During World War II the Port of New York saw 21,459 convoy ship clearances in a total of 1,462 convoy departures. cated the problem and it is remarkable that no casualties were opposite New London, Connecticut, in Long Island Sound. Harbor entrance control presented a complex problem. The caused by this type of "friend! y fire. " The Upper Bay was also protected by an anti-submarine net primary requirement was an immediate, accurate identification of all in-bound vessels. This determination had to be made and anti-motor torpedo boat boom across the Narrows. Paswell to seaward of the Ambrose Channel. It was critical that no sage through the net and boom was afforded by a 900-foot gate hostile vessel be allowed to enter the main ship channel, which and a 600-foot emergency gate on the Brooklyn shore. Strong at the outer harbor entrance was only 2,000 feet wide and 40 currents of four knots or more swept through the Narrows feet in depth. Sea mines or block ships sunk in this restricted making passage of the net and boom a hazardous undertaking area could result in the closure of the Port of New York for in the best of circumstances, complicated by the constant months, an event of potentially disastrous consequences. congestion of ship traffic through this natural bottleneck. In the event, the Port of New York was closed for only one Despite the critical nature of the ID requirement, at the end of the war, the Navy estimated that the system was effective only twenty-four period, 13-14 November 1942, after the discovery of sea mines in the vicinity of the main ship channel some two 60 to 70 percent of the time. In addition to the complex geography of the harbor, the sheer miles southeast of Ambrose Light Ship. Of the ten mines laid by volume of traffic strained the system. During World War II the U-608 on the night of 11November1942, five were swept and Port of New York saw 21,459 convoy ship clearances in a total detonated between 13 and 21November1942. It was only with of 1,462 convoy departures. By the end of 1942, the Harbor the end of the war in Europe and the capture of the records of UEntrance Control Posts [HECPs] were expected to monitor over boat Command that it was discovered that a total of ten mines 900 merchant ship arrivals per month, not including naval were laid. A search for the five remaining mines was made in vessels, and an approximately equal number of clearances. May 1945 without results. It was critical to ensure a smooth and uninterrupted traffic These averages rose to 1, 100 per month in 1943, and would peak at 1,200 per month in early 1944. The first six months of 1944 flow at the entrance to the Ambrose Channel. Ships could not saw 7,121 arrivals and 7,238 clearances. During the build-up to be allowed to congregate outside the harbor entrance where D-day, convoys totaling as many as 110 vessels departing in a they would be easy prey for U-boats. In order to speed up the actual boarding and examination of vessels, this responsibility single 24-hour period were not uncommon. Retired seaman Jack Quimby, as a boy of 13 living on the was given to the Coast Guard Pilot Command-pilots would West Side at 157th Street and 11th Avenue, remembers the be boarding vessels in any case in order to guide them into port. sudden overnight disappearances of vessels anchored north of The task fell to the 123 professional pilots licensed by New 72nd Street in the Hudson. "Sometimes," he recalls, "as many York and New Jersey to guide ships into and out of the Port of as "75 ships-tankers, Libertys, Victorys-tied 3 abreast and New York. They were organized into powerful guilds that dated back to the age of sail; leaving a channel for tugthe New York and New Jerboats" would ride at ansey Sandy Hook Pilots Aschor up the Hudson waitsociations and the Hell Gate ing to sail. Pilots Association. Anny 6" coastal batThe U-boat offensive on teries in Forts Hancock and the East Coast placed conTilden were responsible siderable stress on the civilfordefenseoftheAmbrose ian system of state and federChannel, secondary coastal ally licensed pilots. As a rechannels and approaches. NEW JERSEY z suit, theSecretaryoftheNavy The primary alert battery o-'fordered the Coast Guard to at Fort Hancock remained ~ assume military control on 24-hour alert through~ over pilotage. On 15 Deout the war and was, in ~ cember 1942, thefirstmemtheory, prepared to fire in ~ bers of the New York and 15 seconds upon suspi~ New Jersey Pilots Associacious vessels or those vio~ tions were commissioned lating entrance procedures. ~ as temporary officers in the Fishing vessels, patrol It Coast Guard Reserve. Pilot craft, and coastwise traf~ vessels and their crews were fic complicated problems al0: likewise enrolled. of identification and con;'i Munitions convoys were trol. "Bring-to" shots ~ often routed through the across the bows of uni~ more protected waters of the dentified vessels, fired at 6 East River, Hell Gate and ranges of 2,000-7 ,000 j Long Island Sound, guided yards, were often tricky ATLANTIC OCEAN when there might be 50 or by the twenty-three mem~ bers of the Hell Gate Pilots more vessels in the vicinNEW JERSEY ~ Association based on City ity of the ship in question. g; Island in the Bronx. The Conditions of reduced visibility further compli- ' - - - - - - - - - - - --=--":....1..- - - - - - - - - - - - ' 8 Coast Guard reserved high
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SEA HISTORY 65, SPRING 1993
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