JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC SECURITY Vol. II, No. 4 November/December 2009
Editor Jeremy Tamsett, M.A.
Associate Editors Gary Ackerman, M.A. Randy Borum, Ph.D. Monte Bullard, Ph.D. Denise Greaves, Ph.D. Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D. Tom Hunter, M.A, M.Litt. Kim Lewis, M.I.M. Vincent Pollard, Ph.D. Ed Urie, M.S.
Published Quarterly by
Henley-Putnam University Press www.henley-putnam.edu
Copyright Š 2009 by Henley-Putnam University All rights reserved. No part of this publication shall be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without written permission from the publisher. No patent liability is assumed with respect to the use of the information contained herein. Although every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this publication, the publisher and author(s) assume no responsibility for errors or omissions. Neither is any liability assumed for damages resulting from the use of the information contained herein. Paperback ISSN: 1944-0464 eBook ISSN: 1944-0472
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Editorial Advisory Board Major General Craig Bambrough, USA (ret.) Dr. Donald Goldstein, Institute for Defense Analyses Dr. Richard J. Kilroy Jr., Virginia Military Institute Dr. William C. Green, California State University, San Bernardino Dr. Sheldon Greaves, Henley-Putnam University
Correspondence concerning essays submitted for consideration should be directed to: Editor@Henley-Putnam.edu. Guidelines for manuscript submissions can be found on the Henley-Putnam University website at www.Henley-Putnam.edu. Materials that have been previously published or are under consideration for publication elsewhere will not be accepted. Questions or correspondence concerning book reviews may be directed to Editor@Henley-Putnam.edu. Unsolicited book reviews will not be accepted. The Journal of Strategic Security is published quarterly by Henley-Putnam University Press and is an imprint of Happy About (http://happyabout.info, info@happyabout.info or 408-257-3000).
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Table of Contents Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism and U.S. Public Opinion .........................................1 Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan ................................. 17 The Tangled Web of Taliban and Associated Movements .........................................31 Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Terrorist Cell within the U.S. .............................................. 39 Extinguishing the Torch of Terror: The Threat of Terrorism and the 2010 Olympics ....... 53 Islamist Distortions: Hizb ut-Tahrir a Breeding Ground for Al-Qaida Recruitment......61 Book Reviews ........................................................67
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Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism and U.S. Public Opinion By Karen K. Petersen
Introduction Lamenting the lack of public awareness of international events and U.S. foreign policy is not a particularly novel exercise; yet, explaining the process by which issues enter and exit the public realm remains a challenging endeavor. Despite contributions from researchers working in international relations and mass communication, explaining public inattentiveness continues to vex scholars. However, in his article, "Up and Down with Ecology: The 'Issue-Attention Cycle,'" Anthony Downs provides a parsimonious and tractable model of public opinion that can be applied to foreign policy issues.1 While Downs concerns himself exclusively with domestic issues, particularly environmental issues, his model has the potential to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the public and policymakers over critical issues such as international terrorism. With minor modifications, the model has the potential to explain public support for failed foreign policies as well. Downs' model, when applied to international terrorism, explains why policymakers seek simple solutions, why the public supports such solutions, and why the media fail to provide meaningful coverage of intractable issues such as international terrorism. Before discussing Downs' model, the basic tenets and shortcomings of some of the more prevalent theories of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy are discussed below.
The Relationship between Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Framing, or presenting issues in such a way as to influence the emotive reaction, fits within the realm of elite-driven public opinion theory. Robert Entman discusses framing as an interactive process he labels "cascading network activation."2 Cascading reflects the interactive process whereby information flows from the top (administration) through the middle (media) to the bottom (public) with limited interplay up the "waterfall." According to Entman, all actors in the cascade model behave as "cognitive misers" who seek to "satisfice" rather than articulate fully 1
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the details of a given issue.3 For issues that are congruent with existing perceptions (at all levels), the process of framing is readily achieved and accepted. For example, responding to a major attack (such as September 11), fits the parameters of the existing framework that dictates that the responsibility for protecting the United States belongs with the commander-in-chief and that the citizens of the United States were undeserving of such an attack. However, when issues do not fit preexisting notions, generating a smooth process of information dissemination becomes more difficult, as we see in the period prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Entman does have a role for citizens to direct information up the hierarchy; rather, the media act as a go-between for citizen framing. Unfortunately, citizen response to foreign policy events, an issue which has been perplexing public opinion scholars for decades, does not always follow a logical progression. The Converse-McGuire Model explains citizen preferences as non-monotonic due to variations in the probability of reception and acceptance: citizens who are moderately aware (receptive) and moderately partisan (acceptant to change) are most malleable for typical events, and the less aware are more malleable for high-intensity messages.4 Zaller's inclusion of the intensity of the message (based on Brody5) moves us towards considering that not all foreign policy issues should be treated as equal and even different stages in the same issue receive different levels of attention. One of the most successful models challenging the assumption that foreign policy is an elite realm comes from communications scholarship on the influence the media bring to bear on foreign policy agendas, particularly the process by which agendas are constructed or influenced. Thomas Birkland defines an agenda as "a collection of the elements of public problems to which at least some of the public and governmental officials are actively attentive."6 Agendas range from concrete policy proposals to beliefs, and exist at all levels of government and society.7 Agenda setting is the process whereby actors attempt to get issues on or keep issues off the agenda, or attempt to control the content of the agenda. The role of the media in setting the agenda can best be described as a process (intentional or otherwise) whereby "through their day-by-day selection and display of the news, editors and news directors focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most important [salient] news events of the day."8 The media influence "the salience of an issue, an influence on whether any significant people really regard it as worthwhile to hold an opinion about that issue."9 As evidence of the important role of
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Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism and U.S. Public Opinion
the media in the agenda-setting function, Maxwell McCombs discusses numerous instances in his book in which the media created a sensation of fear over issues that were actually improving rather than worsening.10 In contrast to the above schools of thought, Downs provides a model explaining the level of attention to an issue that allows the salience of events to drive the public reaction rather than relying only on elites or the media (as the framing and agenda-setting models do, respectively). Instead of viewing the media as the agenda-setting force, Downs posits that events drive public interest and that public interest determines media coverage. The model developed by Downs, while focused exclusively on environmental issues, appears to fit other critical issues, including international terrorism. After describing the issue-attention cycle below and discussing the applicability of each component to the issue of international terrorism and U.S. public opinion, a modification of Downs' model is offered and the potential implications for U.S. policy are discussed.
The Five Attributes of the Issue-Attention Cycle While Downs' issue-attention cycle has received widespread attention in domestic politics, there is no reason to assume that the relative dearth of attention in international relations and/or foreign policy research means that the cycle is inapplicable to those areas. For example, Christopher Bellavita finds that homeland security issues do tend to follow the issueattention cycle,11 and Michael C. Hall finds that the stages of the issueattention cycle "well describe" travel safety policies and public opinion of travel safety measures in the wake of September 11.12 Extending Downs' model beyond the water's edge, while uncommon, does not lack precedent. The five stages of the issue-attention cycle—pre-problem, alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm, realizing the cost, gradual decline of intense public interest, and post-problem—all fit the issue of international terrorism. Each of these five stages and evidence of the analytical leverage of the model based on applicability of each stage to the issue of international terrorism is discussed below.
The Pre-Problem Stage The pre-problem stage "prevails when some highly undesirable social condition exists but has not yet captured much public attention, even though some experts or interest groups may already be alarmed by it."13 3
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Clearly, international terrorism was a problem for numerous other states and for the U.S. prior to 2001 (at least since the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut). In public testimony before the September 11 Commission, then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated: The terrorist threat to our nation did not emerge on September 11, 2001. Long before that day, radical, freedom-hating terrorists declared war on America and on the civilized world. The attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the rise of al-Qaida and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks on American installations in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the East Africa embassy bombings of 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, these and other atrocities were part of a sustained, systematic campaign to spread devastation and chaos and to murder innocent Americans. The terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at war with them. For more than twenty years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient.14 While Rice meets the criteria of "expert," she presents a post-hoc analysis of the threat. The pre-problem stage is also supported by an analysis of news coverage of terrorism in two of the nation's leading periodicals. Mathew Storin finds that while several high quality, in-depth stories on the threat of international terrorism had been published (even one in the months prior to September 11), articles addressing the issue of international terrorism accounted for only slightly more than 1 percent of the total articles he reviewed.15 However, during the period prior to the September 11 attacks, "a large body of work concerning terrorism was being compiled in the academic community,"16 indicating an elite interest prior to the September 11 attacks consistent with the pre-problem stage of Downs' model. Additionally, policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Federal Government left a paper trail of evidence relating to their concerns over international terrorism that dated back at least to Alexander Haig's announcement that opposition to terrorism would replace the Carter administration's focus on the advancement of human rights, an announcement that included discussions of al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin.17 As described by Downs, the pre-problem stage fits public and elite perceptions of international terrorism prior to September 11, 2001, an event which propelled the issue of terrorism into stage two, the "alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm" stage.18 4
Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism and U.S. Public Opinion
Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Enthusiasm Movement into the second stage occurs abruptly, according to Downs. "As a result of some dramatic series of events . . . the public suddenly becomes both aware of and alarmed about the evils of a particular problem."19 Despite the fact that the attack of September 11 was not the first attack on the United States or the World Trade Center, it was the first attack that was sufficient in scale to generate awareness and alarm in the public realm and among policymakers. The United States immediately mobilized for a "War on Terror" with all of the zeal predicted by Downs' model. Nine days after the attacks of September 11, President Bush addressed Congress and the global community offering the following rally cry: "Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."20 Three years later, 70 percent of respondents to a Cornell University survey responded somewhat or strongly favorably to the U.S. War on Terror, which, presumably, included Iraq by this time.21 Alarmed discovery and euphoria certainly seem to characterize the period after September 11. Eventually, however, public opinion about the War on Terror, propelled by an increasingly complex situation in Iraq and the deterioration of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, began to turn against the war and the administration. Pew surveys demonstrated a precipitous decline in the public's confidence in the government's ability to protect citizens from further attacks, from 48 percent immediately after September 11 to 17 percent only four years later.22 Downs predicts a variety of disenchantments and explains their possible sources in the third stage of his cycle.
Realization of the Costs The third stage in Downs' model, a gradual realization of the high costs of significant progress, includes awareness that "part of the problem results from arrangements that are providing significant benefits to someone— often to millions."23 Intellectuals have debated the relationship between terrorism and various components of Western culture and foreign policy at length; however, the public discussion of culpability is far less well developed. This is, perhaps, the point at which the assumption that "the asymmetry between what leaders know and what the public knows" is a significant modifying factor when considering the role of public preferences in foreign policy arenas.24 One could frame this as an asymmetry of intellectual training as opposed to simple asymmetry of knowledge. Practically speaking, the third stage involves the realization of the high costs and the low probability of success. In the case of the United States' over5
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seas contingency operations, the public perception centers on the flawed strategy rather than a flawed paradigm. Nonetheless, public support for funding the Iraq war began to wane even before the depth of the current economic crisis became apparent, demonstrating that at a minimum the public understood the costs.
Decline in Intensity of Interest A key part of the third stage—the increasing recognition that the relationship between the problem and its solution requires inordinate sacrifice— leads to the fourth stage, a gradual decline in intense public interest.25 As Downs notes, "The previous stage becomes almost imperceptibly transformed into the fourth stage . . . As more and more people realize how difficult, and how costly to themselves, a solution to the problem would be . . . ."26 Boredom, discouragement, and suppression of thoughts (or some combination thereof) causes the issue to wane and attention to shift to other issues that are now entering stage two.27 Birkland provides evidence of the movement of the issue of international terrorism from stage three to stage four.28 He finds that New York Times coverage of terrorism during the first quarter of 2002 was 60 percent less than the rate of coverage in the fourth quarter of 2001. By the fourth quarter of 2002, the rate of coverage had dropped by 80 percent, suggesting that movement into stage four began to occur shortly after the initial event (September 11).29
Post-Problem Stage The fifth and final stage, the post-problem stage, is referred to as a "twilight realm of lesser attention," but it is distinct from the pre-problem stage in that the presence of new institutions and bureaucracies continue to impact policy and allow for a higher level of attention than issues in the pre-problem stage.30 Of course, Homeland Security is now fulfilling the role of a new bureaucracy and is likely to continue to do so for decades to come. While we may not have entered fully into the post-problem stage yet, it is likely that we will when the Iraq campaign ends (and in the absence of another major attack on the U.S.), and it is possible that we will remain there indefinitely. Figure 1 represents the stages of Downs' issue-attention cycle as originally conceived.
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Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism and U.S. Public Opinion
Figure 1: Downs' Issue-Attention cycle
Issues Prone to the Issue-Attention Cycle Of course, Downs readily acknowledges that not all problems will go through the issue-attention cycle and posits that three specific characteristics increase the likelihood an issue will move through the cycle.31 According to Downs, "First, the majority of persons in society are not suffering from the problem nearly as much as some minority (a numerical minority, not necessarily an ethnic one)."32 Clearly, if one were to equate suffering with being a victim of international terrorism directly or even indirectly, then international terrorism meets criteria one. Second, the problem itself can be attributed to "social arrangements that provide significant benefits to a majority or a powerful minority of the population."33 Academic discussions of international terrorism, particularly after September 11, tend to be framed in terms of "root causes," which often point to large-scale social problems like global poverty that have roots in social and economic arrangements that benefit the global north or the West. Other justifications for international terror attacks on the United States include the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, which traditionally secured access to key resources through our allies thus benefiting a majority of the U.S. population as well as the powerful, elite military-industrial complex. The final attribute of an issue 7
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prone to the issue-attention cycle is that "the problem has no intrinsically exciting qualities—or no longer has them."34 While international terrorism excites academics, the lack of attacks on U.S. interests means that sustained public interest is unlikely. After all, the public paid little attention to the issue of international terrorism prior to September 11, 2001, and no longer considers Afghanistan or Iraq to be the biggest threats to U.S. security.35 According to Downs, "when all three of the above conditions exist concerning a given problem that has somehow captured the public attention, the odds are great that it will soon move through the entire 'issue-attention cycle'—and therefore will gradually fade from the center of the stage."36 This linear process occurs because condition one means that the majority of the population is not suffering and therefore will not be continually reminded of the problem. The second condition means that significant changes that would cause either social upheaval or painful concessions from the powerful (or both) would be required to solve the problem. And the third condition means that any attempt by the media to sustain the attention of the public would undermine profit, thus giving the media incentive to find a new, more exciting, or entertaining issue to pursue.37
International Terrorism, the U.S. Media, and the Issue-Attention Model Empirically, Downs' model predicts patterns of media coverage of international terrorism whereby we would expect to see very little attention devoted to the issue prior to 2001, which is exactly what Storin38 finds as shown in Figure 2 below.
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Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism and U.S. Public Opinion
Figure 2: Frequency of Stories on International Terrorism Additionally, we would expect that media coverage would be high for a period following 2001, but that the frequency would wane as the issue moves from stage two to stage three or four.39 Consistent with that expectation, coverage is reduced significantly through 2007. Figure 2 indicates a steady downward trend in the frequency of stories related to international terrorism appearing in the New York Times from 2001–2007.40 This downward slope is punctuated by spikes that correspond to the attacks in Madrid and London, but overall the trend holds. International terrorism appears to conform to the issue-attention cycle theoretically (as described in the preceding sections) and empirically with respect to media coverage. While the issue of international terrorism conforms to the model as presented by Downs, one minor modification may increase the usefulness of the model without undermining parsimony. The modification and its potential impact are discussed below along with policy implications of foreign policy issues that conform to Downs' model.
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Modifications of the Issue-Attention Cycle Downs provides a parsimonious, elegant explanation of a problem that vexes researchers—the inability of the American public to focus consistent attention on important policy issues. As such, the issue-attention cycle has excellent potential in the realm of foreign policy analysis. As a "thought experiment," a minor modification to stage three is offered along with speculation as to how the modification would alter the overall model.41 Stage three (realization of the costs) is modified to include "asymmetry of understanding" rather than asymmetry of information. Clearly, policymakers (particularly at the highest levels of authority) will have access to information that is not available to the media and the public. While disparity in information access could create divergent issue positions, difference in access to information need not lead the public to become disinterested in an issue once it enters the issue-attention cycle. Now that interested individuals, at least in developed countries, have access to multiple media sources and more information than ever, the potential for the average person as well as for journalists to research issues is much greater than it ever has been. If anything, this new wealth of information should increase the probability that a given issue will attract public attention. This does not appear to be the case and can be explained with reference to asymmetry of understanding rather than asymmetry of information. The purpose here is not to expound on why people might pay less attention that ever before (something Downs lamented thirty-seven years ago42), rather I want to explain why an asymmetry of understanding might be important to the issue-attention cycle and other research on public opinion and foreign policy. Generally speaking, we are not doing a very good job educating people about international issues from elementary education through college. A 2007 Pew Research Center survey finds that "despite the fact that education levels have risen dramatically over the past 20 years, public knowledge has not increased accordingly."43 The U.S. public remains woefully uninformed about history, geography, and other basic subjects pertinent to understanding international relations.44 The significance of this lack of understanding to the issue-attention cycle is apparent in stage three where Downs predicts that a gradual realization of the high costs of success will occur along with the realization that the policies that lead to the problem benefit society (a majority or powerful minority), thus leading people to become less interested in the problem in general.45 While there have been debates about international terrorism and its complexities, they tend to be either isolated to academic discussions or part of 10
Revisiting Downs' Issue-Attention Cycle: International Terrorism and U.S. Public Opinion
over-the-top conspiracy-theorist weblogs, infrequently reaching the mainstream media. Due to a lack of understanding of the complexities of international terrorism, public perception of international terrorism in the U.S. may have cycled into the fourth stage without ever being affected by stage three. Evidence of this can be seen in survey research showing that almost half of the public remains optimistic about our chances of winning the War on Terror.46 A reserve of optimism regarding the ability to win the War on Terror exists within the United States public/electorate due in part to the public's lack of awareness of the role of geopolitical and international economic factors that seem to provide motivation or at least a semblance of justification for those engaged in international terrorism. Perhaps optimism regarding the War on Terror is a coping mechanism, or it could reflect that the public lacks depth of understanding of the complexities associated with the causes of terrorism and its use as a political tool. While this may be a good thing for advocates of the war on terror, it does not bode well for our democracy. In addition to complicating the issue-attention cycle, such asymmetry of understanding allows policymakers to sell overly simplistic renditions of complex policy without the requisite accountability necessary to ensure the people continue to check the power of those who make such decisions. Because the public lacks the will or ability to process the complex issue of international terrorism, the issue-attention cycle is disrupted in a fundamental way. Due to a failure to understand the complexity of international terrorism, the issue could become mired in a process whereby it cycles through stages two (alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm) through four (decline in interest) rather than progress linearly into the final stage of a twilight realm where only the bureaucracy remains. The insufficiency of education about international relations in the U.S. contributes to the recycling of the issue because the public lacks the intellectual training to process the information that would complete the third stage (realization of the costs), particularly the attributes of the problem that benefit the few at the expense of the many. Any significant event (akin to an event that would precipitate the creation of an issue-attention cycle) could propel the issue back to stage two, as indicated in Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3: Modified Issue-Attention Cycle With the change to stage three described above, the issue of international terrorism could continue to cycle through the core of the model indefinitely rather than entering the post-problem stage of lesser importance. Perhaps such a cyclical pattern could be positive? By keeping the issue alive, we could eventually create a constituency that develops enough sophistication to realize fully stage three thereby actually pressing policymakers to address international terrorism with more attention to detail rather than simply as a military operation. However, if such a change does not occur, the recycling of the issue could amount to carte blanche approval of failed policies, and not just failed policies either, but dangerous and expensive failed policies.
Policy Implications of the Issue-Attention Cycle Attempts to understand the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy have occupied academics for decades. If foreign policy constitutes the "high politics" of the elite, then why are we so concerned with untangling this complex relationship? First, the foundation of democracy, at least theoretically, is the public, which means that understanding public opinion is both fundamentally important and politically astute. Second, reputation matters in international relations. Public support for 12
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democratic policies sends signals to allies and adversaries alike (as does opposition to policy). The strength of public support can provide leverage in international negotiations whether that support is based on thoughtful consideration or otherwise.47 If the issue-attention cycle (including the modification above) describes U.S. public attention to international terrorism, then we should expect that policymakers who attempt to deal with issues of international terrorism, in any way that addresses the nuances of cause and effect, will encounter little public support. Generally, the public should favor strategies that appear to be quick and painless even if such strategies are counterproductive. Eliminating the asymmetry of information may be the only useful strategy for moving the issue of international terrorism out of the issue-attention cycle. If the cycle can be disrupted, then perhaps the core problem can be addressed. Revisiting the issue that Downs first analyzed offers a glimmer of hope. Downs analysis focused on environmental issues and we have seen a re-awakening of at least one key environmental issue that fits the issue-attention model perfectly—global warming. Attempts to educate the public about the root causes and changes in behavior to combat global warming appear to be enjoying some initial success. "One series of surveys show that the 'personal importance' of global warming has increased considerably over the past decade, with the proportion of Americans who say that global warming is either personally 'extremely important' or 'very important' shifting from 27 percent in 1997 to 52 percent in 2007."48 There appears to be growing support for policies that deal with global warming even at a significant cost to the public. While education about environmental issues has begun to shift public opinion and, possibly, public policy, we cannot assume a similar trajectory with respect to international terrorism or other key foreign policy issues. Only if sustained public attention to the issue leads to more depth of understanding can we expect the public to push for more nuanced (even more costly) policies to address the issue of international terrorism. Until that time, public opinion and international terrorism policy will continue to demonstrate consistency with Downs' model and policymakers will continue to pursue policies that advocate easy solutions to complex problems in an effort to maintain the support of the electorate.
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About the Author Dr. Karen K. Petersen (Ph.D., 2004, Vanderbilt University) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Middle Tennessee State University. Dr. Petersen researches the causes of international conflict and has published research in International Interactions, Conflict Management and Peace Science, and Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy. Her latest book, Prospects for Political Stability in a Democratic Iraq (with Stephen Saunders) was recently published by Edwin Mellen Press. Dr. Petersen can be reached for comment at: kpeterse@mtsu.edu.
References 1 Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology: The 'Issue-Attention Cycle,'" The Public Interest 28 (1972). 2 Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 3 Ibid. 12. 4 John Zaller, "The Converse-McGuire Model of Attitude Change and the Gulf War Opinion Rally," Political Communication 10 (1993). 5 Richard Brody, Assessing the President (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). 6 Thomas A. Birkland, "'The World Changed Today': Agenda-Setting and Policy Change in the Wake of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks," Review of Policy Research 21 (2004): 180. 7 Ibid. 8 Maxwell McCombs, Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 1. 9 Ibid., 2. 10 Ibid., see chapter 2. 11 Christopher Bellavita, "Changing Homeland Security: The Issue-Attention Cycle," Homeland Security Affairs 1 (2005). 12 Michael C. Hall, "Travel Safety, Terrorism and the Media: The Significance of the Issue-Attention Cycle," Current Issues in Tourism 5 (2002): 459. 13 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," 39. 14 Condoleezza Rice, "Transcript of Rice's 9/11 commission statement," CNN.com, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/04/08/rice.transcript/. 15 Matthew V. Storin, "While America Slept: Coverage of Terrorism from 1993 to September 11, 2001," The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy Working Paper Series, (2002): 30, available at: http://tinyurl.com/yj6q8rd (www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/ papers/working_papers/2002_07_storin.pdf).
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16 Ibid. 17 Jeffrey Richelson and Michael L. Evans, "Volume I: Terrorism and U.S. Policy," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 55. (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 2001), available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/index1.html#I. 18 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," 39. 19 Ibid. 20 George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," White House Office of the Press Secretary, (20 September 2001), available at: http://tinyurl.com/yh7pp2n (georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html). 21 Erik C. Nisbet, and James Shanahan, "MSRG Special Report: U.S. War on Terror, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Anti-Americanism," (Ithaca, NY: The Media and Society Research Group 2004), available at: http://www.angus-reid.com/uppdf/Cornell_2.pdf. 22 Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, "The Polls—Trends: Preventing Terrorism After the 9/11 Attacks," Public Opinion Quarterly 71 (2007). 23 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," 40. 24 Thomas Knecht and M. Stephen Weatherford, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006): 719. 25 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," 40. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Birkland, "'The World Changed Today.'" 29 Ibid., 185. 30 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," 40. 31 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," 41. 32 Ibid., emphasis in original. 33 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," 41. 34 Ibid. 35 A Rasmussen Reports survey taken in June 2009 ranked Afghanistan and Iraq last among seven potential threats with only four percent of respondents placing either at the top of the list, available at: http://tinyurl.com/myppp3 (www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_america/ war_on_terror_update). 36 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," 41. 37 Ibid. 38 Storin, "While America Slept."
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39 The frequency of media discussions is measured by examining the frequency with which stories about transnational terrorism with respect to U.S. interests or policies appear in the New York Times from 2001 through 2007. 40 While most Americans get their news from television, there is a great deal of congruence between the major periodicals and the content of television news. A comparison of the coverage immediately after September 11 of eight major newspapers and five major television networks revealed some differences. Overall, however, all sources shared the same top frames and in those areas "little difference was evident among different media . . . " See Xigen Li and Ralph Izard, "9/11 Attack Coverage Reveals Similarities, Differences," Newspaper Research Journal 24 (2003): 217. 41 While I have not attempted to incorporate this into discussions of international terrorism, another interesting modification would be to alter stage two to expand the catalyst to include more than a "dramatic series of events." The role of pivotal persons (Al Gore and the resurgence of the debate over global warming, as an example) might be an interesting addition to the model. 42 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," 42. 43 Pew Research Center, "What Americans Know, 1989–2007: Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Little Changed by News and Information Revolutions," Pew Center, April 15, 2007, available at: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=319. 44 John Roach, "Young Americans Geographically Illiterate, Survey Suggests," National Geographic News (May 02, 2006), available at: http://tinyurl.com/ykn57jp (news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/05/ 0502_060502_geography.html?fs=www3.nationalgeographic.com&fs=plasma.nationalgeographic.com). 45 Downs, "The Issue-Attention Cycle," p 39–40. 46 " . . . [Forty-three] percent of voters believe the United States and its allies are winning the war on terror . . . Twenty-five percent (25%) say the terrorists are winning, and 24% say neither is ahead." Rasmussen Reports, "War on Terror Update," available at: http://tinyurl.com/37ndhq (www.rasmussenreports.com/ public_content/politics/mood_of_america/war_on_terror/ war_on_terror_update). 47 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42 (1988). 48 Matthew C. Nisbet and Teresa Myers, "The Polls: Twenty Years of Public Opinion about Global Warming," Public Opinion Quarterly 71 (2007): 456.
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Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan By Steve A. Young, Ph.D. and Imdad Hussain Sahito, Ph.D.
Introduction As President Obama is in the midst of deciding whether additional U.S. combat forces are needed in Afghanistan in addition to the 21,000 troops recently committed,1 he must realize that additional armed forces are only a stopgap measure in Afghanistan's downward spiral into an 'undergoverned' failed state. Similarly, as Pakistan's fragile and fractured civilian government continues to appease the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen with Taliban cultural values led by Baitullah Mehsud and others, it comes closer to the concept of a "misgoverned" failed state, possessing a small arsenal of nuclear arms. The problem for the U.S. administration is that neither of these countries can be allowed to fall further into disrepair. At the same time each requires a different and unique approach to the threat of "Talibanization" that faces each country—the control of territory within each country by Islamic radicals seeking to impose their ultraconservative interpretation of shar'ia law onto the general populace. Generally acknowledged is the belief that what has tentatively worked in Iraq, that is, the additional U.S. troops and employment of former Sunni insurgents to help fight foreign fighters associated with al-Qaida, will not work in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.2 While a regional approach to the conflict in these two countries is warranted, Afghanistan and Pakistan are on two different economic, social, and political playing fields. Hence, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution for the two countries, especially one that draws on the Iraq playbook. In addition to its internal political problems, Pakistan also faces the issue of al-Qaida and Taliban training camps positioned in its literal back yard, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA or Tribal Areas). Resolution of the War on Terror cannot come to fruition without addressing the problems that exist in the Tribal Areas. This largely self-governed terrain has come under Taliban influence and serves as a safe haven for Taliban and foreign-fighter cross-border attacks into Afghanistan and, more recently, large-scale attacks into Pakistan itself.
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Afghanistan: An Exercise in Persistence? Three issues stand out when one considers the political, economic, and social situation in today's Afghanistan: 1. Since 2005, the Taliban have increased the frequency and lethality of their insurgency. 2. It is the world's largest producer of both white and black/brown heroin. 3. Its current government is largely ineffective and corrupt. These three factors should figure prominently as the U.S. administration's Pakistan policy evolves over the coming months. In October 2001, the United States responded to the tragedy of September 11 by joining forces with the Northern Alliance militia to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan and take revenge upon the al-Qaida leadership. Our new ally's charismatic leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated two days before the September 11 attacks by suspected al-Qaida suicide bombers posing as journalists. In the wake of these events, small groups from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) persuaded remaining Northern Alliance leaders that the U.S. military was coming to help them take control of Afghanistan. The initial coordinated effort was eventually supported by U.S. air strikes. By the end of November 2001, the strategic northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif and the capital of Kabul were under the control of Northern Alliance forces, thus signaling the end of Taliban rule. Kandahar fell shortly thereafter in January 2002, setting up the final push to capture al-Qaida leader Usama bin Ladin at Tora Bora, a remote and geographically formidable region located in the mountains on the Pakistani border opposite the Pakistan city of Parachinar. After several failed attempts to locate and capture ibn Ladin, including Operation Anaconda, coupled with inactivity by American commander General Tommy Franks, there was no large U.S. troop presence at Tora Bora despite CIA requests, and ibn Ladin escaped with likely Pakistani assistance across the Afghan border.3 As a result of the conflict, the United States had relatively quickly pushed aside the Taliban and remaining foreign fighters, but not necessarily dismantled their residual fighting capability. Nevertheless, even after having missed the chance to capture ibn Ladin at Tora Bora, there at least now existed an opportunity for nation building. In the wake of the U.S.-supported Northern Alliance push, there were opportunities to speedily establish a working representative government and begin soft power pro18
Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan
grams to win local Afghan support even while continuing to employ force against the Taliban and al-Qaida remnants. Unfortunately for Afghanistan and the American publics, the military effort stalled and the heartsand-minds program was limited to a few well-meaning and modestly effective Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Meanwhile, the Bush administration turned its attention to Iraq and essentially abandoned the War on Terror in Afghanistan at a time when significant progress was seemingly attainable. From the beginning of 2002 until approximately 2005 the security situation in Afghanistan remained relatively calm. But in the adjacent border area with Pakistan, the Taliban and what was left of the foreign-fighter contingent began to reconstitute themselves. Eventually, these forces started returning to their former strongholds in southern Afghanistan and employing insurgent tactics gleaned from former Iraqi fighters who had been displaced by U.S. pressure there.4 As a result, U.S. casualties in Afghanistan increased both in terms of quantity and lethality. Throughout the 2009 fighting season, the U.S. has remained poised to escalate its commitment of armed forces to correspond with anticipated increases in the number of U.S. casualties. Efforts by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and others to increase licit commerce in Afghanistan—chiefly by building paved roads— has also led to increased illicit uses by narco-traffickers involved in moving raw opium to local laboratories for processing and the final product, heroin, to international markets. Over the past few years Afghanistan has become the world's largest producer of raw opium and processed heroin. Traditionally, the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia, chiefly Myanmar, has been the world's primary source of heroin. However, poppy production has decreased there by 70 percent, according to Interpol.5 The reduced production capacity has been replaced by opium coming out of Afghanistan. In 2006, the United Nations estimated that Afghanistan had approximately one hundred and sixty-five hectares in poppy production yielding approximately six thousand metric tons of raw opium. If one assumes a ten-to-one ratio of raw opium to heroin product, then the yield of heroin was six hundred metric tons that year. In January 2008, the average price in Afghanistan for one kilogram of dry opium was US$106. It is extremely difficult to quantify the amount of money derived from the drug trade going to Taliban and al-Qaida coffers; however, one estimate placed Taliban earnings in the US$1 billion range over the last ten years.6 Afghanistan's president Hamid Karzai, head of a corrupt and mostly ineffective government, stood for reelection in August of 2009.7 The United States backed Hamid Karzai because he was among the few Afghan elite 19
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that stayed behind in the 1979–1989 fight against the Soviet Union. While not an active fighter, Karzai was a significant fundraiser during the war and a political presence in southern Pakistan and Afghanistan afterwards. Moreover, his English language and political skills and his being ethnic Pashtun, the dominant ethnic group of the country, seemed a winning combination for the Afghan presidency. However, Karzai has proved to be ineffective when dealing with former warlords and even members of his own family regarding political corruption and involvement in the drug trade.
The Situation in Pakistan Pakistan's current problems stem from a series of mostly ineffective and/ or corrupt governments since it was founded in 1947. For more than a decade, the government has failed to control its borders in the FATA and to effectively respond to a homegrown Taliban insurgency. After the creation of Pakistan, the government adopted policies toward the FATA inherited from British colonial rule. Special regulations under the traditional local system were adopted. Not only were people allowed to keep their weapons without any government licensing, but these areas proved to be centers of arms production, whence they were supplied illegally to the rest of the country and Afghanistan. Many hardened criminals from other parts of the country obtained refuge there because of the absence of Pakistani law. The FATA also served as a source of mujahideen during the 1979–1989 conflict with the USSR. Pakistan's political history chronicles the actions of a series of military and civilian governments, none of which has been particularly effective in solving Pakistan's persistent political and economic problems. Pakistan's deep flaws in governance began almost as soon as its first leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, died, little more than a year after its independence. A series of military and civilian leaders followed, setting the stage for General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's military takeover of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government in July 1977. An avowed Islamist, Zia began establishing Pakistani madrassas (Islamic religious schools that tend toward extremist ideology) built with Saudi Arabian funds and staffed by Saudi Imams preaching the very conservative Wahhabist brand of Islam. The number of Pakistani madrassas increased substantially during Zia's rule and formed the ideological and numerical basis for what was to become the Taliban, or "religious students" in the Arabic language. Following Zia's death in 1988, Ali Bhutto's 20
Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan
daughter, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif alternately shared the prime minister's office until 1999, when Pervez Musharraf displaced Sharif by military coup. Musharraf eventually assumed the presidency until August 2008, when he resigned under pressure from the new civilian government. Asif Ali Zardari, Musharraf's successor and widower of Benazir Bhutto, previously served two separate jail terms for corruption and accusations of murder. Musharraf's internal security policy was one of appeasement with the Pakistani Taliban as they extended their influence beyond the Tribal Areas into the Swat District of northern Pakistan. Such appeasement was the hallmark of the fractious state of control over Pakistan's domestic and international affairs. Moreover, radical Islamists have recently attempted to assert control over even more of Pakistan through violence, a situation that has raised concerns in the Obama administration about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.8 Sometimes it is difficult to assess where the real power lies in Pakistan as there are four potential power centers: the president, the prime minister, the chief of the army staff, and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief. That the Afghan Taliban had been supported both in terms of finance and manpower by the Pakistani ISI since their inception had been rumored within U.S. intelligence circles for many years and only recently confirmed by media reporting.9 The ISI had always assumed that it could control the Taliban, but has since found out that the Afghan Taliban have their own agenda: to continue the fight against the United States in order to regain sovereign control of Afghanistan. The Pakistanis had assumed the view that the Taliban were a friendly alternative to an Indianinfluenced Afghanistan. However, since their ejection from Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban and foreign fighters present in the Tribal Areas began radicalizing conservative Islamists in the Tribal Areas, especially in Southern Waziristan. The new Pakistani Taliban quickly spread into North Waziristan, then further northward through the Khyber Agency to its terminus in the Bajaur Agency. The term "Talibanization" was first used to describe the Pakistani Taliban taking over or highly influencing the political and social structure of the Tribal Areas.10 Such takeovers have been facilitated by numerous Pakistani Government agreements with the Pakistani Taliban; an appeasement exercise that has yielded none of the peace elements promised by the Pakistani Taliban. This futile policy of appeasement culminated in December 2008, with the Pakistani Taliban takeover of the Swat Valley located in Swat District of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Girls now no longer attend school there and the District is sub21
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ject to shar'ia law. The area under Taliban influence or direct control now extends throughout the Tribal Areas into northern Pakistan. The Taliban have extended their attacks from the FATA to Pakistani major cities including Lahore. Moreover, the number of suicide attacks inside the country has become so common that people feel insecure to walk in the cities. Thousands of people have been killed and properties destroyed. The following table demonstrates the result of violence in Pakistan between 2003–2008.
Annual fatalities from terrorist violence in Pakistan, 2003–2008 Year
Civilians
Army personnel
Terrorists
Total
2003
140
24
25
189
2004
435
184
244
863
2005
430
81
137
648
2006
608
325
538
1471
2007
1523
597
1479
3599
2008
2155
654
3906
6715
Total
5291
1865
6329
13485
Source: Institute for Conflict Management (SATP) Institute for Conflict Management (SATP) and Pakistan Assessment 2009, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/.
One result of Pakistani military operations has been a humanitarian crisis not seen in recent years. According to the NWFP government, the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) has exceeded three million. These people have migrated to various parts of the country and have severely stretched the capacity of the Pakistani Government to provide food and shelter for the refugees.
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Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan
A Comprehensive Regional Strategy for Afghanistan Recently, President Barack Obama announced that there would be a regional strategy directed at stemming the influence, reach, and lethality of al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, appointed former U.S. ambassador Richard Holbrooke to serve as Special Representative to both countries. In addition there will be more diplomatic and civilian personnel assigned to Afghanistan to try to help rebuild the country's political and economic infrastructures. While these initiatives are sound efforts, neither diplomatic nor infrastructure improvements can be made without increased security in the countryside. However, new boots on the ground will not achieve the president's stated goal of destroying al-Qaida because (a) the administration maintains the policy of no hot pursuit into the Tribal Areas, and (b) an increase in troops will only serve to solidify government control in urban areas while the Taliban potentially retain control over the rural areas. Therefore, the administration should have a different goal than their predecessors: that of controlling territory. All too often, U.S. troops clear an area of Taliban then leave, only to have the Taliban return and wreak vengeance on the village for cooperating with the enemy. Upon returning to a previously "liberated" village, U.S. commanders frequently find friendly but not necessarily cooperative inhabitants. The recently enacted "take and hold" policy of capturing and occupying local towns with friendly forces, however, may convince villagers and the village elders that the United States will protect them from the Taliban. This is likely the only policy that could succeed in Afghanistan as no counterinsurgency program can succeed without the support of the general population. The Afghan Army is a well-respected institution amongst the population, but the police are among the most corrupt of public servants. Drug money influences their decisions and undermines any semblance of the rule of law. This is relatively understandable as the police are grossly underpaid, if at all, and their training is superficial at best. Nevertheless, the police and the army are those who are most acquainted with local problems and presumably know what is happening in their areas of operation. Therefore, it would appear necessary to initiate a concerted countrywide effort to upgrade the army's training in counterinsurgency techniques and tactics, and to train and outfit local police forces using a similar template applied by U.S. forces in Iraq. In addition to basic police investigation techniques, chief among the training topics should be classes in ethics and rule of law. These concepts have to become inculcated within law enforcement in order to gain some respect and trust from the local populations. 23
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At this time, there are few details about which additional U.S. civilians would be encouraged to go to Afghanistan, but personnel from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are ideal given their depth of expertise in all facets of development including economics, education, environment, and health issues. Therefore, increases in USAID's budget are essential in order to get the necessary expertise into the country. Once security improves via the aforementioned take-and-hold policy, international NGOs should be encouraged to return to these secure sites. The culmination of these synergistic factors would go a long way toward social, political, and economic reconstruction and development. Beyond the efforts of USAID, additional capability is needed in the form of a reconstituted U.S. Information Agency (USIA), which was disestablished as a post-Cold War dividend. Dissolved in 1999, USIA was a part of public diplomacy that never received much attention in the United States, but was well known overseas. For over forty years, this government agency, known as the U.S. Information Service (USIS) overseas, was an oasis in foreign territory for persons wanting to read English language newspapers and magazines and take English language lessons. Although sometimes portrayed as a U.S. propaganda vehicle, in actuality, USIS served as an informal U.S. cultural center for persons not wanting to be identified as visiting the local U.S. embassy or consulate. If winning hearts and minds is an Obama administration goal, then the public diplomacy plan for Afghanistan should be a key component of the overall strategy regarding the country.
Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking While extra boots on the ground and additional civilian personnel are key to stabilizing Afghanistan, what has not yet been discussed in any detail are plans for addressing poppy production and introducing the concept of replacement crops or other tactics intended to remove reliance on the production of illicit drugs. Any move to block opium income, however, will be viewed as widely unpopular. One only has to see the issue from an Afghan farmer's perspective to see why: opium production yields approximately US$2,154 per acre, while irrigated wheat generates approximately US$230 per acre, and dry wheat farming generates only about US$113 per acre.11 With this reality, one can only accomplish so much nation building with troops and soft power. The underlying cause of the grief of Afghanistan, and indirectly Pakistan, is the thriving drug trade in these countries, and it will continue to mire Afghanistan in the third world unless it is addressed. Most important will be cutting off access to the money generated by the sale of opium and 24
Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan
heroin.12 This lesson was learned in the 1980s drug wars against the Cali Cartel in Colombia. Two items are necessary to have a successful insurgency: a modicum of popular support and financial resources. Therefore, in order to defeat an insurgency each of these factors must be successfully addressed. The combination of hard and soft power will increase security and popular support. A reduction in financial resources can only be achieved by going after the drug trade, an effort in which many lessons were learned under the auspices of the U.S. sponsored Andean Initiative and the efforts of current Colombian President Ă lvaro Uribe VĂŠlez. Like an insurgency, success against the drug trade requires a combination of hard and soft powers as well as the political will of the host government. Active pursuit of the Taliban will create some success against the heroin trade, but the Taliban are not the only ones involved in the drug trade. It may be easier initially to address the growers. One suggestion has been for pharmaceutical companies to purchase more legally grown raw opium.13 On the surface, this idea has merit as there would be market forces deciding the product's price. Addressing illicit poppy production, then, becomes the underlying solution to Afghanistan's problems. Take away the proceeds from the sale of heroin and the Taliban's fiscal resources eventually dry up or are seriously curtailed. It is doubtful that Pakistan or other countries could or would want to make up the funding differences for any sustained time period. Since the drug trade is also the source of Afghanistan's political corruption, take away the illicit profits and corruption declines to a rate normally associated with developing countries.
U.S. Strategy in Pakistan President Obama's strategy for Pakistan appears much less clear, but no less difficult. As the United States prepares to send more troops to Afghanistan, it also needs to address the stability of neighboring Pakistan. Unfortunately, there appears to be little change in the two-prong policy of the previous administration: more Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Predator and Reaper drone attacks in the Tribal Areas and aid money for Pakistan, much of it directed to the military. Unfortunately, while appearing necessary to keep the pressure on al-Qaida and Pakistani Taliban elements in the Tribal Areas, the UAV attacks are becoming more known for indiscriminate civilian killings while achieving occasional success against high-value targets. Generally these attacks are considered negatively and not fruitful for the cause. In the absence of a persistent and
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effective Pakistani army presence, there appears to be no other military alternative in the short term. These attacks do nothing, though, for winning grass-roots local support. Money for Pakistan has been squandered in the past and there is little reason to think that future financial outlays will not follow suit. Recent attacks in Lahore by elements of either Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)14 and/ or the Pakistani Taliban have highlighted the Pakistani Government's inability to deal with these homegrown terrorists.15 Moreover, these attacks indicate the increased confidence and ability to reach beyond the Tribal Areas and these groups' main bases of support. LeT, once highly supported by the ISI for the Kashmir insurgency, has now turned its attention to destabilizing Pakistan's central government and was linked to the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai. The Pakistani Taliban's goal is to turn the country into some semblance of Afghanistan. Any measure of success by either group or combination of these and other likeminded groups would lead to a significant destabilization of the Pakistani Government. In order to comprehensively address these issues, a multifaceted approach to Pakistan's insurgency problems should be developed in concert with the Afghan program. Of course, there will be additional U.S. funding for training Pakistan's armed forces and hopefully police as well. But, the U.S. effort must be coordinated between and within each country, because neither country's insurgency or terrorist problem can be solved independently of the other. However, if any of these problems are to be solved, or at least contained, one must attack the source of the problem: radicalization and instability in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Threat of Radicalization in the FATA Since their eviction from Afghanistan, the Taliban and al-Qaida have reconstituted themselves in what has become an insurgents' safe haven. The FATA were used consistently during the war between 1979 and 1989 with the Soviet Union for the same purpose, and their use is one of the reasons the mujahideen were able to keep fighting during that time period. Currently, the FATA are home to those most likely to attack the Pakistani state and its American allies. That the FATA harbor what the United States considers high-value targets is evident in the number of UAV attacks launched in the area.16 Terrorist training camps once found in Afghanistan are now active there, and successful attacks on U.S. convoys bearing supplies for the war in Afghanistan originate from the FATA.17 26
Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan
The Pakistani Taliban was organized in South Waziristan and its influence has extended northward to Bajaur Agency and into the Swat District, threatening Pakistan proper, with Islamabad, the nation's political capital, only one hundred miles from Swat. The Tribal Areas are also home to many heroin processing laboratories. Logic therefore dictates that to be successful in either Afghanistan or Pakistan, what must be addressed are the issues that make the people of the Tribal Areas susceptible to Taliban recruitment and the cultural traditions that offer safe harbor to the Taliban and foreign fighters, such as Pashtunwali. The goal is to develop an approach or policy that offers an alternative to the Taliban in Pakistan's FATA. Although a very difficult task, there are several initiatives that can be implemented while being sensitive to the cultural realities of the Tribal Areas. To date, Pakistan's policy toward the Tribal Areas has been to either militarily root out foreign fighters and Islamic extremists or appease extremists bent on establishing the Taliban creed in Pakistan. What has not yet been attempted is a sustained effort at economic development within the Tribal Areas. For economic development to have a chance to succeed, however, basic infrastructure development in the form of roads and bridges and the creation of additional border crossings between Afghanistan and Pakistan must be constructed. The long-term goal should be to establish the Tribal Areas as a free trade zone, drawing foreign direct investment from Arab, Western, and Asian sources. Currently, hard-top roads in the Tribal Areas are poorly maintained and most are dirt track. This hampers incidental travel and commerce within the Tribal Areas and creates a more insular society. Moreover, a more efficient transportation system can only help farmers and tradesmen get goods and services to market in a timelier manner that reduces loss of fresh produce and increases quantity of scale for other goods. Requisite in any comprehensive regional strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is creating additional controlled border crossings within the Tribal Areas. Presently Pakistan and Afghanistan share a one-thousandsix-hundred-mile border, but maintain only two official border crossings. In Pakistan there is one border crossing northwest of Peshawar at Torkum and another at Chaman, located northwest of Quetta in southwest Pakistan. Spin Boldak is Chaman's corresponding Afghan border town while there is no official Afghan town opposite Torkum (in comparison, the border between the United States and Mexico is slightly greater than one thousand nine hundred miles and runs through four U.S. states and six Mexican states; in Texas alone there are twenty-six official border crossings). The road to Torkum is via the tortuous and infamous Khyber Pass, which has been subject to many recent attacks on NATO 27
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convoys by militants and Pakistani bandits.18 Having only two official border crossings presents challenges to govern or secure legal commerce and prevent widespread banditry. The addition of controlled border crossings would result in an immediate increase in commerce between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additional border crossings also have the advantage of creating additional tax revenues from customs fees and tariffs. There should also be greater cross-border cooperation between the two countries since the majority Pashtun ethnic group transcends both sides of the border. Extended families on both sides of the border may also welcome the additional convenience of ease of passage between the two countries. Choosing locations of additional international border crossings would not be difficult. One immediate candidate is the Afghan town of Khost. The nearest Pakistan Tribal Area town is Miram Shah and there are numerous informal trails leading to the border on both sides used by militants to fire on U.S. and allied troops stationed in Khost. Creating additional international border crossings is a concrete confidence-building measure that would link these two neighbors and provide needed security and stability without undue fear of attacks from militants.
Conclusion There are many sources of conflict and internal pressures facing Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Obama administration is right to consider a regional approach to formulating U.S. policy on these two strategic South Asian countries. Both countries are facing their own versions of homegrown insurgencies and both countries suffer from ineffective governments. Central to the violence impacting both countries are Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which also serve as a safe haven for the Taliban and terrorists waging war against the United States and its allies. Possible common solutions applicable to both countries include the additional build up of exogenous armed forces and the provision of qualified training for local police. Moreover, soft-power activities such as increased diplomacy in both countries and convincing regional powers such as Iran and Russia that a stable Afghanistan is in their best interest could be an effective approach, especially when used synergetically with other military force. Additional USAID projects and a robust public diplomacy presence in certain areas also seem appropriate. In addition, Afghanistan faces a debilitating poppy production problem that also must be taken into account. 28
Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan
In all respects, Pakistan's Tribal Areas are the source of many of the problems of both countries. It would seem appropriate that government stakeholders from both Pakistan and Afghanistan seek common ground to work against the insurgency by creating greater economic access to each country's goods and services by making the FATA a free trade zone, while simultaneously working to create binational institutions for management of their border problems.
About the Authors Dr. Steve Young is a retired Central Intelligence Agency senior operations officer who served in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. He currently teaches Terrorism and Homeland Security courses at Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas, at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Dr. Young may be reached for comment at: say001@shsu.edu. Dr. Imdad Hussain Sahito received his Ph.D. in Criminology from Shah Abdul Latif University, Khairpur, Pakistan. He is currently Department Chairman of Pakistan Studies at Shah Abdul Latif University and recently completed Post Doctoral studies at Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas.
References 1 Julian E. Barnes, "U.S. to boost combat force in Afghanistan," September 2, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/yj7v3zl (latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/ afghanistan/la-fg-afghan-troops2-2009sep02,0,6170770.story). 2 Ivan Eland, "Will Transplanting the Strategy in Iraq to Afghanistan Save the Day?" The Independent Institute, October 20, 2008, available at: http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2350. See also, Rory Stewart, "What Worked in Iraq Won't Help in Afghanistan," The Times, March 17, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/cphgt7 (www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5920064.ece). 3 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos; The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Group, 2008), 98–99. 4 Omid Marzban, "Taliban Shift Tactics in Afghanistan," The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 3, no. 15, April 18, 2006, available at: http://tinyurl.com/ykzwbpp (www.jamestown.org/single/ ?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=735). 5 Interpol Drugs Sub-Directorate: Heroin, August 2007, available at: http://www.interpol.int/Public/Drugs/heroin/default.asp
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6 James Emery, "The Taliban Opium Connection," The Middle East Times, April 1, 2008, available at: http://tinyurl.com/cz5rev (www.metimes.com/International/ 2008/05/14/the_taliban_opium_connection/2650/). 7 As this article goes to print in late September 2009, there was no clear winner of the elections and allegations of fraud have clogged the newswires; Karzai received the majority of votes. 8 Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, "Taliban Exploit Class Rifts to Gain Ground in Pakistan," New York Times, April 17, 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html?th&emc=th. 9 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, "Afghan strikes by Taliban get Pakistan help, U.S. aides say," New York Times, March 26, 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/asia/26tribal.html. 10 Unlike their Afghan counterparts, the Pakistani Taliban is comprised of a number of disparate groups with similar political goals. However, these groups have been informally united under the banner of TTP, led by the now deceased Baitullah Mehsud. 11 James Emery, "Afghan Opium—the Farmer's Perspective," The Middle East Times, April 8, 2008, available at: http://tinyurl.com/yhwtsur (www.metimes.com/ International/2008/05/14/afghan_opium_the_farmers_perspective/3848). 12 "Holbrooke: U.S. shifting Afghan drug policy," USA Today, June 27, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/qbqf62 (www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-0627-us-afghanistan-drugpolicy_N.htm). 13 Peter van Ham and Jorrit Kamminga, "Poppies for Peace: Reforming Afghanistan's opium industry," The Washington Quarterly, 30:1 pp. 69–81,Winter 2006–07. 14 LeT's primary objective is the "liberation" of Indian-held Kashmir and most of its attacks are aimed in some form or fashion against India. 15 Bill Roggio, "Banned Pakistani terror group suspected in Lahore attack," The Long War Journal, March 6, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/ar2ss3 (www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/03/banned_pakistani_ter_1.php) 16 "Suspected U.S. drone attacks kill 12 in Pakistan," Reuters Canada, September 29, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/yfqspar (ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/ idCATRE58Q0N020090929?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true) 17 "Afghan convoy attacks may be retaliation-officials," Reuters, December 22, 2008, available at: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N22495246.htm; See also, "Pak must shut down terror training camps to make progress, Breaking news 24/7, March 25, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/dllbe6 (blog.taragana.com/n/pak-must-shut-down-terror-training-camps-to-makeprogress-21615/). 18 Mustafa Qadri, "The Taliban's Lucrative Line in Logistics," New Matilda.com, February 6, 2009, available at: http://mustafaqadri.net/wp/articles/the-talibans-lucrative-line-in-logistics/.
30
The Tangled Web of Taliban and Associated Movements By Greg Smith
Introduction Following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, worldwide attention became focused on the Taliban and al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan. Prior to the attacks, many people had never heard of the Taliban or their shar'ia-law style of government. Since 2001, many splinter groups have formed in response to the continual United States presence in the region. Today, the term Taliban has been used to envelop several groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Haqqani Network (HQN) and the Tehrik-eNifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). These groups make up the majority of fighters along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Many of these groups have been historic rivals for control of the region, but have since joined a loose alliance in response to United States and Pakistani Government actions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This article examines the origins and operations of the Pakistani Taliban and associated groups. Particular attention will be given as to how these groups receive funding and support from each other through state sponsors such as Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and non-state sponsors such as al-Qaida and Wahhabi idealists in Saudi Arabia, as well as arms supplies from Iran and potentially China.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) In early September 2004, the Pakistani Government sent eighty thousand army and Frontier Corps (FC) forces into the FATA of South Waziristan. Militant members of the Mehsud tribe, aligned in ideology to the Taliban and residents of the FATA, repelled the attacks by conducting ambushes of army convoys. These tribal fighters had long objected to any interference by the Pakistani forces in the region.1 The battle resulted in a stalemate, with the army capitulating control of the FATA to the tribal fighters. Around the same time, a prominent militant leader, Baitullah Mehsud, launched attacks on tribal leaders who favored negotiations with the Pakistani Government. Mehsud labeled his group the TTP. To ensure success, the TTP received ideological support from al-Qaida senior leadership, logistical support from the Afghanistan Taliban, intelligence support from 31
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the ISI, and financial support from the madrassas and wealthy benefactors in the Middle East. The United States, recognizing the growing threat of the TTP, conducted a series of strikes from MQ-1B Predator aircraft in South Waziristan. In response to the Predator airstrikes and Pakistan's continued incursions into South Waziristan, Mehsud's TTP supported a spectacular suicide attack on the JW Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan.2 This attack was sanctioned and applauded by al-Qaida and brought the TTP further under the Taliban umbrella.3 By all indications, al-Qaida continues to provide TTP with ideological support through its media outlets the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and the Foundation for Islamic Media Publication (As-Sahab) by praising TTP leaders and encouraging further attacks on the Pakistani Government.4 South Waziristan's western border leads directly into Afghanistan's Paktika province. Paktika has been a stronghold of the Afghanistan Taliban and has often been the site of attacks on coalition forces. The Taliban view Paktika as a strategic center of gravity as it leads to Kabul and the Tora Bora mountains. The TTP allow Afghan Taliban forces to use bases in South Waziristan to launch these attacks and share logistics with the parent movement.5 This cooperation between groups allows both to flourish in terms of supply and maneuver. Mehsud and the TTP appeared to operate with impunity in the South Waziristan agency. This freedom of maneuver came in the face of continued Pakistani military incursions into the region. Reports have indicated that the ISI provided support to Mehsud in the form of advance warning of impending military actions in Waziristan.6 Mehsud was finally killed by a United States Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in August 2009. The power vacuum has created some instability in the TTP, but the core faction is largely intact and under the leadership of Hakimullah Mehsud, a top commander in Orakzai province and cousin to the slain Baitullah.
Funding The TTP receives substantial funding from three primary areas. First, the local madrassas have provided Mehsud with funding for his insurgency. Madrassas receive funding from prominent Muslims in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which is then often funneled through the madrassa system into the hands of the TTP. Second, the TTP is indirectly funded from wealthy benefactors who share a common ideology of shar'ia law and subscribe to the Wahhabi sect of Islam. This radical view of Islam originated in Saudi Arabia and has spread throughout Pakistan in response to the 32
The Tangled Web of Taliban and Associated Movements
continued presence of U.S. forces in the region. Finally, The TTP participates in opium smuggling and heroin production in South Waziristan. Funding from this smuggling accounts for the vast majority of TTP financing.7
The Haqqani Network (HQN) Jallaluddin Haqqani is the tribal leader in North Waziristan and has been associated with the Taliban for almost fourteen years. Haqqani serves as Amir for the HQN. The HQN conducts attacks inside Afghanistan's Paktika province from his Waziristan base. In 2008, this group was responsible for the majority of suicide attacks in Kabul, Afghanistan.8 Like the TTP, Haqqani and his network receive support from al-Qaida, other Taliban-associated movements, and passive support from the Pakistani Government and the ISI. The HQN cooperates with Mehsud's TTP in terms of logistical support and tribal influence. While both groups originate from the same Zadran tribe, sub-tribe conflicts and competition for power kept the movements separated until the United States began operations in the region in late 2001. Predator strikes in the North Waziristan city of Miram Shah attempted to kill Haqqani but failed.9 These actions emboldened Haqqani and served to drive his group further under the influence of the overall Taliban movement. In addition, both HQN and TTP share access to opium smuggling routes allowing the drugs to move in and out of Afghanistan with relative ease. These actions are also a source of considerable funding for the group and allow future operations. Haqqani has an established personal relationship with Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri and was once the commander of all Taliban forces in Afghanistan when they battled the Northern Alliance in the late 1990s. Haqqani receives significant ideological and media support from alQaida's media network. Videos of HQN suicide bombers are broadcast on the GIMF websites to inspire other radical elements to action. Many of alQaida's messages include HQN as a member of their organization. While this is not entirely true, Haqqani capitalizes on this relationship in order to raise funds from benefactors sympathetic to al-Qaida's cause. The Waziristan Accord between the Pakistani Government and tribal elders in Waziristan, brokered by Haqqani, has allowed the HQN to grow in strength and influence. Following the peace deal in Waziristan, Pakistan itself became an unwilling state sponsor of terror by allowing the group to operate unrestricted in 33
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exchange for no attacks in Pakistan. Pakistan lacks the resources in the FATA to mitigate the HQN influence and is in fact trapped by the previous policies of self-government and a minimal footprint. All of these factors favor the HQN and allow them to wield enormous influence amongst the tribes in Waziristan. During the 1980s, Haqqani was a favorite of the CIA and ISI in terms of funneling arms and mujahideen to fight the Soviets. As the Cold War ended, the CIA lost interest in Haqqani and quickly moved to other projects in Africa and the Middle East. The twelve-year absence of CIA presence was supplemented by Pakistan's ISI. Haqqani and the ISI shared significant intelligence as the Taliban marched across Afghanistan. This relationship, although strained by the events of September 11, has not completely dissolved. The ISI still provides the HQN with intelligence assistance in hopes of preserving the relationship post-U.S. withdrawal from the region. Many hard-line Islamists within the ISI continue to use the HQN and other associated movements as a proxy force for its greater ambitions in the region. Haqqani is happy to oblige this relationship but remains independent in actions against the United States forces in Afghanistan. Finally, Haqqani receives considerable funding from wealthy Saudis and Gulf state Islamists. As one of the few movements that include a large number of foreign fighters, Haqqani has cultivated a strong relationship that ensures future funding. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states view Haqqani as an asset while downplaying any relationship to the United States. Radical Islamists see both the HQN and the TTP as models for future Islamic armies.
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) The militant group capturing most of the headlines in Pakistan today is Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). Founded in 1992 by Maulana Sufi Mohammad in response to the United States' presence in Pakistan, the TNSM has attempted to implement shar'ia law in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP).10 The TNSM rose to prominence in 2001 when Sufi Mohammad rallied thousands of Pakistani tribesmen to fight the Northern Alliance. This campaign was closely monitored and supported by Pakistan's ISI. As the United States war in Afghanistan began, the Pakistani Government closed the border but turned a blind eye to any militants wanting to fight for the Taliban.11 These militants returned to Pakistan and began a cam34
The Tangled Web of Taliban and Associated Movements
paign of militancy in the Pakistani agencies of Bajaur and Malakand. The Pakistanis responded by capturing Sufi Mohammad and trying him for subversion. With Sufi Mohammad in a Pakistan prison, control of the TNSM fell to his son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah. Fazlullah wasted no time in aligning his fighters under the Taliban umbrella. The TNSM has waged a bloody offensive in the NWFP with actions in the Swat District and has exerted considerable influence in the agencies of Dir, Malakand, and Bajaur. The TNSM receives support in several areas. First, internal financial support for the group comes from radical mosques and madrassas. Funds from these entities allow the group to continue its struggle against the Pakistani Government. Second, TNSM fighters have taken control of the emerald mines in Swat Valley. The group retains about a third of the profits earned from these mines. This is significant considering that these emerald mines have historically yielded approximately 10 percent of the world's uncut gems, worth about US$15 million.12 Finally, the TNSM profits from smuggling activity in the border agencies of Bajaur and Dir. Opium smuggled through these routes heads either through Central Asia and on to Europe or across Kashmir toward Asia. Just as the HQN and TTP benefit from Saudi and Gulf State support, so too does the TNSM. This financial support is normally routed through charitable organizations and then filtered to the group for use.
Conclusion: Commonalities between the Three Groups Although the three militant groups discussed are located in different areas and are from different tribes, they share four common beliefs that have led to a unified front for the time being. First, the groups all share a radical interpretation of Islam. This view aligns with the Taliban's goal of a strict implementation of shar'ia law. Second, all three groups vehemently oppose the presence of the United States in Afghanistan. As the Taliban and al-Qaida continue to call for Muslims to oppose the occupation, the groups are able to set aside tribal and cultural differences to unite against an outside force. Third, the groups oppose the Pakistani Government in terms of democratic reforms and an attempt to impose any form of rule in the NWFP and FATA; the actions of the Pakistani army, at the urging of the United States, have actually made the situation worse for the government. Finally, all of the groups are profiting from the conflict in terms of finances and power. Hakimullah Mehsud, Haqqani, and Fazlullah have emerged as the leaders of their respective groups and
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have benefited from continued actions. They will continue to support each other and the Taliban as long as it continues to prove profitable in terms of ideology, power, and funds.
About the Author Greg Smith is a Senior Master Sergeant in the United States Air Force and a graduate of Henley-Putnam University where he completed his Bachelor's Degree in Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies. He has participated in combat operations over the former Yugoslavia and is a veteran of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He currently serves as the lead Air Force Instructor at the Joint Special Operations Forces Senior Enlisted Academy, Joint Special Operations University, MacDill AFB, Florida. He is an Evaluator Gunner in the AC-130U "Spooky" and AC130H "Spectre" gunships and has flown more than 3,400 hours including 291 combat missions and 1,375 combat hours.
References 1 Ahmed Rashid, "Descent into Chaos; the U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia," (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 274. 2 Aftab Borka, "Al Qaida Suspected of Pakistan's Marriott Bombing," Reuters Online, September 21, 2008, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSLK18396120080921. 3 "Official: Taliban, al-Qaida links strong," UPI, August 7, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/yhwp83m (www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/08/07/OfficialTaliban-al-Qaida-links-strong/UPI-81631249621105/). 4 Daniel Kimmage, "The Al-Qaida Media Nexus," RFE/RL Special Report, March 2008, 5. 5 Bill Roggio, "22 Taliban Killed in Attacks on Three District Centers in Eastern Afghanistan," Long War Journal, June 25, 2008, available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/06/22_taliban_killed_in.php 6 Times of India Online, "Mehsud Has Links with ISI," April 11, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/da9ym2 (timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Mehsud-has-linkswith-ISI-Report/articleshow/4387924.cms). 7 Ed Felien, "Afghanistan and Opium: the Big Payoff," The Public Record Online, October 29, 2008, available at: http://tinyurl.com/6444jo (www.pubrecord.org/ commentary/437-afghanistan-and-opium-the-big-payoff.html). 8 Anand Gopal, "Key Afghan Insurgents Open Door to Talks," Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 2009, available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0319/p01s01-wosc.html.
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9 Barry Newhouse, "Suspected US Missile Strike Hits Taliban Commander's House," Long War Journal, September 8, 2008, available at: http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-09/2008-09-08-voa15.cfm. 10 Profile of TNSM, South Asia Terrorism Portal, available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/tnsm.htm. 11 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 90. 12 ARY News, "Taliban Occupy Emerald Mine in Shangla," April 24, 2009, available at: http://www.thearynews.com/english/newsdetail.asp?nid=25684.
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38
Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Terrorist Cell within the U.S. By Richard J. Hughbank
"The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops." Samuel B. Griffith II, On Guerrilla Warfare, 19611
Introduction Both domestic and international terrorist organizations employ guerrilla warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures.2 Thus, the ability to identify and defeat the members of these organizations, cripple their infrastructures, and disrupt their financial resources lies in the understanding of modern guerrilla warfare as it develops in the twenty-first century within the United States.3 The forms of asymmetric warfare4 adopted by domestic and international terrorist groups alike is no longer intended to gain simple media exposure or governmental manipulation; they want to make an overpowering impact by causing massive loss of life and severe damage to infrastructure and are often motivated by religious imperatives and political goals.5 As terrorism analyst Stephen Flynn has observed, "Throughout the 20th century [Americans] were able to treat national security as essentially an out-of-body experience. When confronted by threats, [America] dealt with them on the turf of our allies or our adversaries. Aside from the occasional disaster and heinous crime, civilian life [in the United States] has been virtually terror-free."6 With the turn of the twenty-first century, terrorist operations have become more prevalent in the United States and are taking shape in the form of modern guerrilla warfare, thus creating new challenges for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. After reviewing the origin and nature of these challenges, this article will offer some suggestions for countering guerilla warfare in the United States.
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Terrorist Operations within the United States According to a book by Harvey Kushner and Bart Davis, Islamic extremist groups have been plotting within the borders of the United States for decades, originating with an exclusive network of educated leaders eventually known as "Mullahs."7 They note that this "secret Islamic network" was formed during the mid-1980s "when a tightly knit group of Islamic radicals attended the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in Greensboro."8 After years of planning, recruiting, and training in decentralized terrorist cells located throughout the country, "[t]he founding members of the secret Islamic terror network executed a longrange plan: raise money to fund terrorist activities; support Arab and Muslim demonstrations against our government's foreign policy and its support for Israel; infiltrate our political, economic, and military system to conduct espionage and to buy influence; and use our universities to set up fronts for terrorist organizations, because our academia's commitment to Free Speech and tolerance of diversity will protect them."9 In an effort to gain a more thorough understanding of terrorism, recognize who the terrorists are, and contend with why Americans have been attacked in their own sanctuaries, a growing cadre of academics and security professionals have recently begun developing the field of terrorism and counterterrorism studies. However, one of the challenges yet to be overcome in this field is the need for a common definition. As one scholar has observed, "[W]e seek to define terrorism so as to be better able to cope with it, [but we] cannot begin to counter effectively that which we are unable to fully comprehend or agree on as to its nature."10 This lack of a universal definition poses issues in identifying, defending against, and ultimately defeating terrorist acts in the War on Terrorism. Not only is it imperative that commonly accepted definitions of domestic and international terrorism exist, it is equally important to understand the methods of terrorist warfare and how they are actually conducted as well as what type of individuals—even among U.S. citizens—would join a cause that uses terrorism to achieve seemingly unobtainable objectives. As Benjamin Netanyahu—a former soldier in an elite antiterrorist unit in the Israeli Army and former prime minister of Israel—has noted, "The current breed of interlocking domestic and international terrorists is certainly not to be taken lightly. They know the West well and have developed strategies designed to take advantage of all its weaknesses."11 Identifying the enemies' tactics and their motivational means for executing such heinous acts of political- and religious-based violence against an innocent civilian population will prove invaluable in the fight against domestic and international terrorism within the United States. 40
Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Terrorist Cell within the U.S.
Guerrilla Warfare Tactics Tactics that have been successfully employed by small guerrilla-fighting forces for centuries are quickly becoming a serious problem, as domestic and international terrorist groups are utilizing stand-off, overt (high profile), and covert (low profile) tactics to accomplish their end state with little regard for those outside their organizations. This type of terroristoriented asymmetric warfare is currently used all over the world, even though such a strategy rarely leads to the type of complete victory envisioned by its adherents. Understanding guerrilla warfare requires the recognition of how terrorist cells operate within their political and religious ideologies and within their varying environmental battlefields. According to historians Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, guerrilla warfare has historically been viewed as . . . a war of the masses, a war of the people. The guerrilla band [has been] an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws great force from the mass of the people themselves. Guerrilla warfare [has been] used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression.12 Guerilla leaders such as Mao Tse-tung in China, Ernesto "Che" Guevera in Latin America, and Carlos Marighella in Brazil, have revolutionized the art of small-unit warfare against larger and more adequately resourced opponents. Their decentralized campaign tactics have led to many victories over mighty armies and have eventually been adopted by many terrorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (later known as the Red Faction Army) operating in West Germany.13 Guerrilla warfare has become the principal design from which terrorist cells are shaping their operations from preparation to recruitment to execution. It has historically been a proven blueprint for various levels of tactical success and always provides the terrorist an opportunity to launch "himself against the conditions of the reigning institutions at a particular moment and dedicate himself with all the vigor that circumstances permit to breaking the mold of these institutions."14 As Mao Tse-tung wrote many years ago, "A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more than a patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated . . . homemade bomb. His indoctrination begins even before he is taught to shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and politically alert fighting man."15 41
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Twenty-First Century Terrorism as Guerilla Warfare Domestic and international terrorist groups located within the United States are demonstrating the various guerrilla warfare techniques of old as they are setting out to achieve their political and religious objectives. From the development of the organization through the execution of the attack, these groups are organized in a manner—and utilize tactics, techniques, and procedures—consistent with the operational phases of a traditional insurgency. These offensive measures are initiated whenever the opportunity for power, control, and socioeconomic influence favor the aggressor. Other operational fundamentals include influencing the need to defend multiple potential targets, the massive consumption of critical resources, sacrificing counter (offensive) measures, and the loss of political and law enforcement initiatives. In essence, insurgents seek to reduce resources and diminish any willingness to protect civilian communities through attrition and exhaustion.16 One last and extremely critical impact could include the alienation of (local) communities toward law enforcement officials and local and federal governments. Guerilla warfare groups generally organize their activities around seven areas: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, combat employment, and demobilization. Each is described in more detail below.
Preparation Terrorist groups first look for a location from which to base their operations and begin recruiting. Location is critical, as they require an environment conducive to recruiting as well as privacy for planning their attacks. Community selection and socioeconomic structure are two critical factors in the choice of location. Like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, terrorist groups form decentralized cells that consist of a select few individuals who can blend into an urbanized community and begin the recruiting process. The members of these sleeper cells17 will blend into their chosen society by obtaining jobs, paying bills, and acting and speaking like the indigenous population within the neighborhood for months and years while preparing and recruiting for the next attack. The socioeconomic structure of a community is crucial to a cell's intelligence preparation in a given area of operation. As Daniel Pipes notes, although most would expect the militant Islamic to entice those individuals from the lower end of the social strata, "research finds precisely the opposite [to be] true. To the extent that economic factors explain who becomes Islamic, they point to the fairly well off, not the 42
Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Terrorist Cell within the U.S.
poor . . . . Those who back militant Islamic organizations also tend to be well off. They come more often from the richer city than the poorer countryside."18
Initial Contact Over time, the organizational structure begins to take shape, and positions within the cell are filled with recruits from the local community. In order to recruit locals to meet their specific needs, cell members set clandestine operations in motion to begin identifying those who meet the special needs within a particular cell. As Tse-tung observed, guerrilla warfare's "basic element is man, and man is more complex than any of his machines."19 While looking for those individuals who might meet their strategic and tactical needs for future terrorist operations, cell members integrate themselves into the daily lives of their target population with absolute discretion, giving the appearance of the average U.S. citizen residing in "Anytown, U.S.A." Marighella believed that urban guerillas would have neither the means nor the capability to maintain a job for very long, forcing them to begin expropriation tactics over long periods of time. He also spoke of the importance for guerilla insurgents to learn how to live among the indigenous people in their operational area, employing extreme discretion as they gradually integrate into their new environment. Once they have comfortably maneuvered themselves into the everyday events of their chosen community, then, and only then, will they begin their initial contact.
Infiltration Infiltration is defined as complete submersion into a society. In places such as Dearborn, Michigan; Brooklyn, New York; Hancock, New York; and Buena Vista, Colorado (the last two cities refer directly to cells of the Jaamat ul-Faruqa movement), Islamic jihad extremists have infiltrated and begun recruiting, training, and plotting their next terrorist attack against the United States—all in the name of Islamic purification through violence and destruction. A critical factor for the development of the cell's structure in this stage is the process of isolating promising recruits in U.S. society who may harbor ill feelings toward either the current government or Christians and Jews. They begin to quietly spread their religious and political beliefs as a more acceptable alternative to the democratic governments in the evil empire of the Western world. Christianity is dismissed in their eyes as a lesser religion, or no religion at all, and the Islamic faith is praised as the only righteous path to Allah (Arabic for God), as revealed through the last prophet Muhammad and his universal and timeless message. 43
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Additionally, these groups engage in criminal acts such as fraud, burglary, racketeering, and illegal use and distribution of drugs (narco-terrorism) in an effort to financially provide for future training and tactical operations. Other methods of gathering funds to further facilitate their jihad are through the production and sale of militant Islamic propaganda during their teachings, training, and prayer meetings.
Organization Once the infiltration phase in an area of operations has been established and deemed satisfactory to the needs of the newly formed insurgent group, the terrorist cell's organization begins to take shape. The traditional guerrilla forces of Afghanistan, Brazil, China, and Vietnam grew in size equaling two hundred to one thousand-person units, but terrorist cells forming in the United States are significantly smaller and "stovepiped" in design, mostly due to the urban terrain and environments in which they have chosen to conduct their operations. This organizational technique is better known as decentralization, or networked decentralization. With decentralized cells working toward a common objective, those caught during the commission of an illegal act are unable to give any operational intelligence on other sections of their cell or on the existence of other cells. A terrorist cell evolves in both size and sophistication as new recruits enter their training and progress to any of the cell's three organizational forces: auxiliary, intelligence, or operational.
Build-up Although the name of this phase implies there is a massing or increase in size of the cell, the size will vary with each location (and sociological environment), organization, and intended mission. As stated earlier, unlike the traditionally sizable guerrilla forces dating back to Guevara, Marighella, and Tse-tung, twenty-first-century terrorist cells located within the United States are organized in much smaller and more elusive elements in order to suit their needs for covert operations at every phase of their insurgency. Furthermore, recruits with special skills are also examined more heavily when considered for recruitment, unlike the average guerrilla fighter in previous wars. As Loveman and Davies observe, drawing on the doctrine originally espoused by Guevara, "Guerilla warfare, the basis of the struggle of a people to redeem itself, has diverse characteristics, different facets, even though the essential liberation remains the same."20 Understanding this philosophy is critical for law enforcement agencies throughout the country that must identify and disrupt terrorist cells within their jurisdictions. Guevara's teachings still hold true in the forming and training of both domestic and 44
Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Terrorist Cell within the U.S.
international terrorist organizations located in the United States. Another important parallel between guerrilla warfare of old and today's terrorist cells is that this form of war "is a war of the masses, a war of the people."21 While terrorist cells will utilize this phase to further develop their organizations, they will only have a select few who are deceived by their fatwa22 to attack and kill other Americans in their own country.
Combat Employment Once a cell has determined that the time has come to conduct "combat" operations, plans will become actions set into motion with finite precision, leaving little room for identification or interception by first responders. The asymmetric actions of typical guerilla warfare are a product of months of detailed planning, resourcing, organizing, and rehearsing. Although there are varying social-strata levels joining and participating in terrorist acts, make no mistake that the delivery platform of this horrific weapon of terrorism will result from highly trained and dedicated Islamic jihadists who truly believe their actions are righteous and for the betterment of the Islamic nation.
Demobilization Although the term demobilization infers that terrorist forces are maneuvering from wartime to a peacetime position through the disbanding of their organization, this is not the posture referenced here. Demobilization during guerrilla warfare is more likely to occur in the form of a dismembering of the operational cell responsible for the actual terrorist attack— that is, if the members do not die for their cause (e.g., homicide bombings) or get caught during the commission of their criminal act. It could also be concluded that the parent cell itself could stand down and relocate to another area or region if the situation proved dangerous to its existence and execution of ibn Ladin's fatwa. The organization's decentralized operational control allows the separate cells to function independently, providing uninterrupted and continuous operations. In order to successfully terminate a local cell's operational status, a way must found to demobilize the actual base facilities where they recruit, train, plan, and project terror against their intended targets. This key cell adjustment will not be undertaken lightly by terrorist organizations, as it involves several critical moving pieces not only in terms of the destruction of its current base of operations, but also in the process of executing the first five operational phases over what could prove a lengthy and costly amount of time. Therefore, if a cell cannot be identified and totally eradicated by a country's intelligence and law enforcement agen45
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cies, the next best option may be to cause its members to believe that they must demobilize and move to another location.
Strategic Challenges for Countering Guerilla Warfare Over two hundred years after the first Spanish guerrillas, terrorist groups are still thriving on the principles that have made guerrilla warfare such a tremendous and potentially successful tactic of fighting more with less. However, there are several critical differences in how modern guerrilla warfare is executed in the United States today, as compared with other countries in the past: 1. The foundation of modern terrorist cells could be either domestic or international in nature (that is, not always "homegrown"). This might appear irrelevant at first, but while most domestic terrorist groups are discontented from the government, they are not necessarily looking to cause massive loss of life (Timothy McVeigh's terrorist attack of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City is clearly an exception). International cells consisting of militant Islamic groups conducting guerrilla operations in another country are not only looking to have an impact on the government, they are also plotting to attack soft targets with the intent of destroying critical economic infrastructure and cause enormous loss of life in order to carry out the following fatwa issued by ibn Ladin on February 23, 1998: "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."23 2. While the cause is against a perceived oppressive government, it is not, nor will it ever be, supported by a trained, professional army constituted of U.S. citizens. Guerrilla armies in other countries have always depended on a "regular" army to sustain their governmental opposition, and the lack of popular local support will ultimately minimize the opportunities for guerrilla-style warfare to win the wars of either attrition or annihilation, especially in a foreign country. 3. Terrorists are fighting for "religious ideologies" rather than for "civilizations." In a fight for religious ideological pursuits, the identified battlefield must contain multiple supporters in these perceived ideologies in order to successfully sustain the cause and have any hope for longterm success. While there are over one thousand two hundred mosques
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Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Terrorist Cell within the U.S.
with some two million American Muslim participants located throughout the United States,24 clearly very few members have the desire to express their religious and political beliefs through ibn Ladin's fatwa. 4. As Therese Delpeche notes, terrorist acts will "contribute to reshaping international relations,"25 and not just in the immediate area in which they are conducting operations. If terrorism was to successfully manipulate U.S. citizens and subdue or defeat the government of the United States, every other country in the world would feel the ripple effect of the most powerful nation in the world collapsing to a weaker enemy, and other economies would ultimately face unrecoverable losses as well as an onslaught of follow-on terrorist attacks. The world will not stand by and watch terrorism erode the United States to the point of defeat. 5. According to Delpeche, "The boundaries between military and civil defense are being blurred. The increasing need to protect civilians from terrorists attacks . . . will lead the most-developed countries to give a new priority to civil defense, making it harder for the terrorist[s] to strike in the middle of cities and easier for [the] government to deal with limited unconventional attacks."26 Governments today are better equipped with intelligence-gathering techniques and technological defense mechanisms to fight modern guerilla fighters. The freedom of movement within a city or state has been limited by these modern counterinsurgency techniques, causing terrorist cells to move at a slower pace and spend more time planning and training for their next attack. The greater the degree of precision placed on terrorists increases the opportunity for local law enforcement agencies and other first responders to act or react to their attacks and potentially prevent an attack from occurring.
Closing the Training Camps, Mosques, Compounds, and Schools While militant Islamism has been a force to contend with throughout the world for many years, it is also becoming more prevalent in the United States. According to Kushner and Davis: It isn't an accident that many U.S. mosques have become appendages of worldwide jihad against the West. The number of Muslims coming here rose rapidly after the United States revised immigration laws in the mid-1960s. The number of mosques and Islamic community centers grew over that time, by some estimates from 47
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about fifty at the end of World War II to more than twelve hundred today. The role of the mosque has also changed—from Americanized "cultural clubs" of earlier immigrants to conservative, religion-oriented institutions that manipulate the national and cultural identities of new immigrants in an effort to avoid their inclusion in mainstream America.27 These terrorism analysts also point to a common thread that emerges from recent cases brought against confirmed or alleged Islamic terror cells in the United States—the connection between the terror cells' members and a local mosque.28 State and federal law enforcement agencies must initiate and maintain aggressive intelligence-gathering operations with varying profiles, specifically targeting those individuals and organizations where militant Muslims teach others to execute ibn Ladin's fatwa. "Islamberg," a training camp utilized by the Jamaat ul-Faruqa movement in Hancock, New York, is a prime example of how militant Islamic teachings have penetrated the fabric of the United States' society and begun the recruiting and transformation of Islamic Americans against their democratic government. As Cooper notes, "The youngest members of Islamic society are being exposed to intolerance and hate in the Islamic religious schools from the earliest grades on."29 Delpeche recently observed that having the ability to contain violence has always been the key to security.30 Stephen Flynn agrees, arguing that . . . the threat is ongoing, and [the United States] must be doing more right now to limit the consequences of future acts of terror. It will take time to implement well-conceived, layered security measures that protect the critical foundations of [the American] society. [Americans] have to make judgments about [their] most immediate vulnerabilities, identify what stop-gap protective measures [they] can implement in a hurry, and develop and exercise plans to guide [their] response when the next attack materialize.31
Conclusion Terrorism, by its nature, seeks out and exploits its opponents' weaknesses. Terrorist cells will only execute when they believe the tactical advantage is clearly theirs and that, as Tse-tung dictates, "chances for victory are weighted heavily in their favor."32 The asymmetric warfare tactics practiced by domestic and international terrorist organizations have achieved some success over the years in various countries throughout the 48
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world. Arguably the most powerful and influential nation in the free world, the United States must refuse to concede to such heinous acts of violence, as its second- and third-order impacts could prove detrimental to the political and economic status of nations throughout the world. As Stephen Flynn observes: The reason that catastrophic terrorism holds such potential as a means to wage war on the United States is not simply because these attacks can inflict damage to systems we depend on; it is because our enemies have good reason to believe that a successful act of terror on American soil will trigger a reaction which the U.S. Government exacerbates localized destruction with substantial self-inflicted national and even global costs.33 In order to pursue a successful counteroffensive against terrorism, the United States must analyze previous defense strategies in overseas areas of operation and begin to concentrate on the varying phases of a terrorist organization's movement within its own borders, as well as on its understanding of what Kushner and Davis describe as "the terrorist's language, culture, history, methods, and psychology."34 Furthermore, the leaders of this democratic nation should consider how they might prevent others from joining these militant Muslim organizations as willing participants by improving the socioeconomic welfare of those subject to easy recruitment. We are at a point in our history where "timidity" will prove an undesirable and fatal flaw in the defense of this nation. The days of Americans feeling safe within their geographical borders has come to an end, as militant Islamic jihadists penetrate the United States' societal footprint and live among their prey. Outdated security against the average criminal element will neither prevent nor protect against modern-day criminal attacks by a well-funded and highly trained terrorist cell. According to Flynn's analysis, "[Americans] must create the kind of structure that widens the breadth and quality of civic participation in making America safe. The nation, not just the federal government, must be organized for the long, deadly struggle against terrorism."35 The War on Terror has forced the United States to face its enemies on its own soil for the first time since the Civil War, thus forcing its strategies of defense to alter as it considers the long-term effects of both massive wartime damage to infrastructure and loss of civilian life. The world is anxiously standing by to see just how effective the United States is in handling terrorism inside its own borders as well as in other foreign countries, as its actions (or lack thereof) will forever shape the diplomatic and 49
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economic policies sustained between itself and other governments around the world. The United States cannot afford to lose this war. A version of this article previously appeared as a chapter in a book published by: Forest, et. al. (June 2007). Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century [Three Volumes]: International Perspectives. Chapter titled "Guerilla Warfare and Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Terrorist Cell within the United States." Praeger Security International, Chapter 12, pp. 235–252.
About the Author Major Richard Hughbank, U.S. Army (retired) is an academic professor of homeland security and counterterrorism studies and the President of Extreme Terrorism Consulting, LLC. Richard has over twenty-one years experience in the Military Police Corps and is a combat veteran in the War on Terror. He is currently working and conducting research in Afghanistan while working at the Counterinsurgency Training Center. Richard can be contacted through his website http://www.understandterror.com or at rhughbank@understandterror.com.
References 1 Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (Praeger Publishers, 1961). 2 Tactics, techniques, and procedures in terminology utilized in the United States Army to describe doctrinal concepts that units apply in combat, tactics that small units, crews, or individuals apply to a given set of circumstances, and courses or modes of action that describe how to perform certain tasks. 3 Portions of this chapter have appeared previously in Richard J. Hughbank, "Policing America's Streets: How to Fight and Win the War on Terrorism in Anytown, USA," On Point: A Counter Terrorism Journal for Military and Law Enforcement Professionals, a multi-installment column that was published in the February 24 through June 2, 2006 issues, available at: http://www.uscav.com/uscavonpoint/FeatureArticles.aspx?CatID=6510. 4 "Asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, ways, and means. The more dissimilar the opponents, the more difficult it is to anticipate [their] actions. One way to look at [it] is to see it as a classic action-reactioncounteraction cycle." See Clinton J. Ancker III and Michael D. Burke, "Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare," Military Review (July–August 2003): 18. 5 Adam Dolkin, "All God's Poisons: Re-Evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism with Respect to Non-Conventional Weapons," Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment (Guilford, CN: McGraw/Hill Dushkin, 2004): 160–162.
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6 Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism, (New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), 2–3. 7 Harvey Kushner and Bart Davis, Holy War on the Home Front: The Secret Islamic Terror Network in the United States (United States: Sentinel, 2006), 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 4. 10 H.H.A. Cooper, "Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited," The New Era of Terrorism: Selected Readings, ed. C. Gus Martin (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004): 59. 11 Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies can Defeat the International Terrorist Network, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001), 5. 12 Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Che Guevara: Guerrilla Warfare, (New York: SR Books, 2004), 52. 13 Nico Armstrong, "Carlos Marighella: Walking a Line between Terrorism and Revolution," International Studies Review, 42. This publication noted the impact Marighella's book Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla had on the Baader-Meinhoff Gang. 14 Loveman and Davies, Che Guevara, 52. 15 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 8. 16 For more on the goals and objectives of insurgents, please see the many case studies presented in volume 3 of this publication, particularly those by Thomas A. Marks and Adam Dolnik. 17 Sleeper cells are small groups of individuals that belong to a larger terrorist organization. The cell "sleeps" (lies dormant) inside a population until it decides to act. 18 Daniel Pipes, "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" The New Era of Terrorism: Selected Readings (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004): 113–114. 19 Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 7. 20 Loveman and Davies, Che Guevara, 51. 21 Ibid., 52. 22 A "fatwa" is a legal pronouncement in Islam, issued by a religious law specialist on a specific issue. Usually a fatwa is issued at the request of an individual or a judge to settle a question where "'fiqh,'' Islamic jurisprudence, is unclear. Because Islam has no centralized priestly hierarchy, there is no uniform method to determine who can issue a valid fatwa and who cannot and upon whom such fatwas are binding. 23 The text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans was published in Al-Quds al'Arabi on February 23, 1998. Statement signed by Sheikh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin; Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of the Jihad Group in Egypt; Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, a leader of the Islamic Group; Sheikh Mir Hamzah, secretary of
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the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlul Rahman, leader of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh, available at: http://www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen2.htm. 24 U.S. State Department, 2001. 25 Therese Delpeche, "The Imbalance of Terror," The New Era of Terrorism: Selected Readings (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004): 52. 26 Ibid., 50. 27 Kushner and Davis, Holy War, 68–69. 28 Ibid., 60–61. 29 Cooper, "Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited," 61. 30 Delpeche, "The Imbalance of Terror," 64. 31 Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 111. 32 Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 23. 33 Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 8–9. 34 Kushner and Davis, Holy War, 163. 35 Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 155.
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Extinguishing the Torch of Terror: The Threat of Terrorism and the 2010 Olympics By Serge E. Vidalis, CD, MA
"It cannot be insisted upon too strongly that in a small war the only possible attitude to assume is, speaking strategically, the offensive." Colonel C.E. Callwell, 19061
Introduction With the change in seasons comes the expected change of insurgency operations in Afghanistan as Taliban and al-Qaida fighters mount their spring and summer offensives against both NATO forces and Afghanis sympathetic to foreign troops. As insurgents curtail their seasonal operations with the arrival of fall and winter, is it likely that a threat may arise from Afghanistan to affect the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia? As will be illustrated herein, the threat to the games will not be borne directly from the insurgency in Afghanistan but rather by the universal jihadist ideology of al-Qaida rather than the nationalist beliefs of their fellow fighters, the Taliban. This article aims to call attention to the plausible threat to the 2010 Olympics posed by al-Qaida's far-reaching terrorist network while also offering a focused threat analysis based on the network's preferred tactics. Essentially, the power of al-Qaida lies in their network: the threat to the Olympic Games stems from proxy extremist and terrorist groups linked directly and indirectly to al-Qaida.
Nationalist vs. Universalist Terrorism In his article "Freedom Fighters and Zealots: Al-Qaida in Historical Perspective," Christopher J. Fettweis presents the typologies of terrorism as consisting of two camps, nationalist and ideological terrorists. Clearly, the Taliban fall into the nationalist camp as "their goals are territorial, usually as part of an attempt to carve out a homeland from an existing state or territory; their goals, therefore, have limited, rather than universal, application" and "target the interests of the perceived occupier of their territory."2 In contrast, ideological terrorists aim to "agitate on behalf of an idea, not a people; they have no specific territorial aims; their goals have 53
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no natural restrictions; and, as a result, their targets can be drawn from the universe of non-members, or non-believers in the cause."3 It is the latter of the two terror groups that pose a threat to the security and safety of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. To better appreciate the potential threat to these games, a review of terrorist incidents from previous Olympic Games may prove valuable.
Previous Terrorist Incidents and the Olympic Games Since the start of the modern Olympics, there have been only two terrorist events. The most infamous of these was the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics at the hands of Black September, a radical offshoot of the Fatah party, the militant faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), then under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. The birth of Black September came about by the expulsion and deaths of thousands of militant Palestinians residing in Jordan who fought for the return of their homeland. The purpose of Black September was "to let the world know of its people's plight and pursue a penchant for the destruction of Israel and Western interests" as retribution for their displacement. According to John K. Cooley's book, Green March Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs, published in 1973, the organization was composed of numerous cells of militant followers, leaderless and dispersed throughout various regions of Europe and the world living very ordinary lives yet participating in terrorist activities as opportunity afforded. Their actions during the 1972 Munich Olympics had two purposes: to express to the world that the Palestinian people had been abandoned and to strike at their archenemy, Israel. From Munich two lessons were learned; the first confirmed the difficulties of counterterrorism operations to detect sympathizers and resistance fighters who may reside in foreign countries and are committed to pursuing the organization's cause even though they are "decentralized" or effectively "leaderless." The second was that nationalist terrorist groups are prone to attacking persons or interests representative of their fight. In this case, the victims were innocent Israeli athletes. Twenty-four years later during the Atlanta Summer Olympics of 1996, the international community again witnessed an act of terror, an act of domestic terrorism founded on the ideological beliefs of one man, Eric Robert Rudolf. Rudolf, a former U.S. Army soldier, was eventually convicted for the death of one person at the Centennial Olympic Park by the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) and for three other separate bombings in the Atlanta region. In a statement made by Rudolf 54
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in 2005, he charged that the government of the United States was implicit in the deaths of infants by the legalization of abortion, and that the use of force to stop these killings was justified. Also an affront to his beliefs was his perception of the government's legitimization of homosexuality, which he felt weakened the moral fiber of American society.4 The Atlanta Olympic bombing, in contrast to the Munich attack, demonstrated that ideologically motivated terrorists have "no boundaries and no end except the annihilation of"5 competing ideas. Such terrorists believe that their actions are an "awakening of the masses through violent example," and hope that they "will inspire a broad movement against their ideological enemy."6 No different than in previous years, the 2010 Olympics present a targetrich environment for terrorist groups, mainly because the games symbolize unity in the international community. In addition, many of participants in the games—including the host-nation Canada—are supporting counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The global radical jihadist ideology embraced by al-Qaida and its international supporters presents a unique challenge to domestic Canadian security forces; they must be prepared for an enemy that is experienced and battle-proven.
Ideological Perspective of al-Qaida Understanding the ideological beliefs of al-Qaida is essential in understanding the threat that they may pose to the 2010 Olympics. Al-Qaida's ideological dispensation can be traced to the late 1970s when its founder Usama bin Ladin became the "unofficial" ambassador of Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan and Pakistan in an effort to aid Afghanistan in its fight against the Soviets. A devoted supporter of the mujahideen, ibn Ladin aided many fighters and commanders in their efforts with the jihad. The Afghan jihad continued growing under the guidance of Abdullah Azzam with "an international network of overseas branches linked by mobile telephones, personal computers and lap-tops" where "in excess of 25,000 foreign jihadis are said to have passed . . . to the Mujahedeen."7 At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, ibn Ladin offered his services to defend Saudi Arabia by offering his "global network of ex-Afghanistan jihadists, beginning with several thousand Wahhabi veterans now back in Saudi."8 Ibn Ladin's overture of support was refused by the Saudi leadership, and ibn Ladin eventually fled the Kingdom to consolidate al-Qaida in Sudan and later Afghanistan.
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In 1996 ibn Ladin offered his support to the Taliban in return for protection in Afghanistan where he would renew his efforts of establishing terror-training camps for future operations. By 1997, ibn Ladin had issued his first fatwa, declaring it the "duty of all Muslims to 'kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and military . . . in any country in which it was possible.'"9 The fatwa was followed by the bombings of the U.S. Embassy in East Africa and the USS Cole, instantly creating the persona among young Muslim men in the umma that he was the vanguard of "Resistance to Western Imperialism." These acts of terror would propel ibn Ladin to the center stage of radical Muslims and Western intelligence agencies alike.
Current Threat Environment: Decentralized Terrorism and 'Lone Wolves' Fast-forward to 2009: the once mighty and entrenched Taliban and alQaida terrorists in Afghanistan have been on the run for eight years. They have largely sought refuge in familiar territory over the Afghan border in the northern tribal regions of Pakistan; the very area where ibn Ladin supported mujahideen insurgents in Afghanistan during the 1979–1989 Soviet campaign. Although there is no certainty that ibn Ladin is alive, there has been speculation that his medical condition has prevented him from resuming the leadership role he once performed. It is rumored that one of his elder sons has assumed this role. Regardless of whether ibn Ladin is dead or alive, the al-Qaida establishment has been shaken into a state that closely resembles what Fettweis calls the stage of "decentralization," a phase that can precede the collapse of terrorist organizations. In the case of al-Qaida, decentralization means that splinter groups or "lone wolves" aim to carry out terrorist acts in the name of al-Qaida. The al-Qaida network now appears to be a "leaderless resistance"10 as described by Cooley in reference to the dispersal of Black September sympathizers and fighters. Such lone-wolf actors seek to become embedded within society and to pursue their nefarious activities from within as so-called "homegrown terrorists." There are a number of Islamist and jihadist-inspired terrorist groups that are believed to have a presence in Canada. A number of groups and individuals have recently been discovered while preparing to carry out terrorist attacks.11 Several of these terrorist suspects had established links to the al-Qaida network, acquired terror training overseas, and/or acquired explosive material, resources, and components in pursuit of their violent jihadist ideology. In the end, it is the lone wolves that must 56
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be feared during the 2010 Olympics for they are not "constrained by . . . rational strategic limitations" and have "chosen the most-destructive weapons available to inflict the maximum amount of damage on people and property."12
Risk of a Terrorist Attack at the Olympics with IEDs The ability of a lone-wolf actor to hide within the population and strike with the intent to inflict the greatest amount of carnage possible is but one challenge for Olympic security forces. The ultimate challenge will be to detect and neutralize his weapon of choice—the improvised explosive device. Since the commencement of combat operations in Afghanistan and the morphing into counterinsurgency operations, coalition forces have faced a growing threat from increasingly sophisticated IEDs. With an enormous stockpile of Soviet-era weapons, Taliban and al-Qaida fighters initially possessed an endless supply of high explosives derived mainly from abandoned bombs, projectiles and landmines from the failed Soviet Afghan campaign. In the initial stages of the recent Afghan war, the majority of IEDs were crudely built and initiated by command wires requiring the bombers to be in the same vicinity of their targets. Often these devices would be concealed in concrete barriers, deceased livestock, and other inanimate objects. As coalition forces developed counter-IED tactics, insurgent and terrorist bomb makers improved their construction methods by employing remote wireless firing devices and other electronic components. Tactical use of these weapons also changed with the recruitment and deployment of suicide bombers who target their victims with body bombs or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devises (VBIED). The message to be taken from Afghanistan in relation to the 2010 Olympics is that al-Qaida terrorists or their proxies are capable of exporting their bombmaking expertise and their capabilities abroad to strike in Canada.
How Should the Threat to the Vancouver Olympics Mitigated? The violent and radical ideology of al-Qaida and its decentralized sympathizers who are engaged in the insurgency in Afghanistan present a clear and present danger to the security and safety of the 2010 Winter Olympics. There are numerous terrorism plots that have recently been discovered in Canada and the United States that illustrate the capability and desire of such terrorists to strike domestic targets with the use of explo57
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sive devices. The most severe threat facing the Olympics is in the form of IEDs, which can be concealed, transported and delivered by a lone-wolf terrorist inspired and supported by elements of al-Qaida to a populated and hard-to-secure public open area or venue much in the same manner that Eric Rudolf attacked the Atlanta Olympic Centennial Park. One critical approach to mitigate the terrorist threat during the Olympics is for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to adopt and integrate counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies learned from the Canadian Forces (CF) fighting in Afghanistan. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police face many challenges in developing a learning culture to combat IEDs in particular. All organizations "acquire personalities over time" and "develop abilities in certain areas to accomplish the tasks of the organization but are constrained by their experience to innovate only within the self-defined parameters of what they see as their purpose."13 The necessity to develop a counterterrorism/counterinsurgency strategy for the upcoming 2010 Olympics Games requires a new mindset in domestic policing operations, and must take into account global terrorism, not just homegrown perpetrators.
Conclusion Preventing the repeat of an Atlanta-style bombing will require the partnership of both public and private sector security agencies, and the cooperation of the general public to observe and report suspicious persons and activities. The tendency for public security agencies to work in "silos," self-contained administrative hierarchies with little or no contact with other hierarchies, could be the downfall to a secure and safe 2010 Olympic games. Hopefully, any terror threat to the Olympic Games will be extinguished before it can be initiated, but the threat is very real. Although efforts to secure the games have been going on for a considerable time and have continued to test the capacity of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, it must also be recognized that the Canada and its citizens have yet to be baptized by fire as the United Kingdom, Spain, Israel, India, the United States and other victim nations of recent terrorist attacks.
About the Author Serge E. Vidalis is a retired Canadian Naval Officer who served in Naval Special Operations and possesses expertise in maritime counterterrorism, mine warfare, and explosive ordnance disposal. His career included a 58
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five-year departure from the navy when he served as a police officer in British Columbia, Canada. Vidalis returned to active duty within weeks of September 11, 2001, and was deployed in March 2003 to the Arabian Sea in support of Operation Apollo and Operation Enduring Freedom, where he lead a special protection team. Vidalis holds a Master of Arts Degree in Conflict Analysis and Management with specialization in Political, Ethnic, and Security Issues, and is currently a Doctoral Candidate at the University of British Columbia researching the Impact of Culture on Western Security Strategies and Terrorism. Serge is also the President of Blue Force Global—Special Services Group Ltd., a firm specializing in strategic security and emergency management services.
References 1 Charles, E. Callwell, Small Wars, Their Principles & Practice, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 75. 2 Christopher J. Fettweis, "Freedom Fighters and Zealots: Al Qaida in Historical Perspective," Political Science Quarterly (The Academy of Political Science) 124, no. 2 (2009): 272. 3 Ibid., 273. 4 "Army of God," Statement of Eric Robert Rudolph, April 13, 2005, available at: http://www.armyofgod.com/EricRudolphStatement.html. 5 Fettweis, "Freedom Fighters and Zealots," 276. 6 Ibid., 281. 7 Charles Allen, God's Terrorists—The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad (London: Abacus, 2007), 282. 8 Ibid., 287. 9 Ibid., 293. 10 Fettweis, "Freedom Fighters and Zealots," 289–290. 11 Ibid., 281. 12 Ibid. 13 John, A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 217.
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Islamist Distortions: Hizb utTahrir a Breeding Ground for AlQaida Recruitment By Krishna Mungur
Introduction In 1953, a radical splinter organization from the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT), was founded by the Al-Azhar University (Cairo, Egypt) educated jurist Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabhani who criticized the Muslim Brotherhood for collaborating with Egyptian secularists, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser.1 A sizable portion of the more radical members of the Muslim Brotherhood broke away, to join Nabhani's budding movement. Today, HuT is known to operate in more than forty countries, calling for the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate, with a history of violence and links to violent terrorist organizations. Given increasing tensions in the region over the presence of coalition troops, Predator drone airstrikes,2 a destabilized Pakistan, and lawless regions in Afghanistan, HuT is well positioned to amplify the strategic threat to coalition forces serving in the Pakistan and Afghanistan theaters.
History and Ideology The Hizb ut-Tahrir organization considers its members to be the vanguard of political Islamism in the world. In this position, argues HuT, the members are told they are vastly superior or of far greater importance than non-members. In the West, where Muslims may experience racism and prejudice, being made a leader in this self-proclaimed vanguard is particularly empowering, and helps the organization breed greater loyalty. In the East, HuT members are often sentenced to prison, which helps reinforce the conviction that they are among the most important Muslims. Historically, the early Muslim community was subjected to incarceration and torture, and HuT ideologues view their own incarceration as similar to the torture endured by the early Muslim community. Instead of slowing the recruitment process for HuT, statistical estimates suggest that such experiences as violence and imprisonment may actually accelerate it.3
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Membership Reliable estimates of the membership of HuT are difficult to determine. As with any clandestine organization, member cells are deliberately kept ignorant of the identity of other cells in their own geographic region. In addition, HuT has formed scores of front groups, many with only a few members in each. The front groups exist as a psychological operation, intended to convey the impression that the ideas of HuT are shared, debated, and discussed seriously by many other organizations. In some cases, a single member might belong to more than a dozen front organizations, and under any number of false identities, frustrating any sincere effort to determine genuine membership numbers. One indicator of the level of support enjoyed by HuT is the attendance at rallies, conferences, and other events. In August 2007, HuT held a conference in Indonesia, at the Gelora Bung Karno stadium in Jakarta, a place normally reserved for football matches. The facility, which can hold an audience of one hundred and eight thousand, was packed to capacity.4 While it is unlikely that every person in attendance was a rank-and-file member of HuT, the conference likely enhanced the prestige of the group because of a keynote address by Din Syamsuddin, the chairman of Indonesia's second largest Muslim organization, Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah, boasting some 29 million members. Despite the fact that many in attendance were not members of HuT, support for the organization from non-members is widespread. The first HuT conference in the United States, in July 2009, had a much more modest turnout of approximately three hundred attendees in the Chicago suburb of Oak Lawn.
Beliefs Hizb ut-Tahrir is strongly committed to the destruction and subversion of democracy. Its earliest literature, from founder Sheikh Taqiuddin anNabhani, testifies to this fact, and references to such insurrections are rampant. To help realize their dream of an Islamist Caliphate, Nabhani drafted a proposed Constitution for the Caliphate. The document clearly places HuT into a class of subversive political organizations operating under the guise of religion that seek to realize the founding of a totalitarian dictatorship. For example, when HuT showed its Constitution to representatives of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, it was quickly rejected after only two meetings.5 Similarly, Jordan's King Hussein predictably refused to implement the Constitution, and banned HuT from operating in Jordan, stating that it sought to overthrow the monarchy. From these and other similar experiences with Arab leaders, HuT denounced the 62
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governments of Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.6 Other Islamist organizations that have operated within democratic structures, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in Palestine are also unacceptable to HuT.
Tactics It is commonly reported that HuT is committed to nonviolence to achieve its stated political objectives, such as forming an Islamist Caliphate.7 However, a review of relevant literature and investigation into the history of the organization is not consistent with a nonviolent group seeking the restoration of the Caliphate. HuT has not restricted its operations to discussing its Constitution with Arab governments. In 1968–1969, HuT led failed coup attempts in Syria and Jordan. Coups were again tried in 1974, but also failed.8 HuT has encouraged suicide bombers to attack Western troops in Iraq, referring to suicide bombers as "martyrs" and stressing the mission of destroying "the new crusaders."9 The successor to Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, Abdul Qadeem Zallum, who led the organization after the death of its founder, has gone on the record saying that every Muslim government "must forcibly unite . . . into [a] military state even if it means killing millions of people."10 In November 1990, Sheikh Omar Bakri, leader of HuT in Britain, publicly called for the assassination of Prime Minister John Major.11 Although HuT literature frequently claims to be seeking a nonviolent revolution, its violent history suggests otherwise.
Group Identity and Cohesion HuT is a breakaway from the less radical Muslim Brotherhood organization. The splintering process from the Muslim Brotherhood was characterized by more extremism and radicalized actions. However, HuT itself has also seen a splintering process from within its own ranks. A group of violent radicals following Sheikh Omar Bakri broke away from the main organization in 1996, leading to the formation of the smaller and more violent organization Al-Muhajiroun. Individuals and cells from Hizb utTahrir and Al-Muhajiroun have partnered with the hardcore terrorist groups, such as Hamas, the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade,12 and al-Qaida on attacks including: London's shoe-bomber attacks and the London July 7 and July 21 bombings in 2005;13 the Christmas Day 2000 bombing of Indian military barracks in Srinagar in cooperation with the terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed;14 the founding of a terrorist training camp in Bly, Oregon during 1999;15 a 2004 aborted plot to bomb the Ministry of Sound nightclub in London;16 the Madrid train bombings of March 2004;17 a poison-gas attack in France in 2000;18 the kidnapping of 63
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Western tourists in Yemen in December 1998;19 attempted surface-to-air missile purchases in East London during 2005 to shoot down civilian airliners;20 and poison ricin plots from January 2003 against the Heathrow Express rail system in London.21 Sheikh Omar Bakri has even allied with his own rivals, including Abu Hamza and Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal. It is this splintering process within a radical organization that has turned into a violent group that poses the greatest risk to Western forces in a destabilized Pakistan and the lawless regions of Afghanistan.
Conclusion: Current and Future Threat In July 2009, Pakistan, HuT recently called for a coup against the government of Pakistan, by "military means" if necessary.22 About one month later, thirty members of HuT in Afghanistan were arrested.23 Western forces face the potential for military coups in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Additionally, since HuT has authorized the killing of military personnel in suicide bomb attacks, Western forces face this threat as well.24 The use of Predator drone air strikes in the Global War on Terrorism, and the mere presence of Western forces in the military theater provide greater tinder for the fire of HuT recruitment strategies. The threat posed by HuT to Western forces is real, severe, and must not be overlooked.
About the Author Krishna Mungur is an Independent Contractor with nineteen years combined experience in Open Source Intelligence research and analysis, and information technology. He fulfills assignments within his own consulting company, SCC, in cooperation with government agencies, defense contractors, and within academia. Krishna has completed hundreds of studies on terrorist organizations, attacks, leadership profiles, and created the Werzit (http://werzit.com/intel/) website for intelligence studies and counterterrorism. The website has detailed country and regional studies, historical analyses, and extensive archives on national security. His current work is concerned with terrorism from the three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Krishna is a member of the International Association for Intelligence Education, and holds a Master's of Science in Strategic Intelligence from American Military University, and two Bachelor's degrees from Miami University, in Oxford, Ohio.
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References 1 Gamal Abdel Nasser was a practicing Muslim, but identified with pan-Arabism, embracing Sunnis and Shi'ites, religious non-Muslims, and atheists. See Said K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab—A Biography (New York: Macmillan, 2004), 134. 2 Byron York, "Nothing Says "No Due Process" Like a Hellfire Missile," Washington Post, January 9, 2009, A-12. 3 Ed Blanche, "Islam's Secret Army? Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Transnational Party Whose Declared Goal Is to Establish an Islamic Superstate, Is causing Growing Concern in Capital Cities Around the World," The Middle East 392 (August–September 2008): 16–19. 4 Lucy Williamson, "Stadium Crowd Pushes for Islamist Dream," BBC News, August 12, 2007. 5 Ed Hussain, Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 133. 6 Ibid., 96. 7 Williamson, "Stadium Crowd Pushes for Islamist Dream." 8 Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest—Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996), 27–29. 9 Tom Harper, "Islamists 'Urge Young Muslims to Use Violence'," Daily Telegraph, September 30, 2007. 10 Blanche, "Islam's Secret Army,"16–19. 11 Melanie Phillips, Londonistan, (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), 14. 12 Christopher Dickey, Securing the City: Inside America's Best Counterterror Force—The NYPD, 1st ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 206. 13 Sean O'Neill and McGrory, Daniel, Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque, (London: HarperPerennial, 2006), 285. 14 Yusri Fawdah and Fielding, Nick, Masterminds of Terror: The Truth Behind the Most Devastating Attack The World Has Ever Seen, (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003), 47. 15 Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network, (New York: Berg, 2004), xi. 16 Intelligence and Security Committee. Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented?: Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (London: The Stationery Office, 2009). 17 Jason Bennetto, "Scotland Yard Chief Reveals London Link to Madrid Bombings," The Independent, 19 March 2004. 18 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (New York: Berkeley Publishing Group, 2003), 117. 19 Sean O'Neill and McGrory, Daniel, Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque, (London: HarperPerennial, 2006), 285.
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20 Risk Management Solutions, Inc. "Terrorism Risk: 7-Year Retrospective, 7-Year Perspective," In Risk Management Solutions (2008), available at: http://www.rms.com/Publications/Seven_Years_of_Terrorism_Risk.pdf. 21 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and Expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 275. 22 United Press International, "Hizb ut-Tahrir Set for Coup in Pakistan," July 7, 2009. 23 Middle East Media Research Institute, "Dozens of Hizb-ut-Tahrir Members Arrested In Afghanistan," August 10, 2009, available at: http://tinyurl.com/yas2d3b (www.memrijttm.org/content/en/ blog_personal.htm?id=1707&param=UP) 24 Zeyno Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam's Political Insurgency (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, December 2004), 50.
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Book Reviews Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis. By David T. Moore. Washington, D.C.; Joint Military Intelligence College Press, 2006. Maps. Figures and Tables. Notes. Sources cited. Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis is Occasional Paper Number Fourteen published by the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This series of Occasional Papers deals with significant issues in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and is supported by JMIC through its Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. This work builds on earlier publications in the same series dealing with analytic methodology in the U.S. IC. The author, David T. Moore, is a senior intelligence analyst and technical director at the National Security Agency (NSA). Serving in assignments both abroad and in the Washington, D.C. area for more than two decades, Moore has developed expertise in the areas of intelligence analysis competencies, methods, and standards, and has been an advocate for best practices in intelligence through creative insights into analytic methodology. His methods have been tested for practicality in several training and educational courses throughout the U.S. IC. The central theme of this work is the need for analysts throughout the U.S. IC to be better trained in various critical thinking methods and to put their training to use in more effective ways. The shortfall in intelligence analysis in the U.S. IC in the last half-century, according to Moore, has been the analysts' persistent reliance upon their own (or their agencies') presuppositions, assumptions, and biases. Moore's argument is that this pattern of analysis has resulted in a number of intelligence failures and has not encouraged analysts to think "outside the box." According to Moore, for analysts in the IC to be most effective, they need an "overarching, reflective framework to add structured reasoning to sound, intuitive thinking" (1). Moore first illustrates this point by defining three types of reasoning— inductive, deductive, and abductive—and how these three reasoning processes trace the development of analytic beliefs along different paths. While Moore argues that analysts who use these reasoning processes stand to be the most persuasive, he still warns that fallacious reasoning or mischaracterization in any of the three methods can affect reasoning using the others. Moore then defines critical thinking and its application in intelligence analysis, using the definition set forth by Richard Paul and Linda Elder of the Foundation for Critical Thinking. According to Paul 67
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and Elder, critical thinking is "the mode of thinking in which the solitary thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skillfully taking charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual standards on them" (8). Moore argues that when the correct questions and related alternative explanations are not fully considered, intelligence failures occur. He uses the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study to demonstrate how preconceived notions about the presence of foreigners in Cuba in the summer of 1962 led to several missteps in the handling of the crisis by the fall of 1962. Moore effectively reasoned that the lack of critical thinking strategies used to evaluate the events leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis had a significant impact on how the U.S. responded to the incident. Analysts at that time instead relied upon preconceived notions of the value of HUMINT being reported from Cuba. Moore warns that these fallacies can also be capitalized upon by an adversary for deception purposes, and were effectively employed to some degree by the Cubans and Soviets in this situation. Moore also cites another area in which critically thinking analysts can have a significant impact in the IC and U.S. foreign policy—with policymakers. According to Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, who wrote Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, analogy is a tool commonly used by policymakers. Moore reasoned that critically thinking analysts might add substantively to the policymakers' options by "constructively challenging the tendency to rely upon analogy as a way of addressing situations" (35). For much of the rest of the paper, Moore continues to define critical thinking strategies, their importance in the IC framework, and how the IC needs to further its efforts to incorporate critical thinking training into the development of its analysts. He outlines the poor record of implementing critical thinking training throughout the IC and provides suggestions on how to remedy that so IC analysts will have the right tools to review a broad spectrum of intelligence information in a rapidly-changing environment. According to Moore, with the proper training, IC analysts will be better able to synthesize intelligence using different strategies as opposed to relying solely on intuitive thinking, which inherently leads to biases and preconceived mindsets. He describes the critical thinking course currently utilized by NSA and touts it as a good model to follow. Overall, this paper serves as a valuable tool for senior IC officials who will formulate and develop future training programs for IC analysts. Moore cites examples for implementation of training and at the end of the paper 68
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provides exercises and activities for use in a classroom setting. The paper would possibly prove more useful to more inexperienced analysts in the IC if Moore would provide a further breakdown of the actual critical thinking methods, and practical examples of how to apply those principles in real-life intelligence situations, as he illustrated with the Cuban Missile Crisis case study. With that said, though, this paper likely serves as a fitting complement to the other papers in the series and should be utilized as part of JMIC training. Christine E. Williamson is an Intelligence Analyst for the U.S. Air Force.
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At The Center Of The Storm: The CIA During America's Time of Crisis. By George Tenet with Bill Harlow. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007 (first paperback edition published in 2008). ISBN: 978-0-06-114779-1 (paperback). Photographs. Glossary. Index. Pp. xxii, 561. $16.95. It is difficult to specify whether this is a biography or a history. Certainly it is one person's view of actions and reactions that significantly changed America's world. George Tenet had been a U.S. Senate staffer and a part of the National Security Council (NSC) staff before being appointed as the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1995. He became the Director in 1997, and served in that position until 2004, under the William J. Clinton and then the George W. Bush administrations. A lot of world events happened during his years with the CIA that directly affected the United States and how we conduct our daily lives, and that necessitated changes in U.S. Government structure and responsibilities. His account of his days with the CIA and world events in that period provide the reader with insights as to how some decisions were and were not made, at least from the perspective of someone at the senior level of America's Intelligence Community (IC). While one might expect that the author would try to justify things that occurred and that, retrospectively, might have been done better or differently, Tenet seems to make every effort to be fair-minded in his descriptions of actions and decisions, and indeed takes the blame for some of the things that went wrong during the period. To me, this is not an effort to provide a rationale for actions taken during this turbulent period. Rather, it is an insightful view of some of the day-to-day activities that took place. It is also an insightful view of the IC and how it operates. In the preface of the book, Tenet makes his objectives clear: "This memoir relies on my recollection of a tumultuous period in our nation's life. No such undertaking is completely objective, but it is as honest and unvarnished as I can make it." A bit further he states that "this is the story of how we saw the threat, what we did about it, what was proposed and not done, how our thinking evolved, and why the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency were ready with a plan of action to respond forcefully to the loss of three thousand American and foreign lives" (3). The structure of the book follows the early days of his work at CIA, including the normal day-to-day activities, the events of September 11, 2001, the preparation for and conduct of the war in Afghanistan, and the preparation for and initiation of the war in Iraq, and concludes with a comprehensive afterword and postscript summarizing the book. 70
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In Tenet's early days at the CIA, the Agency, as well as many other government organizations, were undergoing funding reductions and reduced hiring. He demonstrates how good leadership under these adverse conditions can modify or alleviate some of the associated stresses. He describes his focus on the value of the employees and how a leader must earn their trust, providing leadership from "the perspective of the glass being always half-full" (4). A clear indicator of his leadership attitude was the fact that on most days while he was Director he ate lunch in the main cafeteria at the CIA, not in an executive dining room. Tenet takes an incisive look at events and situations leading up to September 2001, including those he labels as "missed opportunities" (191). In his words, he treats this view not as what could have stopped the attacks but in the context of several "what ifs" that could have delayed them or reduced the effects. He also notes some of the intelligence collected that indicated the imminence of an al-Qaida attack, but no clear indicators of the specific targets. Based on some of these indicators some actions were taken, but they were not always popular. Even shortly after September 11, when the IC assumed that this was only the first wave of a series of attacks, a program that increased intelligence collected by the National Security Agency (NSA) against foreign terrorists that were suspected of planning new attacks on the U.S. was vilified as "domestic spying." Concerning the build-up to the Afghanistan war and the Iraq invasion Tenet cites many of the conflicts and even misunderstandings that developed among the many elements involved: the FBI, the CIA, members of Congress, the Pentagon, the Office of the Vice President, and the Office of the President. The author elaborates on the conditions surrounding areas of potential concern that might bear on the decisions to initiate attacks. For example, he provides more background to consider concerning the uproar following his use of the phrase "slam dunk" which, according to him, was not an expression to support the president's decision to remove Saddam Hussein and launch the Iraq war. Rather, Tenet maintains that the exclamation was in response to a question as to whether more information regarding Iraq could be declassified and released in order to better debate the issues at hand (362). Also significant among these concerns and misunderstandings were the facts surrounding al-Qaida associations with Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and the famous sixteen words, "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa," which appeared in the president's State of the Union speech early in 2003 (449).
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As interesting and fact-filled as the twenty-five chapters of the main text are, the last two sections are even more fascinating. The afterword sums up much of the content and the rationale that Tenet has expressed, and the postscript, written in February 2008, a year after the first publication, includes his perspective as influenced by later events. In the afterword, he notes that "first and foremost, it must be said that intelligence is not the sole answer to any complicated problem. Often, at best, only sixty percent of the facts regarding any national security issue are knowable" (490). Further in that chapter he discusses the practicality of a surge in military forces in Iraq—at the time of the writing the surge had not taken place— and he is not especially optimistic about its outcome. Consistent with the rest of the book, in the afterword he enforces the need for commitment to fighting "the global challenge of terrorism" as a worldwide problem, not focused exclusively on Afghanistan, Iraq, or specific terrorist groups (496). A significant theme in the postscript is the potential for nuclear attack: "The intelligence is clear and compelling that al-Qaida has the intent to attack our homeland with a yield-producing nuclear bomb" (509). Regarding this he expresses his hope that the book will "spark discussion leading to strategic and tactical plans to address the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists" (513). This book will certainly be of real interest to those who are in or familiar with the intelligence business, as it is filled with behind-the-scenes activities as seen by the Director of the CIA. In addition, all of us who lived through September 11 and have concerns about America's future and safety will find this a worthwhile read. Ed Urie is a member of the Henley-Putnam University faculty and is also an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. He is a retired U.S. Army Intelligence Officer and a veteran of CIA and NSA.
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Female Suicide Bombers. By Rosemarie Skaine. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2006. ISBN: 978-0-7846-2615-7 (paperback). Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. vii, 172. $35.00. Until I read Female Suicide Bombers, I had no idea how many deaths have been attributed to suicide attackers. Even more amazing was the percentage of female suicide attackers. Female Suicide Bombers investigates how women have become combatants in armed conflicts throughout the world. Its pages are filled with very useful and interesting statistics. Rosemarie Skaine does a wonderful job of categorizing and detailing female suicide bombers in our society. The book starts out by discussing the history of suicide bombing. Skaine provides a chronological analysis dating back to the first century when Jewish Sicaris used suicide bombers, up through and including bin Laden's September 11 attacks in New York City. Subsequent chapters cover relevant information including why women are used as bombers, the effects of terror on society, and the tactics used by female suicide bombers. Skaine also cites numerous conflicts throughout the world where females have been used as suicide bombers. For example, in 1991, Dhanu, a Sri Lankan Tamil, became the first Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) female suicide bomber. On May 21, 1991, Dhanu detonated an explosive vest that killed India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Other conflicts brought out in this book include the Chechen-Russian and the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts. Female Suicide Bombers also discusses United States domestic security and foreign policies regarding terrorism. Skaine examines several congressional initiatives that enable this country to defend itself from terrorism. The first is the Patriot Act, which enhances law enforcement investigatory tools and strengthens the United States' measures to prevent and detect money laundering. A second initiative is the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. In November 2002, the Department of Homeland Security was established, which protects the country from attacks on U.S. soil. It strengthens computer security as well as Internet surveillance. Included in the same chapter that covers domestic security and foreign policies is a discussion on new strategies and approaches taken by the United States against terrorism. I found this chapter to be most informative. The author quotes retired General Wesley K. Clark, former Supreme
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Allied commander of NATO, as saying: "To win this war, we must defeat the ideology of terrorism, depriving angry young people of their ability to justify their hateful actions in the name of Allah" (159). In addition to the United States providing leadership, diplomacy, and military intervention to combat terrorism, Skaine writes that we must also cut off terrorist activities by drying up their financial support. Terrorists do not write a check for items needed to carry out their mission. Terrorist organizations deal with large sums of money, which originate out of criminal activity. In order for the United States to make a dent in the War on Terror, we must stop the flow of money to these organizations. The last topic that Skaine covers in her book is preparedness and training. It goes beyond saying that the world needs to be more prepared for the next terrorist attack. This is especially true in responding to the threat from female suicide bombers. The book was well researched and easy to read. It would be very useful for anyone interested in intelligence, counterterrorism studies, and strategic security. In my opinion, Rosemarie Skaine's book, Female Suicide Bombers is a must for your library. Michael Savasta is a member of the Henley-Putnam University faculty and is also an adjunct faculty member at Broward College. He is a police detective with twenty-eight years experience and a former USAF SPI officer.
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Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice. By Christopher Paul, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. ISBN: 978-0-275-99591-1. Acronyms/ Abbreviations. Charts. Diagrams. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources cited. Appendix. Pp. ix, 175. $55.00. Information Operations (IO) is probably the most misunderstood operational capability in the Department of Defense (DoD). Each of the military services, the various offices working IO at the joint level, and DoD have their own conceptual understanding of how IO should operate on the battlefield. For at least ten years, these entities have battled over how to define the discipline, what to include in the doctrine, and how to conduct IO on the battlefield. Too many times leaders overlook IO as a formal operational capability, but then may unwittingly include it in battle without knowing they are conducting IO. Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice, by Christopher Paul is a move in the right direction for helping provide clarity within the IO discipline and shedding light on how all the IO components can work together, as well as what IO's role should be in peacetime as well as wartime. Paul states that his intention in writing the book was primarily for its use as a reference tool, which is exactly what anyone involved in military operations, specifically IO, currently needs. This book is an excellent resource for anyone currently working in, or who may be assigned to, any one of the IO capabilities in the future. Paul is an academician in his training and education, a social scientist to be precise, with a Ph.D. in Sociology from UCLA. He works in Philadelphia's RAND office with current research interests in military influence operations, integration of air and naval forces, simulation training, press-military relations, counterterrorism, and military operation on urban terrain. In his book, Paul consistently states that IO should be part of a coordinated and synchronized effort between multiple government agencies, of which the Department of Defense is only one facet. The book outlines three core IO themes: (1) the need to integrate and coordinate IO with higher-level U.S. Government information efforts; (2) the tension between capabilities concerned with information content [PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC] and those concerned with information systems [EW and CNO]; and (3) the tension between capabilities employing "black" content and those that employ only "white" information. Black content includes those capabilities that are used that do not tell the entire truth or purposefully tell a lie to hide true intentions. White content can be thought of as what public-affairs personnel are responsible for: telling the truth. Paul states: "There are many ways that 'mixing the liars and the 75
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truth tellers in one pot' brings grief" (118), which is one of the arguments that public affairs personnel have with IO when it comes to writing doctrine: they do not want to be associated with the deceptive aspects of IO. Information Operations casts a large shadow that many on the operational side of the Department of Defense either like to ignore, or like to claim they do not have the technical knowledge to understand the concepts associated with IO. Too many times leaders responsible for one of the many facets of IO state that they are sure glad their subordinates understand this stuff because they sure don't! Paul points out this problem and quotes Christopher Lamb's observation of lessons learned during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 (OIF 2), stating that "a major problem documented in OEF, OIF, and OIF 2 lessons learned is that IO planners did not adequately understand PSYOP and thus failed to appreciate its capabilities sufficiently or employ them appropriately and effectively" (52). One could replace the word PSYOP in this sentence with any of the other IO core capabilities, supported capabilities, or related capabilities and still suffer from the same outcome. A major problem with IO military assignments is assigning personnel to IO positions without the person having an understanding of IO concepts, leading to the compounded problem that even IO personnel do not understand IO. Paul's book helps those without a degree or technical background in any of the IO areas understand how to integrate the IO capabilities into operational military strategies. One problem area noted in the book is that in chapter one, Paul does an excellent job of explaining how the executive level of government needs to dictate the strategic information objectives, but then the rest of the book lays out IO in the military environment and deals with the execution of IO in the IO cell at the joint level of the military. Since he stated there is a need for the executive level to coordinate IO efforts, it would have been nice to read more on how those at the federal level should carry out that endeavor. Of course, maybe that could be a follow-on book intended for those in the federal level of government who work on shaping perceptions of society. Paul's chapter "Contemporary Information Operations" provides an excellent overview of IO at the joint level of the military, from highlights of the relevant IO doctrine to diagrams and charts depicting an IO cell and IO cell chief functions. If readers are not familiar with how IO is organized in the U.S. military before reading the book, they will have a clear understanding of the environment, at least at the joint level, after reading the book. 76
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The heart of the book, though, lies in chapters three through five, where Paul breaks IO down into three areas: information content (psychological operations, military deception, and operations security), information systems (electronic warfare and computer network operations), and related military capabilities (public affairs, civil-military operations, and military support to public diplomacy). In each chapter, Paul describes the capability in general terms, then specifically describes it as it relates to IO with the tools and capabilities listed. Finally, he identifies the challenges each capability faces. These three chapters are probably the most valuable portion of the book since the reader who has a limited understanding of one IO area can refer to the appropriate section and begin to comprehend how the capability can be used for effect in a comprehensive operational IO campaign. In the final chapter, Paul looks toward the future of IO and provides suggestions on how to reorganize IO to minimize the tensions between information content and information systems, and black content from white content. An important concept stressed is that everyone in the U.S. Government contributes to shaping the perceptions of the adversary. The actions of an E-1 Army private may have a tremendous influence in shaping an adversary's perception since the private may have face-to-face contact with an adversarial population. Paul also makes realistic suggestions for reorganizing IO to separate the content-based capabilities from the systems-based capabilities. He suggests that both EW and CNO be in a systems organization and PSYOP, MILDEC, PA and CMO be in a content organization. Of course, this would create the problem with mixing the black and white contents together so he suggests separating the white and black parts of PSYOP and marrying the white part with PA and the black part with MILDEC. He further suggests changing the names so there are no residual associations with former capabilities. Paul concludes that there are further challenges to IO that may present future problems, but separating content from systems and black from white is a good start to solving some of the current issues facing the discipline. Robin L. Thompson, D.M. is a former Air Force IO specialist and is currently an adjunct professor at Henley-Putnam University.
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The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency. By Matthew M. Aid. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-1-59691-515-2. Photographs. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. 424. $30.00 The National Security Agency (NSA) wears many hats, but its primary role is two-fold: first, it breaks the cryptologic codes of foreign governments and their militaries and feeds this information to policymakers responsible for guiding the foreign relations of the United States; second, NSA develops specialized technology that ensures foreigners cannot break into coded U.S. communications, either government or military. Matthew M. Aid provides extensive coverage of the politics and necessity leading to the creation of the NSA. He starts with U.S. cryptologic efforts during the Second World War and traces NSA's successes as well as failures up to the present day. Although there are intelligence disappointments mercilessly revealed throughout the book, in the end one cannot help but believe that even this skeptical author has gained respect for NSA's contributions. During the Eisenhower administration, NSA learned that the Russians were preparing to move troops into Poland, and that Israel, with British and French support, was planning to attack Egypt. Prior to the invasion of Hungary, NSA detected Soviet troop movements. During the Kennedy administration, NSA confirmed North Vietnam was controlling Viet Cong activities in the south. In another part of the world, NSA tapped into the Cuban national telephone system and developed intelligence uncovering Soviet activities there that played a crucial role in resolving the Cuban Missile crisis. By the time of the Johnson Administration in 1964, NSA was intercepting and reporting regularly on North Vietnamese naval communications. The author describes in detail the role of intelligence during the Gulf of Tonkin affair, and the self-serving "cherry picking" of available intelligence by policymakers. Much intelligence during the war came from NSA reading of diplomatic traffic from other countries, instead of from intercepted Vietnamese communications, which remained secure, except for low-level cipher systems. In response, NSA refined the art of "traffic analysis," the derivation of intelligence from monitoring communications patterns without being able to read the content of the messages. Warning of the Tet Offensive came this way.
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By 1972, NSA had broken the communications codes of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and helped deter planned terrorist attacks against Israelis in New York City. It played a crucial role in providing intelligence to President Ford during the Panama Canal negotiations. Aid's coverage of NSA history continues to more current events, but gradually with fewer facts and more speculation. Considerably less information is available concerning events such as the Persian Gulf wars, the invasion of Iraq, and the situation in Afghanistan. Aid also points out that not all intelligence was used properly. There is ample coverage of NSA warnings being ignored. For example, CIA intelligence analysts rejected its warnings that Egypt and Syria were preparing to attack Israel in 1973. NSA had also picked up advanced warning of the Soviet military move against Czechoslovakia in 1968, even though the CIA continued to insist no invasion would take place. There are many such examples in the book. The author also reviews what we know about several major disasters suffered by NSA, such as the unprovoked Israeli attack on NSA's ship Liberty in which thirty-four crew members were killed, including twenty-five NSA civilian cryptologists. Israel claimed the attack was an accident, but intercepts of radio traffic confirm the attack was intentional. The author notes that the NSA will not release the intercepts, presumably to cover up for the Israelis. The Secret Sentry is a serious history of NSA. By reviewing the voluminous footnotes at the end of the manuscript, one can get a sense of the remarkable amount of research behind this work. A great amount of material is taken from the National Archives but there are hundreds of references to original documents never published, but reviewed by the author. In addition, there is a large amount of information obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and from numerous recordings from the NSA Oral History project in the Center for Cryptologic History. Another notable aspect of the book is how the author covers the extreme sensitivity of NSA's work, and the terrible consequences when its secrets are revealed. For example, in 1971, Jack Anderson reported that NSA could listen to Politburo telephone calls. As a result of his arrogant and stupid act, the U.S. embassy was given a bath in high-energy microwave bombardments, and this vital source of intelligence dried up completely. Most readers will recall how irresponsible reporting by the New York
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Times revealed that Usama bin Ladin's cell phone was being tapped. He never used a phone again. Aid provides many such examples, and they should serve as a warning to everyone. Anyone who studies The Secret Sentry will come away with awe and appreciation for the amazing accomplishments of the NSA. It truly is one of the most remarkable institutions in the U.S. Government or anywhere. The people who work there sign up for a life of obscurity, never to be publicly appreciated. What it does require is incredible ingenuity and brainpower, yet by the time its deeds are recognized, the persons involved are either dead or long retired. In covering this important institution, Matthew M. Aid is very much distinguished from other writers. This reviewer has read more or less all of the published books (in English) about the NSA. The Secret Sentry is among the very best. Edward M. Roche is a Professor of Intelligence Technologies at HenleyPutnam University.
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The Blood of Lambs: A Former Terrorist's Memoir of Death and Redemption. By Kamal Saleem with Lynn Vincent, New York, NY: Howard Books, 2009. ISBN: 978-1-4165-7780-5. Appendixes. Notes. Pp.xi, 340. $23.99. Kamal Saleem, the son of a Lebanese blacksmith, learned at his mother's table that the most sinful Muslim man can redeem himself with one drop of an infidel's blood. This lesson and others from Saleem's accounts of his violent and hate-filled life as a terrorist are the foundation of an excellent book. As the title of The Blood of Lambs suggests, the book exposes the violence of the young and impoverished who are recruited by radical Islam. Saleem was forced to leave school and begin work at the age of six. But despite his abbreviated formal education, and with the able assistance of Lynn Vincent, his co-author, Saleem delivers a fascinating life story that is full of lessons to complacent and too-trusting Americans. The chief lesson is that America has an enemy within her walls—radical Islam—and does nothing about it. Saleem is qualified to make this assessment because at one time he was such an enemy. A corollary lesson is the frequent use of al toquiah—lying to enemies for the sake of Islam—that is frequently illustrated by the behavior of Saleem and his fellow Islamic radicals. The deception formerly practiced by Saleem is now turned against him by "moderate" Muslims in the United States who claim that Saleem is a liar and seeking to provoke prejudice against a peaceful people and their religion. Saleem started down the path of radical Islam at a young age. Going to work at a job across town, Saleem, a Sunni Muslim, was beaten by three different groups of bullies—Armenians, Kurds, and Shiites—the last of which literally chased him into the arms of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was a life-changing event. Saleem instantly was granted not just care for his wounds and reassurance, but more importantly, protection. It was not the kind of protection that involved calling the police or the bully's parents. Saleem witnessed the fear and awe that the Muslim Brotherhood inspired among its neighbors as its members visited each group responsible for terrorizing the six-year-old now under the protective wing of the Brotherhood. Later in life, Saleem came to see the Muslim Brotherhood as the lifeblood of Islamic terrorism and a "Muslim imitation of European fascism" (69). Soon Saleem was a member of Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which sent him on his first mission at age seven 81
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smuggling weapons into Israel. The description of the training for that mission and its execution, and other missions he carried out as a youth and teenager, fill much of the first third of the book and provide insight into the ease with which an unending supply of Islamic fighters are recruited and used. Pages turn quickly while reading accounts of Saleem's growing up as an Islamic fighter that are interspersed with chapters of his current life as a former terrorist speaking about the dangers of radical Muslims both alone and as a member of "The Three Ex-Terrorists" (Walid Shoebat and Zakariah Anani are the other two former Muslim terrorists). The life of a former Muslim speaking out against radical Islam (Saleem converted to Christianity following a severe accident) is not without danger. The constant threats and protective measures take their toll, as evidenced by a panic attack of his teenage daughter and the anxiety he and his wife experience when threatened. One account that will interest intelligence and counterterrorism professionals is Saleem's recruitment by an American for duty in Saudi Arabia. Seeking to escape the Lebanese Civil War, Saleem was hired by an American company that seemed to go to extraordinary lengths to employ him. Saleem became the manager of a recreational village in Saudi Arabia at a large salary, and in relatively short order became the operator of a "honey trap" operation as the American company brought in women under the guise of nurses, clerks, and technicians who were really dancers, escorts, and sex workers. Saleem's employer sought to supply pleasures to the Saudis to gain a business advantage and to influence Saudi-American relations. Saleem outfitted the rooms with cameras and extorted funds for the PLO. Saleem glosses over his connection with the American company and we are left to wonder if he was a recruited intelligence agent without realizing who his true employer was. In 1980, Saleem led a group that transported SA-7 surface to air missiles to Afghanistan. After managing narrow mountain trails, Saleem was shocked to find an American Special Forces team assisting the mujahideen to whom Saleem had brought the SA-7s. The account of Saleem's time in Afghanistan is instructive, especially the American attempt to recruit Saleem and his fear that his cohorts would suspect he had been pitched. Saleem had no desire to work for Americans, however. Instead he entered the United States on a temporary visa in 1981, planning to do as much harm as possible. He was financed by the same Saudi prince who had sent him to Afghanistan. America's poor and criminal groups proved to be 82
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fertile ground for recruiting. One of the most revealing accounts of the book is not a battle scene, of which there are several, but Saleem's secret to recruiting Americans to Islam: he fed them. "You would not believe how many people in these Bible belt neighborhoods simply wanted something to eat" (245). It gives one pause to ponder if the same tactics are more effective now than in the 1980s. In another case, a local thug he tried to recruit was left without his posse after being convicted. But Saleem visited him in jail before he was transferred to prison. Playing on the new convict's fear, Saleem provided a contact—a Muslim Brotherhood contact—who arranged for his safety in prison. Upon his release, the former neighborhood tough was a dedicated Muslim who promptly traveled to a Pakistani terror camp. Just as Saleem had been easily recruited by the Muslim Brotherhood, he was able to recruit with the same inducements—personal safety and freedom from starvation. This is a powerful lesson and illustrates how The Blood of Lambs operates on two levels. It is an interesting primer for the uninitiated or poorly informed, but it is also excellent reading for intelligence and counterterrorism professionals who can take away lessons about recruitment, tradecraft, and the power of the Muslim Brotherhood, which remains very active recruiting in all Muslim countries and feeding its recruits to several radical organizations. Perhaps Saleem's lesson to the professionals is this: know your opponent because he is already here. Steven O'Hern is the author of The Intelligence Wars: Lessons From Baghdad and is a retired member of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. He is a faculty member of Counter Threat Institute International.
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Attaché Extraordinaire: Vernon A. Walters in Brazil. By Frank Márcio De Oliveira. Washington D.C.: National Defense Intelligence College Press, March 2009. ISBN: 978-1-93294622-2. Photographs. Bibliographic References. Footnotes. English and Portuguese. Pp. 196. Free download available at http://www.ndic.edu/press/13120.htm. Within the known annals of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), few individuals loom as large (figuratively and literally) as Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters. Although he is not well known outside of the defense IC in particular, Vernon Walters' career spanned decades of service both in and out of uniform, crossing many continents, often in Silent Missions (the title of his own 1978 autobiography), unbeknownst to the American public until well after the events unfolded. In Attaché Extraordinaire, Frank Márcio De Oliveira, a retired Brazilian military police officer, and current research fellow at the National Defense Intelligence College, focuses on those segments of Walters' life and career that involved his service in Brazil. De Oliveira traces Walters' early military career, where as a first lieutenant during World War II, he was assigned as a liaison officer to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy due to his extraordinary ability to learn languages. Walters not only learned to speak Portuguese, he also gained the respect and admiration of those Brazilian officers that he came to know and befriend, including General (and future President) Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco. It was during Walters's duties as U.S. Defense Attaché in Brazil in 1964 that a military junta, led by Castello Branco, came to power. There were speculations in the Brazilian press that the U.S. Government was behind the coup, noting Walters' access to the coup leader, but Walters maintained throughout his lifetime that neither he nor the U.S. Government played a role in encouraging the Brazilian military action. Walters went on to a successful military career, serving in various diplomatic and intelligence positions with significant strategic security implications. De Oliveira makes a case that Walters, as a true "wordsmith," embodied the tools of argumentation and persuasion that allowed him to be a "connector" between hard and soft powers, a rare synergy of soldierstatesman. In the book's main shortcoming, De Oliveira attempts to stretch the analogy by attempting to show parallels between the careers of Walters and former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who also was in military intelligence during World War II. Whereas Kissinger was to make his name known in academic circles that parleyed into a high-profile diplomatic career, Walters was content to be a soldier who maintained a much lower profile. 84
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The strength of De Oliveira's text is the rich insight it provides on Walters' influence in Brazil and his continuing legacy in that country. Quoting General Alexander Haig's eulogy at Walters' internment at Arlington National Cemetery in 2002, De Oliveira notes the strategic intelligence implications of Walters' influence in Brazil as "both an observer and someone who shaped history." Walters' ability to understand Brazil—not just its language, history, and culture but its strategic significance and importance the nation would come to play in the Western Hemisphere as a rising power—and cultivate relationships with key leaders, garnered him high respect and public honors from the Brazilian people. As a former U.S. Army Latin American Foreign Area Officer (FAO), myself, I always admired General Walters as someone who embodied the spirit of the true strategic scout, the epitome of a successful FAO, who embodied the ability to empathize with his host country's counterparts and gain their respect and trust, yet without going native and forgetting for whom he worked. He also took seriously the responsibility to mentor the next generation of FAOs, as noted by one of his young charges, then Major Clarke Brintnall, who commented accurately (still to this day): "Young captain Foreign Area Officers had no status in the Embassy, but he [Walters] made sure that we were all brought into the full activities of the Army Attaché Office, soon thereafter the Defense Attaché Officer, and that all of us received the benefit of his experience." Attaché Extraordinaire offers readers an important look into the life of one of the nation's best strategic thinkers from a foreign perspective. De Oliveira is clearly a product of Brazilian military heritage, where Walters' legacy looms large, yet he is still able to assess the broader strategic implications of Walters' role in Brazil and does not shy away from the more controversial aspects of Walters' influence. At one point in the text, he admits that we may never know the true extent of Walters' personal involvement in the events leading up to the military coup of 1964, and that there are two very different views ("protective angel of the coup" or "devoted friend of Brazil"). Yet, given Walters' strong Catholic faith and "missionary" zeal in service to his nation, he would likely see the two as non-exclusive. Richard J. Kilroy, Jr. is a professor of International Studies and Political Science at Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA.
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