USS Kearny and USS Reuben James Early Casualties of an Undeclared Naval War by William H. Langenberg
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n rhe earl y morning of 3 1 O ctober 194 1 convoy HX-156 slowl y steamed north from Newfoundl and toward Iceland . D espite the fact rhar it was almost six weeks before America's ent ry in to Wo rld War II , fi ve US Navywa rshi ps were escorring rhe convoy carrying war materials bound for Grea r Britain. One of th ese five escorrs, th e obsolescent Clem so n-class fo ur-piper destroye r USS Reuben James (DD-24 5), was stati o ned o n the port side of rhe convoy, abo ur 2,000 ya rds fro m rhe las t ship in the outboard column . Ar 0532 Reuben James received an order fro m rhe escorr co mmander to run down a radio direcrionfinder bearin g o n a poss ibl e submarine contact somewhere to po rt of the co nvoy. Jusr as the destroye r bega n to add speed and turn towa rd the proper bearing, she was struck by a torpedo o n her po rt side below the bridge. Seconds later, rhe ship's fo rward magazin e bl ew up, snapping Reuben James in two. All of rh e hull and superstructure forward of the number-four stack disappeared beneath rhe sea. The remain ing afrer sectio n of the ship slowly serried in rhe icy No rth A tlantic, as survivo rs franti cally launched balsa life rafts from the bl azing hull onto th e oil-covered water. Lucky survivors climbed aboard or clun g on precariously as the remainder of rhe ship slid beneath rhe sea with trapped o r wo unded m en. Just fi ftee n minutes after rhe torpedoing, silence serri ed over rh e sce ne. Bur nor for long. When th e after secti o n of the hull sa nk, rwo d epth charges exploded at th eir prese t depth , ca usin g m o re ca rn age among th e survi vors o n rhe surface . Thus at 0708 rh a r m o rnin g o nl y 45 shocked , o il -co ve red, n ea rl y fr ozen survivo rs we re taken aboard two remainin g esco rt vessels from con voy H X- 156. A total o f 11 5 Reuben J ames crewmen, including all of th e office rs, perish ed . Why was Reuben J ames escorting a co nvoy carrying war materials to G rear Britain nearly six wee ks before the US becam e a belligerent in W o rld W ar II? The answer to chis question illustrates a little- rem embered as pect ofAmeri ca n history, th e undeclared naval war between the U nited Scares and Germany which raged in rheArlantic O cean fo r several months before the US entered World W ar II .
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An Undeclared Naval War In an effo rt to preclude Am erica n involvement should anoth er majo r wa r begin in Europe, Congress passed rhe Neutraliry Act in 1935, prohibiting expo rt of implements of wa r to belligerent states in America n ships. le also prohibited loa ns o r credits co such co untri es and granted the President power to bar expo rts of ocher than war materials to bellige rent nations. Foreign powers we re required to pay in advance fo r war materi als and tra nspo rt them to their des tin ation. This "cash-and-ca rry" clause govern ed trade with European nations up co the outbreak of WWII. Impending wa r in Europe m ade the Roosevelr adminiscra tio n apprehensive ch ar the Ne utrali ry Act might hinder G reat Britain and France from purchas in g war materials during rhe loo ming co nflict. Intern atio nal law permitted belligerents to purchase these supplies from a neutral state, but in 1939 the existing Ne utrali ry Act superimposed restri cti o ns on such Ameri can action . President Roosevelt sought an am endment to the Neurrali ry Act rhar wo uld permit the US to withhold arms from the perceived aggressor nations whil e sendin g war materi als to the perceived victims. The amended Ne utrali ty Act, passed by Co ngress in 1939, co ntinued the "cashand-carry" prov isio n fo r belligerent nati o ns. T his actio n favo red G rear Britain and France, as they we re theo retically abl e to exercise sea co ntro l in rhe Arl an ti c. Partially to offset this perceived advantage, however, che 1939 Ne ucraliry Act sec up a European danger zo ne extending fa r out to sea from Britain and France into which no American m erchant ship co uld legally sa il. American fea rs abo ut a Euro pea n war became reali ty in September 1939 when rhe German arm y invaded Poland. W ithin o ne year, th e Ge rm an military machin e had occupi ed Norway, the Low Co untri es and France. Italy had joined rhe conflict on the side of Ge rma ny. G rear Britain now stood alone, and man y Americans becam e concerned char, if Britain surrendered, irs powerful Navy would fall under Ge rman co ntrol , brin ging rhe US into danger. Reflecting t he concerns of rh e Am erican people, President Roosevelt so ught ways to aid Britain shorr of decl arin g wa r. T hus in September 1940, after p ro tracted
im portuning by British P rime M inister W insto n S. Churchill, Roosevelt traded 50 obso lescent four-piper des troye rs to G rea r Bri tain fo r eight nava l and air bases in rhe Atlan tic O cea n an d Caribbean Sea. T he Ge rm an s co nsidered this trade, accomplished by executi ve action without Congressio nal approval, to be an "openly hostile act. " I r was soon fo llowed by the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Bartle ofBrirai n, thus endi ng German d reams of a cross-Channel invasion to conquer and occupy England. Meanwhile, President Roosevelt becam e dete rmined to defend America by helping th e British, even while recognizing th e risk of open warfa re with the Ge rmans. In Nove mber 1940 he p ro posed to Co ngress that aid to Britain be facilitated by a "lendlease" program , in whi ch war materials wo uld be shi p ped to England at no extra cost, bur wo uld th eo reti cally be returned or replaced with equi valent suppli es at a lacer d ace. Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act in M arch 194 1. Roosevelt's experi ence as Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1 91 3-20) under rhe W ilso n admi n istratio n during Wo rld War I surely alerred him to the face char Ge rman U- boacs would sink merchant ships carryin g "lend-lease" suppli es to G rea t Britain. Furthermore, if th ese shipments were essential to the defense of the US , as Roosevelt repeatedly alleged, the President as Co mm ander-in-Chiefwould have to devise ways to esco rt these fo reign m erchant shi ps with US wa rships, potentially leadin g to combat betwee n Ge rman U- boats and Am erican esco n vessels. Such a scenario could resul t in overt wa rfa re in the Atlantic Ocean. Bue President Roosevelt pressed fo rwa rd with the "len d-lease" program , and the feared scenario un fo lded. After rhe fa ll of Denmark in May 1940, the British army landed troops o n Iceland, ostensibly to prevent a possibl e Ge rman takeove r of the isla nd, whi ch wo uld have threatened th e No rth Atlanti c shipping lanes betwee n America and Euro pe. Great Britain established air and sea bases on Iceland and, by m id- 194 1, there we re over 27,000 British military personnel statio ned there. C hurchill had urgent need fo r these t roo p s elsew h e re, a nd h e e nrrea ted Roosevelt to replace chem with American forces. In ret rospect, one of Churchill's
SEA HISTORY 87, WINTER 1998-99