IEWS The Foundations of Naval History: John seminate documentary sources in naval hisKnox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the tory to a wider readership. It was Laughton Historical Profession, by Andrew Lam- who pioneered the use of such materials as bert (Chatham Publishers, Gerald Duck- he attempted to single-handedly correct worth & Co. Ltd., London GB, 1998, much misinformation in naval history illus, appen, sources, index, ISBN 1-86176- through the more than 900 biographies of 086-8; ÂŁ30hc) naval figures that he wrote for the DictioThis volume from the prolific pen of nary ofNational Biography. Among them, Andrew Lambert, Professor of Naval His- some Victorians looked askance at Nelson tory at King's College, London, is a very for his amorous liaison with Emma, but it welcome contribution to the study of naval was Laughton who played a key early role in history. As a major figure in the develop- rescuing Nelson's professional reputation. Despite these impressive achievements, ment of historical studies, Laughton was virtually forgotten until 1965, when Pro- Laughton's work had even greater effect. His 1874 lecture on "Scienfessor D. M. Schurman brought attention to him as a tific Study ofN aval History," THE FOUNDATIONS in particular, was widely read. key figure in his seminal study, OF N AVAL From it one can follow a line The Education ofa Navy: The HISTORY ofliterary influence that leads Development ofBritish Naval in a direct line from LaughStrategic Thought, 1867ton through succeeding gen1914. In that study, Schurerations of British naval hisman quite rightly ranked torians from Co lomb to Laughton alongside such Corbett, Richmond, and other writers as the two Roskill. Among others who Colombs, Mahan, Corbett, read that same article was an and Richmond. Inspired by insightful American naval Schurman's pioneer work in captain: Stephen B. Luce. the field, other scholars Inspired by what Laughton looked more deeply at the work of Mahan, while Schurman himself had written, Luce eventually met him in focused on a full-length study of Corbett. London and the two became corresponNow, Andrew Lambert has continued this dents. It was this connection that nurtured line of enquiry with his exemplary study of in Luce the idea that originally made hisLaughton, showing him to be an even torical study a fundamental part of the more important figure than previously educational approach of the US Naval War College. It was also the initial intellectual thought. As Lambert shows, through his diligent stimulus that led Luce to give Alfred Thayer and fruitful work in the archives, Professor Mahan the task of researching and writing Sir John Knox Laughton, Royal Navy, what eventually became Mahan's influen(1830-1915) was, arguably, the key found- tial "Sea Power" series. Andrew Lambert's important study ing figure for the intellectual movement that took place in the midst of the techno- clearly demonstrates that Laughton was logical revolution at the beginning of the not only a major figure in the development 20th century and that eventually produced of the navy's intellectual heritage, but the Mahan and Corbett. I twas Laughton whose catalyst that laid the foundation for the 1874 paper on "The Scientific Study of modern study of naval history. Overlooked Naval History, " read before the Royal by scholars for far too long, Lambert has United Services Institute in London, first now given Laughton his due. Everyone laid out the basic concept behind the use of with a broad interest in naval history, not history as a basis for broad professional only those with a particular interest in the thinking about current and future naval intellectual history of the Navy or in the issues. It was Laughton who was the key revolution in naval affairs that occurred figure that led the Admiralty to open its vast just a century ago, will want this book on treasure trove of documents to historical their shelves. researchers. It was Laughton who was the JOH N B. HATTENDORF Naval War College key figure in founding the Navy Records Newport, Rhode Island Society in 1893 as the vital means to dis42
Malta Convoys, 1940-1943, by Richard Woodman Qohn Murray, London GB, 2000, 471 pp, illus, notes, biblio, index, ISBN 07195-5752-4; $55hc)Available (add $5s&h) from Trafalgar Square, PO Box 257, North Pomfret VT 05053; 1 800 423-4525; e-mail: rsquare@sover.net. Captain Woodman, master mariner, already noted for his naval histories and the Drinkwater novels, has written a masterful chronicle of the struggle for command of the Medi rerranean Sea and the survival of Malta as an Allied fortress . Success in each of these viral efforts was vi ral to the other, and both were conducted against overwhelmingly superior Axis forces. Malta held out, until the capitulation ofltaly and the rolling back of German arms on African and European fronts, through the valor of British and Allied naval forces and merchant ships, together with supporting aircrafr, coupled with the heroism of the defenders and population of an island under savage and sustained bombardment. The casualties at sea were enormous. Major actions such as Taranto, Matapan and Operation Pedestal are already widely famed. Here they appear within a very detailed acco unt of all the operations directly or indirectly related to the bringing of support to Malta. These involved not only escorted convoys but also aircraft carriers, other warships and submarines, and single merchant ships which conveyed reinforcements, fighter planes, fuel, food, and ammunition while under attack by enemy bombers, torpedo bombers, submarines, small craft, and the large Italian battle fleet, not to mention extensive mine fields . The author vividly describes the ferocity of the ensuing battles as well as the desperate situation ashore in Malta itself and the problems facing those in high command. All the vessels engaged on both sides, and most of their commanders, are named. Due tribute is paid to the flag officers, notably Admirals Cunningham and Somerville, and their bold decisions. The author leads in with a comprehensive historical and geopolitical background and compares the strengths and weaknesses in the opening orders of battle. He examines the policies of Hider and Mussolini and how they abandoned plans for invasion despite Malta's proximity to their supply routes to North Africa. Extensive notes and a very complete index expand the narrative.
SEA HISTORY 95, WINTER 2000-01