Leyte Gulf was the largest sea battle of all time .... it was also the last battle between battleship fleets, bringing to an end a long naval warfare tradition. with a total of thirty-two warships including five battleships. Two of the battleships, the Yamato and the Mus as hi, were the largest warships in the world and carried 18.1-inch guns. The force originated at Lingga Roads off Singapore and was to penetrate the center of the Philippines, transit San Bernardino Strait into the Pacific and then proceed south along the coast of Samar Island to Leyte Gulf. The plan went into effect on 17 October when it became obvious to the Japanese High Command that Leyte was to be the invasion si te. The movements of so many enemy warships attracted the attention of the US Navy and counter measures were taken that ultimately frustrated any hope of a simultaneous attack on the Leyte beachheads. On 23 October Kurita lost three cruisers to submarine attacks off Palawan Island. The next day he was hit by planes from Task Force 38 of Halsey's Third Fleet, resulting in further loss and a general retirement-at least for a short while. Later, in the dark hours of 24/25 October, the first part of the Southern Force under Nishimura was annihilated in Surigao Strait by Seventh Fleet surface ships commanded by Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf. The second pait under Shima, which arrived on the scene later, took some hard knocks as well before retreating back down the Strait. The pincer movement had failed, but not the SHO plan per se, for the element of deception had worked perfectly. Halsey discovered Ozawa' s Northern Force of seventeen ships late on 24 October and hastily took off in pursuit with the entire Third Fleet, a total of sixtyfi ve ships. Laterthe same evening, Kurita, who had changed course back to the east after Task Force 38 planes had departed, transited San Bernardino Strait unopposed, much to hi s surprise.
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Shima Second Striking Force
Unga yen Gulf
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Cape Force Engano
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Kurita Centre First Striking
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11 .30(23)
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Darter
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Ground~d • 06.32(23) Atago & 06.56(23) Takao Maya hit
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Panay
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Palawan
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Nishimura Southern Force
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Bombed 09.18(24)
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reconnaissance and preponderance of ships and planes, could be surprised by a superior enemy surface force? A grave mistake had been made, whether at the highest levels of planning or at the fleet command level, and a crisis situation had developed off the coast of Samar Island. Escort catTiers were not expected to engage in fleet surface actions. The Taffies were stationed off Leyte Gulf to provide air support for land operations, and to conduct anti-submarine patrols. Most of the armaments on the carriers were antipersonnel bombs and depth charges. Armor-piercing bombs and torpedoes were in short supply. Yet Taffy 3 was the only thing blocking Kurita 's
clear sailing to the Leyte beachhead. When the Japanese opened fire, Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, commander of Taffy 3, succinctly noted: "it did not appear that any of our ships could survive another five minutes."
A David and Goliath Contest With the first shell splashes, Rear Admiral Sprague altered Taffy 3' s course away from the advancing enemy at flank speed, ordered carriers to launch all their planes as quickly as possible, ordered screen ships and carriers to make smoke and sent off general calls for help to the other task units and to Vice Admiral Kinkaid . At 0716, as the shell splashes were getting closer, the American ships entered a providential rain squall in which most of the planes (each carrier had approximately 18 Wildcat fighters and 12 Avenger bomber-torpedo planes) were flown off, and the course was altered again to open the distance from the enemy even further. By 0730 when Taffy 3 came out of the squall, over a hundred planes were airborne and attacking the cruisers and battleships with an assortment of weapons including rockets, depth charges, and JOO and 500-lb anti-personnel bombs. By 0800 they were joined by planes from Taffy 2 which were more adequately fueled and armed with armor-piercing bombs and torpedoes. The air attacks were conducted with unmistakable courage, as attested to by Japanese crewmen interviewed after the war. The pilots took great risks in their bombing and strafing attacks, and when their bullets and bombs were spent, made
At the start ofthe Battle of!Samar, USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) and two destroyer escorts make a smoke screen, which was used to conceal the fleeing carriers and the destroyer counterattack.
The Surprise off Samar A few minutes before 7 AM the next morning, while steaming south off Samar, Kurita came into contact with Taffy 3, the northernmost task unit of Seventh Fleet escort carrier Task Group 77.4. Surprise was complete on both sides as they struggled to make certain identification. This did not last long, for at 0659 the battleship Yamato opened fire on the carriers with its 18.1-inch guns at a range of 29,000 yards. How was it possible that the US Navy, with all of its sophisticated surveillance equipment, network communications, air SEA HISTORY 71, AUTUMN 1994
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