CHEVRON CASE:
Ecuador’s defense on the claimants abuse of process in international investment arbitration PROLOGUE
CHAPTER I HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER II THE BEGINNING OF THE CHEVRON III CASE
CHAPTER III THE DISCUSSION OF THE TRIBUNAL’S JURISDICTION
by Ecuador and wrongly determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the merits of the dispute, even against the parties’ will, as expressly and clearly specified in the BIT. They had themselves clearly determined that the effect that should be attributed to said treaty was prospective, thereby waiving any retroactive effect that the provisions of said BIT could have. Ecuador objected to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in light of the arguments listed below: Abuse of process. Ecuador showed that Chevron and Texaco’s positions were inconsistent and contradictory with respect to the previous declarations made by the companies before United States courts, in which they attested to the equity and capacity of the Ecuadorian Courts, while they fiercely undermined these very Courts in the arbitration process. Ecuador requested that, according to the principles of good faith and legal estoppel in international law, Chevron and Texaco should not be allowed to contradict themselves and thus create jurisdiction over a new “litigation”.
BACK TO CONTENT
CHAPTER IV TRACK 1: SCOPE OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
CHAPTER V TRACK 2: DENIAL OF JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction (ratione materiae). Ecuador argued that the claims based on Texpet’s suits were not covered by the definition of an “investment dispute” under Article VI (1) of the BIT; thus, the country claimed that the litigation that was filed was outside the scope of Ecuador’s consent to arbitrate under the BIT. Ecuador argued that Texpet’s claims did not arise nor were related to an “investment agreement” or to a violation of the Treaty “with respect to the treatment of investment” for a series of reasons: a. The judicial claims did not include the features necessary to be qualified as an “investment.” b. The claims filed were not covered by the meaning of Article I (i) (a) (iii) of a “claim to money”, since the complaints were not “associated with an investment” as required by the same article. c. Texpet’s claims were not covered by the category of a “right conferred by law or
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