'~ll ... were civilians. All were volunteers. And their morale never cracked."
ed the area. During one 140-day stretch storms raged for 116 days. Weather was always a factor in the North Atlantic. The Allies had access to excellent forecasts. But convoys-fighting to stay withing range of friendly aircraft based on Iceland-were often routed through the most intense storms. Sometimes they lost more ships to the weather than to submarines. The Germans, lacking the weather reporting facilities of the Allies, early in the war constructed a clandestine weather station on the east coast of Greenland . So from our own front yard they kept U-boats apprised of the vagaries of the North Atlantic weather for most of the rest of the war. In February 1943 the Germans had approximately 400 U-boats. More than a third were always ready for the Atlantic battle. And 50 submarines .were concentrated on the main convoy routes between Greenland and Iceland. At the same time the British were running out of supplies. In two months if the U-boat attacks persisted , the British would be unable to meet their military requirements . Gross Admiral Donitz had taken full naval command from Admiral Raeder. And his reputation for aggressive submarine warfare was well known to Churchill and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound. Then in March , 1943 German Intelligence (B-Dienst) stumbled onto a real prize: The complete plans and routes of Convoys HX229 and SC122 had been sent by mistake by radio from New York to the U.S. Coast Guard Patrol off Greenland . Convoy SC122 with fifty ships left New York on March 5th. And Convoy HX229 left New York in two sections on March 8th and 9th with an additional seventyfive ships. Having decoded the complete message, the Germans were ready. Admiral Donitz committed 42 U-boats to the convoy confrontation. And as the Germans characterized it , the greatest convoy battle of all time was soon to begin. There was some confusion on the German side when they failed to see that Convoy HX229 had been divided into two sections. After they received the message that HX229A had been ordered to proceed on a different course to the north , they prepared to engage it. Then when they intercepted the communication directed to HX229 giving the anticipated course, they concluded the first message was a ploy. And they changed plans to attack HX229- leaving Convoy HX229A with thirty-seven ships to escape to the north. SEA HISTORY, FALL 1983
A North Atlantic convoy in August 1943. Courtesy, Special Collections , the Nimitz Library, US Naval Academy.
Th e last North Atlantic convoy, April 1945, taken from th e Liberty ship Oakl ey Wood bound for Antwerp with a cargo of 10,000 tons of 500 pound bombs. E. L. Hayden collection. The author, Chief Radio Officer Ed Hayden , aboard the Liberty Ship Herman Melville in 1943 bound f or Hull , England with 10,000 tons of ammunition.
Convoy SC122, slightly ahead on the same course as H'X229, had nine escorts. But Convoy HX229 was dangerously short of protection . The Royal Navy's B4 Group had been given the job originally, but storm damage had reduced it to five ships . To make matters worse the senior officer, Commander Day, on the destroyer HMS Highlander had to proceed to St. Johns for emergency repairs. That left Lt. Commander John Luther, an inexperienced junior officer on the destroyer HMS Volunteer, in command with only four other escort vessels and no rescue ships. Early on the morning of March 16th Admiral Max Horton , through Western Approaches Headquarters (CINCWA) at Derby House in Liverpool , and Admiral 7