PEP Part 5 – PEP Deployment & SAR Postures

By LCDR Randy Perkins, USN

Welcome to PEP Part Five, the final installment of the PEP (Personnel Exchange Program) Pilot articles in Rotor Review. Previous PEP articles, One through Four, can be found in Rotor Review issues#153 - #156. This article will give an insight into a PEP Pilot deployment flying the AS365 Dauphin F on the French Aircraft Carrier FS Charles de Gaulle R91. It will also highlight the Search and Rescue (SAR) postures and alerts used by the two AS365 Dauphin F helicopters on board the carrier. Hopefully, for the H-60 pilots reading this, it will inspire new ideas to improve how we currently use our SAR matrices.

I had the privilege of conducting two sets of workups and deployments flying the Dauphin F, aka the PEDRO (see previous articles for explanation) with the French PA “porte-avions” or PAN “porte-avions nucléaire” Charles De Gaulle, better known as Charles or the CDG. The information provided here is a result of those experiences.

Workups / Readiness Cycle

Just like any naval vessel going to sea, the CDG has a standard workup cycle that follows a pattern of ENTIND – Entrainement Individuel (think Sea Trials), MECO – Mise en condition Opérationnelle (think LHD or CVN workups combined into a single underway), MISSION - deployment, and EAE – Ecole de l’aviation embarqué (think CQs post-deployment).

Deployment

Deployment is typically shorter than a standard U.S. nine-month carrier deployment, and the readiness cycle is more concise. The CDG typically follows a yearly readiness cycle and deploys at the beginning of every year, starting in January. However, there are off years when the ship can enter long maintenance periods. Charles will normally deploy anywhere from three to six months, and deployments can vary in Area of Responsibility (AOR) depending on the current events in the world. Possibilities include providing support to the 6th Fleet and 5th Fleet AOR or transiting East towards 7th Fleet with various partner-nation interactions. We must also remember that the French have a single aircraft carrier vice the 11 the U.S. has. This means any movement of their carrier to any part of the world holds significant political and strategic meaning.

For the Dauphin pilots, the deployment is largely spent conducting airborne SAR, SAR alerts, liaisons (PMC), Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (MISR), and Unit Level Training (ULT). ULT can include day and night (aided and unaided) training in any of the following: Deck Landing Qualifications (DLQs), Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP), open-water SAR jumps, SAR hoisting from various platforms, and fast-rope training. A variety of other training flights can also be conducted with the French Fusiliers or French Commandos if embarked on the accompanying French Frégates. Due to the high use of foreign escort vessels, the Dauphin F can be a PMC workhorse on deployment, even as a light helicopter. Not all training is sea-based, and if the CDG decides to make a port call in Djibouti, the Dauphin F helicopters will conduct a dirt detachment (DET) during the port call. The dirt DET will work primarily with French commandos conducting everything from low- level navigation, Confined Area Landings (CALs), sniper shooting, overland fast-rope, and “largage palmeurs,” our version of SAR jumps at 10 feet and 10 knots, but replaced with French Commandos and nearby zodiacs. Zodiac deployment and fastroping to zodiacs is also an option but is typically conducted by the AS565 Panther within the strike group.

Aerial Shooting with French Commandos on a range in Djibouti.

It is worth noting that DLQs are more complex than in the U.S. There are two important aspects to consider. One, that all French naval helicopter pilots train night-aided and unaided ship landings and hoisting. Most of them are more comfortable on a dark night at sea landing or hoisting unaided on an air-capable platform rather than under Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). Second, an AS365 can land in any direction on almost every French Air-Capable Platform from Frigate to Carrier. A landing at 3 o’clock, 6 o’clock, or 9 o’clock in relation to the ship's heading is perfectly normal and accepted. Wind envelopes are divided into two portions - landing “dans l’axe du bâtiment” or on ships heading and “face au vent relatif” or into the relative wind.

Dauphin F conducting FASTROPE training with the Force Protection

Air Wing

The Air Wing onboard typically consists of two Rafale Squadrons with approximately 12 Rafales each (11F, 12F, or 17F), one E-2C Hawkeye Squadron with two E-2Cs (4F), a Caiman detachment with one NHx90 (31F), and the Dauphin Detachment with two AS365 Dauphin F (35F). I have listed the squadrons with each T/M/S (35F, 31F, etc.). These are the units that will always embark on the CDG. The Rafale units will rotate one squadron yearly, but units remain largely the same. The scale is vastly different from that of a CVN and U.S. naval squadrons, where we can simultaneously provide multiple squadrons and aircraft to several aircraft carriers. An ATL2 is also typically present and can provide a similar cover to that of a P-8, depending on the need and location of the CDG throughout the deployment.

Strike Group

CTF-473 is typically comprised of one PAN/CVN, two to three French Frigates, one Supply Ship, one Submarine, and several foreign “escorteurs.” The PA (porte-avions), FDA (Frégate de défense aérienne), FREMM (Frégates type multi-Mission de type Aquitaine), and the P.R. (Pétroliers Ravitailleurs type Durance) are the core vessels in the CTF. Other types of French frigates are available but are typically independent deployers, such as the Frégate de type La Fayette and the Frégate de Surveillance de type Floréal. An FDA will usually be equipped with an AS565 Panther (a militarized version of the Dauphin), and the FREMM is generally equipped with an NH-90 configured for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). Foreign destroyers and frigates that have either interacted with the strike group via exercises or escorted the strike group for varying periods of time include: U.S. DDGs (USS Ross, Roosevelt, Arleigh Burke, Truxtun), the Greek Frigates Adrias (Elli Class), Hydra (Meko 200), and Kanaris (Kanaris), Italian Frigates Virginio Fasan and Carlo Bergamini (Bergamini), Italian Destroyer Andrea Doria (Andrea Doria), Egyptian Al Fateh (Gowind) and Frigate Alexandria (911), Saudi Arabian Frigates Al Riyadh and Makkah (Al Riyadh), Japanese Destroyer Suzuzuki (Akizuki), Spanish Frigate Santa Maria (OHP), India’s Destroyer Chennai (Kolkata), the Netherlands Frigate Zeven Provincien, and several foreign CVs such as the Queen Elizabeth and Italian Comte di Cavour. Finally, if any U.S. CVN is in the area, there is a high likelihood of cross-deck operations between the two nations. The interaction with these NATO and sometimes non-NATO nations is essential for maintaining foreign relations and requires an extensive knowledge of the Maritime Procedural Publication (MPP) and Helicopter Operations from Ships Other than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) (generally managed by a French HEC working on the Admiral's staff).

A division flight for the arrival of French President Macron: two AS365 Dauphin F and two NH-90 Caiman.

For the Dauphin pilots, this constant interaction and presence with foreign “small-boys” or escort vessels gives us the chance to conduct a variety of training other than just PMC if the escort is present for more than a few days.

SAR Postures and Alerts

The Commanding Officer designates the SAR Postures for every deck cycle with inputs from the ship's Air Boss and Operations Officer. They are determined based on various factors, including the size of the deck cycle, weather, warmup period, qualifications, etc. These postures are identified as Pedro 1, Pedro 2, and Pedro 3 covering an area of responsibility extending out to 50 NM. These postures can be held in alert as Pedro 1 – 10’, Pedro 2 – 15’, and Pedro 3 – 30’ or Airborne as Pedro 1 – 10 NM maximum, Pedro 2 –30 NM maximum, and Pedro 3 – 50 NM maximum. Alerts Pedro 1 and Pedro 2 can be held from the ready room as the crews are highly efficient, and the aircraft allows for a rapid start-up. Pedro 3 is the standard daily SAR alert and can be held anywhere on the ship. Each posture is also associated with a “délai d’intervention,” in other words how quickly the aircraft can be on scene. The associated times are 25 minutes, 40 minutes, and 60 minutes, respectively. If, for example, an aircraft is airborne in a Pedro 2 posture at less than 30 NM conducting training on an escort vessel, they are allowed to go below their minimum SAR fuel only if they can meet the delay time associated with their posture – 40 minutes, refueling included. During takeoff and landing, a posture is typically more restrictive than during the deck cycle, as the risk is highest during these periods.

A typical posture might be Pedro 1-2-1 or Pedro 2-3-2. This will determine whether the crew is equipped with flight gear if in alert and the maximum allowable distance from the carrier when the aircraft is airborne. When airborne, the helicopter must keep a minimum fuel that allows the crew to execute a SAR within their maximum distance of responsibility. The farther away from the ship, the higher the minimum fuel required to allow for transit back to the ship in case of an ejection or crash. Due to the limited max gross weight of a light helicopter, which results in less fuel if equipped with a SAR crew and equipment (four crew members), and a minimum fuel level required to execute a SAR, the aircraft is usually restricted in its overall mission flexibility as it quickly reaches its minimum SAR fuel. As a result, the aircraft usually cannot conduct PMC while holding the “PEDRO” (SAR) function unless conducted during the relaxed Pedro 3 status where a rescue swimmer is not required in the aircraft, and the crew can execute any other mission while remaining within 50 NM. We normally never experience this in an MH-60S with our high max GW and ability to carry an internal auxiliary tank.

Alert 5’ also exists and is used during a RAS/RAM (replenishment at sea / ravitaillement a la mer). The light helicopters typically do not conduct VERTREP during a RAS (I can hear the sighs from the 60S pilots) due to their lift capacity, which is written at 907kg but, in reality, is reduced to 200kg - 400kg. So, the aircraft is typically in Alert 5’ –aircrew in the aircraft outfitted in dry suits if sea temperatures are below 18 deg C (day) and 20 deg C (night) to provide immediate SAR in the case of a man overboard. In rare cases, the Dauphins will conduct VERTREP and do so with the “élingue” or pendant remaining attached for the duration of the evolution.

SAR Posture + Unit Level Training

Although PMC is normally prohibited while holding the Pedro function, in 2019, the French Navy rewrote its documents governing the function of Pedro, our equivalent of the SAR matrix. The aircraft is now allowed to conduct a large variety of training while holding the function of Pedro. This includes all of the previously mentioned ULTs. The French Navy cited the last ejection over a decade ago and the introduction of twin-engine Rafales as examples of improved safety and capacities of the SAR helicopter, which was typically prohibited from exiting its left- or right-hand orbit next to the carrier. For example, a Dauphin F assigned the function of Pedro in a Pedro posture of 2-3-2 can now takeoff before the deck cycle, transit 30 NM (Pedro 2 Max distance) to an escort vessel such as an FDA, and start to conduct hoist training during the beginning of the deck cycle. During the deck cycle, the aircraft is now in Pedro 3 (50 NM maximum), so if the carrier or FDA begins to separate, the aircraft can still hold the PEDRO function while training. However, aircraft must have the minimum fuel necessary to conduct a SAR. As the distance grows, the minimum fuel rises. Therefore, at some point during their training sequence, the crew must be able to refuel on the escort vessel. It is often wisest to keep the escort vessel within the most restrictive posture, in this case, Pedro 2 at 30 NM, to avoid the problems with maintaining a minimum fuel onboard.

An H-60 pilot might ask themselves – open-water SAR jumps at night during deployment? Practice rescue strop or litter hoisting from an escort FDA or DDG? How and why?

A Dauphin F conducting VERTREP between the P.R. Marne and R91.

The helicopters in the French Navy also hold what we in the U.S. Navy would view as the USCG mission of coastal SAR. Therefore, an extensive part of their SAR mission is not just blue water SAR but all facets of SAR, including coastal SAR and anything from small craft to cruise ship hoisting. They must be proficient and capable of hoisting from any platform in any situation. They are so proficient with hoisting that I have conducted several PMC runs where we hoisted our passengers. As SAR is their primary mission, open water SAR jumps, and ship hoistings are practiced day and night as often as possible on deployment with the safety requirement of a second SAR capable aircraft airborne and within 15 minutes if conducting SAR jumps. It should be noted that a 10 foot and 10 knot or 15 foot and 0 knot rescue swimmer deployment does not exist in the French Dauphin community, and SAR jumps are always conducted via the hoist.

To my knowledge, the “revised” SAR Matrix being tested by a deployed or recently returned CVN strike group (at the time this article was written) has made significant strides for H-60S detachments responsible for SAR with re-evaluated distances, mission flexibility, and SAR tasking for other SAR capable assets in the area. If we continue in this direction, we will be closer to our goal of using our naval helicopters more pragmatically and sensibly. Hopefully, sharing these French SAR procedures helps advance that goal. Both sides have seemingly altered their matrices to allow for a more reasonable and efficient manner of expending flight hours. There are several similarities and overlaps between the two, but for the French Dauphin, their limited GW and endurance when configured for SAR, continue to restrict crews from fully exploiting the rewritten documentation.

Summary

French vs. U.S. CVN SAR Matrix

Unlike the prior, current, and, I imagine, future U.S. SAR Matrices, the French Navy does not consider the status of the SAR boat when determining the Pedro/SAR postures for the helicopter. Nor does the use of a naval ship conducting PGS (Plane Guard Station at 1000 – 2000yds) or PGWS (Plane Guard Watch Station at 1-3NM) change or reduce the Pedro posture for the helicopter. Additionally, it is important to note that there must always be a designated spare PEDRO or secondary asset during a deck cycle. 99% of the time, this is the second Dauphin F, therefore, the 35F squadron is always two to make two for every deck cycle without a “spare” for their spare Pedro. The spare Pedro must be kept in a Pedro 3 posture or higher. This means minimal maintenance for the second Dauphin F during deck cycles due to a requirement to assume the PEDRO function within 30 minutes and a maximum distance of 50 NM airborne if conducting a different mission. A ship in PGS or PGWS is considered a viable spare Pedro asset but never primary. If the function of PEDRO or SPARE PEDRO is held by another helicopter in the force, it will dictate a reduced distance for their mother ships from the CDG and an increased readiness level for their aircraft.

Practice litter hoisting with a French escort vessel

This is the final article in the PEP series. If this is your first time reading, I invite you to look back at RR #153 –RR#156 to better understand a PEP Pilot's journey. PEP can be a challenging, but rewarding experience, and I encourage you to seek information on PEP tours or foreign exchange opportunities from your detailers. As an officer in the U.S. Navy and pilot in U.S. Naval Aviation, I, and I suspect we, often believe that the methodology of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Naval Aviation is the only methodology. Or at least this is our only exposure. As a result, we create aircraft commanders, department heads, and commanding officers within our specific community bubbles. This can lead to an extremely high level of expertise in our officers on any subject matter relating to the U.S. Navy, and one that we could argue is necessary for being a professional and competent military leader. There is a reason the U.S. military has been so successful from an operational standpoint. However, there is a chance that with this single exposure, an officer and the U.S. Navy, for that matter, might fall into a self-perpetuating cycle. Values, beliefs, and mindsets tend to be reinforced the longer we stay within one group or community. I propose that a foreign exchange tour broadens our horizons, gives us a new perspective, and prevents us from being blind to other avenues or methodologies. As always, contact me at randyperkinsIV@gmail.com for corrections or questions.

An AS565 Panther conducts FWD Deck hoisting with USS Ross (DDG 71)