DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH
NEWS
10
I
I
MAY
A
income for the tenant and agricultural
generate enough cash income, or to avail.
accruing the to land be shares more laborer, share or of capitaT'may labor vis-a-vis crucial in defining "exploitation" than the form of tenancy itself. That is, other forms of production organization which are not characterized by tenancy may even result in lower employment and labor income, and may even have higher concentrations in asset ownership. Per-
their desirecredit to sources becomehaveleaseholders of outside expressed (Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano, 1987:9). Thus, it may be wiser to make a transition to leasehold status optional, Furthermore, ' it is crucial that support services be part and parcel of a land reform strategy, (e.g. extension services to increase the skills and productivity of
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haps the most obvious example would be wage labor on sugar plantations and capitalist enterprises like multinational agribusiness plantations. Third, since rural
the farmer_beneficiary, and credit programs) to enable him to purchase necessary production inputs. "
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product and factor markets are imperfect, the landlord (ff he is not an absentee)
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may as the conduit credit neededserve to purchase productionfor inputs, Abolishing the social and economic
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other
institutional
arrangements
may
have detrimental effects on the viability of the small farmer. Fourth, the issue of landless workers, who would be excluded from a tenure-based identification of land reform beneficiaries, is completely neglected. Finally, .restrictions may lead to even more inequitable production arrangements. There is an increased incentive to evict tenants (and substitute hired labours) to avoid inclusion in land reform, thus reducing the amount of employment and labor income,
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1987
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institutions of tenancy without providing adequate support services through
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'..:....:i.!.:):....ii' ..; workers to a _,.lU..t ._in the utilization ...: resources" (Article Moreover, the
share from their labor of marine and f.ishing XIH, Section 7). . Constitution also pro=
..........:.:.._ vides the legal framework for the implei.'.':.
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mentation aspects of th.e progr_n. In particular, the Constitution provides that: !.'";.'":":' ..:'.""ii'i"."'".: '" :' (1) The progam should, ensure landowners of "just compensation" for all their lands which have been affect by land reform; (2) Congess may prescribe Recent Development on the retention limit hased on a number of Agrarian. Reform 2 criteria ranging from "ecological, developmental, or equity considerations"; One of the major differences of the (3) incentives for voluntary land-sharing proposed agrarian reform program from schemes shall be provided by the state; its predecessors is that it is mandated in (4) One of the state's primary fimctions the 1986 Constitution. Unlike previous in the program is to ensure that the land reform policies, the scope and physical and marketing infrastructures
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essential to the production
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pulated in the newly ratified Constitution. Article XIII, specifically Sections 4 to 8 stipulatedthat all agricultural lands,
tion of the agricultural commodities shall be adequately provided; (5) Participation by all parties who will be affected
regardless of the crops being cultivated or their legal categories, (i.e., public or. private) shall be covered by the agrarian reform program. The potential coverage includes some 12 million hectares of cul".'i_.'"" tivated lands and four million hectares :':"" of uncultivated and idle lands affecting approximately 30 million farmers,
by the program should be elicited in the formulation of the agrarian reform scheme; and (6) The eovernment should develop mechanisms which will encourage landowners to invest the proceeds of the program to agribusiness/industrial undertakings. Some critics (e.g. Lard, 1.986) point
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ol,,:,renancy adequate,
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sup,..i.i
The above arguments do not imply that tenurial change is undesirable, Rather, these suggest that legislation, of tenurial changes without the provision of other . support mechanisms may be counterproductive. For example, the often.legislated abolition.of share tenancy, may not be beneficial to the farmer who -is short of cash. On the other hand, share tenants who have already been able to
regular farmworkers and their respective families as beneficiaries, The Constitution also provides that the principle of agrarian reform shall be applied to the disposition and exploitation of natural resources especially those suitable for agricultural purposes. Like. wise, it empowers the government to formulate provisions which protect the rights of subsistence fishermen and fish-
and distribu-
out that the abovementioned clauses could restrict the equitable distribution of all agricultural croplands and natural resources. For instance, if just compensation were equated to the market value of the agricultural lands (which is the interpretation of the Constitutional Commission), then the redistribution of lands to small farmers and farmworkers will not jibe with the true spirit of. the land