Leyte Gulf marked the end of the Japanese Navy'sfleet offensive capability point of responsibility-so that Halsey could take his entire force from Philippine waters and attack Ozawa in the north on his own volition, which, of course, is exactly what he did. The situation was made much worse, however, because in doing so Halsey misled Kinkaid and others into believing that some of his force, Battleship Task Group 34 under Admiral Lee, was still guarding San Bernardino Strait. It is quite possible to view the Taffy 3 losses as the better alternative to that of a more traumatic, and more devastating, scenario in which the Japanese battleships and cruisers enter Leyte Gulf and smash the supply ships and the tremendous concentration of supplies and equipment on the beaches. Conceivably this could have happened in conjunction with the planned army counterattack against the American invasion troops. Certainly it would have been supported from the air and US air cover would have been less in evidence, as a result of Kamikaze attacks on US escort carriers. Was there anything with which to contest Kurita in Leyte Gulf if he managed to get that far? Perhaps Oldendorf's battleships and cruisers thathad smashed the Southern Force the night before could have performed the task. Indeed, on learning of the fight off Samar, Vice Admiral Kinkaid issued orders to Oldendo1f to move his ships to a position adjacent to the landing site and await the appearance of Kurita. But where was Oldendorf? Actually, his cruisers were far down Surigao Strait pursuing Shima' s ships, and available sources do not make clear the exact location of his battleships. In appeals for help made to Halsey, Kinkaid noted that the big ships were short of ammunition, but the records indicate that while there was a shortage of armorpiercing shells, there were enough of other kinds to fight a battle, especially a desperate one. To some, Kinkaid ' s statements suggest that perhaps Oldendorf's battleships were also in Surigao Strait and not able to get in position in time. Taffy 3 losses, then, were not in vain. The Taffy defense slowed the forward progress of the Japanese ships, knocking out four heavy cruisers in the process , and in the final analysis, by its tough posture, it persuaded Kurita to withdraw. Rear Admiral Sprague identified precisely the components of his command's success in his action report by noting: "The failure ... of the enemy main body and encircling light forces to
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Taffy 3 commander Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, right, receiving the Navy Cross from Rear Admiral Calvin T. Durgin, aboard USS Fanshaw Bay (CVE-70) on 15March1945.
completely wipe out all vessels of this Task Unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screen, our torpedo counterattack, continuous harassment of enemy by bomb, torpedo, and strafing air attacks, timely maneuvers, and the definite partiality of Almighty God. " Of course Sprague and his men did not do it entirely by themselves. Planes from the other Taffies, particularly Taffy 2 located fifty miles to the southeast, contributed mightily, and there were the mistakes made by Kurita in the disposition of his fleet, as well as the poor marksmanship of his gunners, and the serious communications problems among his ships and with the other forces of the SHO plan. In reviewing the American side of the battle, one is struck by the fact that the desperate situation of the command neiOne of the 1200 survivors of USS Gambier Bay (CVE-730), USS Hoel (DD-533), USS Johnston ( DD-5570and USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) rescued during the days following the battle.
ther evoked panic nor a diminution in the performance of the officers and men. Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland, Captain of the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts, one of the ships lost in the battle, noted as much in his battle report: The crew were informed over the loudspeaker system at the beginning of the action of the CO' s estimate of the situation: i.e. , a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival could not be expected, during which time we would do what damage we could. In thefaceofthisknowledge the men zealously manned their stations ... and fought and worked with such calmness, courage, and efficiency that no higher honor could be conceived than to command such a group.
An End to Japanese Naval Power Overall, the Battle of Leyte Gulf ended Japan ' s standing as a naval power and, therefore, was a great American victory. Had Kurita's Center Force managed to get beyond Samar Island and into Leyte Gulf on 25 October, it is highly unlikely that the outcome would have changed. However, the victory would hardly have been as great, for almost certainly the cost in lives and materials as well as in morale would have been high. That this did not happen was largely a consequence of the vigorous and effective response of the Taffies. In assessing this response, the distinguished naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison expressed the sentiments of his fellow citizens when he noted: "The Battle off Samar had no com peer. The story of that action, with its dramatic surprise, the quick thinking and resolute decisions of Clifton Sprague, the little screening vessels feeling for each other through the rain and smoke and , courting annihilation, making individual attacks on battleships and heavy cruisers; naval aviators making dry runs on enemy ships to divert gun fire from their own; the defiant humor and indomitable courage of bluejackets caught in the 'ultimate of desperate circumstances' wi II make the fight of the 'Taffies' with Kurita'sCenterForce forever memorable, forever glorious." !,
Mr. Nicolosi is the Director of the Naval War College Museum in Newport, Rhode Island. Themuseum'sexhibit "The Battle of Leyte Gulf" will be open through 28 November. For hours, call the museum at 401 841-4052. SEA HISTORY 71, AUTUMN 1994