The Battle of the Nile:
Europe at Crossroads by RADM Joseph F. Callo, USNR (Ret.)
F
or many , Trafal gar is Vice Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson's best known victory. But there ' s a compelling case that the Battle of the N il e in August 1798 actually was more important. Perhaps the Battle of the N ile lacked the heroic drama of Trafalgar-intensifi ed as those events were by Nelson' s death- but its impact on Europe's hi story was profound. The Prelude The run-up to the Battle of the Nile had several aspects. One related to Ne lson, arg uably the most famou s naval combat leader of modern times. The other was quite sweeping hi storicall y. Both were inextricably intertwined. In te1ms of the personal , the prelude to the battle can be thought to begin with elson's resounding defeat by the Spanish at the Battle of Santa Cruz, Tenerife, in the Canary Islands, in 1797. There, as the result of a di sastrous British amphibious assault against the Spanish, then allies of the French, an overconfident and underprepared Nelson lost his arm to grape shot-and very nearly lost hi s career to the deep depression that followed the action. It was a severely shaken officer who, after the debacle, wrote to his commander-in -chief, Adm iral Sir John Jervis, Earl of St. Vincent, requesting that he be allowed to return home to be " no more seen. " Jervis ' reaction was a significant example of the kind of insightful leadership by a senior officer that can salvage a brilliant career on the brink of abandonment. Although he had a well -deserved reputation for being a hard-nosed commander, Jervis didn ' t heap blame on his subordinate fo r the Santa Cruz fai lure. Instead, he introduced a philosophical note to the battle ' s aftermath by writing to Nelson that " mortals cannot command success."Importantly, Jervis' s approach helped retain Nelson as a combat leader fo r later events. After a nearl y year-long recuperation in England, Nelson returned to duty at a critical juncture in the struggle between Britain and Napoleon. The French had assembled an invasion force at Toulon that was dete1Ted from an assault on Britain only by a lack of French sea control. Napoleon had defeated the European armies aiTayed agai nst him , and
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the British were the principal military power that obstructed the expanding French empire. And it was with a focu s on empire that Napoleon decided to strike at the British thro ugh conquest of Egypt and, eventuall y, with mi li tary threats against the Briti sh in Indi a. Against that broad geopolitical background, the British government decided that the Mediterranean-an arena from which it had withdrawn the Royal Navy early in 1797, and in which it had no naval bases east of Gibraltar- was a strategical! y crucial arena. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Spencer, summed
"The fatal engagement ruined all our hopes; ... it left the field free for the English." it up in a letter to Admiral Jervis in April 1798, writing: "The appearance of a British Squadron in the Mediterranean is a condition on which the fate of Europe may at this moment be stated to depend. " After the decision to re insert a squadron into the Mediterranean , Spencer pushed the boundaries of his office somewhat with a "suggestion" to Jervis, the commander of British naval forces in the area: "I think it almost unnecessary to suggest to yo u the propriety of putting [the squadron] under the command of Sir H. Nelson." A Big-Stakes Sea Hunt In March of 1798, Nelson hoisted his rear admiral 's flag aboard HMS VanguardandjoinedJervis ' s fleet off Cadiz. In April , Jervi s placed Nelson in command of a detached squadron , the primary mi ss ion of which was to fi nd and destroy a French inv as ion fleet, with Bonaparte embarked. Ne lson's orders were blunt: "Take, sink, burn , or destroy" the enemy. The prob lem was that the fina l destin ation of the invasion fleet was unknown to the British. As a result, Nelson went through an ex tended period of physical and mental strain . Noted naval author Robert Gardiner, in the recent anthology Ne lson against Napoleon, described the ex perience as " prob-
ably the most anxious and stressful of the great sai lor's career, aware as he was that the fa te of Europe might depend on hi s deci sion. " Several important face ts of Nelson 's leadership were shown during the seven weeks he cri sscrossed the Mediterranean searching fo r the French. One was the strate g ic co mpre he n s ion th a t matched hi s ability to grasp a tactical situation. Nelson believed that the ultimate destination of the French fleet was Egypt, and in the end , that strateg ic analys is proved to be correct. Another importantaspectofNelson 's leadership that came to bear during hi s hunt fo r the French fl eet was his abil ity-notwithstanding circumstances that would have overwhelmed others-to maintain foc us on his mission. Despite the confu sing reports and many fru strations-including a desperate lack of frigates fo r scouting, plu s the lack of British bases for log istical support-Nelson risked hi s career by hi s willingness to rely on hi s own judgment in a murky situation. He was rewarded when the enemy battle fleet was finally located on 1 August in Aboukir Bay, 15 miles east of Alexandri a. By then , Nelson had missed his chance to strike at Napoleon and his army while embarked, but as it turned out, another opportunity to frustrate Napoleon's plans was at hand . The Battle Begins The French battle force at Aboukir consisted of 13 ships-of-the-l ine, 4 frigates , 2 brigs and 3 bomb vessels. Their main fo rce was compri sed of 9 74-gun ships, 3 80-g un vessels, and th e 120-gun l ' Orient. These 13 vessels were anchored in a line, with the head about one mile from shoals, and the landward side somewhat closer to shallow water. The French admiral , Brueys, had placed himself in a defensive position, one that presumed hi s attackers would enter the bay in a traditional line ahead, and then sail from rear to van , bringing the French ships under fire in sequence. Appai¡ently Brueys also ass umed that the British would not attack immediately, since sunset was approaching and night fleet actions were uncommon . The British squadron was made up of 13 ships-of-the-line of 74 guns, a 50gun fou rth-rate ship and a bri g. They SEA HISTORY 85, SUMMER 1998