DE LEON
represents its economic interest. For the U.S., only by complying with the agreement that it is able to engage China in the rules of the international system, while achieving greater access in China's market. These are the respective foreign policy interests that China and the U.S. are currently giving priority in their bilateral relationship. The weight given to these foreign policy interests servesas the self-enforcementmechanism that provides the necessary condition for both countries to see greater benefits in complying with, instead of violating, the agreement. Table 2.
Summary of China-U.S. Bilateral Relationship Showing Fulfillment of Conditions because of Foreign Policy Linkages E(c)-E(nÂťE(v)
Country
China
E(c) .Modernization
and development augmenting China's economic reforms; .Able to actively participate in the fonnulation and revision of the rules of the game.
United States
.Greater market accessin China; .Enforcement of its foreign policy of engagement through the wro rules.
E(n) .Loses opportunity to increaseinflux of technology from the U5. and delay the processof its ecOl}omicreforD!Sthrough modernization. .Remains at status quo lessening the risk of domestic political instability due to increased pluralism that accompanies drastic liberalization. .Loses greater tt)arket accessin China. .It would be a tool giving the U5. a leverage to encourage improvement of China's conduct in the area of human rights, the Taiwan issue, democratic
E(v) Modernization is still possible; DiscuSsionof other political issuescan be relegated to other summits.
.Greater market accessin China is still possible with the annual review of its NTR status; .Maintains its leverage to pressure China on other political and non trade issues.
It can be seen,therefore, that this was the reasonwhy the V.S. changed its position after rejecting the initial concessionsof China for WTO accession. However, despite successfulclosure of the deal in November 1999,the formal normalization of China-V.S. bilateral trade relations is still under debate in the V.S. Congress. Only with the extension of the PNTR status fer China will th~ V.S. be able to achieve its overall interests, in terms of economic and, more importantly, foreign policy, from the WTO Accession Deal. Having separately analyzed the respective foreign policy interests of China and the V.S., this section has demon$trated the dynamics and weight that these interests play in dedding whether or not one will comply with a
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