CIA Covert Operations: A Divisive Foreign Politcy Tool

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power constituted a real threat to the United States’ global hegemony and would contribute to instability within the world order. To contain the spread of communism, the United States, via its intelligence service agencies, orchestrated covert operations in countries suspected of aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as other intelligence services, were a crucial asset to American foreign affairs, especially in the field of covert operations. While certain American covert operations were successful, others were detrimental to the United States’ reputation on the world stage and deepened an already present division within global politics. Even though some operations were unsuccessful, this essay will argue that American covert operations were a key asset in influencing domestic and foreign politics, which were, in part, a reaction to the United States’ desire to protect its interests in the face of the rise of communism during the Cold War. This paper will explore the significance of Operation AJAX, Operation PBSUCCESS and Operation ZAPATA during the Cold War and determine how the American intelligence community influenced the nature of American interventionism. Moreover, this paper will take into consideration how covert operations undertaken by the United States have contributed to the destabilization of states and how their consequences are still felt to this day.

Covert operations played a key role in the United States’ efforts to contain the spread of communism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, United States’ intelligence services began operations in Europe to ensure that communism would not become the predominant ideology on the continent. The American National Security Council stated that the United States should “preserve and retain as many of its effective allies as possible” (Lay, 1954). Indeed, United States intelligence services were able to successfully prevent European countries, such as Italy, from electing a communist government through the use of “psychological warfare” (Del Pero, 2001).

The success of the American intelligence services in influencing the internal politics of foreign nations, as seen in the case of Italy, would mark the beginning of the heightened use of covert operations throughout the Cold War. Covert operations had considerable advantages compared to other means of foreign intervention, such as direct military deployment (Isenberg, 1989). Covert operations could be implemented within a short time frame, required fewer agents, and were relatively inexpensive (Isenberg, 1989). Another important advantage of covert operations was the ability of the American government to publicly deny its involvement in such activities. Plausible deniability was especially crucial as it allowed the government to appease both foreign and domestic interests (Gleijeses, 1995). In fact, a memorandum from the CIA to the President’s office asked whether the President would “want directly to deny or to avoid denial by using some less direct and therefore inevitably ambiguous form of words” (Barnes, 1961). In fact, information regarding CIA operations abroad would be kept from the public, as such operations were politically contentious. Public knowledge of the role of the intelligence community’s involvement in foreign interventionism could destabilize domestic politics, as well as affect the United States diplomatic relations with other countries. Despite the early successes of its early missions, as seen with Operation AJAX and Operation PBSUCCESS, a few miscalculated steps in Operation ZAPATA would mark the end to the widespread use of covert missions as a foreign policy tool.

One of the early successful interventions conducted by the CIA was Operation AJAX in Iran, whereby the American government wanted to overthrow Musaddiq and install a pro-American regime. The manner in which the United States would approach this situation would establish a precedent for future American administrations. Not only would this particular mission further the importance of American foreign intelligence services maintaining the balance of power for the United States, but it would also ensure American dominance in a region near the Soviet Union. Tensions began to rise between the United States and Iran when their newly elected Prime Minister, Muhammed Musaddiq, decided to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (Ruehsen, 1993, pp. 467). This plan went against American interests in the region, as the American government was concerned about the rise in global oil prices and how it would subsequently affect American industries (467). Musaddiq’s plans to nationalize Iranian oil also stoked fear of the spread of communism in the Middle East. It was a generally accepted fact by top US officials that if “left to themselves…[Iran] will welcome communism” (467) even though there was enough evidence to suggest that Musaddiq was not inclined to turn Iran into a communist state (469). Despite the clear lack of evidence that there was a substantive “communist threat” posed by the Iranian government, “Eisenhower and Dulles viewed the situation strictly in Cold War terms” (469) and were nonetheless persuaded that such a threat was indeed present in Iran (472). The British, who were also affected by Musaddiq’s plan to nationalize oil, sent in a small military build-up to add pressure on Iran to reverse its decision to nationalize Iranian oil (468).

The British intelligence service, MI6, also requested assistance from the CIA (474). MI6 had devised its own plan to oust Musaddiq called “Operation BOOT” and had accumulated a significant amount of intelligence through its human intelligence missions in Iran (474). However, the British presence in Iran was no longer welcome and could compromise the success of a coup so the United States took a leading role (474). Operation AJAX was a result of collaboration between British and American intelligence services. In order for Operation Ajax to be successful, the various agencies working on this mission would have to ensure that there was enough support against Musaddiq within Iran. To this end, the United States “had to obtain cooperation and confidence from the Shah” (477), as he would rule over Iran once Musaddiq was removed from power. Furthermore, another important element of the 1953 organized coup would be the “instrumental” role of the street gangs that helped garner support against Musaddiq (476). Protests against Musaddiq were led by pro-Shah forces, who were able to garner support from Iranians who were influenced through propaganda orchestrated by the United States and Great Britain that described Musaddiq “as a tool for the Communists” (480). Moreover, the success of Operation AJAX was dependent on the collaboration between the CIA and the Defense Departments (476). The role of the Defense department could be described as “vital,” as “[t]he Iranian army would have to be won over for there to be any real chance of success” (476). With diminished domestic support and growing riots that were supported by the police (480), Musaddiq was removed from office and replaced by a pro-American regime in August, 1953.

Operation Ajax proved to be very successful for the United States. Following the 1953 coup, “Western businessmen were flocking to Iran” (481) allowing the United States to regain capital that it lost during Musaddiq’s rule. The Shah also stated in a meeting with the American Secretary of State that Iran would also take a strong stance against communism within Iran (Dulles, 1954). The United States achieved their goals of containing the spread of communism and re-establishing American industries within the region with minimal financial cost and very few agents on the ground. They had plausible deniability as it was not entirely clear, though assumed by a few, that the United States was involved in the coup. As noted by one French reporter, “the recent royalist coup d’état was largely inspired, if not actually engineered, by foreign elements, notably the United States” (Ruehsen, 481). Operation AJAX would provide a framework for subsequent covert operations that sought to achieve similar goals. The removal of Musaddiq would have not been possible without the “complicity of numerous Iranian citizens” (483). Similarly, the success and failure of Operation PBSUCCESS and Operation ZAPATA would also depend on whether or not there was enough support within the country to remove those countries’ leaders.

One year after Operation AJAX and the resulting coup d’état in Iran, the United States government attempted to remove Guatemala’s democratically elected president Jacabo Árbenz in Operation PBSUCCESS. The motives to remove Árbenz were similar to those in Operation AJAX. Not only did the Eisenhower administration fear that Guatemala would become a communist state, but Árbenz’s leadership threatened American investments in the region, most notably the United Fruit Company (Rabe, 2004, pp. 787). As Árbenz implemented a land reform program in 1952, many wealthy landowners began to resent the newly elected Guatemalan president and labelled him as a “communist” (Streeter, 2000). A statement made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs expressed the fear that Guatemala’s proximity to the United States would be advantageous for the Soviet Union if the latter were to fall under its sphere of influence (Holland, 1954). Similar to Operation AJAX, the success of Operation PBSUCCESS in Guatemala depended on the support of both the Guatemalan people and its military (Rabe, 785). As stated in a memorandum addressing the deployment of American military resources in Guatemala, “[the people of Guatemala] are unorganized and entirely helpless to resist the well planned and executed campaign directed against them from Moscow” (Holland, 1954). This particular type of thinking, whereby American leadership feared that certain developing nations would seek assistance from the Soviet Union, transcended throughout the decision-making process regarding foreign intervention by the CIA. American air support was instrumental in backing the Guatemalan military which was a leading factor for Árbenz’s resignation from office (Streeter, 2000). To further perpetuate resentment towards Árbenz within the general population, the CIA would use radio and leaflet propaganda which was inexpensive and non-invasive (Nelson, 1998, pp. 506). The use of paramilitary and propaganda put forth by the CIA would give the necessary support for the Guatemalan army to no longer support Árbenz (506).

While Operation PBSUCCESS was regarded as highly successful, Árbenz’s removal from office was followed by an authoritarian regime that was especially brutal against its people (Ching & Cullather, 2000, pp.179). While the United States sought to protect its interests and maintain its ascendency over the Soviet Union, the involvement of the CIA in the removal of democratically elected governments does bring into question the morality of such operations. Even in instances where certain regimes used unconventional means to gain control, as in the case of Cuba, a question remains as to whether the United States was justified in inciting regime change.

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