The Case for Seamen's Recognition:
Reflections on Merchantman? or Ship of War by Rear Admiral Thomas A. King, USMS
Now in its fifth decade, the discussion continues about whether merchant mariners who were in active support of allied forces in World War II should be accorded the same recognition and benefits as veterans ofthe armed services. Charles D. Gibson, a licensed captain and scholar of the role of merchant seamen in the defense of our country, has just published Merchantman? or Ship of War (Ensign Press, Camden, ME, 214pp, illus, $20hb). What follows are thoughts on the book, and the subject, by Rear Admiral Thomas A. King, Superintendent of the US Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York. At a time when the conscience of America appears to compel recognition for so many who have been overlooked and whose lasting contributions to our nation and our society remain unacknowledged, author Charles Dana Gibson has surely struck a nerve with Merchantman? or Ship of War . Carefully , coherently and with meticulously crafted logic he builds the case for recognition of the unique wartime role of America's merchant mariners. Merchantman? or Ship of War focuses most sharply upon the seafarers who sailed World War Il ' s " bridge of ships " and whose sacrifices made victory possible. The book does more , however, in tracing America ' s reliance upon merchantmen back to the Revolutionary War, when merchant ships and those who sailed them were a significant portion of our fledgling nation ' s sea power. Author Gibson leaves scant room for doubt insofar as his thesis that in war the American Merchant Ma1ine is far more than simply another supporting component of our mobilized industrial complex. Mr. Gibson starts where others most often stop. Those others simply accept that in World War II the American Merchant Marine was nationalized and consisted of armed, public vessels. But Mr. Gibson most convincingly traces the historical acts of the United States and other world powers in defining the status-legally and pragmatically--0f merchant shipping in time of war. His case is far more reasoned than are the numerous ad hoc actions and decisions that fail to call the armed merchantman of World War II what it actually was. Consider the role of a shipmaster during World War II: He commanded a well armed ship with an assigned US Navy gun crew. He was ordered to supplement the Navy armed guard with his merchant crew , to fight the ship if attacked and , in fact , to assume that any hostile ship would attack and maneuver his ship to
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Convoy PQ 18 under attack on Sept. 13, 1942. Derail of a painting by John Hamilton from his newly published War at Sea (seep. 41 ).
facilitate opening fire first. If necessary and possible, he was to ram and sink the enemy. His ship was totally engaged in transporting the muni~ions of war to America's armed forces through contested waters. The shipmaster's daily plots of the enemy sinkings of sister American merchant ships starkly confirmed that his ship was a target and that the enemy ' s men-of-war were dedicated to searching out and destroying his ship , his cargo and often his crew. When an American merchantman was routed by national authorities in convoy with other merchantmen , they were each locked into joint effort with accompanying naval forces. Like the navy ships , the merchantmen were subordinate to the senior naval commander. Ships in the convoy maneuvered together and opened fire on military command. When attacked by enemy submarines, surface ships or air force, the merchant ships took their fatal losses . As author Gibson brings out , proportionally more ships and mariners were lost from the merchant ranks than the Navy suffered from its own . An ironical circumstance is brought out in the book through comparison of civilian manned merchant ships with a good number of Navy- and Coast Guardmanned logistical support ships. By silhouette and often by full daylight observation, an enemy submarine commander could not distinguish between the naval ship and the merchantman. The two ships could be of the same design , painted the same, similarly armed and their actions and reactions upon sighting the enemy were identical. It would have been impossible for the enemy to pre-determine that one was a belligerent manof-war and the other a defensively armed- but non-combatant- merchant ship. The irony is complete when a judgment can pretend to be made four dee-
ades later saying in effect that the crew on one qualified for veterans' status but the crew on the other, composed of purely civilian , industrial employees, did not. The recent actions of the Department of Defense review board seem to say that the World War II merchant mariner in convoy on the North Atlantic was, at best , only in support of the military in the same degree as a factory worker at home. What the enemy submarine commander could or could not determine by periscope in time of war, is now irrelevant at a Washington desk or hearing room. Six thousand merchant mariners' life expectancy would have been greater if the enemy had the insight that has apparently developed , forty years late, in the peacetime deliberations of a review board. With equal insight, the submarine commander might have said ' 'this one is a man-of-war and I am entitled to sink it on sight , but that one is a merchantman and must be given warning and allowed to safely abandon ship prior to torpedoing." Six thousand casualties document the reality ... merchant mariners and military serviceman were equally in the service of their country and they paid with their blood for that patriotic privilege. My own experience-from cadet to shipmaster during World War II-and four decades of reading and thoughtful reflection, confirm Charles Dana Gibson's conclusion that World War II merchant ships and those citizens who sailed them were in this nation's service. They shared the risk and contributed to victory in a measure equal to those who presently are designated veterans. There is an injustice in the failure to recognize and to correct this, and Merchantman? or Ship of War documents that oversight and injustice for all who are willing to be instructed. J,
SEA HISTORY, AUTUMN 1986