LOCATING POLITICS: ON THE QUESTION OF INEQUALITY

Inequality, in the most literal sense, is not necessarily a problem. We recognize theinevitable existence of some inequalities and promote other inequalities. I claim multiple different normative claims are often made when discussing wealth inequality. At some points, it seems as though a utilitarian argument is being made that suggests that the wealth of the upper classes is wasting away in their savings accounts. At other points, ‘the problem of inequality describes something closer to the problem of poverty, and the needless suffering that some face. Sometimes the problem of inequality seems to refer to social cohesion. It is often discussed as if the problem is self-evident when in reality multiple problems are being addressed. The point is not to argue which is the real problem — they are all real problems — the point is to realize that they are all symptomatic of larger processes in the economic and political realms. "Wealth inequality" has become a blanket term that attempts to capture all problems in the economic realm. The emphasis on inequality has misidentified the location of politics: the focus should be on the origins of this inequality and the exact location of injustice, which is the process, not the outcome, of political economics.

The descriptive claims of wealth inequality are more or less agreed upon. It is a measurable phenomenon, quantified most recently by Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century. To summarize, wealth inequality has been rising since the industrial revolution. After a brief halt to its growth due to welfare policies during the postwar era, it has been on the rise since the 1970s with the introduction of neoliberalism. Piketty’s famous formula, r > g, where r is the return on capital and g is the growth rate, suggests a divergence in wealth over time of capital owners and non-capital owners (Piketty 2014). His formula states that some individuals will see a growth in their wealth higher than the average growth rate of society. Thus, the gap between those with substantial wealth and those without has and will continue to grow. The descriptive accounts of inequality do vary, and it is a subject worth studying, but it is the normative claims that have not received enough attention. A strong normative analysis of inequality would disregard its status as a source of economic problems and would see it rather as an indication of economic problems.

Piketty focuses on outcomes because he avoids the factors at play in the process. First, the concept of bargaining plays no role in his model. Second, Piketty conflates wealth with capital, which is to say Piketty does not view certain forms of wealth as more productive than others. The inclusion of the two aforementioned factors would allow Piketty to better analyze the process, but their exclusion results in a limited account focused only on outcomes. Varoufakis demonstrates the problem with Piketty’s sole focus on outcomes through a comparison to Robert Nozick’s famous critique of John Rawls.

Rawls argues that if one were to consider the optimal division of resources objectively, one would seek to maximize the circumstances of the least advantaged. Thus, Rawls promotes redistribution until the point at which more redistribution would be damaging. In other words, Rawls claims that inequality is only justified if it helps the least advantaged. Nozick critiques this theory of justice on the grounds that it limits freedom. Nozick claims that in Rawls’ theory, no action that skews this optimal distribution would be allowed. Nozick suggests that people ought to be able to have choice, even if their choice skews the optimal distribution. The critique is that Rawls’ theory limits people’s decisionmaking capacity; a Rawlsian world must be static and inactive: “The simple-minded point [Nozick] made — a point that Marx had essentially made before — was that what matters is not so much the outcome, it’s the process” (Varoufakis 2014). Piketty’s focus on changing the distribution of wealth ignores the importance of process, just like Rawls. Piketty’s world is also static and inactive: it is a just process, not outcome, that should be pursued.

Inequality itself is not injustice; the lack of power and freedom in the economic process is the injustice, which produces the outcome of inequality as its symptom. The problematic reality is that decision-making power during the process of production is currently in the hands of a small minority. The power dynamics of the economic process are best exemplified by bargaining power. As J.W. Mason and others point out, it is strength in workers’ bargaining power (which Piketty does not consider) that has led to the moments of least inequality (Mason 2015). Or consider the lack of freedom that Nozick discusses. Freedom is the ability to shape one’s life, and to an extent, shape one’s surroundings in accordance with their will. Freedom means that we can pursue our preferred objectives, interests, and outcomes. The working class’ current lack of decision-making abilities is an unfreedom. It limits the degree to which one can pursue one’s individually preferred outcomes as well as the degree to which one can shape the rules and environment in which one operates. Most people tend to lack the freedom to produce what they want, produce how they want, produce for how long they want, and so on. These injustices may be discovered in the outcome, but they are located in the process. They are the source of unjust results.

Thus, it is not simply that a just process will lead to a just outcome, but that a just process can lead to a diversity of outcomes. Rather than pursue an ideal outcome, we should promote the capacities of people to pursue the outcome of their choosing; that is to say, optimize the power and freedom people can have over their own lives. This allows for a politics of versatility, activity, and freedom. It is with this in mind that I am arguing for a politics of process.

Consider the following objection in favour of outcome-based solutions. Even if the outcomes of the economic realm are symptomatic of its process, they themselves can still be damaging, and thus policy directed at results is still needed. Symptoms too cause harm, and therefore also need to be corrected. This objection often recognizes its limits when its application is attempted. Even when one is applying a policy directed at an outcome, one must know the process to be able to apply their policy. I claim that results-oriented thinkers, in the stage of theorizing ideal outcomes, tend to not only ignore the problems in the process but ignore the reality of a process itself — as is the case with Rawls and Piketty. The only problem as it appears to them is that the policy that would create the best outcome has yet to be implemented, without asking if there is a reason why it has not or could not be implemented. This leads to an uncontentious vision of the process of economics and politics — which is the actual location of political conflict and the actual source of unjust outcomes. Indeed, many tend to presuppose a just process, without realizing that if such a process existed, the very results they want to change may never have developed in the first place.

Let us clarify this point with Piketty’s suggestion of a global wealth tax. Wealth usually goes untouched by taxation — a wealth tax could change this. A global wealth tax triumphs over capital’s ability to avoid taxation by moving across borders to find states with the most favourable taxes. The existence of a global wealth tax would be a positive, but it should not be represented as the solution to inequality. This is not because its implementation is impossible; rather, the actual victory would be achieved prior to the implementation of the policy. The victory would be the creation of a world where such a policy can be implemented. Zizek, in response to Piketty, notes that a global wealth tax would require a global power that transcends the sovereignty of nation-states, is capable of accurately tracking capital, and can implement and enforce the tax (Zizek 2015). The creation of this global power that can reliably track and control capital would be a substantial victory (Zizek 2015). Thus, the suggestion of a global wealth tax presupposes that the actual political victory is already accomplished and that the process is perfectly just. If such a political victory had already been accomplished and our politics were without conflict, which is the requirement for this policy, such issues would be nonexistent, making his solutions irrelevant. Piketty is ignorant about the location of politics and potential political victory.

Piketty sees a house on fire, sees the valuable items being burnt, and thus suggests that the items be removed from the house. He does not realize that one cannot do this while the house is on fire; and that if one could remove the valuable items (i.e., if the house were not on fire), the problem would already be solved and there would be no need to remove the items to begin with.

For those arguing against the injustice of our economic circumstances, "wealth inequality" has become the all-encompassing slogan. As such, it becomes the focus of our attention. It then becomes the sole issue that requires solutions, and its roots are either assumed or forgotten. Our attention is misplaced. Wealth inequality is the unjust outcome of an unjust process. Changing the focus away from the outcome of inequality toward the economic process can achieve the evasion of the dead end that Piketty and others have run into. The divergence of wealth across classes is unjust, unhealthy, and perhaps unsustainable, but it is nevertheless a symptom of injustice of the economic process. We should view the outcome of divergence as symptomatic of unjust processes, and these processes as the location of political conflict.

Mason, J. W. 2015. “It's Bargaining Power All the Way Down.” Crooked Timber. https://crookedtimber.org/2015/12/15/itsbargaining-power-all-the-way-down/.

Sierakowski, Slawomir. 2015. “Utopia and Its Discontents.” Los Angeles Review of Books. https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/utopia-discontentsslawomir-sierakowski-talks-slavoj-zizek/

Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty First Century. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Harvard University Press.

Varoufakis, Yanis 2014. “Yanis Varoufakis Critiques Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century”. Interview by Andrew Mazzone. Smart Talk with Andrew Mazzone. https://www.youtube

33