wounded, and more than a million were displaced. When the fighting cut off areas from humanitarian reach, malnutrition rates rose to an alarming 30% (Gallagher 2000). But what led to this outbreak? Since its independence in 1961, Sierra Leone was ruled relatively unchallenged by the All People’s Congress party until an opposition started to developed. A tiny group of dissatisfied citizens soon swelled into the Revolutionary United Front (RUF); a formidable armed force of 50,000-75,000 and one of the largest recruiters of child soldiers since the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (Peters and Richards 1998 in Pinsky 2012). There is much debate in the literature as to the RUF’s mandate and whether one in fact existed. Some (see Richards 1996; Thusis 2004 in Pinsky 2012) believed the RUF were akin to the Peruvian Shining Path which espoused millenarian appeals for change. Such claims would be discounted, however, when concessions for addressing corruption and bad governance would be to no avail (Hayner 2007). Many others believed that the rebels craved power and sought to control the lucrative diamond resources, reinforced through the fact that the RUF was financed by the notorious Charles Taylor, president of Liberia, as well as the diamond trade. Regardless of the lack of consensus on the RUF’s modus operandi, the rebel group was extremely aggressive and acted as “sobels”—soldiers by day, rebels by night—engaging in sweeps of intimidation and terror (Richards 1996 in Pinsky 2012). Villages were terrorized if they refused to support the forces, and institutions were regularly targeted. In 1997, the rebel group overthrew the government and joined the new military government, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), to form a very aggressive combined force. Efforts at stemming the violence were with minimal success. Indeed, in response to the Abidjan Peace Accord of 1996—one of the first attempts at securing peace—the RUF “literally st[u]ck to their guns” and refused to disarm (Bright 2000). Advancements would only become possible with the Lomé Peace Accord of 1999; viewed as “the most tangible source of hope in Sierra Leone since the civil war began” (Gallagher 2000, 149). As mentioned, tensions ensued when it became apparent that alongside
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