O peration Overlord Years of planning for a critical day of combat by J erry Roberts
hrou ghout the course of history there have been fe w occasions when the fates of nati ons and the course of human destiny have hinged on the outcome of a single day. But June 6th 1944 was such an occasion. The events which took pl ace on the beaches of Normand y on that day helped to set the stage fo r the conclusion of the most horrific struggle in the history of mankind . Fifty years later, Overlord still represents the largest single military operation in hi story, and continues to conjure vivid images . On thi s day, thousands of ships and planes, and vast armi es of men, converged on a broad strip of beach to decide the future of Europe and shape the world in whi ch we now li ve. Ever since the las t British soldier waded into the sea at Dunkirk in 1940, it had been clear to both sides that if the war lasted long enough, particul arly once the United States had become involved, Britain and her allies wo uld someday attempt to return . It was equally clear that with the bul k of Germany's fo rces bogged down on the Eastern Front, the future of Hitler's Third Re ich would no doubt depend on the success or failure of an A ng lo-A merican in vasion. Consequentl y, in March 1942, Hitl er appointed Field Mars hal Karl von Rundstedt to the post of Commander In Chief West and ordered thatan "Atlantic Wall" be created along the exposed coast of France and the Low Countries, with a mobile reserve held inland, ready to swiftly and decisively counter any attempted assault. By Ja nuary 1943 the Allies had indeed committed themselves to a cross-channel invasion, and in March, Britain 's Lt. General Sir Frederick Morgan was named Chief of Staff to the as yet unnamed Supreme All ied Commander (COSSAC). Morgan was tasked with planning the All ied assault to be carried out as early as possible in 1944. T he prospect was daunting. Somehow, along an occupied coast, where the enemy was in fac t expecting to be attacked, enough men and equipment had to be put as hore to engage the most powerful army on earth , an arm y that had already conquered Europe and had had
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nearl y fo ur years to di g in . The first consideration was to determine how many troops would be needed. Based on thebuild-up of American troops then pouring into England, the British and A ll ied troops already there, and the projected availability of landing craft, the plan called for three infa ntry di visions and two ai rborne di visions in the firs t assaul t, to be supported by two fo llow- up d ivisions. Twenty addi tional in fa ntry divisions would be embarked once a beachhead lodgement had been establi shed. The next, and perhaps most importa nt, consideration was the locati on of the assault. The obvious cho ice was the Pas-de-Calais where the French coast li es less than 20 miles across the Engli sh Channel at the Strait of Dover. Calais
Rommel differed with his direct superior, Von Rundstedt, as to how the invasion should be repelled . .. the enemy must be defeated on the beaches. Otherwise, the battle for France was as good as over. also represented the shortest possible breakout ro ute toward Germany. But the Pas-de-Calais had its di sadvantages as well. The Germans expected the Allies to strike here, so it was the most heav ily fo rtified area on the entire coast. Second ly, the Engli sh ports c losest to Dover were not large enough to all ow the tremendous buil d- up of shi ps necessary to stage the in vas ion. Simil arly, there were not any suitable deep water ports near Calais to handle the fl ow of men and materials needed to support the campaign. The physical nature of the area itself was also less than idea l, with narrow beaches backed by steep cha lk cliffs. The other suitabl e stretch of French coastline was in Normandy. Here were broad flat beaches and an interior suitable to a build up of fo rces and airfi eld development, all in close prox imity to
the maj or port of Cherbourg on the Cotentin Peninsula. Although Normandy lay one hundred mil es south of England, it was directly adj acent to major British ports like Portsmouth , Southampton and Plymouth . An additional attraction was the element of surprise-it was not where the Germans ex pected the assault and the defenses were li ghter. For a ll of these reasons, Normandy was se lected. In Novemberof 1943 ,justone mo nth before General Dwight D. Eisenhower was named Supreme Allied Commander in charge of Overlord, Germany's legendary Field Marshal Erwin Ro mmel was pl aced in command of the forces defending the French coast. Ro mmel differed with hi s direct superior, Von Rundstedt, as to how the invasion shoul d be repelled. Rundstedt be! ieved that sinee there was no guarantee where the All ies wo uld land, a large mobile reserve should be held well back from the coast ready to move quickl y to the in vasio n area. Rommel, on the other hand, fe lt that with the decisive air superi ority he ld by the A llies, Germ an mobil e reserves wo uld be delayed. Rommel believed that the enemy must be defeated on the beaches, at the hi gh water mark where they would be most vu lnerable. Otherwise, the battle for France was as good as over. Rommel set about strengthening the Atl antic Wall. The major ports which the A llies would need to capture quickly to ensure a suffi cient fl ow of re inforcements were equipped with large coastal batteri es and stro ng garri sons. On the beaches themselves, natural e lements such as high bluffs were enhanced with concrete casemented arti llery and machine gun strong po ints which could ra ke the beaches with deadly crossfire. The broad beaches of Normand y were of particular concern to Rommel. Landing at hi gh water, the enemy could di sembark hi s forces well up on the beach where a combinati on of the natural gravel shingle at the hi gh water mark, often acco mpanied by a seawall , would provide cover fo r enemy troops. To prevent thi s, Rommel ordered that SEA HISTORY 69, SPRING 1994