawa re Ri ver showed rhar 46 feet-about 7 'h fa tho ms-was the maximum feasible depth to breach hulls at high or low water while insuring rhar the obstructions lay below the river's surface.
The First Foray into the Hudson The British fleet, having left Boston in rebel hands in M arch, began arriving in New York in late June. In early July the army occupied Staten Island and, by midSeptember, the British had raken all of Long Island, New York C ity, and most of the rest of Manhattan. For a short rime in mid-October, between four and five hundred British ships, which had provided protection, transport, and supply for 32,000 British and H essian troops, lay at anchor in New York H arbor. American measures to interdict the lower Hudson at Mount Washington had barely begun when the Royal Navy carried out its first penetration of the Hudson on 12 July 1776 . Under the overall command of Captain H yde Parker, Jr. in the 44-gun frigate Phoenix, a five-ship flotilla-o n a strong tide and followin g wind-ran pas t the incomplete Am erican batteries at Fort Washington and Fort Lee on the Jersey Palisades, with no significant damage or cas ualties. Parker was accompanied by C aptain James Wallace in rhe 20-gun frigate Rose, the armed schooner Tryal, and two renders, Shuldham and Charlotta.
On the day of Phoenix sfirst foray up the Hudson, accompanied by Rose, Admiral Howe arrived in New York aboard the flagship Eagle (ship under sail at right center), joining the fleet that had begun to gather at the end ofJune. ("View ofthe Narrows between Long Island & Staten Island, & our Fleet at Anchor & Lord Howe coming in taken from the Height at the Water Place Staten island 12th July 1776, "Archibald Robertson [wash drawing}, 1776 (Spencer Collection, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundation))
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T his first fo ray into the lower Hudso n was undertake n at the insistence of Ge neral William H owe over the objections of Rear Admiral Molyneux Shuldham. Shuldham believed that the risk to his ships would be too great unless they were accompanied by a body of troo ps. General Howe disco unted the risk, insisting that an upriver naval force was needed to cur off downri ver supply to Washington 's army building up rapidly at New York. As things turned out, however, Parker had no opportunity to prevent riverborne supply during hi s 37day deployment, because Washington had laid in a 90-day supply for the American army at New York and Albany. D ay-to-day movement of Parker's squadron was strongly dictated by wind and ride, compounded by the impossibility of navigating safely at night. Both banks of the river we re controlled by hastily assembled New York militia, who preve nted Parker's crews from coming ashore and subj ected them to harassing musket fire whenever they came within range. Where he could do it safely, Parker em ployed his crews in sounding the poorly charred Hudson, which was aqua incognita to the Royal Navy. Al rho ugh Parker briefly considered attacking Peekskill, observatio n of Fort Montgomery's heavy cannon was enough to deter the attacks in rhe absence of supporting troops. On 25 July, Parker turned back downriver from upper H averstraw Bay, at the entrance to the Highlands, to the Tappan Zee, which lies six miles north of Manhattan. 0 n 2 August, Phoenix went aground on the Tarrytown shoals at 2PM. After a strenuous eight hours, which required him to reposition his ship's guns and wait upon rhe next favorab le ride, Parker warped off the shoals. The next day, rhe British were attacked by six American row galleys commanded by Lr. Colonel Benj amin T upper. Favored by a moderating tide and light wind, Parker and Wallace engaged the galleys whil e riding on anchor cables. Phoenix, howeve r, had to fire between Rose's m as ts in order to bring their combined cannon power to bear on Tupper's adroi tly maneuvered gal leys. D espite their co urage and skill, the galleymen with their six cannon could not overcome Phoenix and Rose, and they sustained heavy damage and cas ualties. Under cover of darkness on 16 August, the Americans sent two fire ships laden with combustible materials against Parker's
SEA HISTORY 98, AUTUMN 2001