Covid, Ukraine, and the ensuing food crisis

Will Lawson

“Wars begin when you will, but they do not end when you please”

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has proven a fitting demonstration of Machiavelli’s aphorism, with the Russian army bogged down in the Donbas, accepting piecemeal progress for increasingly severe casualty-figures. Yet the consequences are not limited to Ukraine, and the destruction and disruption caused by the war has spread worldwide.

For impoverished and starving children in Somalia, Egypt and Sudan – countries which are completely dependent on Russian and Ukraine wheat imports – the war has generated an unprecedented threat of hunger and famine. As a result, some 143 million people now face severe food insecurity, according to the UN secretary general, after food prices rose by 55% globally. Meanwhile, in the UK, food price rises are forecast to reach 15%i.

The immediate cause of the accelerating price pressures was the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with the two countries accounting for 30% of global grain production as a result of the fertile Eurasian soil they both share. The eruption of brutal conflict between the two nations has thus precipitated a severe contraction in global grain supply, reducing the quantity available on the market and raising the price.

The Russian naval blockade has left 20 million tonnes of grain stuck inside Ukraine, unable to access the traditional sea route through Odessa. Whilst Ukraine could theoretically export grain through its Western border, poor infrastructure and the threat of Russian bombardment makes this infeasible. Irreconcilable differences between Russian negotiators and the West suggest that this grain will never depart successfully.

However, whilst it is easy to focus on the impacts of the war in Ukraine, threats to food security significantly predate the war, with price volatility stemming back to early 2021. Rising transport costs have seen the price of shipping go up by some 400% in the last two years, hampering the ability of food exporting countries to rapidly meet the demand from dependent nationsii. At the same time, the rising price of Crude has strained the agricultural process, given that harvesting and refining procedures require intense use of oil-powered machinery. Global food infrastructure sits in a precarious position in the aftermath of Covid, leaving it woefully underprepared for a severe supply-side shock after the war in Ukraine.

And yet, despite the inability of the global food system to even meet standard levels of demand, rapid economic recovery post-Covid has seen commodity demand expand at an unparalleled rate. Expansionist monetary and fiscal policies by Western governments have seen the Eurozone money supply expand and the American money supply nearly double, contributing to rampant inflationary pressures which have seen consumer prices rise quickly. The reopening of restaurants, hotels and the end of social distancing has also increased the demand for food just as global supply came under the greatest strain.

What,

then, might be done?

Given the seeming impossibility of rescuing any large part of the Ukrainian grain, we have been forced to look for alternatives. A first step might be to cease the hoarding of food by wealthy nations, or to end the abuse of food power as a political weapon by food-exporting countries. Recent bans on wheat exports by Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and most recently India have prevented the global market from allocating food resources adequately. Countries like Sri Lanka and Nepal, which import significant portions of their wheat from India, now face food crises while African countries are reeling from the loss of a promised 10 million tonnes of wheat from Indiaiii. Ending this policy of food hoarding would allow food supplies to spread throughout the global economy and reach those who need it most.

In its latest report, the Consultant Group on International Agricultural Research has called for new investment into agricultural research and development so as to improve efficiency and productive capacity. In doing so, we might be able to achieve a longstanding state of global food security which would make crises like these a thing of the past. The body also called for an end to those sanctions which “obstruct food and fertilizer trade,” by allowing Russia to put its food and fertilizer (of which it is a key exporter) onto marketiv. Whilst the geopolitical ramifications of cutting back sanctions might seem severe, in the context of a global food crisis, we may have no choice but to seek compromise and allow agricultural trade to renew after months of instability.

In the long-term, the need for discovering a more secure and environmentally friendly food supply has become increasingly apparent. The wasteful nature of intensive livestock farming, in which animals receive far more calories than they produce as meat and produce, is no longer tenable in a world of increasingly scarce food resources. A study by the Boston consulting group found that investment in plant-based meat alternatives was the best form of climate investment, with beef producing up to 30 times more emissions than Tofuv. Studies by the LSE, in collaboration with the Grantham Research Institute and the Global Green Growth Institute, have lent further support to the need for a strong and stable eco-friendly food infrastructure to tackle current shortagesvi. Food security is a solvable issue, with the world producing enough food for 10 billion people already. A host of issues have put unprecedented pressure on a system which is unnecessarily vulnerable to shock and disruption, showing the need for urgent reform. International cooperation, combined with the development of a coherent and practical long-term global food strategy, is immediately necessary to avoid food shortage becoming a consistent issue.