
10 minute read
The 1986 Gander Medevac
The 1986 Gander Medevac
By RADM Steve Tomaszeski, USN (Ret.) and CDR Roy Resavage, USN (Ret.)
This article records what is recognized as the longest open ocean medevac in U.S. Naval Aviation rotary wing history. It is “Legendary” as it showcases decisive team and individual leadership supported by precise, coordinated execution by all naval forces involved. The airmanship, seamanship, medical and aircrew expertise, coupled with superb assistance at Gander, Newfoundland International Airport, saved a shipmate’s life.
Place yourself in these helicopters as they fly a mission far more demanding than anticipated. Would you be up to such a challenge? Below, “The Past Informs the Present” to be ready for any contingency.
In the late evening of 20 August 1986, USS Chester W. Nimitz (CVN 68), underway in the North Atlantic, received an emergency transmission from USS Iowa (BB 61). Iowa requested an emergency MEDEVAC. A young radio man was scalded with 1200 psi of steam from a pipe that ruptured directly above his workstation. He suffered severe second degree burns over 75 percent of his body.
This medevac was complicated in that the Nimitz Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) was tracking along the Great Circle route in total EMCON (emissions control). The CVBG was enroute to the northern fjords to participate in the multinational NATO Exercise Northern Wedding. Northern Wedding was a Cold War exercise designed to test NATO’s ability to re-arm and supply Western Europe during times of war.
The CVBG was THE centerpiece in this important exercise. It could not deviate from its Path of Intended Movement (PIM). When the MEDEVAC (medical evacuation) request was received Nimitz was over 400 miles east of Gander, Newfoundland, the nearest international airport capable of transporting the Sailor to the National Burn Clinic in San Antonio, Texas.
Tasked with developing possible courses of action (COA) to support Iowa’s request, Carrier Air Wing Eight’s Carrier Air Group (CAG) Commander, Captain Fred Lewis, summoned the commanding officers (COs) of both VS-31 and HS-9 to his stateroom. CAG needed options. Could a helicopter retrieve the patient with a night landing on Iowa then return to Nimitz where an S-3 Viking would fly him to Gander? This plan was scrapped when Nimitz’s senior medical officer determined the Sailor could not withstand the trauma of the catapult shot.
Skipper Roy Resavage, CO, HS-9, informed CAG that HS-9 could medevac the Sailor to Newfoundland then return to Nimitz if we acted immediately. This plan required focused, precise coordination between staffs, ships, and helicopters. This bold COA, determined to be the only viable life-saving option, was to launch as soon as possible, reducing total transit distances as the CVBG was rapidly moving east. Ships had to be positioned at 200 nautical mile “point of no return” intervals for necessary refueling. Skipper Resavage insisted on a two-plane flight for medevac redundancy and self rescue capabilities. The second helo would have maintenance technicians onboard in case repairs were required. It was understood and reiterated that the CVBG would continue on PIM, in EMCON, without regard to their return.
Aircrew were assembled, briefed, and prepared for an arduous flight. Air Wing and Cruiser Destroyer Group Staffs burned the midnight oil with the Battle Group Staff to coordinate ship positions and brainstorm contingencies. EMCON would not be broken. The CVBG would slip - undetected - into the fjord for a planned amphibious landing in Norway.
The mission began at 0400, Thursday, 21 August. Two SH-3H Sea King helicopters launched from the Nimitz with aircrew augmented by medical and maintenance personnel. A night landing was executed on Iowa with the burn victim placed in a body bag filled with saline solution. He was administered intravenous therapy the entire flight. After refueling on Iowa, Skipper Resavage launched, circling Iowa while his wingman landed and refueled. The medevac helos were hand delivered vectors to their next rendezvous point, USS Kidd (DDG 993), several hundred miles to the west (you can appreciate the operational discipline and urgency this mission had with hand delivered vectors in EMCON. They even received Iowa’s famously generous “Presidential” box lunches with a note from Iowa’s CO). No ship was allowed to transmit any radio or radar equipment as the entire CVBG was transiting in EMCON trying to elude Soviet intelligence gathering satellites, shipping, and long-range reconnaissance aircraft.
To remind the 2023 reader, this was before GPS navigation. The SH-3H had no internal navigation equipment. They did have a TACNAV (tactical navigator) that provided Doppler solutions, but it was only as accurate as the aircrew’s “best guess” concerning wind direction and speed. Essentially, they were navigating in EMCON, with MK-6 plotting board technology. “Seat of the pants aviating.”
As the medevac mission flew further west, it encountered an unforecasted low-pressure weather system, later classified as a gale. That forced them to descend to a very low altitude where they still flew into strong headwinds and heavy precipitation. You can imagine the ride in the aft cabin, where our Flight Surgeon struggled to stabilize his patient.
Without the benefit of radio, navigational aids or radar vectors, finding Kidd in these conditions became problematic. A one-degree error in maintaining track could become a large offset 200 nautical miles out. However, USS Kidd was exactly where she was assigned to be. And the crew’s wind estimations were sufficiently accurate to dead reckon their refueling rendezvous. After two “sporty” landings and refueling, the medevac mission proceeded on to Gander, fortified by more box lunches and piping hot “Kidd Koffee.” Most importantly, the patient remained stable.
After what seemed like an eternity the medevac sighted Newfoundland but they didn’t know exactly where they were. They presumed the winds had pushed them south of their intended track, and they decided to try their luck turning north. They were able to fix their position on the coastline spotting railroad tracks (a secret helo pilot trick) and set a direct course for Gander International Airport. They hoped to terminate the flight with a VFR approach to Gander, but as they entered the mountainous region the ceilings dropped to the surface with about 1⁄4 mile visibility. Skipper Resavage had his flight execute a 180-degree course change to find a hole (not a “sucker hole”) that would allow them to climb high enough to establish radio communications with Gander. And there it was…enough blue sky that provided the necessary altitude for radio contact with Gander. As soon as they received their IFR clearance, they proceeded again to Gander. The next hurdle was to land safely.
Unfortunately, Gander’s only precision approach was an ILS (Instrument Landing System). And like most Navy aircraft, the Sea King was not equipped with a VOR (Very High Frequency Omni - Directional Range) or a glideslope indicator. Gander did not have an operable ADF (Automatic Direction Finder) approach, so the flight had to rely on a UHF/DF (Ultra High Frequency-Direction Finding) approach, normally only used as a last resort. The Gander controllers gave the flight recommended altitudes as they attempted to fly the average between major swings in their navigational aides.
Fortunately, the lead helo’s co-pilot achieved visual contact with the ground at a very low altitude. Skipper Resavage continued their descent, sweat pumps on, and followed ground references until they were over the approach lights to the runway…and they landed.
Their wingman was not as lucky. After three unsuccessful approaches from the south, Gander re-routed them to come in from the north. With their fuel state low and weather almost “zero, zero” the wingman was relieved to land on the fourth try.
Gander personnel, acutely aware of the critical nature of the medevac flight, rushed to the lead helicopter. Under the supervision of the Flight Surgeon, they immediately offloaded the burn victim into an ambulance. With police escort and sirens blaring, he was at the Gander hospital in record time. Our shipmate was medevaced via DC-9 to the National Burn Clinic in San Antonio, Texas, when the weather improved the next day.
Our “marathon” medevac helicopters never shut down upon landing, not wanting to risk their engines not starting up again. They had already logged over five hours of intense flying at maximum speed into the wind the entire inbound leg…in wetsuits. The co-pilots never had a chance to get out of the cockpit during the hot refueling and aircraft inspection. The aircraft commanders gave their helicopters visual pre-flights. Then, with proper clearance, they took off into blustery IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) weather.
Enroute to Nimitz the weather thankfully improved. They had an expected tailwind that helped make up the distance the Nimitz CVBG had covered on her PIM eastward. Skipper Resavage’s helo was running low on fuel relative to his wingman because of their extra fuel burn on deck while they were waiting for them to land. It turned out to be fortuitous that they landed first on Kidd to refuel. Their wingman suffered an auxiliary hydraulic failure and had to fly his helicopter against considerable aerodynamic pressures. He executed a flawless “AUX OFF” emergency small deck landing as soon as the fueled lead helo cleared Kidd’s deck. ”AUX OFF” landings are challenging enough on a runway. On a pitching destroyer deck, that’s superb airmanship.
The wingman remained on Kidd another day for successful repairs. Had his wingman landed first, Skipper Resavage’s crew would have been hard pressed to receive HIFR (Helicopter InFlight Refueling) fuel from Kidd given the rough sea state.
After ensuring his wingman was “safe on deck,” Skipper Resavage returned to Nimitz without further incident. They had flown almost 11 hours and over 700 nautical miles in wetsuits. The wingman safely returned the next day. The marathon medevac was offically over.
The Crew
Lead Helicopter: Pilot: CDR Roy Resavage, Co-Pilot: LT Jim Patterson, Aircrewmen: AW2 Douglas Haag and AW3 David Klunk. Medical personnel: LT “Doc” Livenstein and HM3 Mike Evertson.
Lead Helicopter: Pilot: CDR Roy Resavage, Co-Pilot: LT Jim Patterson, Aircrewmen: AW2 Douglas Haag and AW3 David Klunk. Medical personnel: LT “Doc” Livenstein and HM3 Mike Evertson.
Wingman: Pilot: LCDR Steve Weir, Co-Pilot: LTJG Mark Deardurff, Aircrewmen: AW2 Hugh O’Neill, and AW2 Andrew Baker. Maintenance personnel: AMH2 Steven Woicik, AE2 Kevin Warren, and AD3 Michael Reyes-Felicianol.
Epilogue
1: The Iowa Sailor survived this traumatic experience. He was treated for several months at the Burn Clinic. He and his family later had personal communication with Skipper Resavage.
2: Northern Wedding was a success. The CVBG arrived undetected in the fjords.
3: After a mission debrief with CAG in CVIC (Carrier Intelligence Center), the Lead Crew peeled off their wetsuits, headed for the showers and a well-earned rest. They all had been up for over 24 hours.
The next day, Skipper Resavage went to the “Dirty Shirt” (aircrew) wardroom for some chow with his co-pilot. Word of the successful marathon medevac spread quickly on the carrier’s 03 level. Upon entering the “Dirty Shirt,” a fellow CO spotted Skipper Resavage. This CO stood up and began applauding. He was quickly joined by the entire wardroom mess in cheering the Skipper and LT Patterson. Skipper Resavage told me he never forgot that moment. He remembered it as just another “Great Navy Day.”
4: Captain Resavage retired from the Navy after 27 years of service in 1998. He logged over 6,000 hours in both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Yes…he was “a stick.” He began his second career as President of Helicopter Association International in Alexandria, Virginia. The Skipper passed away February 19, 2007 at age 61.
5: Lieutenant Commander Jim Patterson retired from the Navy to pursue his dream of a legal career. Judge Patterson served as an elected Circuit Court Judge in Mobile County, Alabama. Jim passed away January 10, 2023 at age 62.
This story was transcribed from the original article written by Captain Resavage in 2006 and conversations with me. The original article was published in Rotor Review #107, Fall 2009, titled “So Others May Live.”
