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Western District of Texas Court Summaries
By Soledad Valenciano, Sabrina Salazar, and Clarissa Valenciano
If you are aware of a Western District of Texas order that you believe would be of interest to the local bar and should be summarized in this column, please contact Soledad Valenciano (svalenciano@svtxlaw.com, 210-787-4654) with the style and cause number of the case, and the entry date and docket number of the order.
Due Process; Targeting Order; TRO
Texas Ass’n of Money Services Businesses (TAMSB), et. al v. Pam Bondi, et. al ., No. SA-25-CA-00344-FB (Biery, F., May 19, 2025)
Money exchange services companies sought relief from Geographic Targeting Order 14157 (GTO 14157), aimed at combatting the illicit activities and money laundering of Mexico-based cartels, drug traffickers, and other criminal actors along the Southwest U.S. border. The GTO requires all money services businesses located in thirty U.S. zip codes along the southwest border in California and Texas to file Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) with FinCEN in connection with cash transactions valued at more than $200, reducing the historic threshold for money exchanges and transfers from $10,000 to $200. As a result, the plaintiffs would be required to process tens of thousands of CTRs instead of the relative handful previously needed. The Court found that, likely, GTO 14157 (a) is unreasonable; (b) overreaches; (c) is arbitrary and capricious; and (d) under the correct legal standard, violates the Fourth Amendment. The court also found GTO 14157 likely violates the Administrative Procedures Act by not allowing notice and comment. The full forty-page opinion can be found on the court’s website at www.txwd.uscourt.gov under the “Notable Cases” tab.
Motion to Bifurcate; Motion to Defer
Robinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Company, et. al, SA-24-CV-00118-JKP (Chestney, E., March 7, 2025)
The court denied the defendant’s motion to bifurcate. The decision to bifurcate a trial is up to the discretion of the trial court and not section 72.052 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code—a Texas procedural rule that does not apply in federal court. The court indicated this is an issue that should be decided closer to trial, most likely at the final pretrial conference. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to defer consideration of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(d) allows a court to defer consideration of a motion and allow additional time for discovery where a moving party shows “it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition” if the moving party sets forth “a plausible basis for believing that specified facts, susceptible of collection within a reasonable time frame, probably exist and indicate how the emergent facts, if adduced, will influence the outcome of the pending summary judgment motion.”
The plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit was “devoid of any support for his contention that additional discovery will influence the disposition of the summary judgment motion.” Although given the opportunity at two hearings and in his briefing, the plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide the court with sufficient information as to why the plaintiff cannot yet respond to the motion and failed to explain with specificity how the discovery he was seeking would affect the basis of the defendant’s summary judgment motion.
Indigent Litigant; Default Judgment
FCCI Insurance Company, vs. VERITAS Management Company, LLC , et al. , SA-24-CV-00743-ESC (Cheney, E., March 7, 2025)
The court ordered the defendant LLC to secure representation by any attorney by a date certain to prevent default from being entered, as LLCs are not permitted to represent themselves pro se in federal court. The court simultaneously ordered the pro se answer of the LLC to be stricken. The LCC responded that it was unable to find counsel due to it being an insolvent company with no financial resources with which to hire an attorney and asked the court to appoint counsel. The court denied the motion and directed the clerk to enter default against the LLC. There is no absolute right to an attorney in a civil case, and a court is only required to appoint counsel for an indigent party in a civil lawsuit if “there exist exceptional circumstances warranting such an appointment.” Further, the statute that allows for the appointment of counsel for indigent litigants only references persons, not entities.
Motion to Dismiss; Motion for Summary Judgment; Time-Barred Claim
McGarity v. O’Malley, No. SA-23-CV863-OLG (HJB), (Bemporad, H., May 31, 2024); adopted by McGarity v. O’Malley, No. SA-23-CV-00863-OLG, (Garcia, O., July 23, 2024)
The plaintiff brought this lawsuit against the commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), on behalf of a minor, seeking judicial review of the denial of supplemental security income (“SSI”). The plaintiff filed an application for SSI, which was denied by an administrative law judge based on a finding of no disability. The plaintiff requested review of the denial by the SSA’s Appeals Council. On March 27, 2023, the Appeals Council notified the plaintiff that her request for review was denied, that her only remaining recourse was to file a civil action, and that she had 60 days from her receipt of the notice to do so. The notice indicated that absent a showing to the contrary, the plaintiff would be presumed to have received notice five days from the date on which the notice was sent. The plaintiff’s counsel requested an additional 60 days to file suit. The Appeals Council granted the plaintiff an additional 30 days, making the new deadline to file a civil action June 27, 2023. The plaintiff filed suit on July 12, 2023, after the Council’s extended deadline. The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. The court converted the motion to a motion for summary judgment, as it relied on facts outside of the pleadings. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
Subject matter jurisdiction; diversity jurisdiction; amount in controversy; Rule 12(h)(3) dismissal; breach of contract
Nealy v. Cnac, No. SA-24-CV-273-JKP (HJB), (Bemporad, H., May 31, 2024); adopted by Nealy v. Cnac, No. SA-24-CV273-JKP, (Pulliam, J., July 16, 2024).
A pro se plaintiff filed this breach of contract claim arising out of a consumer credit transaction involving the purchase of a vehicle, citing to Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and seeking either performance of the contract or restitution in the amount of $125,000. The court’s jurisdiction to hear state law breach of contract claims is limited to those in which the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. However, the plaintiff failed to allege diversity, and despite the plaintiff’s $125,000 restitution claim, both the complaint and the contract in question evidenced a $27,378.32 transaction, falling far short of the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The court noted that because the plaintiff was pro se, he was entitled to amend his complaint so as to bring it within the court’s jurisdiction. However, as amended, the complaint merely changed (1) the restitution claim to $80,000, and (2) the law under which his claim arose to the Federal Reserve Act, without factual support or further explanation as to how the law applies. As in the original, the amended complaint failed to allege diversity of citizenship. As such, the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
