Ripon Forum - December 2022

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Cover Story

4 The Ultimate Weapon is in Short Supply

By David Des Roches

The Army only made 75 percent of its recruiting quota in fiscal year 2022, and other services have also been strapped to meet their targets. Why the shortfall, and what can be done to reverse it?

6 Saving Ukraine: The Evolution of Aid and What the Future May Hold

By Mark F. Cancian

Without the rapid delivery of weapons and munitions from the United States, NATO, and others, Ukraine would have been overwhelmed in two or three weeks. What comes next?

8 The National Defense Stockpile is Small but Important — and Should Be Bigger

By Maiya Clark

Today, the stockpile is but a fraction of its former self; its cache of materials is valued at less than $1 billion. Corrected for inflation, that’s less than 1/40th of its value in 1952.

10 Reagan’s Vision and the State of U.S. Missile Defense Today

By Doug Lamborn

The missile threat environment is far more perilous than at any other time in history. China, Russia, North Korea, and potentially Iran, are deliberately developing strategies to threaten the U.S. homeland.

12 Ensuring Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century

By John D. Maurer

At a time when Vladimir Putin is making irresponsible threats to use nuclear weapons in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is currently supported by last century’s equipment.

Debate:

Volume 56, Number 6

Are We Spending Enough on National Defense?

14 Back to the Future for Defense

By Roger I. Zakheim

Republicans ought to take a page from the Reagan playbook and insist that we can defeat inflation and control federal spending without weakening our military.

15

After Failing Five Straight Audits, the Pentagon Should Not Get a Funding Boost

By Robert Weissman

You don’t need to be a budget hawk to recognize it is past time to end budget increases for the Department of Defense and impose some fiscal discipline on the agency.

Politics & Perspective

18 The Space Force Turns Three

By Bill Woolf

With the U.S. Space Force marking its third anniversary, now is a good time to examine not only some of its key accomplishments, but some of the key challenges it faces in the years ahead.

20 Viewing Border Security as an Ecosystem

By Victor M. Manjarrez

If the number of individuals arrested along our southern border were to form their own city, it would be the fifth-largest city in the United States.

Editorial Board

Thomas Tauke

Michael Castle

Erik Paulsen

Billy Pitts

Pamela Sederholm

Jim Murtha

John Feehery Sara Glenn

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THE RIPON SOCIETY HONORARY CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

U.S. Senators:

Shelley Moore Capito - Senate Co-Chair

Todd Young – Senate Co-Chair

Marsha Blackburn

Roy Blunt

Richard Burr

Bill Cassidy, M.D.

Susan M. Collins

Steve Daines

Joni Ernst Deb Fischer

John Hoeven

Jerry Moran

Mike Rounds

Thom Tillis

Roger Wicker

U.S. Representatives:

U.S. Representatives:

Rodney Davis - House Co-Chair

Larry Bucshon, M.D. - House Co-Chair

Frank Lucas - House Co-Chair

Mike Kelly - Vice Chair

Dan Newhouse - Vice Chair

Ann Wagner - Vice Chair

Mark Amodei

Kelly Armstrong

Don Bacon

Troy Balderson

Andy Barr

Stephanie Bice

Mike Bost

Vern Buchanan

Michael C. Burgess, M.D.

Ken Calvert

Buddy Carter

Tom Cole

John Curtis

Tom Emmer

Ron Estes

Randy Feenstra

Brian Fitzpatrick

Andrew Garbarino

Anthony Gonzalez

Kay Granger

Garret Graves

Sam Graves

Jaime Herrera Beutler

French Hill

Trey Hollingsworth

Bill Huizenga

Bill Johnson

Dusty Johnson

Dave Joyce

John Joyce, M.D.

John Katko

Young Kim

Adam Kinzinger

Darin LaHood

Bob Latta

Billy Long

Nancy Mace

Brian Mast

Kevin McCarthy

Michael McCaul

Peter Meijer

Carol Miller

John Moolenaar

Blake Moore

Guy Reschenthaler

Tom Rice

Cathy McMorris Rodgers

Steve Scalise

Adrian Smith

Lloyd Smucker

Pete Stauber

Bryan Steil

Glenn “GT” Thompson

Mike Turner

Fred Upton

David Valadao

Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M.

Steve Womack

In this edition

After the worst year for military recruiting since the start of the all-volunteer force in 1973, the latest edition of The Ripon Forum focuses on U.S. military readiness at a time of rising tensions around the globe.

Leading the Forum’s coverage is David Des Roches, a professor at the National Defense University and Airborne Ranger in the Army Reserve. In our lead essay, Des Roches examines possible reasons for the recruitment crisis, including the fact that “the pool of eligible Americans is shrinking.”

“To serve in the military,” Des Roches writes, “a young American has to be relatively physically fit, not have a history of drug abuse, and not have an emotional or mental health condition. These standards were devised in a different era for a different society. Now, obesity is rampant in America, marijuana (and other drugs) are socially accepted and increasingly legal ... Unfortunately, these conditions can be disqualifying for military service; less than one-in-four Americans in the target age group are eligible for service. This is not solely a military problem, but rather a comprehensive whole-of-society failure and no less than a national disgrace.”

The recruitment shortfall is not the only challenge impacting U.S. military readiness. According to Mark F. Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, our Armed Forces also face the challenge of maintaining an adequate stockpile of weapons at a time when lethal assistance is being sent to Ukraine and making a difference in its war against Russia. “The United States has sent 8,500 Javelins to Ukraine, about 40 percent of its inventory,” Cancian writes. “Prewar production was 1,000 per year. The Department of Defense is working to expand this, but even at double the prewar production rate, replacing the transferred Javelin inventory would take four years of production. With a two-year lead time, that means a rebuilt inventory in 2028.”

Maiya Clark of the Heritage Foundation writes about another U.S. stockpile that is facing a possible shortage — and that is the National Defense Stockpile of raw materials needed to manufacture critical items ranging from ships and planes to ammunition and body armor. “Today, the stockpile is but a fraction of its former self,” Clark writes. “Its cache of materials is valued at less than $1 billion. Corrected for inflation, that’s less than 1/40th of its value in 1952. The stockpile is all the more important today because, in many cases, the primary supplier of the raw materials it contains is also America’s chief global competitor: China.”

Another national security risk is America’s aging nuclear deterrent. According to author, professor, and America Enterprise Institute nonresident fellow John D. Maurer, renewed attention is being paid to America’s arsenal as a result of Vladimir Putin’s dangerous threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and the decision by China to build its own nuclear arsenal equal to America’s in size. Unfortunately, Maurer writes: “While the threats from China and Russia have matured, much of the American nuclear arsenal has aged far beyond its useful lifespan. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is currently supported by last century’s equipment: 40-year-old submarines, 50 year-old missiles, and 70-year-old bombers.”

Nearly 40 years after Ronald Reagan first proposed that the U.S. develop a shield to protect Americans against a nuclear attack, U.S. Rep. Doug Lamborn (CO-5) looks back at Reagan’s proposal and the state of U.S. missile defense. “Today, the missile threat environment is far more complicated and perilous than at any other time in history,” writes Lamborn, who serves as the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee’s Strategic Forces Subcommittee. “Despite recognizing these threats and repeatedly proclaiming that the defense of the American homeland is their number one priority, the Biden Administration’s Missile Defense Review puts forth a ‘business as usual’ approach.”

With Republicans set to take control of the House of Representatives, the latest Forum also features a debate over whether America is spending enough on national defense. Roger I. Zakheim of the Reagan Institute argues the GOP should take a page from the Reagan playbook and support a defense budget with at least five percent growth annually, while Robert Weissman of Public Citizen argues that, after failing five straight audits, the Pentagon neither deserves nor needs a funding boost.

In other essays, Bill Woolf of the Space Force Association examines the state of the U.S. Space Force as it marks its third anniversary this month, and former Border Patrol agent Victor M. Manjarrez, Jr., of the Center for Law and Human Behavior at the University of Texas at El Paso, examines the state of security along America’s southern border. And in our latest Ripon Profile, Louisiana Congresswoman Julia Letlow discusses her background in education and reveals which federal agency she would most like to reform.

As always, we hope you enjoy this edition of the Forum, and welcome any comments or questions you may have.

Lou Zickar, Editor of The Ripon Forum louzickar@riponsociety.org

The Ultimate Weapon is IN SHORT SUPPLY

Military Implications of the American Manpower Shortage

by DAVID DES ROCHES

The United States has the greatest military capacity on the earth. Even the humiliating strategic defeats in Afghanistan and Iraq have not diminished this standing. Those were seen to be temporary missions away from our core mission of fighting a large-scale conventional war.

As for other nations, the Russian tactical and operational failure in Ukraine has pushed America’s closest rival significantly down the league table. And China thus far remains an unknown quantity; it certainly has a large number of forces and significant capability, but these forces are untested and could prove to be as inept on the battlefield as the once-vaunted Russian Army.

The current war in Ukraine is more akin to what America’s armed forces are structured for. Put simply, the wars of the last

20 years have been wars the U.S. had to fight; the war in the Ukraine is the type of war the U.S. military is built to fight. But there is a problem.

All the military services are challenged to recruit enough young Americans to fill the ranks of the Armed Forces. The Army only made 75 percent of its recruiting quota in fiscal year 2022; other services have also been strapped to meet their targets. The Army – as the biggest and most decisive of the military branches – is rightly the focus of this discussion. Each year, the Army must enlist the equivalent of 60,000 new soldiers — about one third of the entire Marine Corps. As the Army goes, so goes the rest of the services.

So why the shortfall? There is no shortage of speculation,

but a few reasons stand out:

1) The military is increasingly divorced from society. Since the first round of post-Vietnam base reductions, the Army base infrastructure has steadily moved away from cities and into more remote areas. There is no major Army base in the Northeast save remote Fort Drum, New York, which is closer to Ottawa than to Buffalo, Boston, or New York City. Major Army bases are in Manhattan, Kansas not Manhattan, New York. As the Army recedes from society, society recedes from the Army – service tends to become a family tradition, and that tradition becomes centered around a shrinking number of rural bases. This is a half-century long trend.

2) There is a persistent social bias against military service in America. American thinking on its Army is bifurcated. While Americans respect their military and hold soldiers in high regard, they often feel that military service – particularly in peacetime – is something only suited for those who are unable to find other employment. It’s a trope among servicemembers that when they meet someone they will hear, “I would have served but..” with the “but” boiling down to “I thought I was too good.” The military is still viewed as the employer of last resort, and enlisted service particularly is not regarded as a career. Billy Joel managed to tap into these societal prejudices and paint a concise picture of dead-end loser-dom in just two couplets when he wrote: “Davy, who’s still in the Navy, and probably will be for life.

3) Employment is closely related to military recruitment. There is a nation-wide surfeit of jobs, and decades of recruiting experience shows high unemployment is usually good for recruiting, and low unemployment bad. The military life is challenging. See #2 above.

4) The relative value of traditional incentives to military service (such as paid college and free health care) is eroding. Over the last few decades, free access to college and to health care has moved towards becoming a universal right. In the past, these were major attractions to military service. If you can go to college and have your loans forgiven without ever having a drill sergeant yell at you, why wouldn’t you?

5) The pool of eligible Americans is shrinking. To serve in the military, a young American has to be relatively physically fit, not have a history of drug abuse, and not have an emotional or mental health condition. These standards were devised in a

different era for a different society. Now, obesity is rampant in America, marijuana (and other drugs) are socially accepted and increasingly legal. Even before the stress of the pandemic and its associated lockdowns, there was an explosion in the diagnosis and pharmaceutical treatment of various behavior disorders among children and teenagers in the U.S. Unfortunately, these conditions can be disqualifying for military service; less than one-in-four Americans in the target age group are eligible for service. This is not solely a military problem, but rather a comprehensive whole-of-society failure and no less than a national disgrace. And finally…

6) The politicization of the military is a real thing, but it means different things to different people. Some in America have portrayed the military as an incubator of white supremacists, while others have portrayed it as a social experimentation lab for unresolved issues such as abortion and various gender issues. What can’t be debated is that America’s military reflects both the strengths and divides of American society. But these narratives – regardless of political viewpoint – are not helpful when an 18-year old is trying to decide if he or she should enlist or attend college. The military has been invoked by all sides in the culture wars. When two elephants fight, the grass suffers most. Our military has been the grass.

The reasons for the problem are myriad. So how do we fix them?

Each of the causes I cite has a different solution, and some are easier than others. At a minimum, there should two reviews: one on eligibility for military service (with an eye towards updating recruitment standards to reflect modern conditions) and—more controversially – another to look at federal benefits associated with service (to ensure military benefits outweigh universal benefits).

But at the end of the day American society determines what sort of military America has. We are not Prussians. We need to honestly look at who we are and what we want. Our Army reflects us. We need to take steps to ensure we like what we see. RF

David Des Roches is an associate professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies at the National Defense University. He previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. An Airborne Ranger in the Army Reserve, he was awarded the Bronze Star for service in Afghanistan. The opinions expressed here are his own.

Less than one-in-four Americans in the target age group are eligible for service. This is not solely a military problem, but rather a comprehensive whole-of-society failure and no less than a national disgrace.

David Des Roches

Saving Ukraine: The Evolution of Aid and What the Future May Hold

by MARK F. CANCIAN

What began as a trickle is now a rushing torrent. Military aid to Ukraine that began in 2014 in reaction to the Russian takeover of Crimea has surged to $80 million a day. That aid has gone through six phases, each with distinct features that tell us something about the nature of the war and the U.S. response.

Before considering the different phases, though, it's worthwhile considering the whole. Congress has appropriated $68 billion for aid to Ukraine — about 60 percent for military activities and 40 percent for humanitarian relief and economic support. The military element has two parts. One part ($11 billion) strengthens the U.S. defense industrial base and supports U.S. forces that deployed to Europe to reassure allies. The larger part ($27 billion) consists of military aid to Ukraine — about $17 billion that will be delivered immediately and another $10 billion over several years.

NATO and other countries have committed a total of about $41.4 billion. The United Kingdom and Poland provide substantial military aid. The European Union and Canada provide relatively more financial and humanitarian aid. Some countries, like Poland and the Baltic nations, provide a high level of aid compared to their economies (up to 1 percent). Others, like France and Germany, lag.

Phase 1: Prewar. Military aid to Ukraine began in 2014. That spring marked a major disruption for the Obama national security team. The relatively benign national security environment they envisioned had been shattered by Russia's takeover of Crimea, ISIS's sweep out of the desert, and China's continuing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Obama Administration began providing non-lethal aid to strengthen Ukraine, eventually reaching about $300 million per year. The Trump Administration continued that but included lethal aid like antitank weapons. Trump infamously also tried to use this aid as a political lever against the Biden family.

Phase 2: The early crisis (February-April). The invasion did not catch Ukraine totally unprepared since it had been fighting Russia and Russian surrogates in the Donbas since 2014. However, it was not prepared for the scale of the military effort.

Thousands of Ukrainians joined newly created territorial defense units, but they needed equipment. The United States and the West provided lots of the basics like radios, medical supplies, and protective gear. They also sent weapons that were easy to use, like infantry antitank and antiaircraft missiles. One of these weapons, Javelin, became the iconic weapon of the early war period with songs and illustrations (e.g., St. Javelin).

The purpose was to stave off defeat, and that was successful. Militaries in combat need a continuous flow of ammunition and weapons. Without the rapid delivery of weapons and munitions from the United States, NATO, and others, Ukraine would have been overwhelmed in two or three weeks.

Phase 3: Scrounging up Soviet-era equipment (April-June but continuing). The prewar Ukrainian army used Soviet-era equipment almost exclusively. Rather than lose time trying to introduce new equipment, the United States and Europe sent more of this Soviet-era equipment and supplies. U.S. procurement teams searched the globe for any country willing to sell its old Soviet equipment. The greatest need was artillery ammunition, which units in combat use in huge quantities; for example, an artillery battery uses as much ammunition in a week of combat as it does in a year of peacetime training.

Former Warsaw Pact members in Eastern Europe were particularly anxious to dispose of their Soviet-era equipment, so they could get more modern, NATO-standard equipment. It was a winwin-win: the Ukrainians got equipment they were accustomed to using, the Eastern Europeans could upgrade their inventories, and defense contractors sold more weapons.

Phase 4: The introduction of NATO equipment (May to present). Eventually, Soviet-era equipment and ammunition became hard to obtain since the world market was limited, and Russia and China, the principal suppliers, were unavailable. The shortage of artillery ammunition became a crisis. This drove the U.S. and NATO to begin supplying their own systems. For artillery, the French sent the Caesar system, the Germans sent Panzer howit-

A Ukrainian soldier shows the rockets on a HIMARS vehicle in Eastern Ukraine on July 1, 2022.

Congress has appropriated $68 billion for aid to Ukraine … NATO and other countries have committed a total of about $41.4 billion.

zers, the British sent L119s, and the United States sent M777s. These were NATO-standard and thus could use NATO-standard munitions, primarily 155 mm but also 105 mm, both of which were widely available in the West.

The problem was training and maintenance. Because these were new systems, the Ukrainians had to pull soldiers out of the fight and send them to training centers in Europe to learn how to operate and maintain them. That took time. The iconic weapon of this phase was the HIMARS firing a guided rocket. The long range and accuracy allowed strikes against fixed Russian facilities like ammunition depots and headquarters far behind Russian lines.

Phase 5: Dwindling inventories and trade-offs (August to present). The NATO weapons came from surplus stocks. Eventually, there were no more excess systems. Weapons might have been stripped from units in the field, but few countries were willing to do that. Munitions stockpiles could be squeezed, but for the United States, the amounts needed in other war plans — for example, a war in Korea — set limits.

In some areas, the United States made substitutions, such as sending heavier TOW antitank missile systems rather than the lighter, infantry portable Javelin and NLOS. In other cases, the United States placed orders with manufacturers, but these typically had two-year lead times.

A highly visible example of limited inventories was air defense weapons. In the wake of Russian missile and drone attacks in October, the Ukrainians asked for air defense systems. The problem was that NATO militaries had eliminated most of these after the Cold War since prospective adversaries had weak air forces. As a result, NATO could provide only a few systems, and these would take a long time to arrive. For example, NATO member Germany promised to deliver four IRIS-T air defense systems, but only one could be sent before the end of 2022, with the other three sometime in 2023.

The United States is scrambling to rebuild its inventories and expand them for possible future conflicts. This will take time; in some cases, a lot of time. For example, the United States has sent 8,500 Javelins to Ukraine, about 40 percent of its inventory. Prewar production was 1,000 per year. The Department of Defense is working to expand this, but even at double the prewar production rate, replacing the transferred Javelin inventory would take four years of production. With a two-year lead time, that means a rebuilt inventory in 2028.

Industry has been supportive but emphasizes that it wants long-term commitments. It fears that when the war ends, DOD will abruptly curtail its orders. Then industry will be stuck with

excess capacity, which some will regard as "waste." DOD is considering multiyear procurement contracts to give industry the stability it needs.

Phase 6: Post-election and the long haul (Nov to ?). Aid to Ukraine has been strongly bipartisan, with widespread support in Congress and from the American people. Nevertheless, the progressive left and populist right both question aid to Ukraine, arguing that the money is needed at home. The populist right is also isolationist and views Ukraine as "corrupt." In May, these unlikely allies mustered 57 votes against the $40 billion aid package in the House and 11 votes in the Senate. That number will likely grow.

Given the small post-election shift in Congress, it is unlikely that this opposition will be able to reduce military support since that is so central to Ukraine's survival. Instead, the populist right will likely push hardest against economic support to the Ukrainian government and demand more oversight. This latter demand may be satisfied with an auditing agency like the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Opposition to aid will be framed as a call for negotiations. In Europe, there is already a large "peace party," and the combination of cold weather, high energy prices, inflation, and recession might increase its prominence. The problem with negotiations is that the two parties have no common ground on which to seek a settlement. President Zelensky wants the Russians out of all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. Putin refuses to give up any territory and continues to claim all of Ukraine as part of "greater Russia." Even beginning negotiations would be a win for Putin because the United States and European populations would become impatient, expecting negotiations to produce a settlement. This would create pressure to make a deal, even a bad deal. Indeed, this is Putin's strategy: hold on militarily, hope the Europeans crack, and get an in-place ceasefire that allows him to hold what remains of his conquests.

With little prospect for a negotiated settlement, the war looks to last a long time. The history of such conflicts is that they continue until one side is so exhausted that it is willing to compromise its basic principles to end the fighting. Both sides are far from that today. Ukraine has good prospects for the slow reconquest of its territory, but that will take a lot of time. Giving Ukraine that time will require continuing the flow of weapons and munitions for months, if not years. RF

Mark F. Cancian serves as Senior Adviser in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Mark F. Cancian

Without the rapid delivery of weapons and munitions from the United States, NATO, and others, Ukraine would have been overwhelmed in two or three weeks.

by MAIYA CLARK

The National Defense Stockpile is a little-known and less-than-glamorous responsibility of the Defense Department. However, this reserve of raw critical materials plays an outsized role in U.S. national defense — and it needs help from Congress to continue playing this role.

The Pentagon stockpiles 42 different raw materials — items like rare earth elements and carbon fibers — needed to manufacture essential defense items, everything from ships and planes to ammunition. These stores constitute an important insurance policy against supply chain disruptions that could inhibit access to these materials.

The stockpile was first created in 1939, when policymakers could see that World War II would interrupt supplies of rubber, steel materials, and other materials that would be vital to the U.S. war machine, and later, the U.S. war effort.

The stockpile only grew during the Cold War — from a total value of $54 million in 1941, to a total value of $4 billion by 1952. The stores in the stockpile reached peak total value in 1989, when they were assessed at $9.6 billion.

But when the Cold War ended, the stockpile was no longer seen as a priority. Most of its contents were sold off, and those funds reallocated to more pressing needs. Today, the stockpile is but a fraction of its former self; its cache of materials is valued at less than $1 billion. Corrected for inflation, that’s less than 1/40th of its value in 1952.

Unfortunately, the United States is not 40 times less likely today to experience disruption to its supplies of key materials than it was 70 years ago. Nor does it exist in a global environment 40 times safer than that of the

Cold War era.

Instead, the U.S. is once again engaged in greatpower competition, and once again it needs a robust National Defense Stockpile to guard against supply disruptions.

Indeed, the stockpile is all the more important today because, in many cases, the primary supplier of the raw materials it contains is also America’s chief global competitor: China.

Take antimony for an example. This semi-metal is used to manufacture automotive batteries, flame-retardant fabrics, some explosives, and night-vision goggles. It is also primarily produced in China, which accounts for 55 percent of global antimony mine production and fully 63 percent of U.S. antimony imports.

If China ever wanted to put pressure on the U.S. defense industry, it could restrict its exports of antimony, rare earth elements, lithium, or any number of other vital materials of which it is the leading global producer. This could drastically raise the costs of U.S. defense production or halt that production altogether.

This is a massive national security risk. The good news is, the National Defense Stockpile serves to buy down that risk. But it can only accomplish that goal if it contains the right quantities of the right materials.

Congress should use its budgetary and oversight authorities to make sure the stockpile is meeting these requirements. To ensure that it contains the materials most vital to defense production, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees should require the Pentagon to contract with a third party to independently review the stockpile’s holdings

The National Defense Stockpile is Small but Important — and Should Be Bigger

Maiya Clark

Today, the stockpile is but a fraction of its former self; its cache of materials is valued at less than $1 billion. Corrected for inflation, that’s less than 1/40th of its value in 1952.

and its practices. Lawmakers already have the legal authority to request this information from the Defense Department; Congress just needs to use it.

The National Defense Stockpile may or may not contain exactly the right materials. But it is undeniable that, with a total value of less than $1 billion, it does not contain enough of those materials. Congress should provide a financial “transfusion” of appropriated funds to the stockpile.

The good news is that both the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act contain provisions related to the stockpile. The Senate version specifically authorized $1 billion for the stockpile to acquire strategic minerals currently in

short supply. If this provision is enacted in the final legislation, it will more than double the size of the stockpile.

It is easy to forget about the National Defense Stockpile. After all, it represents only a tiny fraction of defense spending. And, like any emergency measure, it for the most part sits unused. However, it is vitally important in the new era of greatpower competition and globalized supply chains. Congress and the Pentagon should prioritize it accordingly. RF

Maiya Clark is a senior research associate in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense.

The stockpile is all the more important today because, in many cases, the primary supplier of the raw materials it contains is also America’s chief global competitor: China.

Reagan’s Vision and the State of U.S. Missile Defense Today

by DOUG LAMBORN

Nearly four decades after President Ronald Reagan first proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), America has made great strides in defending against ballistic missile threats. We have interceptors against both isolated strategic missiles as well as against tactical, theater-range missiles. These are not infallible, but they assuredly do enhance deterrence against rogue threats, and even near-peer competitors.

Although Mutually Assured Destruction has not been eliminated, as Reagan wished, he would have appreciated this degree of progress we have made on defensive capabilities.

President Reagan’s intent embodied in the SDI was clear: leverage technological advancements to develop missile defenses to intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles targeting the American homeland. Research and development into such systems started following his historic speech to the Nation on March 23, 1983. But the end of the Cold War brought progress to a screeching halt. The next two decades were marked by the Global War on Terror and resulting progress in regional missile defense, followed by a reawakening to the value of homeland missile defense in the early 2000s as the North Korean nuclear threat became more prevalent.

Today, the missile threat environment is far more complicated and perilous than at any other time in history. China, Russia, North Korea, and potentially Iran, are deliberately developing strategies to threaten the U.S. homeland. China and Russia are pursuing capabilities with global ranges, such as China’s hypersonic missile with fractional orbital bombardment capabilities. North Korea has launched more missiles in 2022 than in the last four years combined, many of which are reportedly able to reach the American homeland.

The Biden Administration unfortunately is not

building on the progress of administrations of both parties that began in the 2000s. Despite recognizing these threats and repeatedly proclaiming that the defense of the American homeland is their number-one priority, the Biden Administration’s Missile Defense Review (MDR) puts forth a “business as usual” approach. The lack of urgency reflected in the MDR and the multiple components it misses deserve greater public scrutiny and debate. The Biden MDR has at least three major problems.

First is whether the United States will stay ahead of the rapidly increasing North Korean missile threat to the homeland. A vague “missile defeat including whole-ofgovernment activities” strategy is simply insufficient. This nebulous plan fails to consider a significant debate underlying this concept: the future composition of our GroundBased Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. In the House version of the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), measures are incorporated to question whether 20 or 64 NextGeneration Interceptors are required, reenergize the longneglected East Coast missile defense site, and force the Pentagon’s hand on cruise missile defense of the homeland.

A second problem in the MDR is the absence of a serious discussion on the value of new and emerging technologies in future missile defense architecture. The document does not mention directed energy, highpowered microwaves, or any other advanced kinetic capability. Cutting-edge technologies like these have the potential to change how we deter and defend – exactly how President Reagan believed missile defense would change the course of human history. We must increase funding for research, development, and integration of these emerging technologies into future missile defense programs to see if there are solutions that enhance deterrence, achieve cost

Today, the missile threat environment is far more complicated and perilous than at any other time in history.

savings, and provide a more sophisticated defense of our homeland – including space-based solutions. A provision I included in the House version of the FY23 NDAA to use new technologies to defeat hypersonic capabilities is one step in addressing this gap left by the Biden MDR.

Third and perhaps most alarming is the disconnect between the stated top priority of homeland defense and the lack of concrete commitment to missile defense in this MDR. The Obama and Trump MDR’s included a statement of not accepting limitations on homeland missile defense, which is notably absent from the Biden review. This points to a deeper flaw in the Biden Administration’s approach – a legacy view that missile defense of our homeland is somehow destabilizing – even as China and Russia rapidly build their homeland missile defense systems, some of which are nuclear-tipped. This mentality likely has prevented the Biden Administration from producing a more robust MDR, even as recent wars in Israel and Ukraine prove that missile defenses are inherently stabilizing by

providing decision space and reducing the risk of coercion.

President Reagan’s vision for the defense of the homeland has not yet been realized. We must abandon evolutionary reactions to improved and expanded homeland missile defense in favor of revolutionary solutions that achieve the vision set out for us 40 years ago. It is incumbent on us to convey to our citizens, allies, and adversaries that we intend to stay ahead of advancing missile threats.

We will do so by improving and expanding the numbers of our existing missile defense platforms, pursuing advanced and cutting-edge concepts for future development, and maintaining our right to defend ourselves.

It would be a dereliction of duty to do anything less. RF

Doug Lamborn represents the 5th District of Colorado in the U.S. House of Representatives. He serves as Ranking Member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

Despite recognizing these threats and repeatedly proclaiming that the defense of the American homeland is their number one priority, the Biden Administration’s Missile Defense Review puts forth a “business as usual” approach.

President Ronald Reagan addresses the nation on the Strategic Defense Initiative on March 23, 1983.

Ensuring Nuclear Deterrence in

21st Century

by JOHN D. MAURER

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and accompanying nuclear threats demonstrate the continued importance of nuclear deterrence to American security. Today, the United States maintains a nuclear deterrent second to none. The threat of America’s nuclear arsenal gives adversaries reason to avoid conflict with the United States and its allies.

The recent publication of the president’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) lays out a vision for how to reinforce nuclear deterrence in the coming decades. While this review is a useful framework, the real challenges are yet to come. The president and Congress must work together to ensure that nuclear modernization receives the funding that it needs. At the same time, the president should lay out a clearer pathway towards future arms control with China and Russia.

Nuclear deterrence has moved back to the center of national security discussions as a result of Putin’s irresponsible threats. Putin’s truly scary behavior reinforces the critical importance of deterring nuclear use by lawless regimes. Fortunately, Putin’s threats come from a place of weakness. Russia is losing the war on the ground to Ukrainian forces backed by Western aid. Putin’s nuclear threats are designed to drive a wedge into the coalition supporting Ukraine. Thus far, they have not succeeded.

In fact, Russia’s lack of nuclear use, despite embarrassing losses on the battlefield, shows that on some level deterrence is still working. Many analysts have worried that although the United States and Russia have similar numbers of large “strategic”

nuclear weapons, the Russians have several thousand shorter-range “tactical” nuclear weapons, while the United States has only a few hundred. Yet the Russians have struggled to translate this numerical edge into actual battlefield advantage.

If Russia used its large tactical nuclear force indiscriminately, it would risk escalation to total nuclear war with the United States, a war that Russia knows it cannot win. Even using a few tactical nuclear weapons could have significant consequences for the Putin regime. Aside from furthering Russia’s diplomatic and economic isolation, Russian nuclear use might provoke direct NATO attacks on Russia’s weakened military. As a result, Putin has neither used nuclear weapons against Ukraine nor widened the conflict to attack NATO countries supplying Ukraine’s military. NATO’s ability to dominate Russia in a conventional conflict, combined with the United States’ large strategic nuclear arsenal, make nuclear escalation a losing game for the Putin regime. In the short term, the best thing the United States can do in response to Putin’s nuclear threats is continue its support of Ukrainian success on the battlefield.

Over the longer term, however, the United States will need to take additional steps to reinforce nuclear deterrence. While Russia has been deterred from nuclear escalation thus far, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in the first place represents a catastrophic failure that has had dire consequences, especially in the increase of energy and food insecurity. In the future, we should hope to deter such aggression

the

Nuclear deterrence has moved back to the center of national security discussions as a result of Putin’s irresponsible threats.

John D. Maurer

in the first place, rather than simply deterring the worst sorts of behavior within an otherwise-devastating war. Perhaps even more troubling, China has embarked on a new program of nuclear expansion to create, for the first time, a nuclear arsenal close in size to that of the United States and Russia. While the threat from China and Russia have matured, much of the American nuclear arsenal has aged far beyond its useful lifespan. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is currently supported by last century’s equipment: 40-year-old submarines, 50 yearold missiles, and 70-year-old bombers.

The president’s declassified NPR lays out a vision for how to meet these challenges. Critically, the review retains the current nuclear declaratory posture, in which the United States promises to employ nuclear weapons to defend the “vital interests” of the United States and its partners in “extreme circumstances.” These deliberately open-ended criteria both deter adversaries and reassure allies of the United States’ commitment to their defense. The review also commits to modernizing the entirety of the strategic nuclear arsenal, including long-range missiles, submarines, and bombers. Finally, the review emphasizes the importance of modernizing our national nuclear infrastructure, which is critical in a long-term nuclear competition with our adversaries.

While the new NPR points in the right direction, the real challenges are yet to come. Carrying forward the president’s vision will require that Congress consistently provides the resources necessary to carry it out. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has temporarily made it easier to win support for such funding, but nuclear modernization is not something that we can accomplish in a year or two. We need to build consistent, bipartisan support for long-term funding of new nuclear weapons systems and the infrastructure to maintain and upgrade them. Funding for this long-term project has increased in recent years, but significant spending remains ahead, to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars over the next few decades. While a

significant sum, the cost of modernization represents only a small fraction of the annual defense budget. When set against the risks of major wars with China and Russia, the cost of the deterrent is small compared to its security benefits.

Force modernization should be combined with a renewed commitment to arms control to reduce the nuclear dangers that our adversaries pose to the United States. Indeed, the new NPR rightly notes that arms control can play an important role in limiting the nuclear threats from China and Russia. Unfortunately, it does not provide a clear roadmap for how to bring this about. We need to resist advice from well-intentioned disarmament advocates that the best way to reduce nuclear danger is for the United States to “lead the way” in unilaterally dismantling its nuclear forces. History suggests that “leading the way” by example is rarely an effective approach to bringing recalcitrant adversaries into arms control negotiations.

Rather, adversaries are likely to pocket any unilateral concessions while continuing their malign behavior. Instead, future success in deterrence and arms control will depend on the bargaining leverage generated by American nuclear modernization and other force development, including continued work on long-range conventional missiles and missile defense systems. Ensuring that we fund and build those systems is thus the best program for ensuring both future deterrence and arms control. RF

John D. Maurer is a professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Air University and a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. His book Competitive Arms Control was recently published by Yale University Press. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

The U.S. nuclear arsenal is currently supported by last century’s equipment: 40-year-old submarines, 50 year-old missiles, and 70-year-old bombers.

“Are We Spending Enough on National Defense?

Back to the Future for Defense

by ROGER I. ZAKHEIM

As Republicans prepare to take over the House of Representatives, it appears the next Congress is heading back to the future. Republicans believe they have a mandate to get control of spending to defeat inflation, while President Biden and congressional Democrats want no part of that. So we can expect the same government shutdown and debt ceiling dramas we witnessed during the Obama Administration when Republicans and Democrats found themselves in a similar fiscal fight.

Back then, national defense was the biggest loser, as both political parties agreed on budget caps and a sequestration mechanism that decimated military readiness and modernization. Before we repeat those mistakes, Republicans instead ought to take a page from the Reagan playbook and insist that we can defeat inflation and control federal spending without weakening our military.

After all, a military capable of effective deterrence may be more essential to taming inflation today than it was in the 1980s. Much of the inflation the world has endured this year stems from the disruptions created by Russia’s war on Ukraine. If Russia escalates further, or if China invades or blockades Taiwan, the economic consequences and inflationary pressures could be dire. Stronger defense capabilities are in both our economic and national security interests.

Faced with an expansionist Soviet Union and double-digit inflation at the start of his presidency, President Reagan’s economic team pursued a program that cut taxes, reduced spending and reformed Social Security. This fiscal cocktail did not include one ingredient: defense cuts. In what became known as

the “showdown” between Budget Director David Stockman and Defense Secretary Casper “Cap” Weinberger, President Reagan rejected arguments that defense spending undermined the economic recovery.

Stockman sought a slow military buildup in order to limit deficit spending in the president’s first budget request — something Stockman anticipated would be essential to winning over Reaganite budget hawks in Congress and reassuring the markets. Yet President Reagan sided with his defense secretary, allowing the military to grow by more than 50 percent between 1983 and 1987.

Thanks to that decision, Weinberger was able to build a defense program that delivered the military credibility Reagan sought for his “peace through strength” agenda, including a 600 ship Navy, modernized Air Force and nuclear forces, larger land forces, and better pay and benefits for service members. An exasperated Stockman was surprised that there was no sticker shock in the Oval Office. But for Reagan, national defense was the domain of the commanderin-chief and the Pentagon—not the Office of Management and Budget. Stockman’s slow growth alternative would have meant cutting two aircraft carrier battle groups, reducing purchases of F-18 fighter aircraft, and delaying the procurement of the Bradley fighting vehicle—all of which became signature parts of the Reagan buildup.

As important as his decision to move forward with the largest peacetime military buildup in modern history was Reagan’s rationale for siding with his defense secretary. The military budget had to align

Roger I. Zakheim

Republicans ought to take a page from the Reagan playbook and insist that we can defeat inflation and control federal spending without weakening our military.

“Are We Spending Enough on National Defense?

After Failing Five Straight Audits, the Pentagon Should Not Get a Funding Boost

by ROBERT WEISSMAN

The United States spends, by far, more on its military than other nations. U.S. military spending is more than the next nine countries combined; it is 12 times the amount Russia spends.

Yet demands persist from the military-industrial complex to spend ever more. For fiscal year 2023, the Biden Administration has requested a $31 billion increase in Pentagon spending, to $813 billion. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees in July authorized an additional $37 billion and $45 billion. The final total will likely be resolved in December; if anything, it may jump even further toward the $900 billion mark, with the trillion-dollar threshold in view for fiscal year 2024.

The fact that the United States spends so much more than all other countries on the military should, at bare minimum, be an enormous warning sign suggesting that further increases are not needed. But if that spending discrepancy is a warning sign, the pervasive and systemic waste at the Pentagon should be a five-alarm notice to stop spending more – and begin looking at cuts.

The Pentagon announced in November that it failed its fifth consecutive audit, its latest since the agency was first required to start auditing itself in 2018. Although agency officials have repeatedly promised improvements, this year’s audit made little progress from last year’s.

Pentagon spending is replete with waste and fraud both small (a spare parts maker with a 3,800 percent profit level) and large (the defective and dysfunctional F-35 program that will cost more than $1.7 trillion over its projected 50year lifespan, according to the Project on Government Oversight). The Pentagon, in fact, is seeking an extra boost in the current budget for even more on the F-35, as well as other purported needs, according to a Pentagon wish list sent to Congress and obtained by Bloomberg.

The Pentagon itself knows that waste and fraud is rampant – but it fails to exert basic controls. Back in 2015, the Pentagon completed – and then buried – a report identifying a “clear path” to $125 billion in savings on administrative waste over five years.

Why in the world should we keep throwing money at an agency with a record like this? Would Republicans or Democrats or anyone with common sense tolerate this kind of waste at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Department of Labor? Actually, it’s a trick question. That level of waste –the $25 billion annually identified by the Pentagon itself, all the way back in 2015 and not even tallying the waste on failed systems like the F-35 – is more than the ENTIRE budget of the EPA or Department of Labor.

Why do we in fact spend so much on the military, given the widespread waste and the fact that U.S. vastly outspends all other rivals and allies? The short answer is: the corrosive power of the military-industrial complex. About half the Pentagon budget is spent on military contractors. Those contractors prop up think tanks that concoct rationalizations for why we must always spend more. The leading contractors and the Pentagon itself strategically deploy their production and subcontracting so that almost every congressional district has some number of jobs attributable to the Pentagon.

And, of course, the military contractors lather spending on members of Congress, focusing on the military spending committees. A July Public Citizen study found that contractors contributed $10 million in the 2022 election cycle – with final numbers for the cycle certain to be far higher – to the members of the armed services committees. Members who supported increasing the military budget over and above the increase requested by the Biden Administration received three times the amount of

Robert Weissman

Back in 2015, the Pentagon completed – and then buried – a report identifying a “clear path” to $125 billion in savings on administrative waste over five years.

(Weissman, cont’d)

contributions as those who opposed the extra increase.

But while it is conventional wisdom inside the Beltway that more military spending is the politically smart play, the American people don’t agree. Polling from Data for Progress and Public Citizen in May 2022 indicates that spending more on the military than requested by President Biden would be out of step with public sentiment. A strong majority of voters oppose an increase in military spending above Biden’s request. Sixtythree percent of those polled say the military's budget should remain at the level that Biden and the Department of Defense requested. For good reason, opposition to raising Pentagon spending still further is bipartisan. When informed about how much the military is poised to receive as compared to other agencies, Republicans, Democrats, and Independents all strongly agree the military budget should not be raised further (among Republicans: 51 percent vs. 37 percent who think too little is spent).

Yet no matter the waste, amount spent compared to other countries, or public attitudes, those arguing for

more Pentagon spending always have a single demand — more. Now the military-industrial complex is claiming still more increases in Pentagon outlays are necessitated by inflation. This argument ignores the fact that the Biden request already accounted for inflation and the fact that the Pentagon does not experience inflation in the same way as the general economy, in part because many of its costs are set by long-term contracts. Others say the Ukraine war necessitates more spending. But the U.S. already spends far more than Russia, and Ukraine-specific expenses are being funded by supplemental spending bills and should not be incorporated into the Pentagon’s base budget.

U.S. military spending is now greater than the peaks of the Korean or Vietnam Wars or the Reagan build-up in the early 1980s. You don’t need to be a budget hawk – just someone who believes in the prudential management of taxpayer dollars – to recognize it is past time to end Pentagon budget increases and impose some fiscal discipline on the agency. RF

Robert Weissman is the president of Public Citizen.

(Zakheim, cont’d)

with the security needs of the country, not the political calculus of the moment. In 1981, this meant restoring the margin of safety the U.S. had lost against the Soviet Union during the 1970s.

Fast forward to today. The Biden Administration recently rolled out an ambitious national defense strategy that rightly acknowledges the unprecedented challenge posed by China’s modernized military, in addition to the dangers posed by Russia, Iran, North Korea and jihadist terrorism. Despite this, the Biden budget outlook is flat and has all the markings of a defense program designed by the Office of Management and Budget — a political product divorced from their own strategy, which will result in a shrinking and less capable force.

The Republican Congress should not go along with it. Channeling Reagan, they can build on last year’s bipartisan congressional efforts to beef up the Biden defense budget and, at the same time, challenge Biden Administration spending on the ever-growing entitlement state. This means supporting a defense budget with at least five percent real growth annually.

After all, the conceit that Congress can arrest the deficit without entitlement reform is the pernicious myth that does little except weaken our military. During the Obama Administration, we learned the hard way that fixating on budget caps for discretionary spending — less than a third of federal spending — creates a lot of political theater with little to show for it.

The success of the Reagan military buildup and economic recovery was anything but inevitable. The historical record reveals that the same political forces and policy arguments that oppose supporting a strong military today were alive and well during the Reagan Revolution. Back then, principle not politics won the day: “Defense,” Reagan said, “is not a budget issue. You spend what you need.”

Divided government produced a strong military and economy before. It can be done again. RF

Roger I. Zakheim is Director of the Reagan Institute, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and a Commissioner on the Congressional National Defense Strategy Commission.

A military capable of effective deterrence may be more essential to taming inflation today than it was in the 1980s.

Why in the world should we keep throwing money at an agency with a record like this?

WE PROMISE TO BRING OUR BEST TO THOSE WE SERVE

With a firm conviction to serve America’s men and women in uniform and their families, we’re proud to support continued improvement in our communities. Let’s get better… together.

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The Space Force Turns Three

by BILL WOOLF

With the U.S. Space Force (USSF) marking its third anniversary this month, now is a good time to examine not only some of its key accomplishments, but some of the key challenges it faces in the years ahead.

For the most part, these accomplishments so far have been focused on creating the intellectual and organizational framework upon which this newest branch of our Armed Forces will be based. Over the past 36 months, for example, the USSF has developed the first Space Force Doctrine, a foundational document that sets forth “why spacepower is vital for our Nation, how military spacepower is employed, who military space forces are, and what military space forces value.”

The USSF also unveiled a vision for a digital service, which it says will allow it to “embrace automation and streamline bureaucracy to foster and incentivize data-driven, decisionmaking at every echelon.” And earlier this fall, Frank Calvelli, who serves as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisitions and Integration, issued a memorandum that lays out a new approach to acquisition. “The traditional ways of doing space acquisition must be reformed in order to add speed to our acquisitions to meet our priorities,” Calvelli said. “Former approaches of developing a small amount of large satellites, along with large monolithic ground systems taking many years to develop, can no longer be the norm.”

Organizationally, the USSF is made up of three field commands and a headquarters staff. The field commands are Space Systems Command (SSC), Space Operations Command (SpOC), and Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM). SSC delivers the systems needed by the USSF to organize, train, and equip Guardians. SpOC provides ready trained forces to combatant commands responsible for global and theater space operations. STARCOM is responsible for initial qualification and advanced training, tactics technique and procedures (TTPs) manual, doctrine and professional development. Based on this organizational structure, one of the key questions moving forward is whether

appropriate processes are in place to ensure Guardians receive the support and resources they need to accomplish their mission. A simplistic examination of the way an aircraft system is acquired in the Air Force will help with this point. In the Air Force, pilots have influence over the process by which systems are delivered to conduct their air superiority mission. The process starts with emergent threat identification. Pilots determine if a material solution or non-material solution is needed to counter and defeat the emergent threat. If a material solution is needed, the Air Force acquisition process works to deliver the new capability in such a manner to face the threat. Additionally, and most importantly, pilots are provided a simulator connected to high-fidelity virtual environments to hone their skills before they are expected to operate the system in the face of a near-peer air threat.

The USSF does not currently have a similar process or capabilities. Guardians are not provided simulators with a high-fidelity virtual or live environment to hone their skills prior to engaging a nearpeer space threat. That would be like asking a pilot who has never flown the F-22 to jump in and fly the aircraft against a near-peer adversary. Currently, Guardians rely on creating training scenarios and exercising through those scenarios independent of an established connection with high fidelity simulators. In other words, advanced training simulators to face the emergent space threat from adversary countries does not exist. Because the USSF needs to develop and foster these processes, a need for a manpower review should be conducted to allow for the organizational structure to support development and delivery of requisite simulators and trainers.

The threat posed by other countries to our freedom of action in the space domain is real. According to a recent article in the Washington Times, “China is rapidly building a large force of space weapons, including sophisticated anti-satellite missiles, lasers, jammers, orbiting killer robots and cyber tools, to ‘blind and deafen’ a war enemy.” In November 2021, Russia conducted a direct-ascent anti-satellite

Bill Woolf

The USSF has developed the first Space Force Doctrine, a foundational document that sets forth “why spacepower is vital for our Nation, how military spacepower is employed, who military space forces are, and what military space forces value.”

(ASAT) test that destroyed one of its own satellites, creating a field of at least 1,500 trackable pieces of debris in low orbit and threatening space operations and human spaceflight. As State Department spokesman Ned Price said following this incident, “Russia’s dangerous and irresponsible behavior jeopardizes the long-term sustainability of outer space and clearly demonstrates that Russia’s claims of opposing the weaponization of space are disingenuous and hypocritical.”

In light of these growing threats, policymakers should reassess the proposed budget of the Space Force, which — at $24.5 billion — is a small percentage of the overall Department of the Air Force budget of $194 billion. Because the U.S. cannot gain and maintain multi-domain superiority without space superiority, examination to re-align the defense budget to support the Space Force is needed.

Beyond this budgetary review, policymakers should also make an effort to learn more about the USSF. An easy way to do this would be for members to join the Space Force Caucus (spaceforcecaucus.org). This is a way to stay up to date on current issues facing the USSF and hear from military and industry leaders on actions taken to foster a strong U.S. presence in space. The U.S. should also look at the establishment of a

World Space Organization run by a World Space Assembly, as freedom of action in the space domain will require support from the military, civil, and private sectors. This will allow for ally and partner country governments to contribute to the norms of behavior in the space domain.

Finally and most importantly, the USSF requires the personnel to accomplish its assigned tasks. At just over 18,000 personnel, it is barely the size of two numbered Air Forces (which is how the Air Force organizes itself for specific missions.). Once the right size of the force is realized, this number needs to be written into law so critical manpower is dedicated to the new service. To help with this number, the Space National Guard and Space Force Reserve should be established as soon as possible.

The United States Space Force is a young service. With the space domain growing in importance, and with threats in space continuing to emerge, the importance of the USSF will continue to grow, as well. RF

Bill Woolf is a retired Air Force colonel who now serves as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Space Force Association.

The threat posed by other countries to our freedom of action in the space domain is real.

Viewing Border Security as an Ecosystem

by VICTOR M. MANJARREZ, JR.

The southern border of the United States has once again become a flashpoint in the national political debate. When you look at the numbers over the past year, it’s easy to understand why.

According to the Department of Homeland Security, a record number 2,206,436 arrests were made between the ports-of-entry along the nearly 2,000 miles of southwest border. To put this into perspective, consider that from 2010 through 2018 not a single year exceeded 500,000 arrests in any 12 month period. In fiscal year 2022, the number of arrests exceeded 500,000 every 83 days!

To put these figures in an even more stark perspective, if the number of individuals arrested along our southern border were to form their own city, it would be the fifth largest city in the United States — behind only New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston.

Perceptions

Over the last 35 years I have come to learn that perceptions matter. People around the world listen to what U.S. Government leadership says or does not say about illegal immigration, and human smugglers will exploit this to sell hope to those who are desperate.

Hope is a powerful motivator that will make a person believe they can cross a 70 mile desert in southern Arizona with little or no water during July or readily accept being placed in a tractor trailer with 52 others only to die from heat exposure and asphyxiation. As a nation we must be conscious about the perceptions we project.

Border Security as a Complex Ecological System

For much of our history, border security has been viewed as the defense of a distinguishable line on a map. This perspective served us well when we expected our borders to be controlled as opposed to secure. The difference between the two terms is that under a border control mindset, the United States views illegal immigration as a public disorder issue, whereas in a border security mindset, a high level of illegal immigration is a national security issue.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ushered in the notion that our borders would now need to be secure. The primary mission of border security evolved to include counterterrorism in addition to stopping both the illegal entry of migrants and the smuggling of illicit contraband. Although very important, a demarcated line on a map is not the start nor the end for border security, but rather part of a continuum. Viewing border security as a complex system with disparate variables across that continuum provides a greater insight into the processes within the system that may expose national vulnerabilities to domestic and foreign threats.

Non-operational variables play a vital part in formally and informally shaping border security functions by exerting influence through the interaction with other social and environmental systems. I suggest there are multitudes of factors that are not conventionally viewed as having a border security nexus, but they certainly influence how border secu -

Victor M. Manjarrez, Jr.

If the number of individuals arrested along our southern border were to form their own city, it would be the fifth largest city in the United States.

rity is conducted and viewed. It is clear that a border security environment is comprised of systems that are intimately interrelated, and an omission of information related to any one of these systems is likely to result in compromises to border security.

By drawing on the insights provided by the human ecology literature, and specifically Bronfenbrenner’s complex ecological systems theory, this commentary attempts to construct a better framework of understanding the multitude of factors that influence the legitimate and illegitimate flows across the border and actions along this chaotic environment.

Policy Implications

Viewing border security through an ecological systems framework allows us to organize data into patterns that we can interpret and understand shaping pressures, and then act with consequence. The improved understanding could potentially manifest itself at three distinct levels. First, operational level components would be able to recognize sooner subtle nuances to operational changes. An earlier recognition of changes could provide the forewarning to reallocate resources to mitigate crisis levels of mass migration. Border security operational components rely on the right mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure (barriers, access, lights, etc.) to patrol and reduce the risk that is created by vulnerabilities and threats. This alone is not enough. A deeper strategic level of understanding would provide a global understanding of the push and pull factors influencing border security.

Policy and agency decision makers could reevaluate long-term planning that would effectively address variables that impact the decision to illicitly travel to the United States. For example, a brief description of the risk of asylum claims of individuals entering the United States provides a simplified example of how this multi-level conceptualization of ecological systems theory has utility for border security policy. The significant rise in asylum claims by individuals has challenged the government’s ability to perform the objectives of detecting, classifying, responding to, and resolving other illegal incursions into the United States. While Border Patrol Agents between the ports-of-entry or officers at ports are dealing directly with mass migration events, they are forced to constrict their operational profiles. A case in point — on March 29, 2019, the Department of

Homeland Security declared the migration flow of asylum seekers had overwhelmed their capacities to perform all their mission objectives. The Department responded by reallocating personnel from other missions to respond to the migration event. The result is that border security agencies were unable to respond to other border incursions.

DHS claims the increased flow of asylum seekers is a result of outdated laws and misguided court decisions that make quick adjudication of asylum claims practically impossible. Nearly all of the asylum seekers are released into the United States pending the final disposition of their claim. As a result, most individuals will never be removed from the United States even if they are here unlawfully. Both domestic and foreign mass media outlets and nongovernmental agencies are promulgating the lack of consequences of the illegal entry, which in turn is encouraging additional migration. None of the influencers on the increased flow of individuals is in the direct purview of border security entities, but the dynamic certainly affects the ability to perform border security functions at different locations along the border

By including policy with the personnel, technology, and infrastructure we turn the concept of border security from a simple demarcation on a map to an issue that considers the ‘whole of government’ approach to border security. Indeed, viewing border security through an ecological systems lens provides a conceptual framework in which to start seriously addressing the issue of border security over the long haul instead of a series of patchwork attempts.

Our nation currently views border security as either a resource issue or a policy issue. But history tells us that it is actually both of these things, and each needs to be given the same level of priority. The current status on the border is not sustainable nor should it be tolerated by the American public. We can do better.

RF

Victor M. Manjarrez, Jr. is the Director of the Center for Law and Human Behavior (CLHB) at the University of Texas at El Paso. He served for more than 20 years in the United States Border Patrol and filled key operational roles both in the field and at headquarters over the course of his extensive homeland security career.

Although very important, a demarcated line on a map is not the start nor the end for border security, but rather part of a continuum.

Lake & Goeas Discuss Latest Poll Coming Out of the Election and Their Timely New Book Focusing on Respect

WASHINGTON, DC — A Question of Respect.

That’s the title of a new book out this fall that explores the everwidening fault lines of anger and incivility that currently exist in American public and private life.

It was also the focus of a breakfast discussion that The Ripon Society and Franklin Center for Global Policy Exchange hosted on Wednesday, November 30th with the book’s authors — veteran pollsters Celinda Lake and Ed Goeas.

Lake is the President of Lake Research Partners and one of the Democratic Party’s leading political strategists, while Goeas is the former President & C.E.O. of The Tarrance Group, one of the most respected and successful Republican survey research and strategy teams in American politics today.

Longtime collaborators, they have not only written a book together, but they continue to partner on and produce the Battleground Poll, one of the

leading national issue and election thermometers.

Lake opened the discussion by previewing the results of the latest poll, which examined the results of the mid-terms and were being officially unveiled later in the day.

“Voters were very concerned about the economy,” she said, describing the mood of the electorate. “They were very concerned about abortion, but they were also very concerned about the threats to democracy. And there was bipartisan concern about that

Celinda Lake and Ed Goeas appear before a breakfast discussion of The Ripon Society on November, 30, 2022.

threat. 68 percent of Americans are concerned that political speech was inspiring people to take violent action; two-thirds of the people feeling that they wanted to move in a different direction, that there was a threat to democracy — people worried about elections being fair.”

“But when you look underneath that, people had different things in mind … Democrats were most concerned about voter intimidation and voter suppression. Republicans were most concerned about voter fraud. It’s interesting because Independents ebbed and flowed between the two groups.”

Where there is agreement, Lake added, is in the belief that the spirit of unity is lacking in America, and divisions really do exist.

“People really think the country is divided,” she said. “83% agreed that political division in our country is worse than it’s ever been; 67% strongly agreed with that. You don’t get numbers like that unless you get everybody agreeing in a bipartisan way. People believe that the polarization and the division are dangerously high.”

“We asked people to rate it on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 being no political division in the country, and 100 being on the verge of a civil war. I imagined that rates would be around 55 or 60. It was 71. Verging on civil war — that’s where people think we are.”

That’s also one of the reasons, Lake said, that she and Goeas have written a book on the importance of respect.

“It’s a core value for all parties,” she observed. “97% of

Democrats, 94% of Republicans, and 90% of Independents believe that respect for each other is the first step to having a government that works.”

Goeas agreed, and opened his remarks with his own observations about the mid-terms and the results of the Battleground Poll.

“There was a real ebb and flow on who was doing better,” he said of the months leading up to the election. “Through the end of the spring, Republicans were on a real high note. We had been really gaining a lot of traction in

“75% of the American public believes that democracy is currently under attack,” Goeas stated bluntly. “65% believe that strongly. So it’s more than just Democrats, it’s more than just Republicans, and it certainly has a good deal of ticket splitters in that component.”

Goeas then turned his attention to the book he has coauthored with Lake, and how the importance of respect has not only guided him over the past several years, but why both he and Lake dedicated the book to the late John McCain.

Remarks to The Ripon Society

November 30, 2022

terms of support, not only among hardcore Republicans, but among soft Republicans and independents and even a few Democrats kind of coming over in our direction. After the Supreme Court decision, the numbers started moving back in their direction. We never lost the lead, but the lead closed quite a bit.”

“One of the most interesting statistics I have on the election is in congressional races. [Trump] went into eight congressional districts in the fall. We lost seven of those eight districts. He didn’t move them over the top — he moved them to the bottom. We have to be very honest about that impact.”

Goeas was also frank in his assessment of whether public concerns regarding threats to our democracy played a role in the election.

“I had a son who was 8 and I had a son who was 11 at the time when [Trump] was first running,” he recalled. “It bothered me — his style and his ugliness and the instability that he had. It bothered me as a professional in politics, because I understand — and I wish more people did understand — that the image of the president or your presidential candidate defines you as a Republican. I didn’t want to be defined that way. I didn’t want to see our party defined that way.”

“One of the things I respected about John McCain is he saw humanity at its worst when he was a prisoner of war. They broke his arm eight times just trying to get him to agree to go home first, and he wouldn’t do it. There are other awful stories of how they not only hurt his body, but played with his mind during that period of time. I always felt the strength of John McCain’s civility, friendship, and trust was that he saw the worst and wanted to be the best.” RF

“Verging on civil war — that’s where people think we are.”

Celinda Lake

Name: Julia Barnhill Letlow, Ph.D.

Occupation: Congresswoman from Louisiana’s Fifth District

Previous positions held: Executive Director of External Affairs & Strategic Communications at the University of Louisiana Monroe; Instructor of Speech Communication at the University of Louisiana Monroe; Director of Education, Resident Patient Safety & Quality Improvement at Tulane Medical School; Clinical Instructor at the Tulane Medical School

Individual(s) who inspired me as a child: As I walk the halls of the Capitol, I’m often awestruck thinking about the incredible men and women who came before me. It’s the honor of a lifetime to go to work in the same building where people such as Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln walked, but I often find myself remembering one of my favorite teachers, Becky Herrod from the Eighth Grade at Ouachita Christian School. Not only did she help inspire me to become an educator, her lessons about our government and American History have come back to serve me well in Congress.

Issue facing America that no one is talking about: Utilizing career and technical education to help students find employment after graduation. I believe that instead of using a “college-only” approach when counseling students about their direction after high school, we should also talk about trade schools and our community colleges. In Louisiana, our community colleges have done an incredible job designing a curriculum that helps students build skills and meets the needs of the employers in our state. We can ensure that our students have access to state-of-the-art tools and equipment that will help simulate what they will experience on the job.

Challenge facing your District that you’re working hard to address? Poverty – I represent one of the poorest regions in the country. Education is the answer. I firmly believe that if we invest in education at all levels, it will pay dividends for generations to come. As somebody who spent my career working in classrooms before I came to Capitol Hill, I’ve seen firsthand how education can take an individual from poverty to prosperity. When you educate a child, you give them a future.

Finally, finish this sentence: “If I could reform any agency or department in the federal government, it would be…” Without question, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). When Hurricane Ida struck my district last year, hundreds of my constituents were unfairly denied disaster assistance simply because of a bureaucratic programming error at FEMA. Once we were able to rectify the problem, those who were able to file experienced frustrating delays and red tape. In addition, FEMA’s illogical new formulas for calculating flood insurance are costing my constituents thousands of dollars, while the agency has yet to provide a full explanation for these changes to our state’s congressional delegation. I believe we need FEMA to become more customerfriendly, easier to navigate and focus more on rapid response in the aftermath of disasters.