Re-imagining the Osprey: The Impact of the CMV-22B Osprey on the United States Navy

By Robbin Laird

The Osprey was introduced into combat in 2007 in Iraq. That was followed by its introduction into a very different operating environment in Afghanistan. It was an assault support aircraft enabling the Marines to operate with range and speed well beyond anything a traditional rotorcraft can provide.

Many innovations would follow, as the embarked marine expeditionary units (MEU’S) would be able to operate over far greater distances than ever before. In addition, special purpose marine air ground task forces (MAGTFs) were established, giving combatant commanders an entirely different assault capability for special intervention missions.

The Navy has now introduced their own version of the Osprey - not as an assault support platform, but as a logistics asset. And they are doing so when the Navy is in the throes of exploring what distributed maritime operations (DMO) is, including exactly what the nature of logistics support is and possibly expanding the missions to encompass information support as well.

In other words, the Navy’s introduction of the Osprey entails re-imagining its role as a central component of distributed operations, as the Navy will need to operationalize the concept of distributive logistics. Simply put, the CMV-22 is not coming to the Fleet simply to execute a well-defined concept of distributed operations; it is part of the process of creating new versions of the distributed concept of operations.

During the first week of January 2023, I conducted interviews with two senior Naval Officers at North Island Air Station in San Diego, who provided significant detail on the “re-imagining” effort. The first was with the Navy’s “Air Boss” (Commander, Naval Air Forces), the second with the Officerin-Charge of operating the initial CMV-22Bs that have come to the Fleet.

Vice Admiral Whitesell, the Navy Air Boss, underscored: “We are in an experimentation phase. We are working force distribution and integration. We are experimenting like Nimitz did in the inter-war years. We are working from seabed to space about force integration. It is a work in progress. But being successful in operating in an environment where logistics are contested, where getting weapons to the Fleet in conflict, is not just a nice to have capability but a necessary one.”

He highlighted during the interview that the CMV-22B was not simply a logistical plug into a settled concept of operations for the carrier but was part of that re-think or re-imagining process going on with the entire Fleet. As Vice Admiral Whitesell put it: “What is our concept of employment for this aircraft? To answer this question will require a mindset change within Naval Aviation and the COD Community. The expeditionary nature of the CMV-22B expands the possibilities for successful distributed maritime operations and we are determined to get full value out of the aircraft in terms of its synergy with con-ops evolutions for the Fleet.”

He added: “Under distributed operations, the carrier strike group is deployed differently. We are shaping a completely different way of thinking about that and the CMV-22B can be used as part of that mindset change.”

The second interview provided further details on the process of innovation. That interview was with Captain Sam Bryant, Commander, Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing at North Island. Captain Bryant reported that the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Paparo, was pleased with the initial deployments aboard USS Carl Vinson and USS Abraham Lincoln, but feels that the Osprey can do much more in its role in evolving Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

In other words, the reshaping of joint and coalition operations is underway which focuses upon distributed modular task forces which can deliver enhanced lethality and survivability. The Osprey is a path-breaking aircraft which breaks the rotorcraft’s limits on range and speed.

Captain Bryant highlighted that the CMV-22B, compared to the legacy Osprey, has more capability. “We have better range. We have much better avionics. We have better communications which allows us to connect with the strike groups more securely. We are better suited for long-range navigation operations, and the flexibility required to support a high-end fight in the Pacific.”

In that interview, Bryant highlighted that his team was working with the Naval Aviation Warfare Development Center (NAWDC) in their efforts to re-imagine and re-shape Fleet operations. This is certainly nothing that the C-2A Greyhound was part of; a point also emphasized by Vice Admiral Whitesell.

Vice Admiral Whitesell assured me when I return to NAWDC, I would get a very different response to my question of where the CMV-22B fits into the syllabus. When I was last there, the response was simply that we are not sure, for we did not have to think about the COD mission as delivered by the Greyhound to Fleet CONOPS.1

Whitesell noted: “They are looking at how you would use the CMV-22B, notably in the Western Pacific. The CMV-22B is an all-weather, day and night aircraft that doesn’t need a runway. How can we best utilize such an aircraft as we work contested logistics? And how does it empower the way ahead for distributed maritime operations?”

The CONOPS are changing with the reconfiguration of distributed Fleet operations correlated with the USAF effort to work agile combat employment operations. The rework of Navy and Air Force platforms and the introduction of newer platforms shape a maritime kill web force reconfiguration, as addressed in my book with Ed Timperlake.2.

The CMV-22B may be a new platform for the Navy and look like a legacy USMC asset. But it is not; it is part of this reconfiguration effort. But there is a catch which will limit the Navy’s ability to do so. A CONOPS to support the Fleet approach instantly raises questions about the numbers of CMV-22Bs the Navy needs to support contested logistics in a distributed environment.

One aspect is the question of how many aircraft the Navy needs to execute the COD mission. When the Marines were asked during the initial process of evaluating the Osprey for the COD mission, they recommended four aircraft and a team of 100 to 110 people to operate and support the aircraft. The Navy is currently using three aircraft per carrier-based detachment. So that is the first point at which to raise the numbers question.

A second aspect of the demand for increased numbers of aircraft is to look at distributed operations to support the Fleet and realize the aircraft is a web support asset not only a pointto-point load carrying asset. The Fleet demand signal could be high, and that demand will rapidly outpace supply when it comes to these aircraft.

Captain Bryant concluded by emphasizing that there might be a need to build a 21st century version of the Cold

War approach the Navy once used. They had intra-theater support squadrons with several types of aircraft to support the movement of maritime forces. Now with having to support distributed forces over significant distances, one must ask just how the Navy and the Joint Force can execute a 21st century version of such a theater support capability?

Notes

1.For a detailed look at my earlier visits to NAWDC see chapter two in Robbin Laird, Training for the High-End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s (2020).

2. Robbin Laird and Edward Timperlake, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century (2022).