Rethink Mine Countermeasures – A Get Real Get Better Approach

By CDR Nick “TRON” Schnettler, USN and LT Charlie “Handy Man” Thomas, USN

Introduction

Mine Warfare ensures Fleet Maneuverability and is a critical enabler to strategic competition. The U.S. Navy has consistently under-resourced this critical contingency capability, particularly in the mine countermeasures mission.1

Germane to modern warfare, mine warfare mimics other warfare disciplines in two critically important ways:

1. Just like cyber operations, mining operations are a lowcost-of-entry capability with the potential for strategic-level influence.

2. Mine countermeasures are a contingency capability akin to nuclear weapons – they must be demonstrably reliable and exist in sufficient capacity to deter adversary actions.

At the end of the 20th Century, the Navy laid plans for the next iteration of its vertical lift fleet,2 aiming to replace legacy H-60 variants, SH-3, CH-46, and MH-53 with two multi-mission variants of the H-60: MH-60S and MH-60R. The “Master Helicopter Plan” relied heavily on numerous unproven plug-and-play mission systems for the MH-60S as well as the promise of a substantial Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) complement upon which both variants of the helicopter would deploy. A quarter century after the creation of this ambitious plan, many of its assumptions and, more importantly, the next generation technology and ships upon which it depended, remain in a state of perpetual incompleteness. While some planning shortfalls have been successfully mitigated, MH-60S Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) Systems and the LCS Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package remain glaring outliers.3

The Current State of Affairs

The MH-53E Sea Dragon – an aging platform past its prime – is the only Full Operational Capability (FOC) AMCM platform in the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE). Assigned to one operational Helicopter Mine Countermeasures (HM) squadron that supports Fleet AMCM requirements worldwide, the Sea Dragon is a three-engine, heavy lift helicopter capable of towing a robust array of MCM devices under high tension. The Sea Dragon and its many MCM devices were supposed to be replaced in the early 2000s by near equivalent systems on the MH-60S, but those systems suffered numerous setbacks due to poor design and flawed assumptions which in turn lead to technical shortfalls, design errors, and repeated budgetary cuts. Two MH-60S AMCM Systems – Airborne LASER Mine Detection System (ALMDS) and Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) – have been fielded in limited quantities, but do not constitute a complete detect-to-engage capability, predominantly seeing employment during test and evaluation events in conjunction with other LCS mission package elements.

Additionally, the recently retired MQ-8B Firescout was capable of carrying a suite of MCM sensors called Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) Block 1. Efforts are underway to identify a “next generation” COBRA System with superior capability that could be fielded on MQ8C, but that system has yet to be acquired or proven.

The Avenger Class MCM ships – another aging platform rapidly approaching end of service life – is the only FOC MCM surface platform in the Fleet. Currently forward deployed to Japan and Bahrain, this platform was planned to be retired as LCS capacity increased, particularly the LCS hulls outfitted with an MCM mission package. To date, the LCS mission package remains in a test and evaluation status with many of its component systems yet to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) metrics. This reality is further exacerbated by the LCS platform itself, which has failed to consistently overcome its own design and budgetary shortfalls.4

While Sea Dragon helicopters and Avenger ships constitute a robust MCM capability, questions still linger as to whether they offer sufficient capacity to counter the mining capabilities of modern adversaries.5 As such, the Navy finds itself at an uncomfortable impasse: existing MCM capabilities, which themselves may not be sufficient to counter modern adversaries, are on the cusp of retirement and all planned next-generation replacements are less available, capable, and reliable.

A Way Ahead

To address this impending MCM capabilities gap, the Navy should embrace a new strategy that affords a graceful retirement of legacy MCM systems while simultaneously innovating for the future. We recommend a three-step plan:

1. Iterate to Success. Identify the working next generation capabilities and form a solution with those pieces until a new iteration with increased capabilities can be accomplished. To date, the LCS MCM mission package continues to delay Fleet introduction while it waits for all components to be ready, further drawing out retirement dates for legacy platforms. With some creative organization, it is possible to realize a functional mission package today. We recommend combining MH-60S, MQ-8 Firescout, and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Expeditionary MCM (ExMCM) platoons equipped with Mk-18 Swordfish and Kingfish unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and Seafox Portable Mine Neutralization System (PMNS) remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). With these capabilities assembled into a single task unit, the following paradigm is possible:

- Detection / Classification: MH-60S ALMDS, MQ-8C “next generation” COBRA and EOD ExMCM Mk-18s

- Identification / Neutralization: Navy EOD ExMCM Mine Pounce Operations / ROVs and MH-60S AMNS Limiting MH-60S configuration changes to the maximum extent possible will ensure the most prompt detect-to-engage timeline. Significant efficiency is gained if MQ-8C and Mk18s can shoulder the bulk of the Detection / Classification mission, thereby allowing MH-60S to focus on a single configuration for the Identification / Neutralization mission.

2. Focus on Platform Agnostic Solutions. The Navy’s current plan is to concentrate all MCM capacity aboard LCS MCM mission packages and stand down the forward deployed, shore-based AMCM detachments currently supported by the HM Community. Allowing the future of MCM to be solely dependent on LCS is a risky strategy that could lead to under-resourcing Fleet commanders as legacy MCM systems sundown. The strategy moving forward should be to provide the best iteration of capability in a flexible package that can embark on any sea-frame or operate ashore to support MCM tasking. With proper forward deployed, shore-based persistence, MH-60S AMCM detachments could support and embark on LCS when needed while ensuring that Fleet Commanders have flexible and responsive MCM capabilities. This arrangement will also avoid the abundance of no-fly days and loss of live flight proficiency that MH-60S and MQ-8 crews currently experience when LCS is at sea in unfavorable sea states or is in port for extended maintenance periods.

3. Recapitalize the HM Community with MH-60S. HM is a distinct community with a well-defined mission, they simply need a new airframe to continue that mission. To date, the Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Community has supported test and evaluation events for MH-60S AMCM equipment out of convenience. This approach has succeeded thus far due to the narrow scope of operations and the vast support provided by the HM Community. Recent joint HM / HSC AMCM exercises such as Southern California Rim of the Pacific (SoCal RIMPAC) 2022, have demonstrated that HSC understands its new AMCM equipment well. However the community requires a significant infusion of institutional knowledge and increased bandwidth to properly support Mine Warfare. HSC currently supports multiple mission areas to include Personnel Recovery, Anti Surface Warfare, Special Warfare support, and Combat Logistics. These mission sets already stress the limits of what one aviation community can handle. Folding AMCM into the HSC Community is an untenable decision that yields incredible risk for Fleet Commanders. Due to recent shifts in HSC force structure, sufficient MH-60S airframes exist to recapitalize both operational HM squadrons. The challenge to realizing this goal is halting the sundown of the HM Community in sufficient time to retain the manpower required to support continued AMCM operations as MH60S squadrons.

Notes

1. Comptroller General, “An Assessment of the Navy’s Mine Warfare Mission,” www.gao.gov/assets/c-masad-81-13.pdf

2. Federation of American Scientists, “The Helicopter Master Plan,” man.fas.org/dod-101/navy/docs/vision/helomstr.htm

3. Naval Studies Board National Research Council, Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001)

4.w.com/magazine/2022/ Jerry Hendrix, “The Navy’s Littoral Hubris,” National Review, 15 August 2022, www.nationalrevie08/15/the-navyslittoral-hubris/