POLIS
The Report: PM Shinzō Abe's radical economic policies and the future of Japan
V ol . 1 N o . 1 2013-2014 utapss . ca / journal
the university of toronto ’ s undergraduate journal of political science
Photo Credit: Shawq Al-Ani
FEATURE:
Photo Essay - Homage to Damascus by Shawq Al-Ani
INTERNATIONAL
CANADA
LOCAL
FEATURING ESSAYS
Expanding the NSA’s Authority in the U.S. Targeted Killing Campaign By Shelby Challis
Roncesvalles' Gentrification Politics By sonia Ralston
Voter Suppression, Disenfranchisement, and Dirty Politics By Christian Pass-Lang
by Cameron Wood, Kaleem Hawa, and Carson Smulders
II
Homage to Damascus
by Shawq Al-Ani III
POLIS
the university of toronto’s undergraduate journal of political science
letter from the editor Greetings! The editorial staff of Polis: The University of Toronto’s Undergraduate Journal of Political Science is excited to print the inaugural issue of the revamped academic journal. We believe that the journal you are holding will go on to represent the first in a series of annual publications to showcase the best U of T’s undergraduate students have to offer in the arenas of political analysis and commentary. We have been hard at work over the past months to ensure that the revamped journal lives up to the high academic standards of its predecessors, while finding new ways of presenting a sophisticated and smartly designed publication. In this, the first issue, Sonia Ralston comments on the effects of gentrification in Toronto’s Roncesvalles neighborhood. In the domestic pages, Christian PaasLang weighs in on the implications of Canada’s Fair Elections Act. Shelby Challis explores the US’ drone warfare policy in the international section, while the centerfold features the photographic work of Shawq Al-Ani in Damascus. Enjoy,
designers
Ben Crase Joshua Oliver Sasha Rakkar
Alec Wilson Editor-in-chief letter from the president of the apss Undergraduate students in Political Science face a curious dilemma: although there seem to be no end of essays and assignments, the number of opportunities for student work to be published is limited to a small handful. The Undergraduate Journal of Political Science represents one avenue for students to participate in the production of an academic Journal. Both as authors of the submissions, and as the editors creating the final product, the Journal is a unique opportunity for students to present their expertise and disciplinary training in Political Science in a tangible form. If you're like me, you also have parents who will use it to decorate every coffee table in the house — without mercy. This year’s Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Polis, is the culmination of many months of work and offers a new format for readers with improved layout and design. As the President of the Association of Political Science Students, I wish the authors and editors of this journal the very best in their future endeavours. I am confident their experience with the journal will prove to be both a source of pride and academic enrichment that will benefit them in their future professions. The articles in this journal are points of departure for further discussion and inquiry, and so I invite readers to critically assess the positions taken. You may disagree and argue with passion, but be sure to contribute an article of your own to the next volume of Polis so that the next cohort of Political Science students can return the compliment. Yours sincerely, Benjamin H. Gillard APSS President, 2013-2014
POLIS
editor-in-chief
Alec Wilson
2013-2014
u of t design in design
associate editors
Breen Wilkinson Casimir Legrand Judy Lim-Yu Sasha Boutilier
Kelly Yizhuo Gao Sara Tang contributors
Carissa Beata Carson Smulders Desiree Hidalgo Emily Faubert Jona Malile Kaleem Hawa Michael Lavergne Nabeela Latif Negin Khorram Peter Gatti Shelby Challis Sonia Ralston Thomas Barclay Tshweu Moleme Zachary Medow
contributing editors
Breen Wilkinson Sasha Boutilier Judy Lim Casimir Legrand Fabio Ponti Jerome Newton Carson Smulders Matthew Boissonneault
contributing photographers
Jennifer Su
IN THIS ISSUE Cameron Wood is a second-year student, studying political science and international relations at Trinity College. He also serves as a Trinity College representative for the Association of Political Science Students (APSS). Carissa Beata is a second-year student at Victoria College studying
criminology and international relations. She is an associate editor of the University of Toronto Undergraduate Journal of Criminology.
Carson Smulders is a fourth-year student of international relations and political science at Trinity College. Christian Paas-Lang is a first-year student at Trinity College studying international relations. He has also attended Model United Nations conferences with UNSOC and served as the Chair of the UNSC for NAMUN 2014. Emily Faubert is a second-year journalism and psychology student at UTSC. She also serves as the journalism program representative in the Arts, Culture and Media Student Association. Kaleem Hawa is a second-year student at Trinity College studying international relations and global health. He will be serving as Chair of the Trinity College Meeting, President of the Hart House Debates Committee, and President of the University of Toronto Liberals next year.
Michael Sarty graduated from U of T in 2013 with an HBA in political science and history. He is currently working in the Saga Prefecture of southern Japan as an English teacher with the Jet Programme.
Peter Gatti is a third-year student majoring in Political Science and Ethics Society and Law. He is currently a member of the Trinity 299 Research Opportunity Program on the War in Afghanistan, and is an editor for Mindful, the journal for the Ethics, Society, and Law program. Shelby Challis is a fourth-year student specializing in political science at Woodsworth College. She has also served as a contributor to the Hart House publication DEMO, a music magazine.
Sonia Ralston is a first-year student in the architectural studies
program in the Daniels Faculty of Architecture, Landscape, and Design, and intends on majoring in architecture and geography. She is also an executive member of the University of Toronto New Democratic Party and a member of the Varsity Blues women's soccer team.
Table of
Contents THE REPORT Abenomics Michael SARTY
1
LOCAL Blurred Lines Emily FAUBERT Roncesvalle’s Gentrification Politics Sonia RALSTON
3 4
CANADA The Future of Prostitution in Canada Carissa BEATA Voter Suppression, Disenfranchisement, and Dirty Politics Christian PAAS-LANG Free Trade and its Effects Peter GATTI
7 9 10
INTERNATIONAL China’s Foreign Policy in South Sudan Jonah MALILE Aid for Trade Michael LAVERGNE Expanding the NSA’s Authority in the U.S. Targeted Killing Campaign Shelby CHALLIS
13 14 16
ESSAYS A Policy Paper on United States Private Security Companies Regulation Cameron WOOD Global Imbalances in the International Monetary System Carson SMULDERS Exceedingly Rational and Distinctively Insular Kaleem HAWA
19 23 27
1
7 3
16
“The U.S. may need to use PSCs out of necessity, but that necessity should not excuse poor spending on a massive scale.�
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THE REPORT Photo Credit: Global Panorama/Flickr
Abenomics PM Shinzō Abe’s radical economic policies and the future of Japan By Michael Sarty
A
s a foreigner in Japan, I am not as connected to local and national news as I was in Canada. Living in the rural prefecture of Saga in southern Japan, I am isolated from the metropolitan bustle and conversation of vast Tokyo. Furthermore, language barriers and my ignorance of contextual history conspire to keep me out of the loop. However, I am exposed to a unique perspective into Japanese news by seeing for myself what is going on, and being able to speak — albeit in my terrible Japanese — to local people. And I can tell you that these days; the most popular topic of conversation in my area of Japan is Abenomics. Abenomics is the colloquialism for the radical economic strategy Prime Minister Shinzō Abe rolled out in the wake of his December 2012 election. Recalling a Japanese proverb, Mr. Abe has described his strategy as a “three arrows” approach — a ¥10.3 trillion (USD$111 billion) stimulus package, monetary easing, and structural reforms to boost
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competitiveness. Lauded internationally as “supercharged” and “audacious”, in the first few months, Abe appeared to have turned the tide against Japan’s recent history of weak leadership and fiscal mismanagement. Japanese voters seemed to share this view, awarding Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party with a significant seat gain in the upper house of the Diet in elections during July of that year. And from my own experience, residents of rural areas felt the effects of Abenomics through the state-funded construction projects that seemed to blanket my prefecture. Yet there are those who doubt the effectiveness of Mr. Abe’s reforms in setting the stage for long-term economic success for Japan. The “third arrow” of Abenomics, structural reform, was rolled out in June to near universal criticism. The Economist called it “timid,” the Financial Times called it “half-hearted,” and the Japan Times deemed it “small” and “hasty”. However, the real fears for most people in Saga, far from the high-level dealings
of Tokyo, are whether the first two arrows in Mr. Abe’s quiver have properly hit their marks. Stimulus spending is certainly the most tangible, everyday proof of Abenomics. On my way to work this morning — a 20 minute bike ride from the west to east suburbs of my town — I counted 4 different construction projects. Most of these are clearly publicly funded – roadwork, improvements to public buildings, and so on. There is a fear that this sharp rise in public spending is simply a repetition of the Lost Decade of the 1990s, a time of government largesse when public works spending outstripped the entire US military budget. Locals see the same patterns from that decade today, as tepid job growth is whitewashed with temporary, government-funded construction jobs. As a resident, I question the necessity of some recent construction projects. Saga Airport, itself constructed during the Lost Decade, has semi-weekly flights to two airports, with a pilot project of one more. Due to its proximity
to several other international airports, it is chronically underused. Yet Saga’s prefectural assembly has seen fit to repave the runway and extend nearby roads. Mr. Abe’s second arrow, of monetary easing, appears to have hit its mark. Certainly, the weakened yen can be felt in the paycheques of those who have to take foreign conversion rates into consideration. And yet for the rest of Saga’s inhabitants, the long-term impact of Abenomics is of serious concern. Mr. Abe has certainly tamed, in the short term, the bucking bronco of Japanese politics. What remains to be seen is whether his reforms can trigger long-lasting economic progress. ■
Blurred Lines
The Intersection of the Public and Private Lives of Politicians by Emily Faubert
Roncesvalles’s Gentrification Politics
Polish Cultural Enclave or Diverse, Gentrified Community? by Sonia Ralston
LOCAL Photo Credit: Jennifer Su POLIS
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LOCAL
Blurred Lines The Intersection of the Public and Private Lives of Politicians by Emily Faubert Photo Credit: AshtonPal/Flickr
T
oday’s successful politician is not only measured by their skill in solving political problems, but also by their overall. Voters tend to identify more strongly with politicians for their personalities rather than their professed politics ideas. The electorate wants to see that a candidate has the moral fortitude to follow through on their campaign promises — while also being friendly and relatable — which is why the majority of political campaigning is spent meeting with voters and developing a public image. When voters are exposed to a politician’s personality, they can see the common ground they share with their elected representatives. When this is done effectively, a politician’s private life can be used as a tool to enhance their reputability.
people.” He proposed cutting the $200,000 councillor office budget, as well as money allotted for councillor travel, limousine services, and club memberships, suggesting that "if we wiped out the perks for council members, we'd save $100 million easy." Once elected, Ford made a point of not using his allotted city budget, instead paying for the expenses from his salary. He claimed $10 for his first year, and $4 for his second year in office. He believed that: "all this office budget stuff is self-promotion to benefit yourself. Why should the taxpayers have to pay for it?" True to his word, in his first council session as mayor, Ford cut councillors’ budgets to $30,000 from $51,300. He then looked to tackle the city’s public transportation system — another one of campaign promises
“When voters are exposed to a politician’s personality, they can see the common ground they share with their elected representatives.” Before the crack cocaine scandal, Toronto Mayor Rob Ford was a city councillor, parading as an everyman despite coming from a privileged background with a well-connected political father. Ford was elected in the 2000 Toronto municipal election by campaigning on his condemnation of the “gravy train” of city spending, and appealing to aggravated voters who were tired of having their tax dollars misspent. In an interview with former media tycoon Conrad Black, Ford said: “There’s two types of people: poor people and rich people, and I side with the poor
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— by having city council agree to extend the existing Bloor-Danforth subway line. The decision resulted in a five point increase in the mayor’s approval rating to 49 per cent, the highest it had been since he was elected. Ford’s first major scandal came in 2010, when he became the subject of a conflict of interest suit for using official council letterhead and other council resources to raise money for his football foundation. As justification, Ford responded by calling himself an “absolute football fanatic.” The suit was eventually dismissed, and
Ford would remain largely out of the public eye until three years later when allegations of drug use prompted reporters to dig into his past. Sarah Thompson, a former mayoral candidate, accused him of groping her a year earlier, and suggested that the mayor might have been under the influence at the time, saying "I thought he was, yes, but I don't know.” Despite there not being any hard evidence, a poll taken later that month showed that 60 per cent of Toronto citizens said they wanted him to step down as mayor. After the emergence of a recent video featuring an intoxicated mayor Ford spouting obscenities and rambling incoherently in a Jamaican patois, just after swearing off alcohol, Ford responded that: “what I do in my personal life with my personal friends, that's up to me…It's my own time.”As an elected official, Ford’s private life has become public. Ford used the blurred lines between public and professional life to create a rapport with the people of Toronto. He has been an advocate for transparency in government; Ford made his voters a priority, meeting with city staff to resolve issues himself and providing constituents with his personal phone number. He has made a point of mentioning “I’m always available,” yet in face of the recent scandal, Ford seems to finally be searching for solitude. Instead of meeting with the press
and holding open city council meetings, he has been calling the police on interviewers, chasing away reporters, and insinuating that photographers taking pictures of his house might be pedophiles. Every person is entitled to some degree of privacy. However, when someone enters the public sphere, they have to take into account that certain issues they may consider private can become matters of public interest. Becoming a public servant means putting the public's interest ahead of your own. So if a private matter would affect the performance of the elected official, most people would agree that it is no longer private. Mockery of Ford’s weight is not something that voters are interested in for instance, however voters should have the right to know about Ford’s alcoholism and potential drug abuse as those issues directly relate to his effectiveness as a leader. There is no longer an unspoken understanding between politicians and the press. If today’s standards had been applied in the past, how many respected leaders would have survived in office, much less been elected in the first place? In contrast, 2010 mayoral candidate Adam Giambrone was forced to drop out of the 2010 race against Ford when news of his extra-marital affair broke. “I think it's fair to say that there is an expectation when you're the mayor of the city that you're 24/7,” said Rocco Rossi,
“However, when someone enters the public sphere, they have to take into account that certain issues they may consider private can become matters of public interest.”
LOCAL another mayoral candidate who ran against Ford, “you have to be in a position to respond and lead.” Some aspects of Ford’s life, such as his home life and family should be kept private, but anything that could affect his judgment — such as illness or substance abuse — is an important part of his public image and factor into his political legitimacy. In the case of Rob Ford, it has become impossible to separate
“The image of Ford is no longer that of a councillor who loves
football a little too much, but instead of a drug addicted alcoholic who refuses to step down.”
the media clown from the elected official. Just as blurring the lines between public and private life has aided Rob Ford in the past, it is now working to his detriment. Although he accomplished quite a few of his campaign promises, the image of Ford is no longer that of a councillor who loves football
a little too much, but instead of a drug addicted alcoholic who refuses to step down. There is no way of getting around the fact that modern elections are influenced by the morality and character of politicians. Ours is a world where everything can be recorded and where public perception and reli-
ability are weighed heavily in the public’s perception of a politician’s competency. Ford seems to finally understand this, showing some rare insight after having recently been caught intoxicated at Taste of the Danforth: “you don't make a public spectacle of yourself.” ■
Roncesvalles’s Gentrification Politics Polish Cultural Enclave or Diverse, Gentrified Community? by Sonia Ralston
Photo Credit: Jennifer Su
R
oncesvalles, one of west Toronto’s most vibrant neighbourhoods traces its beginnings back to the 1940s, when the community was primarily an enclave for middle-class Polish immigrants. This small, ethnically homogenous neighbourhood helped to facilitate the development of economic connections and integrate newly arrived immigrants into a nascent Canadian society. The enclave has since transformed into an ethnically diverse, gentrified community. This gentrification was brought on by the influx of wealthy residents — along with high-end stores — which drove up rent and housing prices in the area as Toronto expanded. The municipality and local management have furthered Roncesvalles’ gentrification by increasing the neighbourhood’s competitiveness in Toronto’s municipal economy.
These influential bodies have been using the neighbourhood’s Polish elements in an effort to boost the community’s standing within the city, despite Roncesvalles no longer being primarily Polish. This, combined with an intensified development of the community’s main artery, Roncesvalles Avenue, represented a concerted effort to commoditize — and profit from — the neighbourhood’s growth in the city. The Polish community in Roncesvalles began as an ethnic enclave following the Second World War. From 1946–1952, over 60,000 Polish immigrants arrived in Canada seeking to escape European concentration camps and later, Soviet control of Poland. A large number of this newly arrived group settled in Toronto and other major cities. However, most immigrants — many of them
highly skilled middle-class workers fluent in French or English — did not actually originate from Poland. Compared to relatively unskilled immigrants who did not speak either official language, these new arrivals had a better chance of finding gainful employment in Canada at the time. The potential for economic benefits that an established, tight-knit, and ethnically consistent community within the city vastly outweighed considerations of external social connections for Polish immigrants who had not yet fully integrated into Canadian society.
populations. Despite its Polish roots, the neighbourhood has been on a steady path towards ethnic diversity since the 1970s. The change in Roncesvalles’ ethnic profile in the last 40 years is the result of shifts in the Canadian government immigration policies during that time. By prioritizing essential skills over race-based considerations in its immigration selection processes, Canadian society as a whole has experienced the same changes some have observed in Roncesvalles. Formed in 1991 through the amalgamation of two separate
“From 1946–1952, over 60,000 Polish immigrants arrived in Canada seeking to escape European concentration camps and later, Soviet control of Poland.” In the time since then however, Roncesvalles has experienced a massive influx of other immigrant
Toronto Business Improvement Areas (BIAs) — the Roncesvalles BIA paints itself as a primarily
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LOCAL
“Despite its Polish roots, the neighbourhood has been on a steady path towards ethnic diversity since the 1970s.” Polish urban village, and neglects to acknowledge other ethnic groups living in the neighbourhood. A BIA, as defined by the government of Ontario in Article 204 of the Municipal Act is a “local municipality” that may “oversee the improvement, beautification and maintenance of municipally-owned land” and “promote the area as a business or shopping area”. The nature of a BIA, therefore, is to find a way of selling the neighbourhood, which in Roncesvalles’ case is being accomplished by appealing to the community’s Polish cultural roots. In fact, the news section of the Roncesvalles BIA’s website is rife with references to Polish culture: Easter celebrations of traditional events like the Sweiconka, an official farewell to the visiting consul general of Poland, and advertisements for the neighbourhood’s Polish Festival which has been branded as “North America’s largest celebration of Polish culture”. The emphasis on Roncesvalles’ Polish cultural activities suggests that the Roncesvalles BIA chooses to exploit the area as the place for Polish heritage, which necessitates neglecting other established ethnic groups in the area. Most shockingly, the BIA’s Polish Festival only allows businesses that identify themselves as Polish to set up stands, despite the fact that the festival was formerly open to any business — including non-Polish businesses — before the BIA changed the name from the Harvest Festival. This illustrates the deliberate exclusion of other ethnic groups on the part of the neighbourhood BIA, as it reinforces the idea that in order for businesses to be successful in the area, they must fit in with the image that has been created for the community. In 2012, Gordon Perks, the city councillor for Parkdale–High Park, expanded economic development in Roncesvalles by spearheading a proposal to re-zone the residential west side of Roncesvalles Avenue. The proposal entailed new zoning laws that would allow mixed-use buildings to be built on the west side, further encouraging the construction of a variety of new smallscale businesses with potentially
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larger size allowances. Councillor Perks and the area’s planning department explained that the new businesses would serve different purposes than those on the east side, and that the businesses would support one another. However, opening up the street to mixed-use buildings could lead to an influx of developers, buildings of a different character and style, and more traffic, which as the High Park Residents’ Association suggests, could mar Roncesvalles Avenue’s eclectic character. Additionally, at a community meeting in April 2012, Councillor Perks insisted on the development of the west side, rather than maintaining the status quo or becoming a heritage district, despite opposition from the majority of residents. The BIA refused to comment on the issue, expressing their desire to avoid conflict with the community’s residents. In short, Perks’ insistence and the Roncesvalles BIA’s refusal to get involved, suggest that both see Roncesvalles as an exploitable commodity within the city’s economy. Moreover, pushing the development of the area illustrates that both the municipality and the BIA are using whatever available means to exploit Roncesvalles’ potential economic value — be it zoning by-laws, or cultural commoditization. The exodus of Polish residents, the rise of pop-up bars rather than ethnic business, and the gradual influx of high-end stores represent the continued gentrification of Roncesvalles. Recently, Polish households have chosen to leave Roncesvalles for the suburbs, which has allowed for an influx of new young professional families to dominate the area. As a result of the dispersal of Polish residents, this young, professional demographic have advanced gentrification by enjoying the neighbourhood’s atmosphere, despite changing the area’s identity. For example, as a result of significant infrastructural developments led by the municipality along Roncesvalles Avenue in 2011, twenty-one new independent businesses appeared on the street by 2012, many of which were pop-up bars and restaurants. The influx reflects the
Photo Credit: Jennifer Su needs of the young professional population — the maintenance of the village aura with a slight Polish ethnic experience. Furthermore, the arrival of high-end stores such as Sobeys and Starbucks mark the effects of advanced gentrification in the area.
allowed for massive development in the area advanced gentrification — it has also meant glossing over the area’s actual community. The mass cultural consumption spurred by the Roncesvalles BIA, and the increased focus on development by the municipality will
“The mass cultural consumption spurred by the Roncesvalles
BIA, and the increased focus on development by the municipality will likely continue, and as such will mean continued gentrification and diversification of the area.”
Roncesvalles began as a predominantly middle-class Polish immigrant community tasked with maintaining and promoting its own culture in the city. That cultural enclave disappeared overtime, and has since been completely replaced by a diverse and increasingly gentrified community. While the Roncesvalles BIA’s focus on Polish heritage allows the neighbourhood to compete in Toronto’s economy — and is what has
likely continue, and as such will mean continued gentrification and diversification of the area. But one is left to wonder, at what cost?■
The Future of Prostitution in Canada
Supreme Court of Canada Declares Three Pieces of Sex Work Legislation Unconstitutional by Carissa Beata
Voter Suppression, Disenfranchisement, and Dirty Politics The Conservative Government’s Proposed Fair Elections Act could cause more harm than good by Christian Paas-Lang
Free Trade and its Effects by Peter Gatti
CANADA Photo Credit: Alex Indigo/Flickr
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CANADA
The Future of Prostitution in Canada Supreme Court of Canada Declares Three Pieces of Sex Work Legislation Unconstitutional by Carissa Beata
O
n December 20, 2013, the Supreme Court declared three existing laws related to prostitution in Canada unconstitutional — a significant move towards the decriminalization of sex work across the country. Although prostitution is highly stigmatized, adult prostitution — the sale and purchase of sexual services from persons 18 years or older — has never been classified as a criminal offence in Canada. Instead of prohibiting prostitution itself, the Criminal Code of Canada does prohibit several activities surrounding the practice. Legal Context The Criminal Code of Canada makes it illegal to maintain, or frequent bawdy-houses, or brothels, to live on the avails of prostitution, and to communicate in public for the purpose of prostitution. In Bedford v. Attorney General of Canada, these three provisions were stated to infringe the rights codified in s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which expresses that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” First, the bawdy-house provision in s. 210 of the Code was found to prevent prostitutes from working in safe indoor locations.
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Bawdy-houses act as a fixed space for sex work allowing prostitutes to cooperate to ensure their collective safety. As such, the Supreme Court established that the provision violates the right to security of the person and conflicts with its objective to prevent community disruption.
nuisance of street prostitution. However, the response initiated by the provision was declared in Bedford to be grossly disproportionate to that goal. Where provisions are found to be grossly disproportionate or overbroad — and therefore inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice — they
“Bawdy-houses, or brothels, act as a fixed space for sex work, whereby prostitutes can cooperate to ensure their collective safety. As such, the Supreme Court established that the provision violates the right to ‘security of the person’ and is grossly disproportionate to its objective to prevent community disruption.” Second, the living on the avails of prostitution provision in s. 212(1)(j) was deemed to infringe the right to security by disallowing prostitutes from hiring support who may increase the safety of their work, such as legitimate drivers, managers, and bodyguards. Though the objective of the provision is to target pimps who exploit prostitutes, it inadvertently prevents the implementation of potential safeguards. Such over breadth thus renders the provision to be in discordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Third, the public communication provision in s. 213(1)(c) also vitiates s. 7 of the Charter by preventing prostitutes from screening potential clients on the basis of intoxication and propensity to commit violence. This provision is aimed at reducing the potential
can rarely be saved under s. 1 of the Charter. In other words, the gross disparity and over breadth of such a provision are seldom “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
protect those rights? Toward Change Although the decision in Bedford was undeniably momentous, its merit rests largely on its symbolic nature. Consequently, there emerges a legal vacuum, wherein various policies will be considered to fill the gap left by the Supreme Court’s decision. With twelve months for legislative response before the ruling takes effect, real change is in the hands of Parliamentarians. In assessing the possible options available to Parliament, four pegs of the spectrum may be identified. First, legislature may opt to play the most powerful card available to the criminal justice system: prohibition. For the first time in
“However, as with all landmark court decisions, questions re-
main as to what will succeed the laws in question. When will sex worker’s rights in fact be redeemed? More importantly, how will the law be transformed to protect those very rights?”
With the three provisions struck down and declared to be “of no force or effect” as per s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, sex worker advocates celebrated the Supreme Court’s decision. However, as with all landmark court decisions, questions remain as to what will succeed the laws in question. When will sex worker’s rights be redeemed? More importantly, how will the law be transformed to
Canadian history, prostitution itself may be made a criminal offence. Though the targeting of sex workers is contrary to the security-maximizing beliefs brought forward in Bedford — and is therefore highly improbable — the option still remains. For example, the United States (excluding the state of Nevada) prohibits the purchase and sale of sexual services, which includes all involvement by
CANADA third parties. Second, Parliament may choose to adopt the Nordic model. Coined in reference to Sweden, Norway, and Iceland’s policies, the Nordic model targets clients and third
a public consultation on the criminal law’s response to prostitution. The launch of an online questionnaire is a commendable gesture by the government, encouraging effective participation by the
“For the first time in Canadian history, prostitution itself may be made a criminal offence.” parties who exploit prostitutes rather than prohibiting sex work altogether. The idea behind this model is that johns and pimps create the demand for prostitution; by suppressing the demand, the supply of prostitution should subsequently decrease. Moreover, it supports the notion that marginalized prostitutes who use sex work as a means of survival should not be criminalized, but their clients and traffickers should. Third, there is the option for the legislature not to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision at all. Without a parliamentary response, the stricken provisions will be left to fall, and prostitution will be decriminalized. Canada could then be on the same footing as Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Australia who have legalized prostitution and currently regulate the trade. This option will render brothels, living on the avails of prostitution, and public communication of prostitution decriminalized in Canada, with the responsibility of regulation passed on to provinces and municipalities. Fourth, Parliament may choose to stray away from the criminal justice system and regulate sex work through noncriminal measures, such as public health and safety. The Canadian Medical Association notes that female sex workers experience “some of the worst health outcomes in our society”, which include alcohol and drug-induced harms, psychological trauma, suicide, as well as HIV and other sexually transmitted infections. Addressing prostitution as a public health issue will likely follow if decriminalization takes place. In New Zealand, for example, the use of condoms is required in regulated brothels. As the government considers their options, the public is left to wonder how the sex work industry in Canada will evolve if prostitution is eventually legalized. To aid the policy-making process, the Department of Justice has initiated
public in expressing their thoughts on the Bedford decision. But to what extent will public views affect the ultimate legislative approach, if at all? The Winning Choice The so-called ‘legal vacuum’ remains the government’s concern. Though the views of sex workers, advocacy groups, criminologists, and the general public are certainly valid, the legislative approach that will be adopted will inevitably be one fitting current patterns in Canadian criminal justice policy. In the wake of bad publicity, politicians can immediately alleviate concerns and criticism by implementing tougher stances on crime. Particularly since 2006, the Canadian government has leaned increasingly toward the repressive crime control policies of the ideological right. Examples of this include the federal Conservatives’ enactment of mandatory minimum sentences for gun possession and an increase in restrictions to obtaining legal pardons. Indeed, the emerging hard-line stance on crime shows that criminal justice policy in Canada has been evolving to become much more like that of its American neighbours.
ishment, the Nordic model will largely satisfy the government’s need to identify certain groups as the primary cause of an emerging social problem. Yet, the charm of the ‘silver bullet’ may blind policy-makers from making informed
“Addressing prostitution as a public health issue will likely follow if decriminalization takes place.” Although the call for more progressive models of prostitution by sex work advocates are compelling, the application of the Nordic model to Canada's recent shift towards tougher crime policies represents the most reasonable and effective solution for Canada. The Canadian government has increasingly presented policing and punishment as solutions to other social problems; likewise, they will be used to address prostitution. However, the politicization of crime often jeopardizes calls for informed policy decision-making. By isolating johns and pimps as criminals deserving of pun-
decisions. How will the criminalization of clients and third parties effect prostitutes? Though the demand for sex work is predicted to decrease, real trends may not reveal such a decline. Will demand actually decrease or merely remain stable under the façade of successful deterrence? Sex work advocates fear that the Nordic model will make conditions more dangerous for prostitutes. Clients may become more cautious in revealing their identities, leaving prostitutes more vulnerable to violent crime. Regardless of whether or not the threat of criminal punishment de-
ters johns and pimps from seeking out prostitutes, the fact remains that the Nordic model on its own does not proactively protect sex workers. Criminal justice policy today adheres more closely to political undertakings than to criminology or public safety. As Parliament formulates its approach toward prostitution, there exists a faint hope that the opinions of sex workers and the expertise of criminologists — along with the experience of public health experts — will influence policy. Only if such participation is manifested can the criminal justice system be deemed a cornerstone of democracy. ■
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CANADA
Voter Suppression, Disenfranchisement, and Dirty Politics The Conservative Government’s Proposed Fair Elections Act could cause more harm than good by Christian Paas-Lang
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n February 13, 2013, Craig Scott, the NDP critic for Democratic and Parliamentary Reform, described the Conservative government’s proposed Fair Elections Act (Bill C-23) as an attempt at “U.S.-style voter suppression.” He was referencing — among other instances — the introduction of new legislation in 2012 in Florida which reduced early voting days and limited polling locations in the state, resulting in long lines that may have deterred as many as 200,000 voters from taking part. In doing so, Scott was trying to evoke a visceral emotional reaction to Bill-C23 by comparing the proposed Act to recent developments in the U.S. politics, which have been characterized by Canadians in the past as a broken, highly partisan, and downright undemocratic system. The immediate effects of the Fair Elections Act are not as dramatic as the changes seen in Florida in 2012. It would not close polling stations, or shorten polling days — in fact the act increases the early voting period in Canada.
is an opposition critic after all — yet it is representative of more widespread concerns over the Fair Elections Act. Criticisms of the bill include allegations that it exists to punish the Conservatives’ political opponents by suppressing voter demographics that are more likely to cast their ballots for NDP or Liberal candidates. The result of this bill, if the opposition is correct, would be an erosion of the impartial foundations of Canadian democracy, and a weakening of political participation in Canada in general — perhaps to the benefit of the federal Conservatives. The first major issue the bill poses concerns the development of a relationship between the federal government and Elections Canada — the non-partisan agency responsible for ensuring the ability of Canadians to vote, and run in free and fair elections. The relationship between the government and Elections Canada over the past decade has been strained, and characterized by various civil suits, official investigations, and even a raid on Conservative head-
“Though the bill is far from perfect, it contains many solutions to some of the most glaring problems in Canadian electoral law .” Though the bill is far from perfect, it contains many solutions to some of the most glaring problems in Canadian electoral law. Scott’s hyperbole may be expected — he
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quarters. Elections Canada has investigated the Conservatives for overspending in 2006, as well as for the Robocall scandal in 2011. The contentious history between
“The cumulative result of this bill, if the opposition is correct,
would be an erosion of the impartial foundations of our democracy and a weakening of political participation in Canada , perhaps to the benefit of the Conservative Party.”
the government and the oversight agency has sparked outcry that the current bill is an attempts to “defang” Elections Canada, a new political obstacle for the Harper Government. Yet if this were true, it would cause the Canadian electorate to suffer. By limiting Election Canada’s mandate to providing information on where, when, and how to vote, Bill C-23 would end the agency’s work regarding get-out-the-vote campaigns. As justification, the Harper government has cited the failure of Elections Canada to combat dramatic declines in voter turnout, but it is unclear how prohibiting the bill from promoting neutral voter participation campaigns will solve issues of voter apathy. In fact, it will almost certainly exacerbate it. Low voter turnout is in part a result of disillusionment with partisan politics, often among youth, and it is doubtful that partisan participation campaigns — which would replace those of Elections Canada — will generate more interest than those run by the impartial watchdog. While forcing Elections Canada to refocus its efforts on informing the electorate may increase turnout, that benefit
could very well be offset by a loss of interest due to a more partisan approach to election participation campaigns. In fact, it may increase resentment towards formal politics and lower voter turnout. The solution seems obvious; the government should strengthen Elections Canada by giving increasing the organization’s resources, not weaken it by restricting its mandate. Concerning Elections Canada, this bill would fail to achieve its goal of promoting voter turnout, while simultaneously weakening an independent organization responsible for the maintenance of electoral impartiality in Canada. The second major criticism leveled against C-23 by the opposition is that it would create restrictions that threaten to suppress votes, especially those of electors likely to vote for opposition parties. For example, one of the bills’ most controversial clauses would eliminate the practice of vouching in Canadian elections. Vouching describes the historical practice of voters with proper identification acting as a reference for the identity of a prospective voter without appropriate ID. Both parties are required to make a sworn
CANADA statement affirming the legitimacy of their actions. The complete elimination of the vouching system is an overreach that threatens to politically silence thousands of Canadians. Harry Neufeld, an author of an influential report on the subject, maintains that there are many reasons to keep vouching around, describing it as a “safety valve” that allows voters to exercise their constitutional right to vote, even if they lack ID. Neufeld does not ignore the problems of vouching, highlighting that there have been thousands of serious
iar with the regulations already in place. Getting rid of the vouching system entirely would certainly reduce irregularities, but risks the de facto disenfranchisement of over 120,000 voters who relied on vouching in the last election. The vouching system is certainly a source of concern for opposition parties since it is used disproportionately by youth, recently arrived immigrants, and First Nations peoples on reserves — demographics which have traditionally opposed the Conservatives at the polls.
“The complete elimination of the vouching system is an overreach that threatens to politically silence thousands of Canadians.” voting “irregularities” associated with the practice. However, there have been zero reported instances of voter fraud related to vouching, and voting “irregularities” are often a result of poor training of election officials, who are unfamil-
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lthough Canada is situated on a massive tract of land, and is full of natural resources, trade has always been of major importance to the country. Several elections have been fought almost solely on the issue of free trade with the United States. The two countries would reach petty agreements over partial or sectoral decreases in tariffs, and reciprocal tariff
Despite these flaws, the bill advocates for plenty of positive reforms. The lifting of the ban on transmission of early electoral results, for example, is long overdue. Harsher penalties for electoral infringements, small increases
in single-donation caps, and a reaffirmation of the total ban on corporate and union funding will all have positive effects on Canadian democracy.
traditions demonstrated by much of this bill. Casting a ballot should not be an economic action, but an expression of civic duty and virtue. By making it harder for
“The lifting of the ban on transmission of early electoral results, for example, is long overdue.” Finally, and most importantly, the bill makes explicit reference to voter calling services formulating regulation to avoid repetition of the 2011 debacle. These provisions are common sense solutions worthy of becoming law. Unfortunately, the positive reforms proposed by the Fair Elections Act are eclipsed by many partisan flaws. In justifying the limitation of Election Canada’s ability to promote voter participation, the Harper Government claimed that it would result in “better customer service for voters.” This phrase encapsulates the general disrespect for democratic
many people — especially minorities and youth demographics to vote — as well as removing the opportunity for truly non-partisan voter participation campaigns, the government is contributing to the deterioration of impartiality in electoral law, and thus furthering the erosion of our democratic traditions. ■
in spite of Canadian public protest. and make recommendations for In terms of GDP and trade growth, improvements. Completed in 1985, the report recommended, the agreement was an unequivocal among other things, that Canada success. Although, despite trade adopt market mechanisms such growth most Canadians did not as free trade to help stabilize the see any improvement in their economy. Despite having “categoriliving standards. The FTA did not help increase real wages, but cally dismissed” free trade in 1983, actually resulted in an increase in Brian Mulroney, who became unemployment. These complaints Prime Minister in 1984, accepted coupled with a myriad of new legal the advice of the Commission and restrictions on the ways that propushed for free trade. Among the vincial and federal governments main considerations for Canada could introduce legislation regardin pursuing free trade was the ing labour, the environment, and problem of the nation’s increasing the economy reveals a very differdependence on the United States ent picture of the agreement. So as an export market without any while the FTA may have helped to legal framework to resolve trade grow the Canadian economy and disputes. The FTA, signed on Janadapt to a changing relationship uary 2, 1988 to take effect in 1989, with the United States, the Canawas expected to create an increase dian people would have perhaps in trade and productivity. seen more positive results had the On the surface, the macroecoPhoto Credit: Billie Greewood/Flickr agreement included provisions to nomic results seem nothing short protect labour and environmental of astounding. Canada began a standards back home. long period of growth, lead by reduction agreements until 1988, In 1982, Liberal Prime Ministrade, which ballooned from 50 when Canada and the United ter Pierre Elliot Trudeau created per cent to 80 per cent of Gross States signed the Canada-U.S. Free the MacDonald Commission to National Product (GNP), as Trade Agreement (FTA).The FTA investigate economic performance exports almost doubled between marked the first attempt at removing most tariffs between Canada mong the main considerations for Canada in pursuing free and America, as well as creating a trade was the problem of Canada’s increasing dependence on the framework for dispute resolution. United States as an export market without any legal framework The agreement was negotiated and passed by Brian Mulroney’s Conto resolve trade disputes. servative government, somewhat
“A
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CANADA 1989 and 1995. Furthermore, Canada “moved sharply upwards in competitiveness rankings”. These statistics are, however, in need of certain qualifications. Not only did an extremely low Canadian dollar play a large part in the increase in exports, but the auto industry accounted for one quarter of Canada’s increases in exports, which economist Jim Stanford claims was not even because of free trade, but rather in spite of it. Even without these qualifications, Canada’s economic growth did not translate into better living standards for most Canadians; relative productivity, wages, and employment all suffered. The “central economic argument,” that the agreement would close the gap between Canadian and American productivity, and the “central social argument,” that this would lead to higher wages, have both been all but disproven. Despite having increased productivity as a whole, the gap between Canada and the United States in productivity has grown. In the mid 1980s Canada’s level of productivity compared to that of the United States was roughly 90 per cent, and though the FTA was expected to close that gap by bringing foreign competition to the Canadian market, productivity has dropped to 72 per cent as of 2012. On top of this, the argument that the FTA would increase wages was also discredited. For Canadians, real wages did not increase; many in fact fell as a result of free trade, while work became “more intense”. Disposable incomes in Canada decreased by 5 per cent in the nine years following the agreement, compared to a 12 per cent increase in the United States. Moreover, unemployment increased from 7.5 per cent to 11 per cent following the implementation of the FTA, and did not go back below 8 per cent until 1999. Between 1988 and 1996, one in five jobs in manufacturing was lost, and though the root cause of this was a recession, the damage was exacerbated by the FTA. Even during the recession — as wages and employment dropped — rates of return for corporations in the “winning” sectors of the economy, such as the auto and electrical machinery industries, grew compared to what they were in the late 1980s. Part of the reason for this trend is that the previously higher Ca-
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nadian levels of state involvement in the economy became subject to “downward harmonization,” to meet the lower, and consequently more “competitive” levels of the United States. In the decade that followed, programs such as Unemployment Insurance were repeatedly cut. When free trade was expanded to include Mexico in 1994, the existing reality that prevented states from getting involved in the economy became entrenched in the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA). Provisions in NAFTA acted as a catalyst for this harmonization. NAFTA’s Chapter 11 includes the right of companies to sue governments if the government encroaches on their business practices. Article 605, as well, requires that Canada maintain consistent oil exports to the United States, which not only puts Canada at risk in the event of an energy crisis, but impedes the government’s ability to undertake environmental initiatives in the Tar Sands.
“This sort of model, which at least provides for some domestic economic security, is almost certainly preferable to the autarchic content of the FTA and the NAFTA.” ans voted against the Tories in the “Free Trade Election” of 1988, but vote splitting between the anti-free trade Liberals and NDP meant that the Conservatives maintained their majority until the next election. The Conservatives were roundly routed at the polls, in large part due to their support of free trade, leaving them with only two seats. Despite having been politically opposed to the preceding Liberal government’s policy on free trade, it became more of a reality than a possibility by 1993, and the government followed through on negotiations for both NAFTA and the World Trade Organization. The continuation of the various free trade negotiations by the Liberals is perhaps symptomatic of a larger trend in free trade to becoming a federally non-partisan issue. Recently, Thomas Mulcair, leader of the federal NDP came
“Despite having increased productivity as a whole, the gap be-
tween Canada and the United States in productivity has grown.”
The provisions of Chapter 11 and Article 605 are particularly problematic when considered in the context of the British North America act (BNA). Sections 91 and 92 of the BNA Act outline the jurisdictions of the federal and provincial governments, respectively, and while the former are given control over trade, the latter are given control over property law. As a federal agreement; NAFTA greatly restricts the ability of provinces to change property laws and pursue provincial interests. One example of this among dozens occurred in 2007 when a law created by Newfoundland that set minimum research and development criteria for oil companies became the subject of an ultimately successful Exxon Mobil lawsuit. Though it is ultimately the federal government that had to pay the settlement, the fact that nine of the ten provincial governments opposed the original FTA speaks volumes about the general Canadian distaste for the agreement. As previously mentioned, the Conservatives were opposed to free trade before their triumphant 1984 election. After the signing of the FTA, the majority of Canadi-
out in support of free trade with Europe, so long as it took into account labour and environment standards. Considering that no major federal party was against it, what is seemingly up for debate was no longer the acceptance of free trade, but rather the content of free trade agreements. According to a study in 2008, 61 per cent of Canadians favoured renegotiation of NAFTA to include enforceable labour and environmental standards. Guarantees for democratic control of environmental and labour standards are not by any means beyond the scope of a free trade agreement. In fact the FTA itself contained a certain few reservations for fishing rights and agriculture. These were, however, only exceptions, and the FTA and the NAFTA largely failed to create many of these sorts of guarantees. A better model in this respect was the 1965 “Auto Pact” between Canada and the United States, which removed tariffs but also, set a quota for American automakers operating in Canada — requiring them to produce one car for every car sold. This agreement resulted
in a boom in the Canadian auto industry, as production soared from 670 000 units in 1965 to just under three million in 1988. Without this guarantee for domestic content, Jim Stanford claims, “We would probably not have an auto assembly industry today.” This sort of model — which at least provides for some domestic economic security — is almost certainly preferable to the autarchic content of the FTA and NAFTA. However, agreements that also guarantee control of labour and the environment for local governments would take free trade negotiations even further. Had the FTA and NAFTA included standards to protect Canada’s domestic economy, labour, and environment — contrary to provisions mentioned in Chapter 11 and Article 605 of NAFTA — the gains made from these free trade agreements could have been more equitable and helpful to Canadians. ■
INTERNATIONAL China’s Foreign Policy in South Sudan
Has China Outgrown the Principle of Non-Interference? by Jona Malile
Aid for Trade
A Brief Synopsis of Bangladesh’s Experience by Michael Lavergne
Expanding the NSA’s Authority in the U.S. Targeted Killing Campaign Legality of the Program is Murky at Best by Shelby Challis
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INTERNATIONAL
China’s Foreign Policy in South Sudan Has China Outgrown the Principle of Non-Interference? by Jona Malile
Photo Credit: Steve Evans/Flickr
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raditionally, the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations has been a keystone of Chinese foreign policy in Africa. However, the viability of this principle is being tested by renewed violence in South Sudan. In December 2013, a power struggle ensued between the government of South Sudanese President Salva Kiir, and rebel forces led by former Vice-President Riek Machar. A ceasefire was announced in January 2014, but both sides have since rescinded on their commitment to peace. To date, the conflict has resulted in an estimated 700,000 internally displaced people, and over 10,000 casualties. In its past relations with Sudan, China has kept a safe distance from the nation’s internal politics, and has reluctantly implicated itself only when its direct interests were at stake. However, the renewed conflict has made it increasingly difficult for China to secure its interests in the region while maintaining its adherence to a policy of non-intervention. Chinese bilateral engagement with Sudan has largely been anchored by its pursuit of energy security to power its domestic economy. The vast oil fields in South Sudan have been the basis of an enduring economic partnership between Sudan and China that has
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withstood the region’s tumultuous past. Prior to South Sudanese independence in July 2011, the production of oil in Sudan was divided between the northern region of Khartoum, and the southern region of what is now South Sudan. During the Second Sudanese Civil War, China maintained relations with the central government of Sudan through the provision of arms in exchange for access to the oil fields in the south. Once it became clear that Sudan would be divided into two states, China had to adjust its diplomatic relations
remain focused on advancing its economic interests. Investment and natural resources in the region — especially oil — have been its overriding concern. Moreover, China has used development aid and the provision of high-risk credit lines as leverage to secure its access to oil. Whereas some Western nations such as the United States have placed embargoes restricting trade and credit on the grounds of human rights violations, China has not been hindered by such considerations to the same extent.
“In the past, China has more easily been able to divorce itself from the political struggles between the conflicting sides to remain focused on advancing its economic interests.” accordingly. It now had to strike a balance in its relationship with the government in Khartoum — since it controlled the pipelines and refineries in the north — as well as build links with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army to ensure future access to the oil fields in the south. This snapshot of the histories of Sudan and South Sudan serves as a vantage point from which China’s policy of non-intervention can be assessed. In the past, China has more easily been able to divorce itself from the political struggles between the conflicting sides to
China has also demonstrated its commitment to the principle of non-interference at the international level. In 2004, the United States and other Western nations attempted to pass a U.N. resolution to impose sanctions on Sudan once the atrocities in Darfur became widely known. However, China prevented the mobilization of these nations’ wills by refusing
to vote on the issue, and later threatened to use its veto after being pushed to take a stance on the issue. Succumbing to the pressures of other member nations would not have been in China’s interest because it would have destabilized the Sudanese government, which would subsequently interrupt its oil production. In addition to furthering its economic interests, China has another rationale for championing the principle of non-interference. In refusing to embroil itself in the domestic affairs of other countries, China is attempting to make clear that it would like to be extended the same courtesy of non-interference by other nations. In this regard, the principle of non-interference is associated with sovereignty, for they are both rooted in respect for the inviolability of states’ affairs. Thus, the recent history of China-Sudan relations suggests that China has been able to uphold the tenets of its foreign policy, despite international pressures to do otherwise. Despite its past adherence to the policy of non-interference, the present conflict in South Sudan
“Despite its past adherence to the policy of non-interference, the
present conflict in South Sudan poses a challenge to China’s ability to remain steadfast in its commitment to the principle.”
INTERNATIONAL
“This engagement in delicate diplomacy represents a deviation from
China’s traditional foreign policy, in favour of one that is more attuned to the internal affairs of other nations. Rather than attempting to shape the outcome of internal affairs, China is attempting to foster cooperation between Kiir and Machar’s forces to stabilize the region and ensure China’s business interests are protected.” poses a challenge to China’s ability to remain steadfast in its commitment to the principle. The rampant violence in South Sudan has implications for China’s interests in the region. First and foremost, the climate of violence is not conducive to the production and exportation of oil. In this regard, China has a vested interest in seeing that the conflict between the warring factions is quickly extinguished. Because peace in the region would be a strategic outcome for China, it must pursue diplomatic measures that will yield this result. China has already begun to assume a more active role by serving as a mediator between the factions. In February 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Kiir and Machar in an appeal to both
parties to end violence and to encourage them to initiate peace talks. China played a similar role in 2011 when a disagreement between Sudan and South Sudan resulted in the complete shutdown of oil production in the region. China recognized that by creating the conditions for successful negotiations between the two countries, it could hasten the resumption of oil production. Treading lightly, China took on the role of mediator to open lines of communication between the governments. This engagement in delicate diplomacy represents a deviation from China’s traditional foreign policy, in favour of one that is more attuned to the internal affairs of other nations. Rather than attempting to shape the outcome of internal affairs,
China is attempting to foster cooperation between Kiir and Machar’s forces to stabilize the region and ensure China’s business interests are protected. The expanded diplomatic role that China has assumed in the South Sudanese conflict suggests that it has outgrown the principle of non-interference. A new set of circumstances, driven by its economic and oil interests, are
is a strategic outcome that will stabilize oil production, and secure its access to oil. Beyond securing oil supplies, the political gridlock in Sudan that has resulted in terrible violence has heightened the urgency for China to act as a mediator, since it is having negative repercussions on Chinese companies working in South Sudan, and posing a safety risks to Chinese workers in the region.
“The expanded diplomatic role that China has assumed in the South Sudanese conflict suggests that it has outgrown the principle of non-interference. A new set of circumstances, driven by its economic and oil interests, are creating the impetus for China to pursue a new trajectory in foreign policy ” creating the impetus for China to pursue a new trajectory in foreign policy. If it is to continue enjoying uninterrupted access to South Sudan’s oil, China must wean itself from the long-standing norm of non-intervention by engaging in measures that deescalate the tensions. For China, the reinstatement of peace in South Sudan
Together, these factors suggest that it is becoming increasingly difficult for China to treat South Sudan’s domestic affairs as peripheral to its trade-driven interests. As the conflict in South Sudan continues to unfold, China’s diplomatic behaviour will serve as an indicator for the trajectory of its foreign policy in the region. ■
Aid for Trade A Brief Synopsis of Bangladesh’s Experience by Michael Lavergne Photo Credit: Jankie/Flickr
T
he tragic events surrounding the collapse of the Rana Plaza apparel factory building in Savar, Bangladesh on April 24, 2013 brought the Southeast Asian nation to many Canadians’ attention for the very first time. For those of us more familiar with the country, the massive industrial accident
which resulted in the loss of more than 1,100 lives, and thousands more injured and maimed, has called into question the efficacy of business and governmental efforts to support the country’s long term development. As an apparel industry professional and responsible supply
chain practitioner, I have long been wary of the country’s ability to cope with the significant expansion of the sector which took place over the past decade. For numerous reasons I had been able throughout my career to resist the purely economic benefits of placing — or recommending the
placement of — production there. For many, the pressures to offset rising infrastructural and labour costs elsewhere in the region — primarily China, which since its’ accession to the WTO in 2001, and throughout the staggered elimination of global apparel quotas, had been able to attract
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INTERNATIONAL the most significant percentage of offshore apparel manufacturing — seemed to have proven too great. Cambodia and Vietnam have also been primary beneficiaries of incremental production outflows from China due to these same cost factors over the past ten years or so. Industry growth there, while meaningful, has been limited due to the relatively smaller human resource base, and in the case of Vietnam; the country’s focused development policies which have allowed it to successfully move its industrial base up the economic ladder quite quickly. The high tech, pharmaceutical, and automotive sectors have helped to bring the country greater levels of income, skills development, and prosperity albeit with their own set of social costs and challenges. One of the questions which some of us who have been involved in trying to manage these significant industrial shifts into Bangladesh have had is: Was the effort of some governments in collaboration with the apparel industry a concerted one aimed at replacing direct, bilateral development aid with industrial wages? In my own extensive experience in managing global sourcing and procurement for multinational brands and retailers, individual businesses have never explicitly placed fac-
tory orders in a given country to support international development aims. They will, however, move quite quickly to take competitive advantage of trade policies allowing for improved margins
“The recent growth of social capital ventures offers exciting developments in capitalism towards more sustainable and collaborative business models.”
and operating efficiencies. This has been the historic pattern of the apparel and textile trades since the early days of the industrial revolution, and is arguably in the nature of the capitalist economic system. I say arguably because it is my firm belief that business will change and adapt to the expectations and pressures of wider society, whether they are driven by consumers, government, or the economic market. On that note, the recent growth of — and interest in — social capital ventures offer exciting developments in capitalism towards more sustainable and collaborative business models. According to Professors Abdur Razzaue and Abu Eusuf of Dhaka University in their 2007 study “Trade, Development and Poverty Linkage: A Case Study of Ready Made Garment Industry in Bangladesh”, the participation of direct foreign aid and garment led exports as a percentage of the
“Was the effort of some governments in collaboration with the apparel industry a concerted one aimed at replacing direct, bilateral development aid with industrial wages?”
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country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have essentially reversed positions since the early 1980s to land at the time of the study around three per cent and 17 per cent respectively. That is to say,
where once direct aid flows represented nearly 20 per cent of GDP, they now represent only three per cent. This explosive growth has led to the creation of nearly four million jobs in the industry in the span of just twenty years, most of them held by women, providing second incomes to countless families while improving accessibility to education, medical care, and skills development opportunities. In Canada’s case, this shift in aid contributions has meant a real purchasing power reduction driven by inflationary impacts in support of the country’s most needy of nearly two per cent between 1998
al aid extended in both periods. One might think then from the above, that both Bangladesh and international aid donors have realized a net benefit by the exponential growth of the Ready-Made Garment industry. The country successfully put millions of poor people to work while donor nations, at least in Canada’s case, realized a 23 per cent cost savings of contributions to Bangladesh’s development. But considering the billions of dollars in apparel exports which have flowed out of the country over the past few years how is it that the robust industrial infrastructure one would expect of such success was apparently lacking at the time of the Rana Plaza tragedy? Simply put, the vast majority of factory owners failed to invest in robust building integrity, proper fire and safety systems, employee training, and industrial infrastructure. Results of initial structural and electrical systems auditing by both the E.U. led Accord and
“What is law on paper and what has been documented as actual industry practice, are night and day apart.” and 2011 based on an analysis of CIDA’s budgetary reports of the same time period. Consequently, Bangladesh dropped in priority, and ranking, from second place in CIDA spending in 1998 to tenth place by 2011 while in actual Canadian dollar terms allocations changed very little from the approximately $CND 90 million of combined bilateral and multilater-
the U.S. led Alliance for fire and building safety in Bangladesh as published on each organization’s respective web sites, have shown a stark failure of the industry to secure construction permits, occupancy certificates, operating licenses and fire inspections by competent authorities. The Canadian and E.U. governments in particular have been loath to look beyond the robust paper legislation demanded of Bangladesh in order to achieve duty free access to Western consumer markets. What is law on paper and what has been documented as actual industry practice, are night and day apart. The failure of Bangladesh can thus be seen as a failure of engagement by Western donor governments all to the betterment, and increased profitability of multinational brands and retailers. Far too often, the aid-fortrade model has simply meant economic benefits for industry as the cost of increased health, human rights, and safety risk for factory workers the world over. ■
INTERNATIONAL
Expanding the NSA’s Authority in the U.S. Targeted Killing Campaign Legality of the Program is Murky at Best by Shelby Challis
Photo Credit: Rennett Stowe/Flickr
T
he National Security Agency’s (NSA) involvement in the highly controversial U.S. drone program has just recently been brought into public light. The NSA, rather than relying on their former methods of human intelligence gathering, is now primarily relying on signals intelligence or imagery, in order to track and ultimately target individuals for drone strikes. Essentially, the NSA went from targeting individuals to targeting SIM cards. In an interview with a former drone operator, Jeremy Scahill of The Nation and Glenn Greenwald of the Guardian — two journalists who have extensively covered the drone program — revealed that the agency identifies targets based on metadata analysis and cell phone tracking technologies, rather than confirming the target’s identity with informants on the ground through human intelligence gathering. What makes this change in intelligence gathering so problematic is that it is a system rife with errors. The NSA’s involvement in the drone program reveals that the agency has potentially expanded its role beyond its original stated purposes. One justification for the NSA playing such a pivotal role in
drone operations is that the U.S. intelligence community — and the military — lack a strong informant network within the region in order to track al Qaeda. Therefore, they need to rely on the NSA’s technology.
the Middle East. Drones have thus become a central component of American counterterrorism strategy within the region. By June 2013, President Obama had approved six times more drone strikes than his predecessor George W.
“One justification for the NSA playing such a pivotal role in drone operations is that the U.S. intelligence community — and the military — lack a strong informant network within the region in order to track al Qaeda.” The disclosures released by the now infamous former NSA contractor Edward Snowden consistently mention the term ‘metadata.’ What this refers to is information regarding the time and location of a phone call or email — it does not include the actual content of those communications. The distinction between these two forms of data is the crux of the ongoing debate concerning the proper scope of NSA surveillance. Snowden — while recognizing the NSA is an asset to conducting counterterrorism operations — believes the NSA has seriously overstepped its bounds. The U.S. government has been deploying unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, to carry out several hundred missile strikes throughout
Bush had over the course of his entire eight years in office. The main justifications for the Obama administration’s increased reliance on drones is that they have arguably proven to be low cost, low risk, and highly effective in the fight against terrorism in the region. These strikes have mainly consisted of clandestine operations headed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), although the Obama administration is currently in the process of trying to shift the leadership of these operations over to the Department of Defence (DOD.) The administration hopes this will quell the public’s concerns over the lack of accountability and transparency that is seemingly an inherent feature of the program. Under the George W. Bush
administration a third of all drone strikes conducted within Pakistan targeted, and ultimately killed a militant leader. Of the strikes President Obama has authorized within the country, only 13 per cent of strikes were successful. The advent of so-called “signature strikes” — in which the U.S. selects drone targets based on patterns of suspicious behaviour rather than targeting specific militants — are taking on an increasingly crucial role in the U.S. drone program and could be contributing to this percentage decrease. Signature strikes increase the likelihood of civilian casualties and are mainly responsible for the deaths of lower-level terror operators, rather than the leadership of terrorist organizations. The legality of this program is murky at best and unconstitutional at worst. The Obama administration has yet to produce a conclusive set of legal guidelines that lay out the precise rules for when and where extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings are legally permissible. However, the issue is further complicated by the increased presence of American citizens on target lists — reinforcing the urgent need for regulation and oversight. It is not a consider-
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INTERNATIONAL ation of whether or not American lives should be valued over those of foreign citizens. However, how a nation treats its own citizens is often a good indicator of how they will treat citizens of foreign nations. In a speech President Obama delivered to the public this past May, he included a justification for the killing of American citizens: " I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen — with a drone, or a shotgun — without due process… But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America…his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a swat team.” The standard that has been set by the current president’s administration and the Justice Department for authorizing
complicity in killing Anwar al Awlaki, an American citizen, and al Awlaki’s 16 year old son Abdulrahman al Awlaki. In Bryant’s startling confession he said: “I was a drone operator for six years, active duty for six years in the U.S. Air Force, and I was party to the violation of constitutional rights of an American citizen who should have been tried under a jury. And because I violated that constitutional right, I became an enemy of the American people.” The questionable legality of drone operations mirrors the questionable legality of the authority that has been provided to the NSA in order to support those operations. The NSA’s ability to store and analyze the public’s communications has not been accompanied with public explanations justifying that authority, nor are there privacy safeguards in place.
“In December of 2009, using the intelligence gathered from the NSA, the Obama administration escalated their use of drones in Yemen. ” the killing of American citizens is that the threat they pose must be imminent. It is only permissible when capture is unfeasible, and if the individual in question is known to pose an active threat to the United States. However, it is unclear if those standards are consistently being met. Brandon Bryant, a former sensor operator working within the U.S. drone program, recently came out publically to denounce the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in warfare. Bryant suggested that he was motivated to speak out against the program after experiencing intense personal guilt for his
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Over the past 5 years, the NSA has begun to assert itself as a central component of drone operations. This is exemplified by the fact that in 2008, the NSA dedicated three of their analysts to investigating the threat that al Qaeda posed in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen; in 2009 this number rose to 45. During this time the agency also began gathering intelligence for both the CIA, and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). In December of 2009, using the intelligence gathered from the NSA, the Obama administration escalated their use of drones in Yemen.
Relying on signal and imagery intelligence rather than human intelligence also has moral implications in that it increases the likelihood of placing civilian lives at greater risk. The Obama administration has adamantly insisted that
He cautions that there needs to be verification of this intelligence from informants on the ground in order to justify the assault on this targeted individual. Otherwise, the chances of the “wrong people” getting killed increases substantially.
“The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that at least 273 civilians within Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have been killed with drones during President Obama’s time in office.”
the use of drones reduces civilian casualties due to the precision capabilities of these weapons. However, with the increase reliance on signal and imagery intelligence the opposite has proven to be true. A recent study conducted by a U.S. military advisor found that within the duration of a single year in Afghanistan — where the majority of these drone attacks take place — drones are 10 times more likely than conventional aircraft to produce civilian casualties. In addition, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that at least 273 civilians within Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have been killed with drones during President Obama’s time in office. There is an increased likelihood of civilians being killed due to metadata errors. The NSA is not only locating the cell phones of terrorist suspects, but they are also equipping drones with “virtual base-tower transceivers” which, in effect, create a fake cell phone tower so that the targeted individual’s device locks into the NSA’s receiver. This enhances the military’s ability to track that individual. However, relying on this method, as one former member of JSCOC warns, makes it “even more likely that mistakes are made.”
One reason for this is that targets are becoming increasingly more aware of the NSA’s reliance on this method of surveillance, and thus have been thwarting the tactic by either randomly distributing their SIM cards among their units, or having multiple SIM cards associated with their identity. The problem is further aggravated when suspected terrorists are unaware of this technology. Ignorant suspects might let innocent friends and family borrow their SIM cards, and therefore put them at risk of being added to a growing list of civilian casualties. There is mounting evidence to suggest that increasing reliance on NSA technology in the drone program further exacerbates the legal and moral dilemmas associated with the use of drone technology. In order to address these dilemmas there needs to be a legal framework to guide the actions of the NSA in their involvement with these operations. Otherwise, rather than preserving national security, it could end up undermining that security by instituting a policy rife with legal and immoral implications. ■
ESSAYS
A Policy Paper on United States Private Security Companies Regulation by Cameron Wood
Global Imbalances in the International Monetary System Incentives for Multilateral Cooperation by Carson Smulders
Exceedingly Rational and Distinctively Insular by Kaleem Hawaby Peter Gatti
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ESSAY
A Policy Paper on United States Private Security Companies Regulation By Cameron Wood
T
he United States is increasingly making use of Private Security Companies (PSCs)1 in conjunction with its armed forces in theatres of war — including Iraq, where the U.S. was involved from March 2003 until December 2011. PSC involvement in Iraq was highlighted by serious power abuses facilitated by the lack of regulation, authority, and oversight of private security contractors by American officials. As a result of these frequent missteps on the part of PSCs, the international community, the U.S. government, and PSCs themselves are beginning to create regulatory policies, to govern the conduct of private firms overseas. However, given that these policy changes are recent, it is too soon to determine whether or not they will be effective in reining in abuses. In order to continue this process towards increased accountability, the U.S. government should refer to existing international standards such as the Montreux Document2 — a set of guiding principles for the oversight of private military and security companies produced by the Swiss government in conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross – as well as the Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contract Act of 2007 THE PROBLEM Throughout the 2000s the U.S. increased its use of PSCs in Iraq for several reasons, some of which have presented significant problems. The reasoning behind the increase is primarily a consideration of necessity as well as perceived benefit added, which may in fact only be theoretical. Unfortunately, the rapid increase in demand for private contractors in U.S.-led conflicts has complicated the oversight and control processes. Proponents of PSCs articulate the political benefits of having private firms perform the more menial tasks required in war, suggesting that the public outcry associated with contractor personnel casualties is less
POLIS 19
politically damaging than when enlisted soldiers die. By 2007,770 contractors had died in Iraq, and thousands more have been wounded since 2003.3 By using PSCs, governments avoid the political consequences of a higher recorded death toll, and prevent their armed forces from dying while carrying out more menial tasks like transportation services. The relatively lower political costs of PSC deployment could influence foreign policy decisions in myriad ways as a government might be more inclined to intervene in international conflicts but could also be less sensitive to the safety of private operators. The role of private firms in U.S. foreign policy continues to expand. The U.S. Army has concluded that in the future it will require contracted personnel — even in active combat zones — to keep the most modern information systems functioning, and indeed it seems that the increasingly crucial role of information in warfare will come under the purview of PSCs in the future.4 Additionally, governments have been shifting towards PSCs to save costs as well as improve the quality of basic services in war while also relying on private companies for information acquisition, expertise and skills, as well as risk management.5 While these benefits are usually valid, there are exceptions and limitations associated with the unstable private security industry. There is skepticism over whether or not PSCs actually lower government expenditures in war. An argued benefit to PSCs is that the costs of training private security and military personnel to do not fall on the contracting state. However, in the case of American use of PSCs, the issue of cost is more complicated than that. Many PSC personnel operating in American conflicts are former enlisted members of the U.S. Armed Forces, and thus have received their training and experience from U.S. funds, although this represents a sunk-cost. Furthermore, while the government may also hire
foreign contractors, thereby avoiding training costs, personnel that the U.S. government has trained in the past may work for other states. Therefore the cost of training represents a give and take relationship between states, in which the cost of preparing personnel for active duty is shared. For that reason, the cost savings in the training of contractors is not necessarily a direct benefit to the contracting state, and could in
contracting war time services out to private companies. The most serious concern presented by PSC industry is undoubtedly the lack of institutional or formalized oversight. There are many reports of abuses perpetrated by PSC personnel in foreign warzones, particularly within the formerly named Blackwater organization. In a 2006 incident, a drunken Blackwater contractor killed one of the Iraqi Vice-Pres-
“The reasoning behind the increase in PSCs is primarily a consideration of necessity as well as perceived benefit added, which may in fact only be theoretical” fact represent a hidden expense. Furthering the doubts surrounding arguments for the economic benefits associated with the use of PSCs privately contracted personnel receive far more financial compensation than their enlisted counterparts. For instance, the private security firm Blackwater — since renamed Xe Services in 2009, and Academi in 2011 — “charges the government $1,222 a day for the services of a private military contractor. This is equivalent to $445,000 per year, over six times more than the cost of an equivalent U.S. soldier.” 6 The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) argues that because PSC’s have the ability to hire, and fire personnel quickly, the government saves money overall, although there do not appear to be concrete numbers to support this argument.7 In fact, the proposed Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007, which was sponsored by President Barack Obama, requires reports on the number of persons performing work in Iraq and Afghanistan under contract, the companies assigning these contracts, the total costs of these contracts, as well as the total number of persons killed or wounded while performing contracted duties overseas. However, the Act failed to pass through Congress, thereby leaving a serious gap in the U.S. government’s ability to fully account for the theoretical cost benefits of
ident’s guards.). Within 36 hours after the incident, the U.S. State department had allowed Blackwater to transport the responsible contractor out of Iraq, and there is no evidence to suggest that that the State Department took steps to prevent the incident from occurring in the first place. The State Department’s failure to levy a punishment for the incident is due to the fact that PSCs in Iraq are only responsible to their contractor, and CPA Order 17 8, which grants private security firm employees immunity from Iraqi law. While it appears that there is some existing control structure in place for the oversight of PSC conduct that structure is far from ideal. The simple relationship between individual contractors and the PSCs that employ them essentially places private firms outside of the jurisdictions of both domestic and international law. The only provisions for conduct guidelines and disciplinary processes are found in the contract between employers and their personnel, which represents a significant lack of legal oversight in the industry. . This lack of oversight allows for serious shortcuts to be taken that can endanger PSC personnel, civilians and, traditional soldiers, as private firms are not necessarily required to obey legal standards in their conduct. In Steve Fainaru’s Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq, Fainaru recalls the lack of over-
ESSAY sight by the company Crescent and its contractors. He describes the Crescent’s hiring of alcoholics and convicted domestic abusers to lead missions that involved teams of six men in lightly armored Chevrolet Suburbans protecting convoys of dozens of trucks. Scenarios like this one highlight significant problems of accountability present in PSC recruitment and training practices as well as equipment standards. Hiring men who would not legally be allowed to carry a gun in America; inadequately training personnel in the risks associated with a certain mission, and their responsibilities in the use of force; and providing woefully inadequate equipment makes PSCs more volatile and thus enhances the risks of warfare for all involved. CURRENT ATTEMPTS AT REGULATION In an effort to address the almost anarchic nature of the PSC industry, there has been an influx of attempts at regulation at the international, state and company levels to regulate PSC industry behavior since 2007. This paper focuses primarily on U.S. regulation attempts. INTERNATIONAL: THE MONTREUX DOCUMENT The 2008 Montreux Document9 — of which the United States is a signatory — delineates international law as it applies to states and PSCs and includes a compilation of best practices for states, private firms, and their personnel.10 The document suggests that all countries have an obligation under international law to ensure respect for international humanitarian and human rights law;, to enact legislation domestically to support such laws; to establish effective penal sanctions for transgressions;, as well as investigate, prosecute, extradite, and surrender persons suspected of committing crimes under international law to the relevant authorities.11 The document also adds that contracting states have an obligation not to contract PSCs for purely government activities, and to provide reparations for violations of international human law; and finally, that those
violations be attributed to the contracting state.12 Furthermore, it provides for company-based regulation, stating that PSCs and their personnel are obliged to comply with both international and domestic law, and are subject to prosecution under those same laws13 Additionally, PSC personnel are entitled to prisoner-of-war status and are protected as citizens under international humanitarian law, unless they are incorporated into the regular armed forces14. The multi-level regulation scheme proposed by the Montreux Document is an effective basis for PSC regulation. By obliging all states and companies, the document has a greater likelihood of creating beneficial results. One such positive element of the document is a state’s obligation to extradite, and surrender persons suspected of committing crimes under international law15. Coupled with the obligation of all states to prosecute these individuals, these obligations make it unlikely for a lack of accountability to be a factor in the PSC industry in the future. Moreover, mandates such as CPA Order 17 would no longer allow PSCs immunity from prosecution in the territorial state. Through these obligations, the document seeks to rein in the lack of legal control present in the PSC industry. The document’s clarification of PSC personnel’s legal standing fills in a significant gap in international law.16 In the past there were concerns over whether PSC personnel were mercenaries, civilians, or part of the armed forces. The document alleviates these concerns over PSC personnel legality and rights. Along with increasing the accountability of PSCs under international law, the document also increases the accountability of other actors towards PSCs by establishing their rights to prisoner-of-war status, and establishing their rights as citizens — except when incorporated into regular armed forces. Moreover, by constraining them to a defensive role rather than an aggressive one, PSCs cannot be considered mercenaries, and therefore do not represent an illegal form of military service. The perceived gap in international law as it relates to state, company,
and personnel responsibilities — as well as personnel rights — has been satisfied by the understanding presented by the Montreux document, thus laying the basis for greater, and more effective regulation on the international level in the future. There is, however, the possibility of another problem affecting oversight as there is no way of guaranteeing that violations of international law will be reported. Given that the private industry’s primary purpose is profit creation, PSCs cannot be relied upon to report on their own violations, and in a scenario with multiple PSCs operating in a single conflict there is no guarantee that eye witnesses will be able to identify the PSC, or individual personnel responsible for violations. STATE LEVEL (U.S.) This section focuses on two types of attempts at regulation within the U.S.: bills in Congress17, and Department of Defense mandates, directives, and instructions. One example of an attempt at U.S. regulation of PSCs is President Obama’s Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007.18 Though this bill — and two others attempting to regulate PSCs — died in Congress, they should be seen as the basis for PSC regulation from an American standpoint. President Obama’s bill sought to enforce accountability, and enhance congressional oversight for personnel performing private security functions under federal contracts. It called for reports on: the number of personnel and companies working in Iraq and Afghanistan; the total operational costs of PSCs; the number of personnel killed or wounded; the policies and procedures through
supervisory roles to personnel, or threaten the safety of contractors or U.S. armed forces. Finally, it called for transparency of personnel information, as well as cost estimates upon the assignment of a contract, and a report on actual costs at the contract’s conclusion. Though the bill failed, it represents a growing awareness of the need to establish policy on the PSC industry within the U.S. government. The most striking element of this bill is the request of a report on the number of personnel and companies operating under U.S. contract in Iraq and Afghanistan.20 The U.S. government does not even have a current record of the number of contracts it has awarded. It should therefore be no surprise that abuses by contractors can often go unregulated, as the U.S. Congress does not have adequate information on the current use of PSCs. There is a basic lack of information inherent to the United States’ involvement with the PSC industry —to the extent that a bill must ask for the costs associated with their use. Serious questions must be asked about the validity of using PSCs in conflicts if the relevant financial considerations remain unanswered. Without this understanding, the stipulation that the use of PSCs creates savings for the government remains unsubstantiated. In an industry where a private firm like Blackwater received over $1 billion in federal contracts from 2001 to 200621, misunderstandings of costs are unacceptable. The U.S. government should consider the consequences of associating with an industry whose cost-saving benefits are unclear while the country experiences a major recession and further acquisition of debt. The U.S. may need to use PSCs out of necessity, but that
“The U.S. may need to use PSCs out of necessity, but that necessity should not excuse poor spending on a massive scale.” which departments and agencies instruct, and inform contractors of applicable law; as well as the laws broken under contracts, and the outlining of disciplinary actions.19 It further sought to ensure that contractors do not perform solely governmental roles, or
necessity should not excuse poor spending on a massive scale. Despite the failure to pass legislation specifically on PSCs, there have been attempts to regulate the industry within the Department of Defense. In fact, one of President Barack Obama’s campaign
POLIS 20
ESSAY promises in 2008 was to create the reporting requirements, accounting, and accountability required for good governance and actual cost savings when using private contracting companies overseas. It also required that the Pentagon create a strategy detailing when contracting a PSC makes sense, and that it establish the legal status of contractor personnel in order to make prosecution possible.22 The Department of Defense cites three directives and instructions that regulate its policy towards PSCs: The Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence Activities Directive23, The Operational Contract Support Instruction24 and The Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises Instruction.25 These directives are new —all having been established in 2011. Therefore, the effects of these actions cannot be quantified yet, but a look at the theoretical implications can be useful in determining their efficacy. The focus on training for the use of force and its inherent risks, the definition of PSCs’ possible uses, and the selection and investigation of PSCs all fill holes in past policies. The above directives state that PSC personnel are only allowed to be engaged in non-offensive missions and can only engage in defensive combat. This protects civilians as it takes PSCs away from the territory of mercenaries, where personnel are hired primarily to kill. Furthermore, by establishing personnel training requirements within PSCs, contractors will know and understand what constitutes the acceptable uses of force for different scenarios. While it is naive to believe that PSC personnel will adhere to the procedures outlined on the use of force procedure in the chaos of a war zone, these regulations will ensure a greater likelihood of compliance. As well, these regulations protect PSC personnel, as the government cannot use these personnel on dangerous missions in order to avoid unpopular armed forces causalities. The regulations on personnel selection —specifically whether personnel meet all requirements
POLIS 21
for authorization to carry a weapon —ensure that personnel liable to commit abuses are not hired. Furthermore this increases the effectiveness of PSCs, as abusive or irrational individuals no longer participate in missions, therefore increasing the safety of all actors. The biggest concern from a U.S. regulatory perspective is the lack of U.S. law surrounding PSCs. Until a bill similar to President Obama’s is enacted, the U.S. cannot hope for greater compliance with international standards. COMPANY LEVEL REGULATION The final level of regulation is the company level of which the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC)26 is the leader. As of February 1, 2013, 592 companies have signed the ICoC.27 The code endorses the principles of the Montreux Document, and defines itself as a founding instrument for a broader initiative to create better governance; compliance and accountability.28 Signatory companies acknowledge their responsibility to respect human rights and fulfill humanitarian responsibilities in the course of their work. It requires contractor personnel to treat all persons humanely, and requires that all individuals be identifiable and have their vehicles and hazardous materials registered.29 It further stipulates that personnel meet mental and physical health standards, as well as not have a criminal record.30 Company level regulation —if implemented — will have the greatest effect, as it will preempt abuses. Furthermore, while critics of PSCs cite the industry’s profit motives as a possible incentive to shortcut proper action, these regulations encourage companies to exhibit good behavior. In the future, contractors can exclusively use companies who have signed on to the ICoC and look at their compliance record in order to choose which PSC to contract. The company level regulations are similar to other regulations imposed on the industry insofar as they are too recent for a proper understanding of their benefits and downfalls to be considered. However, they do lay the foundations for a merit-based industry
in which the most compliant companies receive the most business, thus making good behavior profitable. Policy on the international, national, and company levels has laid the basis for effective regulation of the PSC industry. The current regulations are too new to glean a full understanding of their consequences and efficacy; however the recent increase in regulation should be seen as a positive step towards an accountable and effective PSC industry. Concerns over the implementation and oversight of such regulations, in the chaos of a war zone, where moral considerations are never a black and white issue, should be raised. Current efforts rely too heavily on PSCs reporting self-reporting —something that is unlikely to happen consistently in a profit-driven industry. In order to move forward, the U.S. government must focus on implementation and oversight to create effective policy. RECOMMENDATIONS Despite all of the theoretical and real life downfalls presented by the PSC industry, the use of private firms is essential to the continued strength of the U.S. Armed Forces. With America’s withdrawal from Iraq, maintaining its presence in Afghanistan, and the shift of its forces to other theatres, the size and applications of U.S. Armed Forces are changing. PSCs give the U.S. the flexibility it will need in the future, as they can be contracted quickly. However, a possible misconception exists in that a PSC’s ability to save money due to the ability to be hired and fired quickly, as PSC personnel are paid six times the amount of their enlisted counterparts. Considering this, a private security contractor would have to be employed one-sixth the amount of time a soldier would be deployed for the government to break even based on their salaries. Governments should consider the length of time they
intend to employ PSC personnel for, and thereby understand how much will really be saved by their employ. Furthermore, PSCs are used in non-combative roles —such as logistics —where equipment and supplies require regular coordination and transportation. Therefore, the use of PSCs is intrinsically linked to longer-term conflicts, and thus might not actually create economic savings. Government policy should consider the costs of long-term use of PSCs, and understand whether their use is actually economically advantageous. If the use of PSCs is determined to be desirable, the U.S. government should allow the Montreux Document to inform its policy. Furthermore, the U.S. government should enact legislation to support the obligations and best practices delineated by the Montreux Document. To further its compliance with the document, the U.S. government should only hire companies who are signatories and have kept faith with the mandates of the ICoC. Given that the U.S. has the largest defense budget in the world, companies will more readily sign and adhere to the ICoC, thereby increasing the quality and variety of services available. Additionally, the government should enact legislation allowing the prosecution of PSC personnel for misconduct. .The government should also favor foreign PSCs whose home state has similar legislation over those based in non-compliant countries. There should be reports by all agencies and departments on which — and to what extent — PSCs are being used under contract. The government should seek to close the information gap between all involved parties including agencies and departments, and the contractors themselves. Finally, the U.S. government should implement a monitoring scheme that does not rely on PSCs and eye-witnesses for the reporting and supervision of misconduct. The govern-
“The government should require reports from the contracting agency or department as well as the PSC, but also follow up with their own reports when abuses do occur.”
ESSAY ment should require reports from the contracting agency or department as well as the PSC, but also follow up with their own reports when abuses do occur. It should ensure whistleblower policies are present in all contracted PSCs, and give monetary or business incentives to companies who exhibit a habit of reporting and punishing cases of abuse. The government should also consider the creation of an investigative unit within the F.B.I as suggested in the Transparency and Account-
ability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007. This unit will investigate and monitor PSC behavior both actively and retroactively to reduce the information gap between PSCs and the government. The Iraq war brought attention to the rise in importance of PSCs to the application of American foreign policy, as well as the pitfalls an unregulated PSC industry can create. Both government and industry have made concrete steps toward greater regulation of
PSCs with innovations such as the Montreux Document, the ICoC, Department of Defense directives and Senate and House of Representatives bills. These policies and suggestions are too new for a proper assessment of their strengths and weaknesses Nevertheless; they do represent increased recognition by the international community, the U.S. government, and the PSC industry of the need for regulation. What used to be an anarchic industry is now becoming significantly more organized;
the U.S. government should take advantage of these initiatives by creating effective schemes for implementation and oversight of these policies, as well as encouraging good behavior through its selection of PSCs. Overall, if these trends towards adequate regulation continue and are supported by the U.S., it is very likely that PSCs will become an effective and co-operative component of armed forces around the world. ■
of management.” Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. P.W. Singer, “War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, January 2004 Also see (“H.R. 369 (110th): Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting Act of 2007,” govtrack.us. last modified January 10, 2007, http:// www.govtrack.us/congress/ bills/110/hr369. “H.R. 2177 (111th): Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting Act of 2009,” govtrack. us, last modified April 29th 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/ congress/bills/111/hr2177 “H.R. 897 (110th): Iraq and Afghanistan Contractor Sunshine,” govtrack.us, last modified February 7th 2007, http:// www.govtrack.us/congress/ bills/110/hr897/text “Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007,” govtrack.us, last modified February 16th 2007, http:// www.govtrack.us/congress/ bills/110/s674 “Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007,” govtrack.us, last modified February 16th 2007, http:// www.govtrack.us/congress/ bills/110/s674 Ibid. Steve Fainaru, Big Boy Rules (Philadelphia: Da Copa Press, 2008), 23 Barack Obama “A 21st Century Military for America,” Obama for America, accessed
February 28th 2013, http:// obama.3cdn.net/303d3f8f5e85133bae_9ypmvyari.pdf 23. DODD 5210.58: gives DOD personnel, engaging in security, law and order or counterintelligence activities, the inherent right to self-defense, requires through briefing and training of an individual’s responsibility. It also dictates that PSC personnel must only use force necessary to carry out their duties. It also dictates when “less-lethal force” and “deadly force” can be used. It gives responsibility of monitoring compliance with the Directive and provides policy oversight to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. (see “Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DoD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence,” asq.osd.mil, April 1, 2011 http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/ psc/DODD_5210.56.pdf ) 24. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS) Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities and provides procedures for OCS, including OCS program management, contract support integration of defense contractor personnel into contingency operations outside the United States. It states that OCS action shall comply with applicable U.S., international, and local laws, regulations policies and agreements. It further states that Contractor personnel may be utilized to support in a non-combat role as long as they have been designated as Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force (CAAF). (See “Operational Contract Support: Department of Defense Instruction,” dtic. mil, December 20, 2011 http://
NOTES: 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Companies or Firms operating in the Private Contracting of Security and Military services industry. Also named in literature and documents as Private Military Firms (see Singer article), Private Military Companies and Private Security Firms. This essay will refer to Companies or Firms operating in the Private Contracting of Security and Military services industry as Private Security Companies (PSC). “The Montreux Document: On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for State related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict,” icrc. org. August 2009. http://www. icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ icrc_002_0996.pdf “Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007,” govtrack.us, last modified February 16th 2007, http:// www.govtrack.us/congress/ bills/110/s674 P.W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security”, International Security, 2002 http://muse.jhu.edu. myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ journals/international_security/v026/26.3singer.html “Private Military Industry.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2013. http:// www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/researchissues/pmsc “Memorandum, To: Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.” latimes.com, October 1, 2007. http://www.latimes.com/media/acrobat/2007-10/32930222.
pdf “Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007,” govtrack.us, last modified February 16th 2007, http:// www.govtrack.us/congress/ bills/110/s674 8. “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised): Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF – Iraq Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq.” Iraqcoaltion.org. June 2004 http:// www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_ Status_of_Coalition__Rev__ with_Annex_A.pdf 9. “The Montreux Document: On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for State related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict,” icrc. org. August 2009. http://www. icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ icrc_002_0996.pdf 10. The Montreux Documents defines PMSCs (the Document refers to PSCs as PMSCs) as”private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves.” Personnel of PMSCs as “persons employed by, through direct hire or under a contract with a PMSC.” Contracting States are defined as “states that directly contract for the services of PMSCs, including, as appropriate, where such a PMSC subcontracts with another PMSC.” Territorial States as “States on whose territory PMSCs operate.” Homes States are defined as “States of nationality of a PMSC, i.e. where a PMSC is registered or incorporated or principal place 7.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
17.
18.
19.
20. 21. 22.
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ESSAY www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ corres/pdf/302041p.pdf.) 25. DODI 3020.50: establishes policy, assigns responsibilities and provides procedures for the regulation of the selection, accountability, training equipping and conduct of PSC personnel and gives procedure for incident reporting. It states that PSC personnel must meet all legal, training and qualification requirements for authorization to carry a weapon in accordance with contract and host country law and have a background check by the company. Additionally, it also requires reporting on all incidents of possible misconduct of PSC personnel, and if
practical an investigation. (See, “Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises”, acq.osd.mil August 1, 2011 http://www. acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_vault/ DODI_302050_01Aug2011. pdf ) 26. “International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers,” icoc-psp.org, November 9th, 2010, http:// www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ INTERNATIONAL_CODE_ OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf 27. “The International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers Signatory Companies,” icoc-psp.org, February 1st, 2013 http://www.icoc-psp.org/ uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_February_2013_-_Composite_List.pdf “International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers,” icoc-psp. org, November 9th, 2010, http://www.icocIbid. Also see “Management System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations- Requirements with Guidance,” Asis International, March 5, 2012, http:// www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_vault/ Item_1997-PSC_1_STD.PDF. The Asis management guidance,
builds on the Montreax Document and ICoC with guidance for respect for human rights law, personnel and their equipment, training and communication. An important element not covered in other documents is the Whistleblower policy saying that”the organization shall communicate to people working on its behalf, their right to anonymously report the nonconformance internally, as well as externally to appropriate authorities. The organization shall not take any adverse action against any individual for the act of making a report in good faith.”
Privatizacao%2520guerra%25203. pdf+war+profits+and+the+vacuum+of+law&hl=en&gl=ca&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgO46rrjekQT0DvPC6eQyx-dEaa87mH3Tmj8tKTbEWnPvuVfomyJ4CcNNn0yv4430kjWGWOr1Z-UFolFNE6KfGCSTyhpH2G2_ CZFXdqlU_MqXcTO9zrpRfnuUZOcvABIvVDZ3q3&sig=AHIEtbSEIJX8TgmwmHKgAA9la-zeNtVQag.
bills/110/s674 Fainaru, Steve. Big Boy Rules. Philadelphia: Da Copa Press, 2008. Barack Obama “A 21st Century Military for America.” Obama for America. Accessed February 28th 2013. http://obama.3cdn.net/303d3f8f5e85133bae_9ypmvyari.pdf.
28.
29.
30. 31.
WORKS CITED: “The Montreux Document: On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for State related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict.” icrc.org. August 2009. http:// www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ icrc_002_0996.pdf. “Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007.” govtrack.us. Last modified February 16th 2007. http://www. govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s674. P.W. Singer. “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security.” International Security. 2002. http://muse.jhu.edu.myaccess. library.utoronto.ca/journals/international_security/v026/26.3singer.html. “Private Military Industry.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2013. http://www.sipri.org/ research/armaments/production/rese-
POLIS 23
archissues/pmsc. “Memorandum, To: Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.” latimes.com. October 1, 2007. http://www.latimes.com/media/ acrobat/2007-10/32930222.pdf. “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised): Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF – Iraq Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq.” Iraqcoaltion.org. June 2004. http://www.iraqcoalition.org/ regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_ Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf. P.W. Singer, “War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. January 2004. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:vPzwQFM2IgIJ:files. privatizacaodaguerra.webnode. com.br/200000083-0eba70fb4f/
“H.R. 369 (110th): Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting Act of 2007,” govtrack.us. Last modified January 10, 2007, http://www. govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr369. “H.R. 2177 (111th): Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting Act of 2009,” govtrack.us, last modified April 29th 2009, http://www. govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2177 “H.R. 897 (110th): Iraq and Afghanistan Contractor Sunshine,” govtrack. us, last modified February 16th 2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
“Management System for Quality of Private Security Company OperationsRequirements with Guidance.” Asis International. March 5, 2012. http:// www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_vault/ Item_1997-PSC_1_STD.PDF. “The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Signatory Companies.” icoc-psp.org. February 1st, 2013. “International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.” icoc-psp.org. November 9th, 2010. http://www.icoc-
ESSAY
Global Imbalances in the International Monetary System Incentives for Multilateral Cooperation By Carson Smulders
T
he current posture of the international monetary system is defined by global imbalances.1 Since the Nixon Shock and the end of Bretton Woods in 1971, the world has undergone a period of massive globalization, ushering in unprecedented growth globally. This has been accompanied by the development of current account deficits in developed nations and massive current account surpluses in emerging economies. There is significant debate about how these imbalances will correct themselves, and how they will affect the current system. Since the increasing integration of global economies has enhanced the effect of potential widespread crises, a correction of global imbalances has international implications. The focus of this paper will be on the international political economy of these imbalances. It will seek to address what incentives for multilateral cooperation arise from global imbalances and, in turn what effect — if any — multilateral cooperation has on remedying them. Arguably, the international nature of the imbalances — a potential for a global systemic crisis brought about by a sharp correction in global imbalances — and the role global imbalances had to play in the 2008 crisis suggest that there are incentives for multilateral cooperation. The paper will demonstrate that multilateral cooperation is necessary in order to coordinate both regional and international policy responses for a gradual re-balancing, and to mitigate spillover effects of unilateral policy decisions.
“Global imbalances are, external positions of systemically im-
portant economies that reflect distortions or entail risks for the global economy.” enforcement mechanisms to induce states to adopt a more stable global monetary framework. This paper will first address the arguments pertaining to the dangers of global imbalances in order to demonstrate that they can threaten — and have threatened in the past — growth and stability. It will then address how cooperation can help to alleviate these threats. The assessment of why multilateral cooperation has done little to address these issues will follow.
“Global imbalances are not a new phenomenon, yet there are
some distinct characteristics that define the period of imbalance that has emerged since the 1980s.”
There are several basic assumptions that undergird this argument. It is assumed that states aim for economic growth and stability.2 In other words, they seek a sustained and uninterrupted growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is justified on the basis that slow, unstable growth is detrimental to a state because it can reduce tax revenue, and therefore its ability to maintain security, as well as domestic stability. Therefore, for cooperation to be justified there needs to be an incentive which provides for stable economic growth. Another assumption is that cooperation can involve a large range of policy options which can range from “informal arrangements — such as consultation and exchange of information — to formal recognition of policy interactions
“States aim for economic growth and stability… they seek a sustained and uninterrupted growth in Gross Domestic Product.” Unfortunately, what little multilateral cooperation has arisen to address these issues has had little effect on the reduction of imbalances. This is because the current system has provided for strong global growth in the past, and because of the lack of
meaning of 'global imbalances.' This paper will use the broad definition offered by Bracke et al. that suggests global imbalances are “external positions of systemically important economies that reflect distortions or entail risks for the global economy.”4 The external positions being referred to are the positions of countries' current accounts. Global imbalances are simply the disequilibrium that exists between the current accounts of major economies. The
and commitments to policies in a coordinated fashion to achieve a mutually agreed set of multilateral objectives.”3 Multilateral cooperation is defined as cooperation between more than two states. Before beginning the analysis, it is important to convey the
current global imbalances stem largely from large current account deficits in the United States and other developed economies, and large current account surpluses in countries such as China and other emerging markets.5 A
economies, a massive increase in financial globalization which has spurred international portfolio diversification, and a relatively strong period of international growth.8 This new period of global imbalances brings with it new uncertainties regarding the future and stability of the international monetary system. These global imbalances have been at the center of an ongoing debate as to the effect they have on the world economy. Prior to 2008, there was a general fear that they were unsustainable and could therefore lead to a major global economic crisis.9 This stemmed from the assumption that when foreign countries ceased to finance the U.S. debt, the dollar would fall, resulting in rising U.S. interest rates and a rapid slowdown in the U.S. economy which, given a fall in U.S. consumer spending, would have a negative effect on the rest of the world economy.10 However, this fear was not realized. Instead, scholars have argued that global
“This new period of global imbalances brings with it new un-
certainties regarding the future and stability of the international monetary system.”
general view is that their cause originates from low national savings in the United States, as well as undervalued Asian exchange rates which promote export-led growth. Bracke et al. note the massive growth in global imbalances in the past few decades. The value of global current account positions as a percentage of global GDP has doubled since 1990.6 Furthermore, the U.S. has been a major focal point of these imbalances, drawing in nearly 75 per cent of the world's savings in the first decade of this century.7 Global imbalances are not a new phenomenon, yet there are some distinct characteristics that define the period of imbalances that has emerged since the 1980s. Most notable are the rise of China and other emerging economies that are converging with the developed
imbalances had a part to play in the global slump that began in 2008, albeit for reasons different from that posed by a slumping dollar. Eichengreen argues that the accumulation of current account surpluses and China's subsequent sterilization of its foreign assets by purchasing U.S. Treasury securities, combined with high savings, stimulated financial flows into the United States.11 This created an environment of low interest rates, high borrowing and increased spending.12 What followed was a large asset bubble which inevitably burst, causing highly leveraged financial institutions to limit lending, and slowdown in the U.S. economy.13 Caballero and Krishnamurthy suggest that global imbalances also contributed to the crisis through foreign countries' desires
POLIS 24
ESSAY
“These global imbalances have been at the center of an ongoing debate as to the effect they have on the world economy.” to acquire safe debt in the United States.14 U.S. banks, providing this safe debt, had to take on increasingly leveraged positions in the domestic debt market, thereby increasing their exposure to toxic assets and the contributing financial instability that characterized the 2008 crash.15 Therefore, there were fears prior to 2008 that global imbalances could lead to financial crises — which the crash confirmed. Although the crisis did not occur in a way that was predicted, global imbalances still had a role to play. However, there is no consensus about the instabilities caused by global imbalances. Prior to the 2008 crash, some believed that fears of a dollar crash were overstated and argued that, instead of a tumultuous correction, a more gradual re-balancing was likely to occur.16 Levy and Brown suggest that in the case of a sharp downturn in U.S. asset prices, private investors will move in to prevent a drastic fall in prices, thereby mitigating a potential for a high rise in interest rates which could strangle the economy.17 Furthermore, they argue that the U.S. position as a net debtor does not affect its role as an economic hegemon — countries will continue to view U.S. assets as an important part of their portfolios.18 This view believes it likely that emerging markets will continue outflows to the U.S. because the U.S. is still the largest market for their export-led growth strategies.19 Therefore, global imbalances posed much less of a threat than those like Eichengreen suggested. Of course, none of these scenarios played out in 2008. Despite the placement of blame on loose money created by large capital inflows to the U.S. causing asset price run-ups, there is some dissent to this view. De Cecco argues that, because of free capital mobility, investment and savings within a country do not need to move in tandem. Therefore, there was nothing stopping banks in Germany from buying toxic U.S. assets.20 Given the general openness of financial markets between advanced economies, De Cecco asks, “do
POLIS 25
we really believe that the U.S. or, say, German private financial institutions would be encouraged in or deterred from investing or divesting abroad by their country of location's surplus of deficit status?”21 Added to this assessment is De Cecco's consideration of lax regulations in the financial markets of advanced countries that contributed to the crisis.22 These arguments attempt to shift blame for macro instabilities away from global imbalances.
that fears over global imbalances did not play out as predicted. However, 2008 did demonstrate that global imbalances could promote instability, albeit in a different way. And simply because the fear of a dollar crisis did not materialize in this crisis it does not mean that, given persistent imbalances, it will not occur in future. Paulo Guerreri contends that even though the 2008 crisis corrected the current imbalances between the U.S. and China by half, the structural foundation of these features means that large imbalances will return and threaten global economic stability in
“Global imbalances do pose a threat to financial stability if allowed to persist indefinitely.” While both arguments hold some weight, it is most likely that global imbalances do pose a threat to global financial stability if allowed to persist indefinitely. Even Levy and Brown, who disagreed that global imbalances were an immediate cause for concern prior to 2008, assumed that there would be some form of correction, albeit a soft one.23 They argue that systemically important economies will look towards a cooperative and reciprocal approach to correcting these imbalances.24 However, they fail to address why these countries will look towards correction in the medium to long-term. Most likely, they realize that some of the instabilities that can arise in the global arena are unpredictable and not limited to the sphere of economics alone. They also have a motivation to underscore the effects of global imbalances, since some believe that they signify declining U.S. hegemony. In arguing the contrary, they attempt to affirm the United States’ global position. Intentionally or not, this affirmation demonstrates a firm belief that U.S. supremacy will continue. Perhaps they are promoting the maintenance of capital inflows into the country. Given that any decline in power means the relative gain of competitors in the world sphere, downplaying the effect of global imbalances is an important political tool. This is not to say that Levy’s and Brown's position regarding global imbalances is incorrect. Indeed, the 2008 crisis demonstrated
the future.25 Also, to believe that global imbalances did not have a role to play in the 2008 crisis is probably disingenuous. Given that some features of global imbalances are unstable, there are indeed incentives for cooperation to mitigate the cost of re-balancing. Subacchi and Noord suggest that cooperation “needs to be necessary, feasible, and to produce a clearly superior outcome in terms of stability and gains — or lower losses.”26 Given that global imbalances can lead to, or will lead to, sub-optimal outcomes in terms of economic growth and stability, it is possible to assume that imbalances can create incentives for countries to cooperate. By establishing that global imbalances can create incentives for cooperation, this essay shall now show that multilateral cooperation, or cooperation between more than two countries, is indeed an effective way of approaching adjustment policies. There is a general academic consensus that in order to overcome these macro-imbalances, there needs to be a readjustment in global demand. Because of the high level of savings in China, there must be an increase in domestic demand in order to promote consumer spending within China and increase the level of imports.27 Along with the stimulation of domestic demand, China should move towards more liberal internal policies and push to internationalize the renminbi.28 Conversely, the U.S.
needs to work towards increasing their savings rate and promote an increasingly proportional balance of payments.29 These solutions to major trade imbalances, however, are easier said than done. They involve an overhaul of existing patterns of growth, and require temporary slowdowns in the economy and involve a large amount of both private and public actors. For example, a practical response to imbalances would be the promotion of flexible East Asian exchange rates in order to make cheap Asian exports relatively more expensive, and thereby increase import volumes.30 However, a shift away from the strategy of export-led growth is a shift away from the strategies that brought many states their success, and they may be reluctant to do so.31 In addition, for the U.S. to decrease its current account deficit there needs to be a general decrease in government spending to increase the savings rate, and a decrease in imports and domestic consumption.32 For the U.S. to navigate the domestic hurdles to achieve these policy responses, and to willingly slow down economic growth, especially in the current context of a recovering economy, the challenge would be immense. The domestic and international opposition to such a strategy would be a substantial barrier to such re-balancing options. Global adjustment requires multilateral cooperation for a number of reasons. Firstly, due to shared regional strategies of export-led growth in East Asia, there needs to be regional coordination to ensure proper adjustment and coordinated policy approaches in order to increase demand in East Asia as a whole. For example, Yonghyup Oh suggests that a more extensive Asian financial market could attract local savings to invest in regionally instead of sending the savings abroad.33 Eichengreen also posits that fostering regional trade integration could move East Asia away from its reliance on the U.S. and developed economies for their exports.34 Furthermore, cooperation is important for the appreciation of the region's currencies against the U.S. dollar.35 If China is unwilling to raise its currency relative to the U.S.
ESSAY dollar, other economies in the region will be reluctant to do so lest they price themselves out of the competitive export market.36 There is thus a need for cooperation to overcome the problem of collective action.37 The question of whether or not the incentives to cooperate — in this case stable growth and integrated regional economies that are better insulated against macro-shocks — is large enough to overcome the benefits that East Asian economies reap from their export-led growth strategies remains to be seen. Multilateral cooperation is also required to coordinate unilateral policy decisions that can have damaging spillover effects in other countries. If the U.S. was to pursue a policy of reducing domestic consumption by means of increasing import duties to protect domestic industries, there would be a worldwide feedback resulting in lower U.S. demand for foreign goods.38 This would hurt those countries that rely on export-led growth. Cooperation is important in order to ensure corresponding strategies in other countries to minimize the impact of decreased U.S. demand. To combat this, Asian countries can promote demand in their domestic economies by increasing government spending and fostering domestic credit markets.39 Foreign demand would rise relative to the fall in U.S. demand, so the world would no longer suffer from a decreased demand environment.40 Subsequently, as prices in the U.S. began to fall, and the prices of foreign goods rose, market-driven forces would create the much-needed exchange rate adjustment.41 This focus on market re-balancing options, in tandem with multilateral cooperation, is an important aspect the rebalancing effort, because it can reduce some of the political tensions which surround exchange rates. Mitigating these political tensions could have promote greater international trust, a necessary condition for international cooperation.42 The absence of multilateral cooperation to deal with global
imbalances can have serious consequences. Adam et al. pose three possible outcomes to the current situation of imbalances. First is a non-adjustment approach, or “unbalanced outcome,” in which the world fails to cooperate to adjust global imbalances, and the threat of a dollar crash re-emerges.43 The second outcome, which takes the first outcome a step further, suggests that massive imbalances, in which the US is no longer able to maintain its status as a lender of last resort, can cause fiscal contraction in deficit countries. An insufficient growth in fiscal spending in surplus countries could threaten internal balance, since there is insufficient domestic demand to make up for the loss in foreign demand.45 Therefore, once again, multilateral cooperation is necessary to achieve optimal demand coordination between major players, particularly Europe, East Asia, and the United States.
“Despite the fact that there are incentives to cooperate to over-
come global imbalances, they are not strong enough to overcome the current system.”
the U.S. dollar would also hurt those countries dependent on U.S. import demand. The regionalism that accounts for differing views could pose a serious problem to remedying global imbalances. This stresses increased need for multilateral cooperation in order to mitigate losses, and to ensure the best outcome for all actors. In fact, there have been several recent instances of multilateral cooperation. In 2006, the IMF brought together the U.S., the EU, Saudi Arabia, Japan and China in order to address the issues of global imbalances.49 One may argue that the failure to bring about policy coordination reveals that the incentives for multilateral cooperation are not strong enough to overcome the current system. This is undoubtedly true, as a new
“Major players such as the US and China have been hesitant to give up sovereignty for cooperation.” There are opponents to this strategy of adjustment. A paper written for the European Parliament by Dr. Stefan Collignon argues that Europe has an interest in maintaining the current system, in which China has strong export-led growth. This is because Asia has proven to be Europe's most important growth market.46 Collignon suggests that an appreciation of East Asian currencies, with a corresponding depreciation of the U.S. dollar, could prove disastrous for Europe's export-dependent states, such as Germany.47 He suggests that China continue its export-led, devalued currency approach to growth, while the U.S. should shift to domestic production in order to decrease unemployment, and “restore trust and confidence in American's leadership.”48 However, as noted above, a unilateral decision by the U.S. to reduce domestic demand, in this case by focusing on domestic production, would be untenable without an increase in domestic demand in surplus countries. The depreciation of
“The absence of multilateral cooperation to deal with global imbalances can have serious consequences.”
global financial architecture — or at the very least a coordinated effort to deal with readjustment — has not yet emerged. This reveals that despite the lack of a concrete outcome from these forums, there is a sense of mutual understanding that the global imbalances can be problematic for the world economy. Of course, greater effort to address these problems came in 2009, after they had contributed to the worst financial downturn since the Great Depression. Guerrieri argues that the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit was, despite its limited success in terms of coordinated policy responses, “a step in the right direction.”50 A result of the meetings in Pittsburgh was the establishment of the G-20 Mutual Assessment Process, or MAP.51 MAP aims to outline specific outcomes to countries’ unilateral policy decisions. The IMF has subsequently suggested alternatives to these policies to improve the global economy.52 Clearly, there has been some movement towards multilateral policy coordination in order to address global imbalances. Despite evidence that there are incentives for countries to cooperate to overcome global
imbalances, multilateral cooperation has had little real effect on coordinated policy responses. In general, major players such as the U.S. and China have been hesitant to give up sovereignty for cooperation. The U.S. — undoubtedly keen on maintaining its global position — would feel constrained by policies that restrict it from acting unilaterally. In the case of China, there is a thin line upon which multilateral cooperation treads in order to not intrude in Chinese domestic affairs. Arguably, despite the incentives to cooperate to overcome global imbalances, they are not strong enough to overcome the current system. Despite the setback in 2008, the current structure of the global monetary system has proven extremely effective for economic growth in emerging and developed economies alike. Furthermore, international organizations are plagued by a lack of enforcement mechanisms. This will continue to be the case without a global hegemon with a global police force to ensure cooperation. The goal of this paper has been to assess the incentives for multilateral cooperation that arise from global imbalances and to address whether or not multilateral cooperation has made any strides in policy coordination for re-balancing. To begin, the paper analyzed the arguments as to whether or not global imbalances were a threat to economic growth and stability. It concluded that global imbalances at the least had a contributing role in the 2008 crisis, and can still lead to global instability. The potential for instability provides incentives for multilateral cooperation because cooperation can ensure the coordination of regional and international policy decisions, and reduce the damaging spillover effects of unilateral policy decisions. It could also help mitigate the effect that different viewpoints of re-balancing could have on re-balancing efforts. It was noted, however, that despite some movement in the international institutions — such as the IMF
POLIS 26
ESSAY and G-20 — to address the issue of global imbalances, there have been few to no multilateral policy outcomes. This is due in part because the existing system can in fact provide strong economic
growth. There is also a notable lack of enforcement mechanisms to convince countries to follow plans to reduce the instabilities caused by global imbalances. ■
NOTES: 1.
2.
3. 4.
5.
6.
7. 8. 9.
A recent article by the IMF in September, 2013 (http://www. imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/res091313a.htm) suggests that global imbalances have indeed undergone a large correction since the 2008 financial crisis. This paper however, will still address the concerns raised by global imbalances in the chance that they return. Paola Subacchi and Paul van den Noord, “Grappling with Global imbalances: when does international cooperation pay?” Oxford Review f Economic Policy, Vol. 28, No. 3. 2012. p. 445 Subbacchi and Noord, “Grappling with Global Imbalances,” p. 447 Quoted in Marcello De Cecco, “Global Imbalances: Past, Present, and Future. Contributions to Political Economy. Vol. 31. 2012. p. 30. Paolo Guerrieri, “Multipolar Governance and Global Imbalances.” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3. 2010. p. 681 Thierry Bracke et al, “A Framework for Assessing Global Imbalances.” The World Economy, 2010. p.1411 Ibid. p. 1141 Ibid. 1141/1142 Barry Eichengreen and Yung Chul Park, “Global Imbalances
10.
11.
12. 13. 14.
15. 16.
17.
18. 19. 20.
and Emerging Markets.” Conference Paper, Conference on European and Asian Perspectives on Global Imbalances. Beijing, July 13-14. 2006. p. 2 Brad Setser and Nouriel Roubini, “How Scary is the Deficit?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4. 2005. p. 195/196 Barry Eichengreen, “The Financial Crisis and Global Policy Reforms.” Conference Paper. Conference on Asia and the Financial Crisis. Santa Barbara, California. October 19-21, 2009. p.310 Ibid. p. 311 Ibid p. 312/313 Ricardo, J. Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthy, “Global Imbalances and Financial Fragility.” NBER Working Paper, No. 14688. 2009. p. 11 Ibid. p. 11 Levy and Brown Reply, in Brad Setser and Nouriel Roubini, “How Scary is the Deficit,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4. 2005 p. 199 D.H. Levy and S.S. Brown. “The Overstretch Myth.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 84. No. 2. 2005. p.3 Ibid. p. 4 Ibid p. 7 Marcello De Cecco, “Global Imbalances: Past, Present, and Future. Contributions to Political Economy. Vol. 31.
21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
27. 28.
29. 30. 31.
32. 33.
34.
2012. p. 41 Ibid. p. 42 Ibid. p. 41 Levy and Brown, “The Overstretch Myth.” p. 7 Ibid. p. 7 Guerrieri, “Multipolar Governance an Global Imbalances.” p. 686 Subacchi and Noord, “Grappling with Global imbalances: when does international cooperation pay?” p. 445 Guerreri, p. 687 Eric Jones, “Shifting the Focus: The New Political Economy of Global Macroeconomic Imbalances.” The SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol. 29. No. 2. 2009. p. 6 Guerreri, p. 686 Ibid. p. 687 Barry Eichengreen, “Should there be a coordinated response to the problem of global imbalances? Can there be one?” DESA Working Paper. No. 69. 2008. p. 14 Ibid. p. 1 Yonghyup Oh, “Asian Monetary Coordination and Global Imbalances.” From: Global Imbalances and the Debt Problem - Should Developing Countries Support the US Dollar? Fondad, The Hague, December 2006. www.fondad.org p. 147 Barry Eichengreen and Yung Chul Park, “Global Imbalances
35. 36. 37. 38.
39. 40. 41. 42. 43.
44. 45. 46.
47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.
and Emerging Markets.”p. 35 Yonghyup Oh, p. 147 Barry Eichengreen and Yung Chul Park, p. 32 Ibid. p. 32 Eichengreen, “Should there be a coordinated response to the problem of global imbalances?” p. 1 Ibid. p. 1 Ibid. p. 1 Ibid. p. 2. Subbacchi and Noord, p. 466 Christopher Adam et. al. “International macroeconomic policy coordination: an overview.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Vol. 28, No. 3. 2012. p. 407 Ibid. p. 407 Ibid. p. 407. Stefan Collignon. “How to Handle Global Imbalances: a Role for European Monetary Cooperation with Asia.” Directorate General for Internal Policies: Economic and Monetary Affairs. 2010. p. 14 Ibid. p. 13 Ibid. p.14 Guerrieri “Multipolar Governance an Global Imbalances.” p. 690 Ibid. p. 682 Adam et al. p. 408 Ibid. p. 408
WORKS CITED: Adam, Christopher et al. “International macroeconomic policy coordination: an overview.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Vol. 28, No. 3. 2012. p. 407 Bracke, Thiery. et. al. “A Framework for Assessing Global Imbalances.” The World Economy, 2010. Caballero, Ricardo J. and Krishnamurthy, Arvind. “Global Imbalances and Financial Fragility.” NBER Working Paper, No. 14688. 2009.
POLIS 27
Collignon, Stefan. “How to Handle Global Imbalances: a Role for European Monetary Cooperation with Asia.” Directorate General for Internal Policies: Economic and Monetary Affairs. 2010. De Cecco, Marcello. “Global Imbalances: Past, Present, and Future. Contributions to Political Economy. Vol. 31. 2012. Eichengreen, Barry. “Should there be a coordinated response to the problem of global imbalances? Can
there be one?” DESA Working Paper. No. 69. 2008. Eichengreen, Barry and Park, Yung Chul. “Global Imbalances and Emerging Markets.” Conference Paper, Conference on European and Asian Perspectives on Global Imbalances. Beijing, July 13-14. 2006. Eichengreen, Barry. “The Financial Crisis and Global Policy Reforms.” Conference Paper. Conference on Asia and the Financial Crisis. Santa Barbara, California. October 19-21, 2009.
Guerrieri, Paolo. “Multipolar Governance and Global Imbalances.” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3. 2010. Jones, Eric. “Shifting the Focus: The New Political Economy of Global Macroeconomic Imbalances.” The SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol. 29. No. 2. 2009. Levy, D.H and Brown, S.S. “The Overstretch Myth.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 84. No. 2. 2005.
ESSAY
Exceedingly Rational and Distinctively Insular The British Decision to Go to War over the Suez By Kaleem Hawa
A
fter nearly two decades of obfuscative political milieu and progressively strained diplomatic relations between Egypt and Western Europe, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal on July 26, 1956. Colloquially known as the Suez Canal, the colossal ten-year development project conducted by the British, French, and Egyptians connected the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. As a result, the canal obviated the need for commercial shipping to sail around the Horn of Africa — thus facilitating European commerce and substantially easing the financial burdens of governing their colonies for Western powers. 1 A little more than three months later, on October 29, 1956, the Israeli Air Force mounted a series of attacks against Egyptian positions across the Sinai Peninsula. The next day, Britain and France issued ultimatums to the Nasserian government demanding immediate cessation of nationalization policies. Pursuant to a lack of Egyptian response they also deployed various aircraft carriers, and initiated a strategic bombing campaign as part of Operation Musketeer on October 31 of that year. 2 This essay is interested in what took place during the pivotal three months preceding this conflagration; it will seek to ascribe determinant models of crisis decision-making outlined in Graham T. Allison’s seminal piece Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis to the British decision to go to war in Egypt. Beyond mere analysis, this essay will specifically argue that both the rational actor and bureaucratic models of crisis deci-
sion-making can be used to explain the British decision to go to war — for different reasons. The first argument will centre around the various conceptions of international politics and economic diplomacy that supported a calculated effort towards war (rational actor model), while the second argument will focus on the impact on the decision-making process of the insular nature, and ministerial power-plays of Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s hastily-formed Egypt Committee (bureaucratic model). Given that the second argument is generally the more accepted of the two by scholars of international relations, this paper will then assess and refute a major criticism of the first argument, which portrays the decision to go to war as fundamentally irrational given the lack of American support for the conflict. Before exploring these issues though, it is important to first establish the nationalization of the Suez Canal as a bona fide crisis so as to justify this essay’s use of crisis decision-making models. In his 1963 overture into the interaction of crisis and foreign policy, Charles F. Hermann stipulates three major features inherent to a crisis. 3 Firstly, a crisis must “threaten one or more important goals of the state.” 4 Given the importance of the Suez Canal for more efficient British international trade and increased military mobility, it is clear that its nationalization was a substantial threat to waning British power in the region. Secondly, a crisis must provide only “a short time for decision before the situation is significantly transformed.”5 An increasingly troubled United States advocated crisis resolution through more traditional diplomatic efforts, and attempt-
“Thus, it was clear that the longer the British waited, the less political capital they would have available to expend on an intractable Middle Eastern military conflict.”
ed to isolate the British by supporting a Soviet and Yugoslavian-backed “Uniting for Peace” motion to the General Assembly of the United Nations.6 Thus, it was clear that the longer the British waited, the less political capital they would have available to expend on an intractable Middle Eastern military conflict. These American initiatives imposed a time constraint on Britain’s decision-making process, and hinted at an ever-evolving political situation that required quick action to pre-empt significant transformation. Finally, Hermann suggests that a crisis “must occur as a surprise to policymakers.”7 While the United Kingdom clearly perceived the growing chill in Anglo-Egyptian relations, numerous scholars such as British international historian Michael Fry have argued that the government could not have anticipated such a drastic and aggressive action from Nasser, who had shown a reticence towards the use of military force in the past.8 Furthermore, there had been no mention of the canal, or outstanding issues in the Suez region at the last Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference that summer. Thus, it is clear that the nationalization of the Suez Canal can be defined as a crisis according to traditional criteria, and it is therefore justified to utilize crisis-level decision-making conceptual models in our analysis. RATIONAL MODEL OF CRISIS DECISION-MAKING This essay’s first argument contends that the British decision to go to war in the Suez can be explained as a conglomeration of rational and utility-maximizing calculations that sought to improve British political and economic stature. This argument is predicated on Graham Allison’s definition of a rational actor model of
decision-making where policy is described as a national choice performed by a governmental chief actor whose “objective is to maximize the strategic goals of the nation.”9 Scholars of international relations will correctly identify the Neorealist undertones to this theory; the father of offensive neorealism, John J. Mearsheimer, goes so far as to argue in Reckless States and Realism that “omitting the rational actor assumption limits Neorealist theory’s ability […] to explain international outcomes.”10 To provide further context, the rational actor model is characterized by a set of assumptions. It assumes that what must be explained in any crisis is inherently the action undertaken. More importantly, the model assumes that said action is a calculated response to a strategic problem chosen by a government actor and therefore requires analysts to conceive of it in the context of that nation’s objectives. 11 Therefore, in order for this essay to prove that the British decision to go to war during the Suez Crisis fit the rational actor model, it will need to prove that the decision could have been justifiably presented to the government as being in line with Britain’s long-term strategic interests. With the background, terms, and assumptions of the rational actor model clarified, it is possible to unpack British decision-making during the Suez Crisis through this model. There were three major harms to Britain’s national interest which military action in Egypt was meant to address: weakened British regional influence in the Middle East, the damage that could be done to Britain’s economy in the eventuality of the nationalized canal being shut by the Nasserian administration, and the shift in the global balance of power towards the Soviet Union. Egyptian President Nasser was widely considered a threat to the
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ESSAY
“Egyptian President Nasser was widely considered a threat to the British and French exertion of power in the post-colonial Middle East due to his mobilization of sympathetic Arab nationalist and paramilitary forces under the banner of Pan-Arabism.”
British and French exertion of power in the post-colonial Middle East due to his mobilization of sympathetic Arab nationalist and paramilitary forces under the banner of Pan-Arabism.12 This Pan-Arabism conceived of a future — coloured by the historical oppression underlying the mandate-system, and specter of colonialism — in which the Arab states were joined into a single nation that was empowered to reject external political control by European governments. The British — who enjoyed at the time a close and profitable relationship with the monarchies governing Jordan and Iraq — were ineludibly vulnerable to Nasser’s subversion, which often took the form of sheltering instigators plotting against King Hussein of Jordan or King Faisal II of Iraq.13 The closely developing relationship between President Nasser and Syrian Prime Minister Sabri al-Asali — a precursor to the two nations’ formation of a United Arab Republic in 1958 — was further bolstered by Nasser’s inflammatory canal nationalization — which naturally concerned a British government that valued its power in Syria and who feared the nation’s proximity to allied Israel.14 All of these developments posed a significant challenge to British regional power, and thus made the prospect of a war to unseat President Nasser attractive. Secondly, it is clear that Britain was economically threatened by the canal’s nationalization. Britain’s use of petroleum had been growing significantly over the years with 1950 estimates placing more than 80 per cent of their oil supply as coming from the Middle East.15 Of that percentage, the vast majority of the oil traveled through the Suez Canal — a fact that underlies the immense importance the British placed on the ability to control the flow through the international governance coalition of the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal. The
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British fear of nationalization was further exacerbated by the Bank of England’s estimates that the cost of replacing Middle Eastern oil inflows with American oil trade would range from $500–700 million per year, something that the Bank argued would “make it difficult to […] avoid economic disaster.” 16 Such an economic cost would not even include damage done to British industry exports, balance of payments, or even the position of the sterling (£), international lenders balked at the fear of default.17 Overall, it is clear that the massive economic costs associated with a potential canal closing — a very possible outcome given Egypt’s aggressive and recriminatory nationalization policy — strengthened the case for intervention.
nists to be anti-Communists in his negotiations with Nasser, and nominally declared that the Soviet Union would provide arms to any government seeking to undercut Western influence.19 He then rooted this principled statement in practice through the sale of a large stock of Soviet arms to Egypt through Czechoslovakia in September 1955 — an act that was met with shock and anger by Britain.20 In response, the United States and Britain rescinded their offer to help fund the building of the Aswan Dam, which was to be used to help control flooding, and improve irrigation in the nation. This perceived act of “tripartite aggression” further alienated the Egyptian government and people from the Western powers. 21 It is clear from this analysis that Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal served only to strengthen the Soviet Union’s position and thus made British intervention a sound and rational political decision to disrupt
“Overall, it is clear that the massive economic costs associated with a potential canal closing — a very possible outcome given Egypt’s aggressive and recriminatory nationalization policy — strengthened the case for intervention.” Thirdly, there is much to be said about Nasser’s burgeoning relationship with the Soviet Union. This argument is distinct from the weakened British regional influence contention in that it identifies British action as being motivated by an interest in maintaining the global balance of power rather than aggressively responding to the more regional challenge of Arab nationalism. Britain, France, and the United States issued a Tripartite Declaration in 1950 advocating limitations on weapons sales to Israel and Egypt in order to reduce the growing Arab-Israeli arms race. That said, the Soviet Union possessed no moral or legal impediments to an arms agreement with Egypt because they had been uninvolved in the Tripartite Declaration, and harboured deep-seated ambitions for the oil-rich territory. 18 In fact, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev abandoned the previous Communist policy of considering all non-Commu-
this dangerous trend. BUREAUCRATIC MODEL OF CRISIS DECISION-MAKING Another theoretical framework that is useful to explain Britain’s decision to intervene in Egypt is the bureaucratic model for crisis-level decision-making. While the first argument elucidated the rational reasons for a British invasion of Egypt, this bureaucratic model adds nuance to the explanation by showing how organizational power-politics and insular decision-making processes shielded British advocates of intervention from their critics and detractors. In seeking to analyze the basis for Britain’s intervention in Egypt, this essay contends that while it is important to articulate significant interests that rationalize
the cause of war, it is equally important to address the reasons that calls for moderation and pacifism were ignored by British decision-makers in the first place. The bureaucratic model of decision-making suggests that governmental behaviour cannot always be usefully summarized as an action chosen by a “unitary, rational decision maker that is centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing.” 22 Instead, conceives of government as being composed of loosely-allied ministries and departments each possessing their own agendas and policy interests. As a result, the final decision to go to war was a result of consensus and power-plays within a closely guarded circle of actors who contributed to an overall disengagement with the opponents of war. Having explained the terms and background of the model, it is possible to analyze the impact of the Egypt Committee on the decision to go to war. On July 27th, soon after President Nasser had nationalized the canal, Prime Minister Anthony Eden formed a war cabinet — christened the Egypt Committee (EC) — to determine the best course of action in Egypt. The EC featured a conglomeration of Eden’s most trusted government ministers including Harold Macmillan the Chancellor of the Exchequer; Selwyn Lloyd the Secretary of State for Foreign Relations; Minister of Defense Sir Walter Monckton; and the Marquess of Salisbury the Lord President of the Council. 23 As a result, knowledge dissemination was immediately limited to a small echo-chamber of trusted advisers. This shielded the Prime Minister from the opinions of critics of intervention throughout the nation. To further demonstrate the EC’s importance in shaping the British decision to go to war, it is important to assess the inherent conflict between the convictions of the men that comprised
“Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal served only to
strengthen the Soviet Union’s position and thus made British intervention a sound and rational political decision to disrupt this dangerous trend.”
ESSAY it and the public opinion of the British people. By September, polling showed that only 27 per cent of the British public supported military intervention, while 64 per cent felt the Egyptian people had some legitimate claim to the canal, and thus wanted to see United Nations involvement.24 It was clear though that the members of the EC were either not attuned to these concerns or, more likely, actively ignored them. Lord Salisbury, for instance, aggressively compared the Nasserian government to Hitler in an effort to overshadow any doubt members had as to Nasser’s intent. He argued, “[t] he lessons of the 1930s should not be forgotten. Experience with Italy and later with Germany had surely shown that if the encroachments of a dictator were not checked at the outset […] the ultimate reckoning involved a far […] greater sacrifice.” 26 Harold Macmillan, the most vocal of the EC members, also chose to downplay concerns that the United States would not support a conflict by saying that “for [Britain’s] immediate needs, we could no doubt expect American aid.” These selective and elaborate attempts by the EC to disregard concerns affiliated with war explain the ultimate government support for invasion. The bureaucratic model also discusses the impact of separate bureaucratic entities interacting with each other. This is the second tier of the argument – one where the model’s conception of compromise and bureaucratic power-plays becomes exceedingly important. Not every member of the EC was supportive of intervention – the most notable opponent was Minister of Defense Walter
Monckton. Rather than engage with his dissent though, Eden, at the persuading of Macmillan, promptly reassigned Monckton to the considerably less powerful role of Paymaster General on October 18, 1956.27 Given that Monckton’s successor — Viscount Antony Head — was a strong political ally of Macmillan, this event can be easily distilled through the lens of the bureaucratic model lens as an example of rival political interests leading to compromised outcomes. 28 This power-play shows how the EC’s constituents ejected dissent from within their ranks in an effort to consolidate the will for war and to necessarily drive the nation closer to war with Egypt. To conclude, the bureaucratic model conceives of two prominent roles played by the EC inner-circle in determining Britain’s invasion: first, that it helped isolate decision-makers from public discontent through obfuscation and visceral language, and second, that it ejected its internal critics through organizational power-play. CRITICISMS OF THE RATIONAL MODEL Shifting now to criticisms, one of the major challenges leveled by skeptics of the rational actor model of decision-making proposed in the first argument focuses on the lack of consolidated American support for intervention and the resultant irrationality of British military action. Implicit to this criticism is the belief that the British government did not weigh the costs and benefits of intervention in a rational fashion. Otherwise, they would have recognized the substantial problems associated
with American reticence to act. Arguing that British intervention in Egypt was staged at a uniquely bad time for the American polity, Louise Richardson of the Canadian International Council says “[t]he mounting of war against Egypt at the same time as the Soviet Union took action against the uprising in Hungary contributed greatly to American anger, for it denied [them] an opportunity to exploit Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe.” 29 The contention here is that British inability to perceive of U.S. hesitation weakens the rationality of Britain’s decision-making process. The response to these criticisms is well established in the body of international relations literature. Professor Bertjan Verbeek, a Senior Fulbright Fellow at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs uses the Realist calculus of an anarchic global ordering to explain the British decision. “Anarchy implies, amongst other things, that states can never be certain of the intentions of other states. […] From that perspective, the British misperception of American intention is not exceptional. At no point did the United States literally announce they would oppose the use of force.” 30 In short, it is conceivable that the British government’s decision was rational given the limited information available to them. This highlights a broader tension relating to crisis decision-making that this essay would like to resolve as well: it is possible for a state to pursue an exogenously determined irrational action using an internally rational and justifiable calculus. This means that it is conceivable for an actor in crisis to act ratio-
nally based on the information available to them but to be later shown, through the benefit of hindsight, to have taken a route that is ultimately damaging to their long-term interests. This essay argues that this is precisely the case with the Suez Crisis and that the first argument made is still correct in assuming British rational decision-making in order to protect its interests. In conclusion, this essay has argued that there are two conceptual models that explain the British invasion of Egypt. Firstly, that a rational model of weighing the political, economic and strategic benefits to preventing Nasserian control of the canal helped cement support for invasion and secondly, that a bureaucratic model of insular politics and organizational power-plays actively led to war. A fascinating extension of this study of the crisis would be to more deeply assess the importance of knowledge dissemination and language clarity. For instance, had U.S. President Eisenhower unequivocally voiced his unwillingness to support military action to the Egypt Committee, would the final outcome have meaningfully changed? Would the political consequences of alienating the United States alter Britain’s rational calculus? Would the Egypt Committee have still insulated and deluded themselves from criticisms? Overall, the Suez Canal Crisis was a seminal issue in Middle Eastern politics that deserves a far deeper level of study in the future to truly understand the intricate nature of the crisis decision-making that shaped it so profoundly. ■
of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Los Angeles: Longman, 1999) 12. 10. John Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism," International Relations 23 (2009): 248. 11. Allison, 13. 12. Said Aburish, Nasser, the Last Arab (New York City: St. Martin’s Press, 2004) 30.
13.
NOTES: 1. 2. 3.
4.
Michael Fry, The Suez Crisis 1956 (Washington DC: Pew Charitable Trusts, 1988) 4. Fry, 6-7. Charles Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit the Viability of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 8 (1963): 63. Hermann, 64.
5. 6.
7. 8. 9.
Hermann, 68. Bertjan Verbeek, Decision Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader (New York: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003) 3. Hermann, 63. Fry, 23. Graham Allison, Essence
David Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000) 49. 14. Aburish, 46. 15. Diane Kunz, Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1991) 87.
POLIS 30
16. 17. 18.
Kunz, 88. Kunz, 102. John Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 171. 19. Auerswald, 55.
20. 21. 22. 23.
Gaddis, 172. Auerswald, 55. Allison, 20. Alexander Shelby, "Anthony Eden, the Egypt Committee, and the Politics of Prestige during the Suez Crisis," Inter-
24. 25.
national Relations 12 (2002): 1. Auerswald, 50. Louise Richardson, "Avoiding and Incurring Losses: Decision-Making in the Suez Crisis," International Journal 47 (1992): 388.
26. 27. 28. 29. 30.
Shelby, 15. Richardson, 383. Richardson, 383. Richardson, 389. Verbeek, 7.
WORKS CITED: Aburish, Said. Nasser, the Last Arab. New York City: St. Martin’s Press, 2004. Print.
Fry, Michael. The Suez Crisis 1956. Washington DC: Pew Charitable Trusts, 1988. Print.
Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Los Angeles: Longman, 1999. Print.
Gaddis, John. We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Print.
Auerswald, David. Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Print.
Hermann, Charles. "Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit the Viability of Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly. 8. (1963). Print.
Kunz, Diane. Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1991. Print.
helby, Alexander. "Anthony Eden, the Egypt Committee, and the Politics of Prestige during the Suez Crisis." International Relations. 12. (2002). Print.
Mearsheimer, John. "Reckless States and Realism." International Relations. 23. (2009). Print.
Verbeek, Bertjan. Decision Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader. New York: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003. Print.
Richardson, Louise. "Avoiding and Incurring Losses: Decision-Making in the Suez Crisis." International Journal. 47. (1992). Print.