Truth's Predicate Values by M.H. DeYoung

necessary (pure truth) & contingent (paradoxical truth’s) PREDICATE VALUES:‘is true’ and ‘is false.’ Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln practiced necessary truth: their truth’s logically consistent predicate values were, therefore, mostly ‘is true.’ In a letter to H. L. Prince, Lincoln cited Jefferson’s dedication to naturally antecedent first principles, i.e., gave reason to his logical fidelity: 1 “Remembering . . . that the Jefferson party was formed upon its supposed superior devotion to the personal rights of men, holding the rights of property to be secondary only, and greatly inferior . . . it will be . . . interesting to note how completely the two [political parties] have changed hands as to the principles upon which they were originally supposed to be divided. The Democracy of today hold the liberty of one man to be absolutely nothing, when in conflict with another’s right to property [as politics of slavery had done]; Republicans on the contrary, are for both the man and the dollar, but in case of conflict the man before the dollar [Lincoln’s appraisal of Jeffersonian politics]. . . . But, soberly, it is now no child’s play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation. . . . The principles of Jefferson are the principles and axioms of free society and yet they are denied and evaded, with no small show of success. One dashingly calls them ‘glittering generalities.’ Another bluntly calls them ‘self-evident lies!’ And others insidiously argue that they apply to ‘superior races.’ These expressions, differing in form, are identical in object and effect -- the supplanting the principles of free government, and restoring those of classification, caste, and legitimacy. . . . They are the vanguard, the miners and sappers of returning despotism. We must repulse them or they will subjugate us.” [And, they succeeded to return America to Sixteenth century dogmatism]

‘What the King says, or does, is just!’ An affirmed rationalization, about which Will Durant wrote this: Ultimately, our troubles are due to dogma and deduction; we find no new truth because we take some venerable but questionable proposition as the indubitable starting point, and never think about putting this assumption itself to a test of observation or experiment. Critically reasoned principles of truth, liberty and justice were supplanted by authoritative dogmatic affirmations, the predicate values of which bear the contingent truth value, as “the divine right of justice -- ‘vox justiciae vox dei’” does. Such truth reason-based neither is fitted for knowledge and morality, nor for the rational part of democracy. Purer justice rests mostly as insidious frustrations of those tyrannized by the ‘vox justiciae vox dei’ system of justice imported from England: Tory-Federalist-Whig dogmabased justice. Legal economic mechanisms of this U.S. tyranny had ‘vox justiciae vox dei’ mechanist dogma-based politics as its sponsor. 2 The . . . Federalist dogma of the divine right of justice -- ‘vox justiciae vox dei’ -- was at hand to serve . . . and . . .free use of it [was made]. When justice comports to dogma-based ‘positive’ laws, the underlying dogmatic tenets are made the master of reasoned principles. With justice not reasonable, the stress of great frustration caused by paradoxical mechanist tyrannies were authoritatively spread onto society. When rationalization is the basis of laws, ‘divine right’-based belief quiets (conflates) the natural principles of reason. Still, injustice describes the result! Similarly, dogma-based rationalizations of ‘truth’ yields ‘falsehoods.’ ‘Positive laws’ denude Justice of consistent intelligent meaning, and we also should worry about parallel erosions of the other ethereal products of mind; for instance, culture can only improve by the inculcation of reason-based understandings of truth, and morality. Selections for this anthology are from Our Federal Savings Plan, DeYoung’s research document about “Social Security.” By M. H. DeYoung all rights reserved

2091

TOPICAL GUIDE NECESSARY & CONTINGENT TRUTH

Is Pure Truth necessary and eternal? About liberal seekers What is ‘continuous truth’? Who can tell about it? Confucius: natural moral law Cicero: true law Moses, ‘The song of ’ Hindus: and the ‘Authentic Brahmin’ Kant: The Critique and ‘rational foundations’ Wolf, Fred Alan:‘The Spiritual Universe’ Plato’s Divided Line Leibnitz: ‘two kinds of truth’ Summarizing Kant’s ‘criticism’ Durant, Will: Our troubles are due to dogma Tautology: truth’s veracity test Truth’s ‘correspondence’ theory Truth’s validity Liar Paradox The tycoon and modern manager: a stark contrast Adam Smith: on corporations Legal Positivism Sovereignty Democracy gained respect free-agency is the principle antecedent of liberty American Brahmanist prejudice Laissez faire Tyranny of nomos (see also p.65) logos ‘authoritative truth’ Steuart’s Statesman

a fly in the Whiggish honey States’ rights issues The critical flaw of ‘conservatism’

2091 5 5 13 14 14 14 16 20 26 29 35 42 45 46 50 51 52 54 60 63 64 69 71 72 74 74 76 108 128 133 167 176

TOPICAL GUIDE NECESSARY & CONTINGENT TRUTH

Truth’s predicate values’ war Only our souls are equal The "subsequent" Whig oligarchy Classifying predicate values Predicate Values are critically important Detecting the fork in our American values’ heritage Footprints of Foreign Policy Footprints of Hamilton’s initiative Roger Williams’ compact theory of state The most dominant political ‘state,’ our Leviathan Preemption and exploitation The footprints of the American ‘Leviathan State’ About the metaphysics of life What freedom is found . . . ? Purest Value predicates of truth are found in ‘good’ and ‘right’ about discipline necessary to lift humanity those who prefer visible and transient things Einstein stands out ENDNOTES

185 197 197 202 205 217 235 237 242 242 246 247 259 283 287 289 291 292 316

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

Reason recognizes the enigmatic nature of human life, and is held open, often challenged: when not reasonable, believed ideals are dogmatic. The conservative idealist’s believed dogma is absolute, i.e., closed. The liberal idealist’s reasoning is open, always ‘seeking’ logical consistency and completeness: many Puritan immigrants were liberal ‘seekers.’ Parrington wrote this about dogma called ‘divine right’ and ‘determinism.’ 3

The three parties that emerged from the theological disputes, Anglican, Presbyterian, and Independent, followed, in the main, political divisions of Tory, Whig, and Democrat. ---The first stoutly upheld the absolutist principle in church and state. It stood for Bishop and King. Numbering probably a large majority of the English people, and led by the hereditary masters of England, it was dominated by the feudal spirit of corporate unity. It believed that social order, the loyal subjection of subject to ruler, was possible only through a coalescence of church and state. The subjectcitizen was born into the one as he was born into the other, and owed allegiance both to his spiritual and temporal overlords. Authority, whether in church or state, was of divine origin, and Bishop and King were the Lord’s appointed, answerable for their stewardship only to God. ---The second party was a compromise between aristocracy and democracy. It substituted the principle of elected stewardship for divine right. Rejecting the absolutism of the hierarchy, it turned to the system newly brought over from Geneva, a system that retained the principle of a state church, but which yielded control of the parish to the eldership, a select body of the best and wisest chosen by the laity, with final authority in doctrine and discipline vested in the synod. It drew its support largely from the London burgesses, but with a considerable following of country gentlemen. As the party developed it tended to merge with the nascent capitalism, restricted the doctrine of natural rights to property rights, and prepared the way for the later

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Whiggery of Pitt, or capitalistic imperialism. ---The third party was more or less consciously democratic in spirit and purpose, the expression of the newly-awakened aspirations of the social underling. Numbers of rebellious individualists appeared who wanted to be ruled neither by bishop nor elder, but who preferred to club with the like-minded and set up an independent church on a local, self-governed basis. They took literally the command of Paul, ‘Come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing.’ That was the true church, they asserted, which withdrew from all communion with sinners and rejected the authority of a sinful state; and so they call themselves Separatists. . . It was the doctrines of Separatism, quite as much as the principle of the independency of the congregation, that aroused the fierce antagonism of Presbyterians equally with Anglicans. In the main those doctrines did not derive from John Calvin; they go back rather to Wittenberg than to Geneva, to the principles of Luther and certain German sects. . . . The Quaker was a mystic, sprung from the New Testament, who denied the Scriptural validity of the Hebraized Calvinism and a hireling priesthood, and accepted the Holy Spirit as the sole guide to his feet. The Seeker, on the other hand, who may perhaps be regarded as the completest expression of Puritan radicalism, was an open-minded questioner who professed to have found no satisfactory answer to his inquiry concerning the nature of the true church, and was awaiting further light. The Seekers were individuals rather than a sect, few in numbers yet greatly influential, men like Roger Williams, Sir Harry Vane, Cromwell, and perhaps Milton, outstanding figures of a great age, who embodied the final results of Puritan idealism before it was submerged into Restoration. During the long years of rule by divine right under the first Stuarts, the Anglicans held the Puritan unrest in strict control.

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

Nevertheless a hundred years of debate and changing economic conditions had rendered the attempt to erect in England a counterpart of the French centralized state, no better than an anachronism. The Presbyterian opposition grew rapidly in numbers and prestige, and the early years of the Long Parliament marked the culmination of Presbyterian power. The bishops were overthrown and the elders were in a fair way to seize control of England. But unfortunately for Presbyterian hopes, the radical sects thrown up out of war clashed with the moderates and finally broke with them; whereupon followed the â&#x20AC;&#x153;root and branchâ&#x20AC;? revolution that had been long preparing. The left-wing Independents secured control of the army and set about the work of erecting a government that should be a real commonwealth of free citizens. The voice of the underling, for the first time in England history, was listened to in the national councils, for the excellent reason that his sword was drawn to enforce his demands. But they were too small a minority to leaven the sodden mass of a people long subject to absolutist rule. The psychology of custom was against them. They could strike down their armed enemies in the field, but they could not liberate the minds of men unfit to be free. Militant Puritanism was overthrown and its idealisms became the jest of every drunken tapster in London. But fortunately, not before its political principles, long obstructed by theology, were sufficiently clarified to be laid open to the common understanding of Englishmen. Out of the debates around the camp fires of the army had come a new philosophy that rested on the principle that the individual, both as Christian and citizen, derives from nature certain inalienable rights which every church and every state is bound to respect. This far reaching doctrine of natural rights, to the formulation of which many thinkers had contributed and which received later its classic form from the pen of Locke, was the suggestive contribution of Puritanism

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

to political theory, with the aid of which later liberals were to carry forward the struggle. The far-reaching liberalisms implicit in the rejection of a hierarchical organization of the church were to discover no allies in the major premises of the system of theology accepted generally by the English Puritans, and by them transported to New England. Calvinism was no friend of equalitarianism. It was rooted too deeply in the Old Testament for that, was too rigidly aristocratic. It saw too little good in human nature to trust the multitude of the unregenerate; and this lack of faith was to entail grave consequences upon the development of New England. That the immigrant Puritans brought in their intellectual luggage the system of Calvin rather than of Luther must be reckoned a misfortune, out of which flowed many of the bickerings and much of the intolerance that left a strain on the pages of early New England history. Two divergent systems of theology, it will be remembered, were spreading through northern Europe during the years of the Reformation, systems that inevitably differentiated in consequence of certain variations of emphasis in the teachings of Luther and Calvin. Both thinkers accepted the adequacy of the Scriptures to all temporal needs, but Luther was at once more mystical and more practical than Calvin, deriving his inspiration chiefly from the New Testament, discovering the creative source of the Christian line in the spiritual union of the soul with Christ, and inclining to tolerance of differences of opinion amongst believers; whereas Calvin was ardently Hebraic, exalting righteousness above love, seeking the law in the Old Testament and laying emphasis on an authoritarian system. The one was implicitly individualistic, the other hierarchical in creative influence. The teachings of Luther, erected on the major principle of justification by faith, conducted straight to political liberty, and he

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

refused to compromise or turn away from pursuing the direct path. If one accepts the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, one can scarcely refrain from following Luther in his conception of Christian liberty. If the mystical union of the soul with Christ has superseded all lesser loyalties by a higher and more sacred, the enjoyment of spiritual freedom must be reckoned the inalienable right of every child of God. Neither the political state nor the official hierarchy can justly coerce the individual conscience. ‘One thing and one thing only,’ said Luther in his ‘Treatise on Christian Liberty,’ ‘is necessary for Christian life, righteousness and liberty.’ And from this he deduced the conclusion that ‘neither pope nor bishop nor any other man has the right to impose a single syllable of law upon a Christian man without his consent; and if he does, it is done in the spirit of tyranny.’ 4 Clearly, this is the spirit of uncompromising individualism that would eventually espouse the principle of democracy in church and state; and it was their native sympathy with such liberalism that led the radical Separatists to turn more naturally to Luther than to Calvin. Many of the differences that set Roger Williams so greatly apart from the New England brethren must be traced to the Lutheran origins of his thinking. There was scant room in the rigid system of John Calvin for such Christian liberty. The Genevan thinker was a logician [who deduced irrationally] rather than a philosopher, a rigorous systemmaker and dogmatist who knotted every argument and tied every strand securely into its fellow [to the presumed dogma called ‘mechanism’ which is associated with dogma of temporal substance called ‘materialism’], til there was no escape from the net unless one broke through the mesh. The formalist who demanded an exact system, and to the timid who feared free speculation, the logical consistency of Calvinism made irresistible appeal; and this perhaps

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

suffices to explain its extraordinary hold on the rank and file of middle-class Presbyterians. More original minds might break with it -- men like Richard Hooker and Roger Williams and Vane and Milton -- but academic thinkers and schoolmen, men whom the free spaces of thought frightened and who felt safe only behind secure fences, theologians like John Cotton and his fellows, made a virtue of [rationalized] necessity and fell to declaiming on the excellence of those chains wherewith they were bound. How narrow and cold was their prison they seem never to have realized; but that fact only aggravated the misfortunes that New England was to suffer from the spiritual guidance of such teachers [Parrington’s description of deterministic ‘chains’ and ‘prison’ is reminiscent of Plato’s Allegory of The Cave.]. In seeking for an explanation of the unhappy union of a

reactionary theology and revolutionary political theory, Harriet Beecher Stowe suggested in ‘Poganuc People’ that the Puritan immigrants were the children of two different centuries; that from the sixteenth century they got their theology, and from the seventeenth their politics, with the result that an older absolutist dogma snuggled down side by side in their minds with a later democratic conception of the state and society. In England the potential hostility between Calvinist dogma and individual freedom was perceived by the more liberal Separatists, but in America it was not till the rise of the Revolutionary disputes of the next century that Calvinism was discovered to be the foe of democratic liberalism and was finally rejected. It is a fruitful suggestion, and in its major contention that the liberalisms implicit in the Puritan revolution were ill served by a reactionary theology, it is certainly in harmony with the facts. That Calvinism in its primary assumptions was a composite of oriental despotism and sixteenth-century monarchism, modified by medieval conception of a city-state, is clear enough today to anyone

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

who will take the trouble to translate dogma into political terms. In recasting the framework of the old theology, Calvin accepted as sovereign conception the idea of God as arbitrary and absolute will -an August ‘Rex regum’ whose authority is universal and unconditioned; and this conception he invested with Hebraic borrowings from the Old Testament. The principle of absolutism, indeed, he could scarcely have escaped. It came down to him through the Roman Empire and the Roman Church, from the ancient oriental despotisms, and it was interwoven with all the institutions and social forms against which the Reformation was a protest. But unhappily, instead of questioning the principle, he provided a new sanction for it and broadened its sway, by investing it with divine authority and erecting upon it a whole cosmology. . . . From this cosmic absolutism, that conceived of God as the stable Will sustaining the universe, binding together what otherwise would fly asunder, two important corollaries were derived: the universality of the moral law, and the necessity of divine judgment. From the former flowed that curious association of God’s will with natural causes which induced Cotton Mather, when suffering from toothache, to inquire what sin he had committed with his teeth, and which left no free spaces or non-moral impulses in the lives of men. From the later flowed the doctrine of theological determinism. If time is embedded in the eternity of God’s mind, if to Him past and future are here and now, fore-knowledge is an inevitable divine attribute, and predestination is only a finite way of expressing God’s understanding of how human fate works itself out. Ally this doctrine of determinism with the Biblical account of the fall of man, and the doctrine of the elect becomes the theological complement of the class prejudices of the times. Bred up in the current aristocratic contempt for the sodden mass of the people, Calvinist theologians easily came to regard them

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

as stupid, sensual, veritable children of Adam, born to sin and heirs of damnation. Only the elect shall be saved. That there was a remnant in Israel whom God had chosen, Isaiah had long before pointed out; and the doctrine of the remnant was confirmed for Calvinism by the sinful heart whose daily actions testified to their lost estate. According to such a theology, the individual clearly is in no effective sense a free soul. There is no room for the conception of human perfectibility. The heritage of natural freedom was long since cast away by the common forefather; and because of the pre-natal sin which this act entailed on all mankind, the natural man is shut away eternally from communion with God. He is no better than an oriental serf at the mercy of a Sovereign Will that is implacable, inscrutable, the ruler of a universe predetermined in all its parts and members from the foundation of the earth. Except for the saving grace of divine election, which no human righteousness can purchase, all must go down to the everlasting damnation that awaits the sons of Adam. In the eyes of such a philosophy it is sheer impertinence to talk of the dignity and worth of the individual soul. Men are no other than the worms of the dust. The boon of eternal life is not included in God’s enumeration of natural rights; it is a special grant from the Lord of the universe who is pleased to smile on whom he is pleased to smile. In the hard words of Paul, ‘Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.’ And those on whom he hath had mercy are his Saints, and they are gathered into his church, as the free city-states had risen out of the muck of medieval despotism. They are the stewards of his righteousness and are called to the great work of rulership on earth that God’s will may be done and righteousness may prevail over iniquity. It was an ambitious program, and so long as the Presbyterian party maintained its ascendency in England it endeavored to thrust its

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

Calvinism down every throat, no matter how unwelcome; but with the passing of power from its hands, and the growth of a common-sense spirit of toleration, Calvinism long lingered out a harsh existence, grotesque and illiberal to the last. In banishing the Antinomians and Separatists and Quakers, the Massachusetts magistrates cast out the spirit of liberalism from the household of the Saints. What is ‘continuous truth’? Who can tell about it? In the cosmos of natural reality, and the grand intelligence inferred by it, what anyone might tell about truth is trivial, or less. Human intelligence is incapable to understand, let alone tell about ultimate encyclopedic truth. Call it Pure Truth, that is as expansive and unlimited as the Cosmos; about completeness or correctness, human intelligence is unable to comprehend pure truth: When human speculation about the Creator’s plan for organizing and sustaining the foundations, structure, and forces of nature is exhausted, a pristine source of life and its energy remains: The only natural evidence is, by ontologism, endemic of the intelligent human soul: if there is cosmic teleology, what is it? Religious Dogmatists put faith in absolute doctrine, which proclaims communication and enlightenment directly from God. But by fallacious supplanting of dogmatic belief, they deny critical logic. Still, the search does go on. Only intelligent logical syllogisms can, by inferences, address answers, the questions of which are about life and its pristine source.

‘all religions are alike, and all are searching for the same truth’ Modern Hinduism Truthful answers must withstand constant critical review. Ponderer’s who critically speculate about ‘the truth’ are Philosophers: Their works have earned respect: All that logically is ‘true’ is reasoned truth.5

Logic asks, ‘what are the rules of correct reasoning’?; Epistemology asks, ‘how do we know’?; Metaphysics asks, ‘what is real’?, ‘how does change come about’?, ‘what is mind’?; Axiology asks “what is the nature of ‘good’?, ‘of the beautiful’?, ‘of the religious’?

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Confucius (550-479 B.C.) gave his maxim of human nature:6 which fits here because natural moral law is about truth, about Epistemology:

What is God given is what we call human nature. To fulfill the law of our human nature is what we call the moral law. The cultivation of the moral law is what we call culture. The moral law is a law from whose operation we cannot for one instant in our existence escape. A law from which we may escape is not the moral law. Wherefore it is that the moral man (or the superior man) watches diligently over what his eyes cannot see and is in fear and awe of what his ears cannot hear. There is nothing more evident than that which cannot be seen by the eyes and nothing more palpable than that which cannot be perceived by the senses. Wherefore the moral man watches diligently over his secret thoughts. When passions, such as joy, anger, grief, and pleasure have not awakened, that is our ‘central self’, or moral being. When these passions awaken and each and all attain due measure and degree, that is ‘harmony’, or the moral order. Our central self or moral being is the great basis of existence, and ‘harmony’, or moral order is the universal law in the world. . . . ‘Truth does not depart from human nature, if what is regarded as truth departs from human nature, it may not be regarded as truth. Cicero, in 51 B. C., declared his maxim of true law:7

True law is right reason in accord with nature; it is of universal application, unchanged and everlasting. ‘The song of Moses’ is about metaphysical truth as inferred by the evidence of myriad natural phenomena (this natural truth, of God’s voice, is available to all who deliberate inferentially, syllogistically, and critically).8

Give ear, O ye heavens, and I will speak; and hear, O earth, the words of my mouth. My doctrine shall drop as the rain,

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

my speech shall distil as the dew, as the small rain upon the tender herb, and as the showers upon the grass: Because I will publish the name of the Lord, ascribe ye greatness unto our God. He is the Rock, his work is perfect: For all his ways are judgement: A God of truth and without iniquity, Just and right is he. This ‘song’ is about continuous ‘truth’ that was referred to in the Commandment, by Moses: ‘thou shalt not bear false witness.’ Either there is a paradox in truth’s meaning (there is, for their meanings are dissimilar!), or Moses did not write both scriptures? Did common meaning, as applied to God’s LOGOS and his creations, change to become the opposite of what commonly is meant by lying? Or, did Biblical truth’s original ‘necessary’ meaning only apply to ‘God’s troth’, i.e., faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, promise, . . . ? : i.e., the value predicates of ‘necessary’ truth, which the song of Moses is about, i.e., is those of Jehovah’s Covenant (‘troth’)? ; the value predicate of Plato’s pure thought and reason? ; the value predicates of pure mathematical truth? ; The value predicates of ‘necessary’ truth’s ‘coherence’ definition? Is ‘necessary’ truth, therefore, an independent something that, when garnered inferentially, exists teleologically, as natural energy, gravity, or as time exists, all as a perceptive part of the soul of man, and as confirmed by God’s ontologism? 9 In contrast, if human ‘belief’ in dogma is a truth-form, as Plato reasoned that it was, then ‘belief’ in falsehood, is also a form of truth? However, its truth value predicate is ‘is false’ or ‘is fallacious,’ which has the same connotation. Anyway, a truer natural distinction of this form of truth is that it is ‘temporal,’ and therefore, is contingent instead of necessary. Devout Christians ‘believe’ the Bible is scripture, but other religious orders have existed contemporarily. Their origins were also recorded as sacred writings. About Hinduism Parrington used ‘Authentic Brahmin’ to

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

depict a particular New England culture. And Machiavelli mentioned Brahminism in his philosophical explications. To appreciate these meanings, Hinduism is philosophically important to consider here. World Book Encyclopedia’s excerpts were available and are pertinent.10

Hindu scriptures were written during various phases in the growth of Hinduism. . . .. The Four Vedas (about 1000 B.C.) Represent the period of early nature worship [the ‘powers of nature’ instead of the ‘Creator of nature’ was the focus of Hindu worship] The Brahmanas (about 800 to 600 B.C.) Represent priestly Hinduism. They develop the idea that man can force the powers he fears to help him in performing the proper rituals of sacrifice and prayer. The Upanishads (about 600 to 300 B.C.) Represent philosophic Hinduism. They speculate on the underlying unity of the universe, and conclude that only the unchanging and permanent Brahman is real. The Laws of Manu (about 250 B.C.) Represent legalistic Hinduism. . . . The code treats religion as a compulsory social institution. It gives detailed commandments and prohibitions for daily living. . . . The Teachings of Hinduism Brahman is the Supreme World-Soul, or Spirit . . .. Hindus speak of Brahman as the one absolute, infinite, eternal, indescribable, neuter Being. They say that Brahman cannot be described in human terms, because all human attributes imply imperfections. And Brahman is perfect in itself. Hinduism maintains that only the permanent is real. Because all things change, only Brahman is real. The religion teaches that Brahman forms the inmost essence of everything. Without it, nothing would exist. . . . Hinduism allows the worship of hundreds of gods as stepping-

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

stones to understanding Brahman. It holds that all the gods are only different aspects of the one Brahman. Hindus particularly honor three personifications of Brahman -- the Creator, ‘Brahma;’ the destroyer, ‘Siva;’ and the Preserver or Renewer, ‘Vishnu.’ . . . Followers of ‘Vishnu’ think of him as a god of love. They believe that he has come to earth a number of times in different form, and they worship these ‘avatars,’ or incarnations. . . . Rama and Krishna [are] two of the greatest incarnations of Vishnu. . . . Caste, or social order, has been binding on all Hindus for hundreds of years. . . . The four traditional casts, in order of rank, have been: (1) Brahmans, the priests and intellectuals; (2) Kshatriyas, the warriors and rulers; (3) Vaisyas, the artisans and agriculturalists; and (4) Sudras, the unskilled laborers. ‘Pariahs,’ the ‘untouchables’ or outcasts, belong to no caste at all. The government of India outlawed untouchability in 1947. Aryan invaders who conquered India before 1000 B.C. first imposed the caste system. They tried to maintain a barrier between themselves and the darker-skinned Indians. ‘Varna’ the Hindu word for caste means ‘color.’ Caste lines were loose at first, but the system became rigid as it grew, and many subdivisions developed. Even eating and drinking with members of other castes was forbidden. . . . History Hinduism had no historical founder. . . . Ramakrishna (18261886) . . . taught that all religions are alike, and all are searching for the same truth. . . . During its long history, Hinduism has seen the rise of many heresies and sects. In the 500 B.C., Gautama Buddha founded Buddhism as a protest against the caste system, the use of the Vedas, and other Hindu doctrines. . . . Guru Nanak (1469-1538) who founded Sikhism, combined Hindu beliefs with those of Islam. . . .

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

The word Brahman (the Hindu ruling Caste) was translated in English to ‘Brahmin.’ Parrington used ‘Brahmin’ to depict New England’s exclusive group of literary writers of ‘highest intelligence.’ Machiavelli used the Hindu meaning to describe those of the intelligence and priestly caste who devised religious dogma and laws to rule ‘absolutely.’ Machiavelli must have viewed similarly emperor Constantine’s shrewd use of the Roman Church (The Western Branch of Christianity) to expand and solidify the Roman Empire. This admixture of religious dogma and laws of enforcement succeeded to merge Eastern Christianity with Western, and was the cement of expansion. Christian doctrine proved Constantine Empire’s demise:11

‘The only living, growing force within the empire seemed to be the Christian Church. The people no longer provided enough soldiers to defend the empire, and hired barbarians filled the armies.’ [Does a factual parallel exist between what contemporarily is happening in Iraq and what had happened to Constantine’s Empire?] For more than a thousand years, absolute administrative corruptness and war despoiled the greater part of the Western World. And officially organized Christianity was a partner of despoilment although an unwilling one: By declaring new and revising old dogma (‘Divine Rights’ and ‘human liberty is spiritual in nature,’ for instance), religious officialdom sided with the dictatorial rule of Monarchs. [Robert Hughes referred to man's subjective proclivities (inward-turned things as they are) when recalling Goethe's " explication of problems with subjectivity. Hughes' describes ‘inwardturning’ to depict man's subjectivity, to clarify political value predicate paradoxes:12 ]

The problems of inward-turning were sketched long ago by Goethe, speaking to Eckermann. "Epochs which are regressive, and in the process of dissolution, are always subjective, whereas the trend in all

Johan Wolfgang Von Goethe (1749-1832) spent 60 years dramatizing ‘the truth’ of mankind. He observed the primary cause of regression and growth of a society:

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

progressive epochs were all objective in nature . . . Every truly excellent endeavor turns from within toward the world, as you see in the great epochs which were truly in progression and aspiration, and which were all objective in nature." Since the reign of Monarchs ended, Christianity has undergone intense critical reinspection and reformation. Even its scriptures have been carefully and critically evaluated. Witness this: 13

Nowhere are highly respected hypotheses discarded so quickly as in analytical and literary studies of the Bible. Theories that were taught as doctrine in most American universities only twenty years ago have been consigned to the trash can, and every year brings discoveries that confound accepted scholarly opinion. . . . Needless to say, this attitude produced an immediate and hostile reaction from religion, and the battle was joined. The meaning of the Bible’s words were obscured in the war over who wrote them and when. . . . The Bible is, after all, a ‘written’ work, and those who encounter it on the one level of literature are often only embarking on a journey that will take them ever deeper. A single passage might be pure poetry to one person and a life-changing message to the next. Who is one and who is the other remains one of the Bible’s mysteries. It is wrapped up in the mystery of God and the mystery of being human, both of which this great Book was written not only to explain but to express. . . . The bulk of Pure Truth is forever the exclusive property of the Creator and speculation about it is the exclusive province of deliberately logical critical reasoning we call philosophy, and those that gain snippets of it are never boastful or dogmatic. John Locke, for instance, observed that logically reasoned inferences of nature are preferable to dogmatic ‘belief,’ which claim dogmatically, the enlightenment of revelation:14

He that takes away reason to make way for revelation puts out the

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

light of both, and does much the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope. Locke Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in The Critique, described a rational foundation to ontological belief in God: ontologism. 15

It is plain that ‘the hope of a future life’ arises from the feeling, which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature. In like manner, it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to the consciousness of ‘freedom,’ and that the glorious order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, give rise to belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe. If Plato is correct, pure reason allows humans to approach God’s realm of knowledge, the source of ‘necessary’ truth which has no opposites. ‘The Critique’ is about ‘value of critical principles of pure reason.’ Because reasoned critiques of dogma routinely are evaded, rational absurdities (‘which mitigate against morality’), routinely are inculcated as ‘the absolute truth’ among the masses of humanity (Nearly everyone was certain ‘the world is flat,’ or ‘Earth is the center of the universe,’ or ‘the Creation story of the Bible,’ are examples of the plethora of dogmas, generally believed as ‘the absolute truth’). ‘The Critique’ also addressed dilemmas embroiling curricula: whether to teach science or dogma. Metaphysical theories often appear to threaten the beliefs and illusions of the usually apathetic mass of society: which, politically speaking, dominate the discussion of what a school’s curricula will include. With the mass of society, dogmas are the standards of philosophical thought and discussion and dogmatic belief pollutes the human wellspring of ‘necessary truth.’ Kant’s following thought is about the critical need of doubt, instead of belief, in the timeless quest of pure truth: ‘for, as the world has never been, and no doubt, never will be without

a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is of the highest and

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error’ -Because all forms of dogma deliberately shun ‘critical reviews’ and because dogma is always supplanted, as principle, to the foundation of absolutism, dogma is the predominant source of philosophical error [truth’s predicate value that ‘is false’ instead of ‘is true,’ either of which in Plato’s view, is of his Realm of ‘Visible truth’ of ‘opinion’ (of ‘belief’ or ‘illusion’)]. Errors and falsehoods, notwithstanding, dogmatic political ‘opinion’ represents fallacious ‘truth,’ the predicate truth value is without logical foundation and always ‘is false.’ About inevitable mental anguish caused by dogma, which Kant called ‘pretensions to transcendent insight,’ Kant commented:

I cannot even make the assumption -- as the practical interests of morality require -- of God, freedom, and immortality, if I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which, in fact, extend only to the objects of possible experience, and which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into phenomena, and thus rendering “practical extension” of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish [experience based] “knowledge,” to make room for “belief.” The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that it is possible to advance in metaphysics without previous criticism [of the dogma], is the true source of unbelief (always dogmatic) which mitigates against morality. Then Kant argues why ‘critically’ deliberate philosophy is essential to the legacy of posterity:

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

random groping after results without the guidance of principles, which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of metaphysical studies. It will render an important service to the inquiring mind of youth, by leading the student to apply his powers to the cultivation of genuine science, instead of wasting them, as at present, on speculations which can never lead to any result, or on the idle attempt to invent new ideas and opinions. But above all, it will confer an inestimable benefit on morality and religion, by showing that all the objections urged against them may be silenced for ever by the “Socratic” method, that is to say, by proving the ignorance of the objector. For, as the world has never been, and no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is of the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error. This important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its fancied possessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does not prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity. The advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure reason are not at all impaired. The loss falls, in its whole extent, on the “monopoly of the schools,” but does not in the slightest degree touch the “interests of mankind.” I appeal to the most obstinate dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul after death, derived from the simplicity of its substance; of the freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of nature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of subjective and objective practical necessity; or of the existence of God, deduced from the conception of an “ensrealissimum” -- the contingency of the changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able to pass beyond the limits of schools, to penetrate the public mind, or to exercise the slightest influence on its convictions. It must be admitted

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

that this has not been the case and that, owing to the unfitness of the common understanding for such subtle speculation, it can never be expected to take place. On the contrary, it is plain that “the hope of a future life” arises from the feeling, which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature. In like manner, it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to the consciousness of “freedom,” and that the glorious order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, give rise to belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe. Such is the genesis of these general convictions of mankind, so far as they depend on rational grounds; and the public property not only remains undisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance by the doctrine that schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight into a matter of general concernment than that to which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools should, therefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of these universally comprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply satisfactory proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant pretensions of the schools, which would gladly retain, in their own exclusive possession, the key to the truths they impart to the public. At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the public without its knowledge -- I mean, the “Critique of Pure Reason.” This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for finespun arguments in favor of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

height of speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and, thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is only by criticism that metaphysicians (and as such theologians too) can be saved from the subsequent perversion of their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious -- as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public. If governments think proper to interfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well for those of society to favor a criticism of this kind, by which alone the labors of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel. This critical science is not opposed to the “dogmatic procedure” of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles “a priori” -- but to “dogmatism,” that is, to the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing -without first inquiring in what way and by what reason has come into the possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason “without previous criticism of its own powers,” and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

to itself the name of popularity, not yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In carrying out the plan which the “Critique” prescribes, that is, in the future system of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. . . . He would have been peculiarly well fitted to give truly scientific character to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of the “organum,” that is of pure reason itself. That he failed to perceive the necessity of such procedure must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at once the method of Wolf, and of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy. Kant’s thought --

for, as the world has never been, and no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another [in a perpetual quandary about what is ‘real’], it is of the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error [intrinsic of dogmatic sup plantations for principle, for instance] --- appeals, to all who garner truthful understanding, that believers in dogma are duty bound to provide their rational explications for critical review? For emphasis, Kant explained the ‘principle’ which Dogmatists lack:

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that it is possible to advance in metaphysics without previous criticism, is the true source of unbelief (always dogmatic) which mitigates against morality. When Dogmatists persist to reject critical reviews of their dogma, can they truly believe their dogma? If they cannot, or do not, for instance, is belief in avowed religious dogma, a warning sign of religious ‘unbelief?’ While Plato lived and applied what would become the Cynic School of Philosophy (The Cynic School of Philosophy is the link between Socrates and the Stoic school.), credit for ‘critical reasoning’ is due to Rene Descartes for explicating, in clear, precise language, the necessary systematic critical processes required to advance in the quest of metaphysical truths: which deliberate critical discipline Kant called the “scientific method.” For his clear systematic process of critical thought, Descartes is called the ‘father of modern Philosophy.’ Without constant critiques, science could not exist and plausible metaphysical truths, particularly, would remain the fodder of speculation and intrigue: dogma the commonly accepted but fault-prone, ‘absolute truth’ of the metaphysical realities (including life and cosmic energy). But, the value predicate of this truth would be ‘false.’ Fred Alan Wolf’s ‘The Spiritual Universe,’ is a scientific ‘quantum jump’ into metaphysical reality of ‘intelligence’ that transcends but also links man with God. In the following, Wolf explains Plato’s importance: to grasp Plato’s concept of the soul, and we need to do that to understand how modern science can have anything to do with such an idea.16

Plato’s Idealism and the Soul When we think of a friend who is over idealistic and perhaps naive but also gifted with an intellect, we may think of the person in terms reminiscent of the Greek philosopher, Plato. He was born in 427 B.C. and died in 347 B.C. He came from a family that had long played a prominent role in the social and political scene of Athens, then the center of Greek politics -- an often conniving enterprise that

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

disturbed the young Plato. I think of him as an idealistic youth, ever dreaming of distant shores and possibilities and easily disillusioned by reality. He was especially disturbed by the execution of his friend and mentor Socrates in 399 B.C. The intrigues and corruption of Athenian political life so sickened Plato, though it would have been natural for him to follow in his family’s footsteps, that he declined to do so and instead became a brilliant thinker, writer, philosopher, and the inventor of the concept of idealism, as we know him today. Let the Philosophers, Not the Poets, rule! Plato was indeed as idealistic as we might imagine him to be. Plato’s idealism, his recognition of the failure of our senses in our attempts to describe not only the soul, but also anything in the world, and the death of Socrates gave him ample fuel to concern himself with changing politics, ethics, and morals. Plato strongly distrusted the political world surrounding him, leading him to proclaim, ‘let the philosophers, not the poets, rule’ -- a dictum we obviously have not heeded, considering the impact of poets and their emotional appeals in modern advertising. He was seeking a cure for society’s problems, not through politics, which, being the work of human minds set on dealing with the lowest principles of human concern, was corrupt at the core, but through philosophical discourse. It was in philosophy, Plato believed, that a human intellect was capable of soaring closest to, not ever touching, the loftiest ideals of the mind of God. He was serious in the hope that not until philosophers became rulers would the problems besetting humankind be resolved and alleviated. To this end, Plato wrote voluminously, usually presenting the arguments in the form of intellectual dialogues that, perhaps ironically, were reminiscent of playwrights of his day. Plato wrote only prose; indeed, he looked with some disdain

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

on poetry and the works of poets and artists in general. This disdain arose from Plato’s mistrust of emotions and feelings -- centered as they were in the polluted material body and its senses. Truth could only be obtained with a cool and reasoning head -- one bent on intellectual pursuit. For Plato, truth was tantamount to God, and all art could do, appealing to the feelings and emotions, was to imitate truth poorly. For Plato, imitation was the lowest sort of the higher human activities. The highest sort was intelligent reasoning. Highest on Plato’s ladder of idealism was something not doable by human beings, but only by Gods. This included the creation of an original form from which all lesser value copies were made. To grasp Plato’s concept of the soul, and we need to do that to understand how modern science can have anything to do with such an idea, we look at the essence of Plato’s thinking about ideals. Reality, Illusion, and Idealism Because Plato believed the truth could only be grasped by using reason and not by appealing to emotion, Plato was particularly disturbed by the worshipful acclaim Greek society gave to Homer’s and other poets’ writings. If Plato were alive today, I am sure he would be appalled by our society’s love of movie heroes and romantic novels. The reason for Plato’s disdain for art is easy to understand: Art imitated life, only portraying it through imitation. It was a representation of reality but not reality itself and was, thereby, wanting. Wolf’s graphic presentation of Plato’s Divided Line impressed me greatly. When years ago I contemplated Plato’s ‘Divided Line,’ I considered preparing a graph but did not act then. My following graph, is largely based on Wolf’s accomplishment, which depiction used a horizontal line. To my vertical line, the ancient Greek concepts of ‘Physis’ and ‘Nomos’ are added: They are predicate-based concepts, which predate the time Plato lived: Plato surely understood them.

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

PLATO’S DIVIDED LINE ‘PHYSIS’ - - COSMIC: ‘Eternal Good’ Ascending order of truth GOD’S LOGOS17 PURE KNOWLEDGE (The predicate of God’s LOGOS is PURE LOVE: Faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, promise: Jehovah’s Covenant. Lao-Tse said this is Sinderesis,18 i.e., God is impartially constant) INTELLIGIBLE REALM FORMS: A B

knowledge pure thought reason

Does the human cogito join ‘NOMOS’ to ‘PHYSIS,’ values of logos to the values of LOGOS? ‘NOMOS’ WORLD: ‘temporal, material’ HUMAN logos [Human logos is naturally corrupted by material aspects and by upbraiding dogma with a material focus. PURE LOVE is corrupted by visceral emotion, admixtures of love-hate-greed] VISIBLE REALM FORMS: C D

Opinion belief illusion

‘Logos,’ was also incorporated, and might be considered as ‘intelligent’ prescriptive intent, or as value predicates of intelligent causal prescription, which define order, strategy, design, motivation, . . . , for plans of action. Causal prescription, which necessarily is eternal, is teleological, therefore, beneficent. God’s ‘LOGOS’ is the antecedent principle of all reality, therefore, is constantly ‘consistent’ and ‘necessary’; it contains what

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Lao-Tse called ‘Sinderesis,’19 and by ontologism, it permeates Plato’s ‘intelligible realm’ which, for the price of deliberately logical pure inferential reason, is available to humans. Temporal causal prescription, which is experience-based, i.e., is inclusive of materialist notions, has paradoxical predicate values. Human ‘logos’ is, therefore, ‘constant’ and ‘necessary,’ only to the extent that human truth value predicates are compliant with the teleological values of the antecedent ‘intelligence’ called LOGOS, which by ontologism pervades Plato’s ‘Intelligible Realm,’ or inconstant and unnecessary to the extent that values are incompatible with eternal necessity, and, therefore, is from Plato’s ‘Visible Realm’ of experience-based ‘opinion.’ Inferential reason-based values tend toward cosmic values, i.e., values which, in relation to the temporal human self, are ‘outward turned.’ Experience-based values tend naturally inward to the temporal human self, i.e., are ‘inward turned’ onto visceral-based wants, illusions, the popular, . . . : they are the concupiscent fodder of ‘power’ and ‘might,’ on which political sophistries thrive and are the social foundations of materialist mechanist dogmas and ‘positive laws.’ Herbert Western Turnbull wrote about the contributions of mathematicians to ‘necessary’ truth and knowledge. His book, The Great Mathematicians, is lucidly concise. He wrote this:20

These ideas have had an enormous influence on the trend of recent and contemporary thought; it is enough to say here that they exhibit in diverse ways the more mathematical side of that philosophical search into the principles of our subject which has marked the most recent stage of its history. For mathematics had now reached a state in which it was possible to do for the whole what Euclid tried to do for Geometry, by disclosing the underlying axioms or primitive propositions, as Peano called them: and the most patient investigation has been made -- notably in our own land by Whitehead and Russell -first of the subject-matter itself and next of the very ideas that govern the subject-matter. As all this was conceived on a sublimely universal

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

scale, it is hardly remarkable that certain paradoxes have come to light. How to face these paradoxes is an urgent problem, and there are at present two or three schools of thought employed upon this. . . . They trace the presence of paradoxes to the use of indirect proofs, or more precisely to what is called in logic the law of the excluded middle. To this they object, very much as others have objected to the Parallel Postulate of Euclid: indeed, it may be a symptom of the advent of a high synthesis in arithmetic and analysis, just as the earlier was in geometry. As nothing less than the whole edifice from Eudoxus to Cantor is at stake, little wonder that these views cause a stir in the mathematical world. ‘Of what use,’ said Kronecker to Lindemann, ‘is your beautiful investigation regarding B? Why study such problems, since irrational numbers are nonexistent?’ * * The precise evaluation of B is approached by the Calculus and particularly this irrational number is critical to precisely evaluating circles. Circles are a form of a continuum with no beginning, and, no end. This irrational number necessarily implicates a continuum in our temporal space, which is critically important, indeed! As, it represents that ubiquitously something like things expected when crossing Plato’s divide between things of physis and things of nomos.

So back we are once more at the logical scandal such as troubled the Greeks. The Greeks survived and conquered it, and so shall we . . .. There is a largeness about mathematics that transcends race and time: mathematics may humbly help in the market-place, but it also reaches to the stars. To one, mathematics is a game (but what a game!) and to another it is the handmaiden of theology. . . . Mathematics transfigures the fortuitous concourse of atoms into the tracery of the finger of God. About the greatness of Plato, Turnbull wrote this:

A second stage in the history of mathematics occupied the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., and is associated with Athens. . . . Her

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

philosophers congregated from East and West, many of whom were remarkable mathematicians and astronomers. Perhaps the greatest among these were Hippocrates, Plato, Eudoxus and Menaechmus . . .. (pp. 18) According to Proclus, the late Greek commentator, “Plato caused mathematics in general and geometry in particular to make a very great advance, by reason of his enthusiasm for them, which of course is obvious from the way he filled his books with mathematical illustrations, and everywhere tries to kindle admiration for these subjects, in those who make a pursuit of philosophy.’ It is related that to the question, What does God do? Plato replied, God always geometrizes.’ . . . (pp.27-28) The study of higher arithmetic at Athens was stimulated by the Pythagorean, Theodorus of Cyrene, who is said to have been Plato’s teacher. For Theodorus discovered many irrationals, o3, o5, o6, o7, o8, o10, o11, o12, o13, o14, o15, o17, ‘at which point,’ says Plato, ‘for some reason he stopped.’ . . . o2 had been discovered by Pythagoras . . .. (pp. 29) As the counting numbers progress, those with ‘irrational roots’ increase more rapidly than numbers with ‘rational roots,’ and since roots are in pairs, triplets, quadruplets, . . . , irrational numbers far outnumber rational numbers: reminding me of a story a math professor told about an unsettled discussion with another professor. Turnbull’s quote sets the scenario: Of what use,’ said Kronecker to Lindemann, ‘is your beautiful investigation regarding B? Why study such problems, since irrational numbers are nonexistent?’ At a subsequent discussion, Lindemann asks Kronecker to pick a number between 1 and 10. Then he asks, ‘what number did you pick?’ ‘Seven,’ responds Kronecker. Shaking his head as though to disbelieve the irrational answer, which he expected from Kronecker’s having nihilistically omitted all consideration of ‘irrational roots,’ he quips, ‘How irrational!’ While the scenario Turnbull quoted, related to the story in my

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

memory, what impressed me to share this quip is the apparent unexamined ‘ontology’ commonly associated with ‘counting numbers,’ and the nihilistically dis. belief-based ‘unreality’ of the ‘irrational numbers, ‘as found in protagonist Kronecker’s mind, as contrasted with the systemic importance of ‘irrational numbers’ in Lindemann’s mind: Lindemann, alone, had necessary ‘coherence,’ as an essential of systemic truth, in mind. About the ontological ‘realness’ of mathematical irrational number roots, N and e are special irrational numbers, which have proved greatly important in mathematical studies of ‘real’ phenomena: The Greeks named the ‘golden ratio’ N. And, as we gain inferred understanding of Metaphysical Ontology, the ontological realness of other irrationals will surely become evident. As a model of cosmic reality, the numbering system corroborates Plato’s ‘divided line’ philosophy of truth: However, about the above critical debate, Kronecker’s argument, that all human knowledge of ‘realness’ is based on sensory experience, mimics Hume’s argument with Kant: Lindemann, is on Kant’s side in Kant’s finding that ‘a priori’ reasoning is critically important to understanding mathematical systems’ completeness and is an essential of all ‘coherent forms of truth’ (Lao-Tse’s Sinderesis, or no opposites, explains why ‘coherence’ rather than ‘correspondence’ is an essential predicate attribute of ‘necessary’ truth’s definition). Plato’s understanding of human capability to reason critically is fundamentally sustained by the reasoned mathematical philosophies of today. He understood what Turnbull suggested: Mathematics transfigures the fortuitous [chance] concourse of atoms into the tracery of the finger of God. Mathematics, therefore, is more than an example of the ‘Scientific method,’ it is the foundation of all science which transcends human experience to unveil pure truth. And while arithmetic is considered an ‘absolutely’ coherent system, most fields of mathematics remain dynamic and therefore, in greater part, tentative as to coherence findings. And, while Plato’s concept of truth, on both sides of his divided line, must always be open to critical review. And, particularly, deliberate reason which is the ontologism integral of human capability, must always exercise caution and is critical: Its nature is anything but ‘subjective,’ in any sense of

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

the sine qua non ‘(without which, not) purity.’ ‘Subjective truth’ in Plato’s Intelligible Realm simply does not and cannot exist as a facet of deliberate logical reason: Only in the nomos-based temporal world (Plato’s Visible Realm) does concupiscent opinionated ‘subjective truth’ individually exist, and ‘is false’ is its paradoxical value predicate far more than ‘is true’: as to intent, often ‘is evil’ as well as ‘is false.‘ And in God’s coherent rational LOGOS, finds no part or sympathy? At some point of development of manmade U.S. constitutional distributive justice, materialist mechanists’ ‘causal determinism’ theory, called mechanism, politically was made the legal foundation to the ‘correspondence frame of truth’: it became the Federalist legal principle concept of political economy: and despite this pragmatic paradoxical causal sense of economic mechanisms, ‘human logos was legally held accountable for having causally prescribed the facts of individual human action,’ and therefore, was legally held accountable as the sole legal causal source of economic truth’s ‘correspondence,’ of the perceptive human intellect (the subject) with its (object), i.e., the fact of reality. Whether the predicate of this correspondence ‘is true’ or ‘is false,’ as legally defined, without consideration of mechanism’s economic determinism, is the legal question that determined temporal truth’s legal predicate fidelity? 21

Mechanism is one of the two great philosophical theories of cause and effect in the universe. Opposed to the theory of mechanism is the theory of teleology. Any thing that grows and develops can be explained in two ways. Mechanism explains it from behind, in terms of its origins. Teleology explains it from the front, in terms of the goal it is seeking. [The paradoxical results of economic determinism legally are ignored] Plato had categorized these individually perceived truths, of the ‘correspondence frame,’ as Form C ‘belief,’ or Form D ‘illusion.’ And both are generally dogma-based: In supposed and real propensities of authority (often illusive), they are dogmatically denied open critical review. Plato’s Forms C & D encompasses political, and, what I call, ‘authoritative truth’

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

(which is the third definition given for truth: 22 (‘a fixed or established principle, law, etc., . .’). Kant reasoned that coherent human emulations of the value predicates in cosmic LOGOS are the purest possible source of truth, ethics, morality, causality (teleology) and justice (beneficence rather than retribution): Only through personal deliberate inferential efforts are cosmic ‘necessities’ of pure truth available, by ontologism, to human intelligence. Kant and Hume provided critical dialogue about ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ truth. But, it was Gottfried. W. von Leibnitz (1646-1716), who shared mathematical distinction with Isaac Newton (with Calculus) that wrote: 23

There are two kinds of truths; those of reasoning and those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. Before concluding that we learn more about ‘necessary’ truth from philosophy than from politics, for instance, we might use Plato’s DividedLine-Forms to systematize pertinence of learning about truth. For this, the following statement from The Critique is repeated (A critical difference between ‘pure rational thought’ and ‘dogmatic belief’ is that dogmatists eschew deliberate criticisms of their dogma, and ‘absolute belief’ historically has been little more than belief in ‘absolutely false doctrine’ about unknown, unproved metaphysical theory as ‘the earth is flat’, for instance.). Dogmatic politics has field days, manipulating the sycophantic opinions of society.

This (‘Critique of Pure Reason’) can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for finespun arguments in favor of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and, thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses.

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Clearly, Plato’s Visible Realm, Form D is the lowest empirical-based form of truth [neither critically anchored (corresponds) to temporal reality nor based on critical principles of deliberate reason]: ‘opinions’ of this realm, are described by authors as analogous to ‘denizens of the barnyard.’ * *Those carrying Parrington’s work to his noted conclusion wrote this: 24

From the beginning -- the scholars discovered -- democracy and property had been at bitter odds; the struggle invaded the Constitutional Convention, it gave form to a party alignment between Hamilton and Jefferson, Jackson and Clay, and then during the slavery struggle, sinking underground like a lost river, it nevertheless had determined party conflicts down to the present. In this ceaseless conflict between man and the dollar, between democracy and property, the reasons for persistent triumph of property were sought in the provisions of the organic law, and from a critical study of the Constitution came the discovery that struck home like a submarine torpedo -- the discovery that the drift toward plutocracy [the rule of wealth] was not a drift away from the spirit of the Constitution, but an inevitable unfolding from its premises; that instead of having been conceived by the fathers as a democratic instrument, it had been conceived in a spirit designedly hostile to democracy; that it was, in fact, a carefully formulated expression of eighteenth-century consciousness, erected as a defense against the democratic spirit that had got out of hand during the Revolution [as was expressed and adopted in the Declaration of Independence], and that the muchpraised system of checks and balances was designed and intended for no other end than a check on the [agrarian] political power of the majority -- a power acutely feared by the property consciousness of the times. It was a startling discovery that profoundly stirred the liberal mind of the early years of the century; yet the really surprising thing is

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

that it should have come as a surprise. It is not easy to understand today why since Civil War days intelligent Americans should so strangely have confused the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and have come to accept them as complementary statements of the democratic purpose of America. Their unlikeness is unmistakable: the one a classical statement of French humanitarian democracy, the other an organic law designed to safeguard the minority under republican rule. . . . When the fierce slavery struggle fell into the past, whatever honest realism had risen from the passions of the times was buried with the dead issue. The militant attacks on the Constitution, so common in Abolitionist circles after 1835, and the criticism of the Declaration that was a part of the Southern argument, were both forgotten, and with the Union reestablished by force of arms, the idealistic cult of the fundamental law entered upon a second youth. In the blowsy Gilded Age the old myths walked the land again, wrapped in battle-torn flags and appealing to the blood shed on southern battlefields. It was not till the advent of a generation unblinded by the passions of civil war that the Constitution again was examined critically, and the earlier charge of the Abolitionists that it was designed to serve property rather than men, was heard once more. But this time with far more weight of evidence behind it. As the historians dug amongst the contemporary records they came upon a mass of fact the Abolitionists had been aware of. The evidence was written so plainly, in such explicit and incontrovertible words -- not only in Elliottâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Debates, but in the minutes of the several State[s] and pamphlets and polite literature -- that it seemed incredible that honest men could have erred so greatly in confusing the Constitution with the Declaration. With the clarification of its philosophy the inflowing waters of liberalism reached flood-tide; the movement would either recede or

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

pass over into radicalism. On the whole it followed the later course, and the years immediately preceding 1917 were years when American intellectuals were immersing themselves in European collectivistic philosophies -- in Marxianism, Fabianism, Syndicalism, Guild Socialism. New leaders were rising, philosophical analysts like Thorstein Veblen who were mordant critics of American economics. The influence of socialism was fast sweeping away the last shreds of political and social romanticism that so long had confused American thinking. The doctrine of economic determinism was spreading widely, and in the light of that doctrine the deep significance of the industrial revolution was revealing itself for the first time to thoughtful Americans. In its reaction to industrialism America had reached the point Chartist England had reached in the eighteen-forties and Marxian Germany in the eighteen-seventies. That was before a mechanistic science had laid its heavy discouragements on the drafters of democratic programs. Accepting the principle of economic determinism, liberalism still clung to its older democratic teleology, convinced that somehow economic determinism would turn out to be a fairy godmother to the proletariat and that from the imperious drift of industrial expansion must eventually issue social justice. Armed with this faith liberalism threw itself into the work of cleaning the Augean stables, and its reward came in the achievements of President Wilsonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s first administration. Then the war intervened and the green fields shriveled in an afternoon. With the cynicism that came with post-war days the democratic liberalism of 1917 was thrown away like an empty whiskyflask. Clever young men began to make merry over democracy. It was preposterous, they said, to concern oneself about social justice; nobody wants social justice. The first want of every man, as John Adams remarked a hundred years ago, is his dinner, and the second his girl.

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

Out of the muck of the war had come a great discovery -- as it was reported -- the discovery that psychology as well as economics has its word to say on politics. From the army intelligence tests the moron emerged as a singular commentary on our American democracy, and with the discovery of the moron the democratic principle was in for a slashing attack. Almost overnight an army of enemies was marshaled against it. The euginist with his isolated germ theory flouted the perfectional psychology of John Locke, with its emphasis on environment as the determining factor in social evolution -- a psychology on which the whole idealistic interpretation was founded; the beardless philosopher discovered Nietzsche and in his pages found the fit master of the moron -- the biological aristocrat who is the flower that every civilization struggles to produce; the satirist discovered the flatulent reality that is middle-class America and was eager to thrust his jibes at the complacent denizens of the Valley of democracy. Only the behaviorist, with his insistence on the plasticity of the new-born child, offers some shreds of comfort to the democrat; but he quickly takes them away again with his simplification of conduct to imperious drives that stamp men as primitive animals. If the mass -the raw materials of democracy -- never rises much above sex appeals and belly needs, surely it is poor stuff to try to work up into an excellent civilization, and the dreams of the social idealist who forecasts a glorious democratic future are about as substantial as moonshine. It is a discouraging essay. Yet it is perhaps conceivable that our current philosophy -- the brilliant coruscations of our younger intelligentsia -- may indeed not prove to be the last word in social philosophy. Perhaps . . . when our youngest liberals have themselves come to the armchair age they will be smiled at in turn by sons who are still cleverer and who will find their wisdom as foolish as the wisdom of 1917 seems to them today. But that lies on the knees of the

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

gods. Variously, Brahmanist cognizance, as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Burke, Hamilton, . . ., had described Plato’s Truth Forms C & D by the opinionated fallacious truth predicate, that John Adams used:25

The mass of men are naturally indolent, selfish, given to luxury, shortsighted, jealous, tending to faction and all mischievous intrigue. Never does he find them given to virtue, choosing wisdom, seeking justice. They cannot endure that others should be superior in virtue, or rank, or power; but driven by ambition they strive to pull down their superiors in order themselves to rise. The men in any society who possess suficient virtue to set justice above self-interest, are few and count for little in the scale against the selfish many. (See “Defense of the Constitution, etc.,” in Works, Vol. VI, pp 9, 57, 97). This Calvinistic doctrine that “human nature is not fit to be trusted,” and that “men are never good but through necessity,” being accepted -- and John Adams was as clearly satisfied of its truth “as of any demonstration of Euclid” -- he proceeded to translate it into political terms, and examine the bearing of it upon systems of government. Like ‘denizens of the barnyard,’ the sycophantic mass of men is easily led to subscribe and follow dogma. Dogma has proved its effectiveness to persuade opinions of the non reasoning crowd to remain within castes as restricted by dogma. As Kant observed, the potential of man is far greater than, because restricted, is in evidence from the lowest forms of Plato’s truth (Plato’s ‘Allegory of the Cave’ viewed dogma as chaining human minds to walls of ‘the cave’: allowing only shadows of reality to persuade the mass of human intelligence whose truths were dogma-based beliefs and illusions.).26

I appeal to the most obstinate dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul after death, derived from the simplicity of its substance; of the freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of nature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

subjective and objective practical necessity; or of the existence of God, deduced from the conception of an “ensrealissimum” -- the contingency of the changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able to pass beyond the limits of schools, to penetrate the public mind, or to exercise the slightest influence on its convictions. It must be admitted that this has not been the case and that, owing to the unfitness of the common understanding for such subtle speculation, it can never be expected to take place. On the contrary, it is plain that “the hope of a future life” arises from the feeling, which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature. In like manner, it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to the consciousness of “freedom,” and that the glorious order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, give rise to belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe. Such is the genesis of these general convictions of mankind, so far as they depend on rational grounds; and the public property not only remains undisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance by the doctrine that schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight into a matter of general concernment than that to which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools should, therefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of these universally comprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply satisfactory proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant pretensions of the schools, which would gladly retain, in their own exclusive possession, the key to the truths they impart to the public. At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

benefits the public without its knowledge -- I mean, the “Critique of Pure Reason.” This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for finespun arguments in favor of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and, thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is only by criticism that metaphysicians (and as such theologians too) can be saved from the subsequent perversion of their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at roots of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious -- as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public. If governments think proper to interfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well for those of society to favor a criticism of this kind, by which alone the labors of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel. Summarizing Kant’s ‘criticism’ to the American heritage and politics which persuade it, Parrington observed this:27

A just and liberal government is an excellent ideal, but it is one for which few amongst the mass of men greatly care; and because America chose to follow its own nose [economic dogma was allowed to dominate the value predicates of official logos], . . . it would not become like the

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

America of its dreams. Still, substantially diminished by dogmatic sophistries and the ‘pork barrels’ of political economy, liberal idealism persists to represent democratic principles. Jefferson’s presidency was considered the first political victory for democracy and Jefferson’s value predicates continue to inspire democratic truths. Jefferson’s retort to Brahmanist dogma-based value predicates, asserting common humanity is unfit to rule, was simple, forceful, and irrefutable.28

Have we found angles in the form of Kings to rule? Class-conscious pseudo monarchist value predicates of Aristocratic Americans, who, at the time, comprised mostly Federalists and Whigs, overwhelmed the Constitutional Convention’s discussion. But they failed to overwhelm the common people. About this, Parrington wrote,29

Although Franklin’s origins . . . were narrowly provincial, his mind from early youth to extreme old age was curiously open and free, and to such a mind the intellectual wealth of the world lies open and free. . . . No other man in America and few in Europe had so completely freed themselves from the prejudice of custom. The Calvinism in which he was bred left not the slightest trace upon him; and the middle-class world from which he emerged did not narrow his mind to its petty horizons. He was a free man who went his own way with imperturbable good will and unbiased intelligence; our first social philosopher, the first ambassador of American democracy to the courts of Europe. . . . The conception of a federal union of the several colonies was slowly spreading in America, and no other colonial had done so much to further it; in his well-known Plan of Union he had sketched the outlines of a federal constitution. . . . He was a forerunner of Jefferson, like him firm in the conviction that government was good in the measure that it remained close to the people. He sat in the Constitutional Convention as one of the few

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

democrats, and although he was unable to make headway against the aristocratic majority, he was quite unconvinced by their rhetoric. Only when the mass of freedom-conscious colonists refused to ratify the proposed Constitution, did the American Brahminist sponsors accede to amending it to include the ‘idealisticly liberal’ Bill of Rights which, with others, Jefferson and Madison framed. Truth’s value predicates, of ‘liberal idealists,’ align with Plato’s physis; values predicates of ‘Brahminist idealists,’ which Calvinists, Federalists, and Whigs subscribed, align with Hesiod’s nomos. Class-conscious Brahmin values are more attuned to monarchy than to democracy: witness Nietzsche’s following statement taken from a literary piece he called ‘Beyond Good and Evil.’30

And in the case of the unique natures of noble origin, if by virtue of superior spirituality they should incline to a more retired and contemplative life, reserving for themselves only the more refined forms of government [over chosen disciples or members of an order], religion itself may be used as a means for obtaining peace from the noise and trouble of managing ‘grosser’ affairs, and for securing immunity from the ‘unavoidable filth of all political agitation. The Brahmins, for instance, understood this fact. With the help of a religious organisation, they secured to themselves the power of nominating Kings for the people, while their sentiments prompted them to keep apart and outside, as men with a higher and super-regal mission. [their nomos-based values were in fact inferior] Evidence of difference is found in respective values in logos . Fundamental differences are inculcated silently, but emotionally, to the pros and cons in the opinions of the mass of society. The predicate of liberal idealists’ truth, as of Jefferson and Locke, finds humankind capable, however latent this capability is at birth, to reason purely in matters involving personal and organic sovereignty; these innate ontologism-based powers derive from nature’s God, bequeathed to humans,

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

as ‘inalienable rights.’ Contrarily, the dogmatic predicate of Brahmanists (as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Burke, Coke, Hamilton, John Adams, . . .) represents ‘belief’ that ‘humanity is incapable to decide issues of organic sovereignty. And, therefore, it is deductively evident, the Creator surely appointed, with ‘divine right,’ kings and intelligent leaders to rule by dogma or force: formulating dogma to control and counsel the less endowed humans, or force them to comply. Brahmanists’ truth’s predicate derives similarly from other dogmas, which, for selfish advantages, they formulate and inculcate: might better be called ‘superior preemptive sovereignty’? : Brahmanist ‘divine right’-based first right to secure, acquire, or take possession of before hand. (This is from World Book Dictionary’s definition of preempt) In ‘the Brahmin caste’s truth, and in authoritative positions to rationalize deductively for ‘all,’ Brahmanists order transmuted dogmas: as ‘materialism,’ ‘mechanism,’ ‘determinism,’ ‘divine rights’: into myriad hybrid doctrines of Economic Determinism, Imperialism, Dollar Diplomacy, Manifest Destiny, and official economic policy to settle inflation endemism by exacerbating its weakest symptom, thereby, increasing unemployment instead of abating the inflation endemism, giving legal inalienable human rights to legally created ‘fictitious person’ corporate entities, . . .. However, because the value predicates of such ‘truth’ are ‘contingent’ upon the superimposed fallacious dogmatic principles, ‘truth’ remains as Plato had categorized, as Opinions, Forms C & D. Because dogma is never submitted for deliberately reasoned ‘critique,’ these truth-forms can never rise above Plato’s ‘opinion’: ‘belief’ or ‘illusion.’ Will Durant observed this: 31

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

legislative rationalization that justified Congress’ legendary ‘pork barrel’) require an organic cohesive influence of a collective cabal-like organic sovereign ‘authority.’ ‘Internal Improvement’ dogma is an example of political rationalization, the desire of which was to justify and install ‘The American System of Political Economy’: or, where does it say in the Constitution that ‘Internal economic Improvements’ for some, not all, is Congress’ constitutional duty to provide for? As ‘viruses’ designed by ‘hackers’ to frustrate the designed operations in the logic-based world of computers, dogma analogously might better be understood as intelligent ‘viruses’ designed to frustrate or modify the human logical intelligent faculties. As a thing, believed to be ‘is true’ (World Book Dictionary definition 3), dogma is believed doctrine, the truth predicate value of which ‘is false.’ Dogma acts as disinformation, which of design frustrate naturally reasoned logical thoughts and actions. Marx indicted religious dogma that was associated with Capitalism (And his argument has long since been recognized, while still rejected, for being ‘is true.’) Earlier, Machiavelli observed the Brahmanist intent to control by dogma the masses of humanity. And, history now confirms Durant’s ‘bag full of ‘are false’ paradoxical problems’ that are related to deductions from dogma that was believed to be a principle antecedent. Like Plato’s Visible Realm-based ‘opinion,’ dogma represents ‘contingent’ paradoxical truth. When evaluating the prescriptive end of dogma, an intriguing kinship with perjury is found, in an orthodox intent with telling lies. Tautology: truth’s veracity test Tautology, as observed from mathematical logic, is commonly and officially largely unknown: briefly mentioned in the dictionary and not at all in my 1965 Encyclopedia, it probably was not available to Federalists and Whigs in Colonial America, for them to routinely be made aware of logical fallacy that results from tautological forms (d) and (e): Affirming Consequents or Denying Antecedents. If not for continual mathematical refinement, which research has made this veracity test of truth language applicable, thereby, has broadened general understanding, tautology would not now be available.

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

Anyway, John N. Fujii wrote this about tautology: 32

By a tautology we mean a statement, which has the truth value ‘true’ for all possible truth values of its components. . . . Compound statements with all truth values ‘true’ are called tautologies and represent valid argument forms. The implication formed by the conjunction of all the premises as the antecedent and the conclusion as the consequent that form a valid argument form, will always result in a tautology. Testing compound statements to see whether they are tautologies is thus equivalent to testing an argument for validity. J. N. Fujii gave three classical valid arguments (P = compound premises, Q = consequent, - = denial, = therefore): (a) Modus ponens P6Q P

Q and classical invalid argument (d): P6Q Q

(b) modus tollens (c) hypothetical syllogism P6Q -Q

P6Q Q6R

P6R

- P

and classical invalid argument (e): P6Q

-P -Q

(d) Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent, and (e) Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent, Fujii warned, are invalid argument forms. With all forms of ‘hypothesizing a tautological argument,’ the invalid argument form (d) Affirming the Consequent appears mostly applied. Fallacies of ‘Affirming

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Consequents,’ as rhetorically is deliberately of nomos, is a particular Sophist pseudo philosophic proclivity intrinsic of nomos-based dogmatic belief (dogma, irrationally expediently affirmed as a logical antecedent, is still but a consequent affirmed as an antecedent). The Federalist Agenda, as Parrington noted, provides an example of (d) Affirming the Consequent, which is a common form of sophistry in Plato’s Visible Realm: 33 [Hamilton’s] notorious comment -- which the American democrat has

never forgiven him, “the people! -- the people is a great beast! -- was characteristically frank. . . . He was at pains, therefore, as a practical statesman, to dress his views in a garb more seemly to plebeian prejudices, and like earlier Tories he paraded an ethical justification for his Toryism. The current Federalist dogma of the divine right of justice -- ‘vox justiciae vox dei’ -- was at hand to serve his purpose and he made free use of it. . . . He was frankly a monarchist, and he urged the [fallacious] monarchical principle with Hobbesian logic. “The principle chiefly intended to be established is this -- that there must be a permanent ‘will.” “There ought to be a principle in government capable of resisting the popular current.” [In ‘Works, Vol. II, p 415] The only effective way of keeping democratic factionalism within bounds, Hamilton was convinced, lay in the erection of a powerful chief magistrate, who “ought to be hereditary, and have so much power. “ He devoted himself to the business of providing all possible checks upon the power of the democracy.” Parrington cited Federalist-Whig fallacious expedient proclivities, which tautologically ‘denied logical antecedents’ and ‘affirmed consequents’: 34

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

seemed to be paid to gentlemen of breeding and manners, and more to assertive self-seeking -- business was no less secure than in the good old days, and its profits were greater. . . . Provided of course that the Constitution should follow population and safeguard business interests against . . .the menace of particularism [antinomy, i.e., Greek anti + nomos]. . . . In the hour of peril, principles go by the board. The Whig party was the lineal heir of the old Federalism, but it denied its philosophical patrimony. It substituted expediency for the old economic realism, and began and ended intellectually bankrupt.. . . aside from petty antagonism to Jackson -- was the vague assumption that the well-being of the American people was dependent on governmental patronage; the belief that each economic group and section must receive its special favor, and that through tariffs and bonuses and internal improvements the country as a whole must prosper. Of this principle of special favors -- a return to the seventeenth century from which eighteenth century liberalism was a reaction -- the American System of Henry Clay was the chief expression, and it remains the most significant bequest of the Whig party to our political history. Clearly, classical dogma fraudulently, if perpetrating logical fallacy is a form of fraud, has usurped constitutionally rational sovereignty. It has done this by tautologically affirming consequents or denying antecedents, which thereby, has conflated constitutional democratic essence in trade for material advantages, which in effect organically has transmuted democratic essence, so to economically make democracy appear as an organic fascist form. Worse, it threatens to make the fascism permanent. And similarly, it has done the same to Islam’s Categorical Imperative, and globally to other society’s reasoned Categorical Imperatives as well. Liberal acts, had nothing to do with this fallacious transmutation, if Cicero’s view is correct:

No liberal man would impute a charge of unsteadiness to another for having changed his opinion. Cicero

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Humans can and do worship Baals rather than their Creator; they also can and do misuse their bequeathed natural human sovereignty: for material gain, many willingly ‘sell’ their birthright. Still, humans when subjected to causal determinist mechanisms (Which the American System of Political Economy surely is), have no choice but to abide their subjection to classical temporal mechanist values and politics, which clearly are of Plato’s Truth Forms C & D (the predicates of which most often bear the ‘is false’ truth predicate value). Unless individual humans’ prescriptively transcend temporal material values to those of reason, their predicate values are ‘contingent’ upon the established classical orthodox dogmas and worse, they inculcate value predicates which spread to perpetuate the dogmatic idealist ‘viruses.’ This inculcation, culturally, is always prejudiced by dogma.

Naturally indolent, selfish, given to luxury, shortsighted, jealous, tending to faction and all mischievous intrigue represented this prejudicial value that commonly is found both in Brahmanist logos and correspondingly, inferentially also found in the posited ‘facts.’ Legal responsibility for human actions (posited facts) is determined by the inferential relationship forensically called truth’s ‘correspondence theory’ (values of logos, which prescribe action, is correspondingly the usual legal responsible cause of facts, as they are posited). However, more subtle is dogmatic ‘contingent’ truth. Logical rational correspondence is more difficult as to inferred responsibility; often now direct correspondence (nexus) between value predicates in logos and human acts seems not to exist, and in the frustration, the ‘correspondence frame of truth’ is far too often fallaciously legally made inapplicable by doctrine of organic ‘sovereign immunity.’ So, ‘welcome to political ‘opinions’ of Plato’s Visible temporal world in which deductively hinged dogmatic unitary materialism, are in the sophistry and chicanery of deductively rationalized and licensed, economic mechanisms, and together with ‘positive laws’, are legally crowned as ‘king,’ to rule truth and justice (where retribution-based justice appears always to trump beneficence-based justice). Legal adjudging that is done for society by the Supreme Court, as the “powerful chief magistrate, who “ought to be hereditary, and have so much power,” which decides which of

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

the paradoxical opposites ‘is truer’, defines the near impossible political quandary, which society must either resolve or abide. ‘Unitary materialist belief’, however, presents untruths as dogma, along with great ‘social ill’: 35

If we imagine a world of mere matter, there would be no room for falsehood in such a world, and although it would contain what may be called ‘facts,’ it would not contain any truths, in the sense in which truths are things of the same kind as falsehoods. In fact, truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements; hence a world of mere matter, since it would contain no beliefs or statements, would also contain no truth or falsehood. Bertrand Russell The validity of truth is whether, or not, it bears the value predicate ‘is true’ (‘Pure Truth’ is a reality-something, only found in logically reasoned truth, the predicate of which consistently ‘is true’). Deciding tautological validity requires careful perceptive analysis of truth’s object in correspondence with the perception’s value predicate: only if truth’s object ‘is true’ and the perception’s value predicate corresponds (correlates) to nature’s value predicate, is the truth value ‘is true’ valid and pure. When a correspondence of value predicates does not exist, ‘is true’ truth does not exist. And, the resulting prescribed facts appear as liar caused ‘social paradoxes.’ The problematic Liar paradox implicates all truth in which the perceptive value predicates have willfully, or not, diverged from those of nature. While liars’ ‘tell lies’ as easily as those who ‘tell the truth,’ knowing deductions made from belief affirmed, but unproved dogma, remain as some related kin to common liars: The crafty Brahmanist, for instance, rationalizes from devilish values for to gain material advantages. This is clearly more nefarious in intent than those who, because of need, intend to gain from ‘telling lies’ (or by force): The ‘liar paradox’ is about willful predicate values, which fail to correspond with natural antecedent predicate values.36

Liar paradox. Semantic paradox, known in antiquity, focus of much recent work. Jack says ‘I am now speaking falsely’, referring to the words he is then uttering. If Jack speaks truly when he says he is speaking falsely, he is speaking falsely. If he is speaking falsely when

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

this is what he says is going on, he is speaking truly. So what he says is true if, and only if, it is false: which seems absurd. One response claims that Jack says nothing true and nothing false. But a variant makes trouble: Jill says ‘I am now not speaking truly’. If Jill is not speaking truly when this is what she says she is up to, she is speaking truly. If she is speaking truly, then she must be doing what she says, that is, not speaking truly. So, it seems, what she says is true if, and only if, it is not true. M. Sainsbury What factually ‘is true’ or ‘is false,’ forensically define the prescriptive predicate’s truth value. Lies are factual posits that forensically define the predicate truth value of the prescriptive (Intent, however, is a deeper residual aspect of the individual intelligent essence; its inference is not nearly as directly forensically linked) When believed dogma ‘is false,’ as mostly it is, do the dogmatic ‘believers’ unwittingly live in, as well, tell, lies? : Do believers’ value predicates prescribe by their actions, a traceable inferred value, which, is, as perjury, simply an act of lying?

That which we are we are all the while teaching, not voluntarily, but involuntarily. Emerson In recent years, a congressional hearing called senior officers of tobacco corporations to testify about their knowledge of the life threatening dangers of smoking. None, although under an oath to ‘tell the truth,’ admitted this factual evidence was caused by smoking. Since then, company documents proved they had known this evidence had been caused by smoking. Not one of them was indicted for the perjury they openly committed. But the important point here is about dogmatic orthodox belief that not only makes it expedient but also easy ‘to tell lies’ and remain unaccountable for perjury. The ‘corporate shield,’ which shunts liability for personal actions that are committed on behalf of a corporate ‘fictitious person’ was made legal by ‘positive’ law. This legal ‘corporate shield’ protected the tobacco industry executives by excusing them from what they knew was ‘is false’ testimony: instead they affirmed this falsity, as their opinion, which is not knowledge:

‘Smoking is nonaddictive’! ‘Therefore, only those choosing to smoke

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

are responsible for the effects of smoking’!

objectives, however, this v.t. definition was not in the earlier year’s edition.)]

And when information to the contrary surfaced, corporate policy, as based on the legalized corporate shield, then argued that the evidence should be suppressed because ‘the information was corporate property, therefore, was a matter of privacy: of ‘rights’ and ‘laissez fair.’ These, ‘is false,’ predicatevalues, of the legalized organic logos of corporate prescriptive policy finds no coherence with nature’s teleological predicate values: corporate, prescriptive predicate value has absolute dogmatic focus on what is most profitable, and this predicate focus is made the deontological duty-based goal of the corporate mantra. It is the driving purpose of legal and licensed exploitations. And with the corporate legal shield, as enforced by law, what fictitious corporate person has ever been put in jail for having committed perjury? Still, the corporate mantra has dominated the personal morality of the corporate officers and employees. If any officer, or employee, divulged information that contradicted the corporate policy, their dismissal from position and employment was surely assured? Corporate officers are dutifully faithful to their corporate logos, or, what other justification is there, that make them worth their outrageous salaries. Were they proud or remorseful for being faithful to what amounts to ‘legally justified, deliberate lying?’ Doubtful! [About this form of rationalization, I found the following v.t. definition (5), which was not in the earlier year’s edition, and clearly appertains to the above unitary materialist-conflated legal scenario] : 37

6. ‘Mathematics.’ To clear from irrational quantities. "" -- v.i. (intransitive verb meaning) to find excuses (often unconsciously) for one’s desires. [this v.i. (intransitive verb meaning), which takes no direct object

Rationalize -- v.t. 1. To make rational or conformable to reason. 2. to treat or explain in a rational manner. 3. To find (often unconsciously) an explanation or excuse for. 4.to explain (myth, legend, ets.) in terms of contemporary scientific knowledge. 5. To organize or run (a business, industry, operation, etc.) on economically sound or proven methods of administration and production [This v.t. (transitive verb meaning), which gametically requires a direct object for clarity of meaning, distinguishes teleological purposeful human thought from deontological duty-based business objectives (i.e., the natural divide between human essence and business duty-based business

for clarity of meaning, applies exclusively to subjective human essence] Paul Baran (sp?), a corporate CEO, presented the following thought to a forum of business executives, which I attended many years ago:

There are many ways to describe the contrast between the tycoon and modern manager [most now aspire for this morally traitorous authority of corporate aristocracy]. The former was the parent of the giant corporation, the later is its child. The tycoon stood outside and above, dominating the corporation. The manager is an insider dominated by it. The loyalty of the one was to himself and his family . . . the loyalty of the other is to the organization to which he belongs and through which he expresses himself. To one the corporation was merely a means to enrichment; to the other the good of the company has become both an economic and ethical end. The one stole from the company, the other steals for it. * * This CEO’s observation of cultural transition resulted from the economic determinism of causal mechanism, which Whigs following Lincoln’s death installed and called, The American System of Political Economy: As tautological ‘is true’ evidence is pursued, Hamilton’s Federalist predicatebased fallacy is politically, especially legally, of concern, then the predicatebased fallacy of Whigs with the installation of determinist mechanism-based official political economy should be recognized as having compounded the original legal fallacy that officially was at play to influence American

While it is impossible to square circles, irrational quantities are intrinsic of rational mathematics.

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

culture.""

improvement’ paternalism (insurance)]. Schumperter’s book was about

Economics Professor Schumpeter then noted that this cultural economic causal effect also related to taking profit, which had no reasonable economic origin in Adam Smith’s seminal economic postulations. Schumperter’s findings were published on the heals of the Great Depression, and his conclusion was this:

another kind of development -- the way in which capitalism develops its propensities for growth. . . . this academic treatise was destined to become the basis for one of the most influential interpretations of capitalism ever written. . . .. Schumpeter’s initial portrait describes a capitalism that lacks the very ingredient that brought growth into the worlds of Smith and Mill and Marx and Keynes -- namely, the accumulation of capital. Schumpeter describes instead a capitalism sans accumulation -- a capitalism whose flow of production is perfectly static and changeless, reproducing itself in a “circular flow” that never alters or expands its creation of wealth. The model resembles the stationary state envisaged by Ricardo and Mill, with the difference that the stationary state seemed the end of capitalism to the earlier writers, whereas for Schumpeter it was the beginning of capitalism. Therefore we must examine the characteristics of the circular flow a little more carefully. Because the system has no momentum, inertia is the rule of its economic life: “All knowledge and habit, once acquired,” writes Schumpeter, “becomes as firmly rooted in ourselves as a railway embankment in the earth.” Thus having found by trial and error the economic course that is most advantageous for ourselves, we repeat it by routine. Economic life may have originally been a challenge; it becomes a habit. More important, in this changeless flow competition will have removed all earnings that exceed the value of anyone’s contribution to output. This means that competition among employers will force them to pay their workers the full value of the product they create, and that owners of land or other natural wealth will likewise receive as rents whatever value their resources contribute. So workers and landowners will get their shares in the circular flow. And capitalists? Another surprise. Capitalists will receive nothing, except their wages

But now comes the Schumperterian contradiction: Capitalism may be an ‘economic’ success, but it is not a ‘sociological’ success. This is because, as we have already seen, the economic base of capitalism creates its ideological superstructure -- rational rather than romantic, critical rather than heroic, designed for men in lounge suits, not armor. In the end it is this capitalist frame of mind, this capitalist ‘mentality,’ that brings [it down]. About Capitalism’s propensities for growth, R. L. Heilbroner cited the ‘static circular flow’ analysis of Prof. Joseph Schumperter: 38 ‘The Theory of Economic Development’ [published in 1912 at age 27]

sounds like an analysis of what we have come to call the underdeveloped world. But in 1912 the special economic status and problems of that “world” had not yet come into existence -- this was still the unabashed colonialism [In the American economic world, Whigs were in charge of the government’s Gilded Age and with the American System of Political economy had installed the pork barrel ‘internal

The primary Presidential election process in 2008 provides a window from which to view the cultural effects of the mechanist economic ideology, as legalized, to affect U.S. citizens: Candidate Obama’s political dilemma, with his pastor’s culturally reactive remarks, particularly appertains to the emancipation of American Blacks’, which proclamation occurred in the 1860's. Evidently, the cultural economic effect of a century and a half, remains unsettled and turbulent: reaction to the mechanist economic legalization is strong and apparent.

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

as management. That is because any contribution to the value of output that was derived from capital goods they owned would be entirely absorbed by the value of labor that went into making those goods plus the value of resources they contained. Thus, exactly as Ricardo or Mill foresaw, ‘in a static economy there is no place for profit! Why does Schumpeter present us with such a strange -- not to say strained -- image of the system? Perhaps we have already divined the purpose behind his method: the model of a static capitalism is an attempt to answer the question of where profits come from. The source of profits is a question that has been gingerly handled by most economists. Smith wavered between viewing profit as a deduction from the value created by labor and as a kind of independent return located in capital itself. If profits were a deduction, of course, the explanation implied that labor was shortchanged; and if they were a contribution of capital, one would have to explain why the profits went to the owner of the machine, not to its inventor or user. Mill suggested that profits were the reward for the “abstinence” of capitalists, but he did not explain why capitalists were entitled to a reward for an activity that was clearly in their own interest. Still other economists described profits as the earnings of “capital,” speaking as if the shovel itself were paid for its contribution to output. Marx, of course, said that Smith was right in the first place though he didn’t know it -- that profits were a deduction from the actual value created by the working man. But that was part of the labor theory of value which everyone knew to be wrong and therefore did not have to be reckoned with. Schumpeter now came forward with a brilliant answer to this vexing question. Profits he said, did not arise from exploitation of labor or from the earnings of capital. They were the result of quite

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

another process. ‘Profits appeared in a static economy when the circular flow failed to follow its routinized course.’ Now we can see why the wildly unrealistic circular flow is so brilliant a starting point. For all the forces leading to disruptions in routine, one stands out. This is the introduction of technological or organizational innovations into the circular flow -- new or cheaper ways of making things, or ways of making wholly new things. ‘As a result of these innovations a flow of income arises that cannot be traced either to the contribution of labor or of resource owners.’ A new process enables an innovating capitalist to produce the same goods as his competitors, but at a cheaper cost, exactly as a favorably located piece of land enables its owner to produce crops more cheaply than less well situated fellow landlords. Again, exactly like the fortunate landlord, the innovating capitalist now receives a “rent” from the differential in his cost. But this rent is not derived from Godgiven advantages in location or fertility. It springs from the will and intelligence of the innovator, and it will disappear as soon as other capitalists learn the tricks of the pioneer. The new flow is not therefore a more or less permanent rent. It is a wholly transient profit. An innovation implies an innovator -- someone who is responsible for combining the factors of production in new ways. This is obviously not a “normal” businessman, following established routines. The person who introduces change into economic life is a representative of another class -- or more accurately, another group, because innovators do not necessarily come from any social class. Schumpeter took an old word from the economic lexicon and used it to describe these revolutionists of production. He called them ‘entrepreneurs.’ Entrepreneurs and their innovating activity were thus the [only naturally ‘is true’] source of profit in the capitalist system. . . ..

Thereafter his real career began, first as a visiting professor in

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

Japan, then in Germany, soon thereafter at Harvard, where his manner and his cloak quickly made him into a campus figure. . . .. The depression was, in fact, a test of Schumpeter’s ideas. If capitalism derived its energy from the innovations of entrepreneurs, why was their stimulus missing in the grim years of the 1930s? Keynes had said that depressions reflected the state of expectations of businessmen, but his theory did not require him to account for the reason ‘why’ their “animal spirits” were low. Schumpeter had a more demanding task because he explained boom and bust by the bunching of innovations and the swarming of businessmen. The endless depression therefore cried out for reasons why the new innovations were failing to arrive on time. . . . The fully developed vision of the future of capitalism does not emerge until 1942, when Schumperter published ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,’ a book that changed the way we think about the system. . . . But now comes the Schumperterian contradiction: capitalism may be an ‘economic’ success, but it is not a ‘sociological’ success. This is because, as we have already seen, the economic base of capitalism creates its ideological superstructure -- rational rather than romantic, critical rather than heroic, designed for men in lounge suits, not armor. In the end it is this capitalist frame of mind, this capitalist ‘mentality,’ that brings [it down]. While the mechanism-based political economy has for too long ignored Schumperter’s analysis, he verified that routine profit taking had no natural truth-based place in the economic circular flow: Paradoxically, routine profittaking effected inflation endemism that devalues the currency that was created to provide utility in the exchanges of consumable goods and services. Productions of War implements, as ordered by government, act similarly on economy as do the routine profit taking by owner manufacturers, who pay the least possible wages for the manufacturing work. ‘Old wealth accumulations’

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

of Smith's seminal postulation are the sophistry-based myth of mechanist ideological idealism: instead, Smith’s economic conceptions were rationally constricted to individually owned shops of productions and exchanges. These economic booms and busts are the result of accumulations that have derived from mechanist organic ideologies and routine profit taking. And the contemporary mechanism-based economy now depends, ever more rapidly now, on this growth in accumulating, and requires a growing preponderance of unearned fiat money that, as fictitiously, is officially legally affirmed on faith and trust for being wealth equivalent. ‘Unearned wealth’ is now produced by processes of socializing, through public stock offerings, the ownership of the rationally fallacious routine profit-taking. And by inflationary endemism as clearly was shown in the example of how W. Rockefeller and H. Rogers profited by purchasing Anaconda Copper Company,39 legalized economic usury describes the myriad inflated values that result from inflation (as real property values, for instance), clearly expose the officially unaccounted endemism resulting from the routine profit-taking by owners of m manufacturing, which inflation cost as routinely is put onto the cost of consumer goods. The means of unaccounted endemism are legions. And all this is evident in the fact that $ 1.00 consumption value in 2001 compares to less than $ 0.06 in 1915. 40 Adam Smith provided these page references to corporations in his seminal document on economy: 41

Is Pure Truth necessary and Eternal?

U.S. government, as an organic entity, is holistically based on the consent of the governed. Government has pertinence only in the sense of its constitutional consent, as ordered and directed by dully elected humans. This consent was not granted in any willful individual manner: those elected, are required to take a strict oath of office, which far too often now is ignored. Licensed corporations neither have this consent nor were they elected, and therefore, do not in any similarly disposed sense, have government’s organic pertinence. Adam Smith’s above registered concerns were surely about the designed organic abuses that corporations, directed by mechanist corporate officers, posed to human’s essence, the consent of which had granted governments authorities. Smith was concerned with any licensing of organic business logos , i.e., mechanism-based intelligence, which is fictitious since it has no natural organic creation or intelligence, the only purpose of which was idealistically expedient to dogmatic business practices, as mercantilism, for instance, (by amoral acquisitive preemptive values intrinsic of achieving economic ‘results,’ which Schumpeter had called ‘the growth propensities of business’). By ‘Affirming dogmas,’ as with imperialism-based ‘Manifest Destiny’ or ‘Dollar Diplomacy,’ for instance, in which businesses are licensed to achieve profits by supplanting the constitutional liberal sovereign consentbased values of government, with autocratic acquisitive preemptive values intrinsic of achieving by exploitations, duty-based mechanist ‘results’: Take, the Monroe Doctrine, which extended consented constitutional meaning of ‘national defense’ to all nations of north and south America, for instance, then, by preemptive dogma, administratively license the transmutation of this constitutional organic government doctrine to corporate businesses,’ the asserted dogmatic ideological principle antecedences of which, both as regards constitutional values, as consented, and the Monroe Doctrine, to ‘national defense’ protection, expressly is transmuted to economically exploit preemptively: thereby, the democratic constitutional meaning, as consented and implied by the Monroe Doctrine, is thereby transformed into an ideological form of business autocracy, for which the Constitution is made the legal scapegoat? It is necessary, therefore to seek reasoned clarity of the Constitutions intent, as consented and by oaths taken,

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

subscribed. The Constitutions Preamble specifies these ordained, by sovereign consent, these constitutional purposes:

‘We, the people, to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.’ Imperialism, however, is as old as history and its forms, of selective power, includes means as economic, the military, or political. Like a Brahminism, the dogma-based values of imperialism clearly find ‘fertile ground,’ in the materialist temporal world of predicated truth-values that in fact are mostly fallacious, ‘is false,’ of ‘opinion,’ instead of ‘reason’-based, ‘is true’. Value predicates of government’s logos (official policy), at some point following Whig administrations of government, abandoned the holistic values, which are intrinsic of a commonweal, usufruct, . . . The predicate value transmutations of government’s official Logos now represent predicate values of dogmatic ‘contingency,’ which supplanted value predicates of ‘necessity’: And respective of truth’s ‘correspondence frame,’ ‘necessary truth’ has been replaced by ‘contingent truth’: or about ‘consistency’ (no truth opposites), was replaced by ‘inconsistency’ (myriad truth-paradoxes): ‘legal positivism’ resulted from this official logos predicate value transmutation? :42

Legal positivism, intending to oppose natural law theory, denies any ‘necessary connection between law and morality’. Central theses among a loose cluster: (1) law is definable and explainable without evaluative predicates or presuppositions; (2) the law (e.g. of England now) is identifiable from exclusively factual sources (e.g. legislation, judicial precedents). Some versions deny that there is knowable moral truth. Most understand positive law as products of will, some as imperatives. John Finnis The official transmutation of predicate values in government’ logos , away from moral values, were preceded by Congress persons,’ acting in concert, transmutation of personal value predicates, from those of natural ‘necessity’

Sovereignty

to those of ‘temporal’ ‘contingency’: for instance, when official actions are in accord with ‘positive’ legal laws,’ (laws resulting from Western practices of the nihilism-based dogma called ‘positivism’), their personal morality is then idealistic, i.e., is for lack of reasoning, conflated to ‘black holes’ of a sine qua non ‘nothingness’ and, in results, lacks’ fiducial ‘is true’ truth value. Individually, morality and patriotism are feigned: as pawns of moral ‘black holes,’ of political ad hominem and idealistic rationalizations, that for reasons intrinsic of the human temporal nature, humans can invariably never satisfy: As this rationalized accusation by ‘conservative’ ‘idealists’ that accused Jefferson, Jackson, Wilson, FDR, Carter, Clinton, . . . , for being ‘flexible to the point of vacillating! ; Therefore, [they] cannot be trusted!’ In this, ‘conservative’ mechanists consider dogmatic stability of the ‘good old boys’ as predicate virtue because, like ‘birds of a feather,’ this dogmatic value, even though ‘is false,’ is the expedient stable common cement of their fallacious concepts of fiducial ‘trustworthiness.’ While their common illusion of trust is as bankrupt as illusions among gang-members, which also commonly ‘is false’ in value but are the mutually nefarious organic logos of any band of thieves, or, what else binds them in mutual trust? The official transmutation of values is in fact a process of sequential rationalizations which transformed constitutional ‘necessary truths ’ into ‘contingent truths ’: a negative metamorphism of constitutional foundations to individual liberty, security, and democracy, which are of the ‘necessary’ value predicates of Plato’s reason-based truth, Forms A & B. Sovereignty is a synonym of ultimate powerful liberty The word sovereignty, as first used, depicted the supreme dogmatic power, authority, and freedom of kings and their kingdoms. Over time the inevitable human mortality mitigated as sovereignty’s power and authority were inherited: with each generation, sovereignty became less absolute. Magna Carta’s documentation verified this mitigation as fact: 43

The Magna Carta, or The Great Charter, has been called “the cornerstone of English liberty.” It is a document that English barons

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

forced King John to approve in 1215. In the Charter, the King promised certain rights to his subjects. Magna Carta marked a beginning for democracy in England. (To be continued) Principles of ‘liberty’ are democracy’s principle value predicates. ‘Liberty’ which applies equally to all, distinguishes ‘democracy’ and, as the history of Magna Carta suggests, the barons wanted the king’s ‘liberty’ for their Brahmin caste: to increase their dominion of subjects (The Barons’ value predicates were Brahmanist, or Machiavellian).

It did not grant democracy to all the people, because the barons designed it to protect their rights and gain more privileges. But it marked the first time that anyone had ever limited the absolute power of the king, in England or anywhere else. Democracy was popular with American colonists, whose purpose was to gain ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom.’ Democracy only gained respect in America because common colonists put their lives at risk to gain a charter agreement for ‘sovereign liberty and freedom.’ American aristocrats, in concupiscent want, were Tories, Federalists, or Whigs. The antecedent concupiscence of these castes,’ was the conscious Machiavellian Brahmanist’s drive for an American monarchy. And they comprised most appointments to the Constitutional Convention. However, Colonel George Mason’s appraisal, “The genius of the people favors [democracy], and the genius of the people must be consulted,” confirmed, that the common demand for ‘liberty’ was not negotiable.44

In the convention the need of a strong state, with powers beyond local legislatures, was not so much debated as assumed [Dogmatically]. By common consent it was agreed that the present lack of a centralized, coercive sovereignty, was the source of all current evils. How many members preferred monarchy to republicanism, in principle, it is impossible to determine; but they all realized the inexpediency of attempting to set it up; even Hamilton yielded to the logic of Colonel Mason’s argument: “Notwithstanding the oppression and injustice

Sovereignty

experienced among us from democracy, the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted.” Since, ‘just and equal distribution of liberty,’ defines democracy’s meaning, the Federalist lament ‘Notwithstanding the oppression and injustice experienced among us from democracy,’ expressed the provincial Federalist (Brahmanist) covetous value which, if consistent,’ should have applied when Whig barons in England took from the King, only to themselves, some of the King’s ‘divine right’-based sovereign liberty: The King must have felt the oppression and injustice of losing his absolute liberty in the same manner as American Federalist did. Undoing injustice is always difficult. In Parrington’s account of Mason’s, expressed Federalist covetousness about liberty, strongly represents a value, which influenced the convention’s thinking. Democracy must have gained respect, however, since Brahmanist caste sovereignty (inferring liberty with impunity) also found the natural human applications of sovereignty, which describe the nature-based essence of intelligent and civilized human character: To be democratically civilized, the unalienable aspects of the human mind or soul must have liberty to posit value predicates of necessity in the materialities of human action. Thomas Jefferson, also an aristocrat but far from being a mechanist, wrote the Declaration of Independence but its true source was the common-will as then was freely expressed by common colonists. An exceptional aristocrat because he became the true representative of the popular-will, Jefferson did not take up arms or join the revolutionary forces: Instead, he helped the common cause by writing and legislating.* * By his aristocratic peers, Jefferson was perceived as having abandoned his heritage, and, for this, he became an arch foe of cultural Brahminism: the caste’s ‘right’ of aristocratic membership is ‘the wearing of the dogma-based predicate values of Machiavellian Brahminism.’ And quite surprisingly, Jefferson, with a few others, spurned these values. Ever since the ‘Declaration’ was written, Jefferson’s description of ‘equal unalienable human rights’ has been challenged by mechanist ‘conservative’ Dogmatists, whose self acclaimed caste rights are based on dogmatic belief

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

in doctrines as ‘materialism,’ ‘mechanism,’ or ‘divine rights’ (Dogmatic empiricists’ deduce only modified dogma that is always of consequential human nature, then affirm it as natural antecedent principle, i.e., like looking through the rear-view-mirrors of their dogmatic value predicates’: as my father-in-law often quipped, ‘don’t be backward about coming forward.’). Jefferson’s sovereignty leveled, democracy is, therefore, a badge of fiducial dedication to the transcendent truth of critical deliberate reasoning: Forms A & B of Plato’s Divided Line. And dogmatic empiricists, who are, or wish to be, aristocrats, shun the ‘necessities’ of these reason-based forms of Plato’s truth which are natural ‘necessities’ of morality and justice. The reason-based part of Democracy is, therefore, exclusively of ‘necessary truth’ which predicates of pure morality and justice, is found only in Plato’s ‘Intelligible Realm’ of human being: As Kant had reasoned, this is ‘a priori’, i.e., before any experience-based deliberation (in which the human mind, therefore, is looking forward inferentially, instead of backward at the dogma-based experience). When predicate values of human logos are not based on ‘necessary truth’ (which truth has no reasonable unnatural opposites), the facts which human actions posit, invariably embroil the discord of diabolical, paradoxical, truth forms, which for the most part is ‘is false.’. Still, the value predicates of logos (the guiding values of the mind) describe the liberty of individual human sovereignty; we commonly call this the human soul and, about this, crucial metaphysical questions linger: --What meaningful liberty is possible without free-agency? --Unless free-agency exists, why are humans held to be accountable? --Is human liberty based on sovereign free-agency? 45

Discovering in the principle of liberty, the cardinal principles of American democracy, [George William Curtis] was disposed to accept a wide application of laissez faire; yet when it opened the door to extortion he was willing to curb an anti-social individualism. A legal ‘safe haven’ from lawful coercion, which allows ‘liberty’ to human sovereignty, must be provided to ensure principles of democracy; all unnatural compelling forms of deterministic force must be neutralized or what we call human sovereignty simply is neither sovereign nor accountable: The

Sovereignty

unalienable ‘rights’ of each individual must be secure for individuals to choose independently whether myriad mechanist forces are of love or hate, beneficial or detrimental, of ‘good’ or ‘evil.’ Individual liberty and agency are companion true-natural-law ‘necessities’ for individually decided ‘events to go ahead and happen as they might’ rather than as determined by causal forces over which individuals have no control. 46 Jefferson, with others, was impressed by the French ideas of ‘liberty.’ He championed the constitutional (Bill of Rights) provisions for ‘individual liberties.’ * * ‘Jacobinism’ is the description that mechanist ‘conservative’ ad hominem gave to French liberalism; conservatives associated blame to this liberalism for the great atrocities and beheading which followed the French Revolution (However, these ‘conservatives’ failed, deliberately or not, to recognize that the unitary materialism value predicates of French culture was common dogma-based, and therefore, more common to their own dogmatic value predicates, as expressed in their ‘positivist’ dogma, for instance, than to the reasoned values of American liberalism.). This conservative prejudice of Whigs came to government’s authoritative power with Lincoln, and following his death, installed The American System of Political Economy, which economically mechanistically effected Henry Clay’s long held ‘internal improvement proposals (which became known as ‘earmarked pork from the common barrel’). Whigs, back then, had found the ‘laissez faire’ principle critically important to the exploitative functioning of privatized businesses: ‘liberty with impunity’ was an essential to the acquisitive predicate values of legalized ‘fictitious person’ corporations,’ which legally were decreed to have equality with human logos. ** ** By a careful review, I noted that the v.i. meaning of legalized decrees contrasted with the v.t. meaning of an act. The example, God decrees; man agrees, was given to the v.i. meaning of to decide, determine by decree, neither of which are required to take an ‘object’ for proper and clear meaning: Noumenon, whether of God’s or human’s logos, i.e., intelligence, therefore, is not grammatically required to take an object for clarity of meaning.

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

However, in the instance of fictitious corporate intelligence, as an affirmed fact of interpretation , legal or not, is an action more than a decree and, therefore, seems logically to requires that an ‘object’ is needed for clarity. The political result, decided by the Supreme Court, preserved businesses’ mechanist ‘liberty with impunity’ in far greater legal measures of ‘laissez faire’ than the Bill of Rights had assured to individual sovereign constituents. Adam Smith’s notes indicate that he clearly understood this: 47

Corporations, tendency of the exclusive privileges of, on trade, 30, 58; by what authority erected, 61; the advantages corporations derive from surrounding country, 61; check the operations of competition, 63; their internal regulations, combinations against the public, 63-4; are injurious, even to the members of them, 64; the laws of, obstruct the free circulation of labour, from one employment to another, 67; the origin of, 192; are exempted by their privileges from the power of feudal barons, 193; the European East India Companies disadvantageous to the eastern commerce, 214; The exclusive privileges of corporations should be destroyed, 225-26 Determined influences, which include deliberate arousing of another’s passions (including libidos), as delivered by or to friends, family, or enemies, is either ‘supportive’ or ‘exploitative,’ ‘virtue’ or ‘vice,’ ‘good’ or ‘evil.’ Organically, employers, media, religion, governments, . . . , have decreed value predicates in their organic logos which deliberately prescribe to channel individual thoughts and actions; the values predicates of decrees (asserted interpretations of the predicate value by legal administering agents for being ‘is true’), prescribe deterministic influence which differs only by the generality of application, which requires or does not that grammatically an ‘object’ is taken for granted to be ‘is true.’ Deterministic ‘laissez faire’ organic logos dominate in determining either employee action or reaction: rebelling employees’ best (often only) option is to find a new employer. This is mechanized influence that is legally enforced, however, the law increasingly now specifies penalties, but economic mechanisms causally still

Sovereignty

give paternal preference to employers. free-agency is a principle antecedent of liberty To be accountable, sovereign humans must act independently, in ‘a laissez faire’ form of liberty; for in fact to be independent, they must be immune to compelling forms of deterministic mechanistic force. ‘Laissez faire’-based immunity, in matters of civil laws and lawmaking, as specified in the Bill of Rights, is constitutionally afforded to individuals (The Supreme Court, without supporting legislation, extended this specified immunity to include ‘fictitious person’ corporate individuals). The First Amendment to the Constitution addresses ‘inalienable human rights to speech, press, assemble, and petition’; the Fourth Amendment addresses the right for people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects; the Fifth Amendment is unspecified and arguably supports a far broader selection of ‘inalienable human rights,’ which, as John Adams reasoned, are coeval of government. The Fourteenth Amendment (not originally considered a part of ‘The Bill of Rights’) intends to restrict organic laws from abridging The Bill of Rights. However, while the original intent was to emancipate slaves by striking down State laws which denied ‘liberty’ to slaves, the Supreme Court declared that states’ rights ‘immunity’ and ‘due process’ applied equally to (fictitious person) corporate businesses: these legalized fictitious, therefore fallacious, human-like corporate ‘liberties’ were also thereby federally immunized by the Fourteenth Amendment. The emancipation of slaves was, thereby, substantially thwarted: Slaves have waited more than a century for to fully gain their constitutional rights as U.S. citizens.48

The statement that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property “without due process of law” expresses one of the most important provision of the Constitution. The same words are found in Amendment 14 as restrictions of the power of the states. They express the idea that man’s life, liberty and property are not subject to the uncontrolled power of government. This idea can be traced to the Magna Carta, which provided that the King could not imprison or

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

harm people “save by lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.” That idea grew with the years. The Declaration of Independence expressed it by declaring that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The youthful John Adams made a compelling argument for ‘a broad immunity interpretation.’ Adams reasoned that ‘human rights’ were of the same moment and importance (coeval) with government and law; 49 neither the authority of government nor common law applied because unalienable human ‘rights’ are of the same moment and importance as the government and the laws created by government. Parrington gave this account of the fierce and still unsettled debate: 50 In asserting the principal of majority will, Jefferson like other democratic thinkers of the time, found himself countered by the argument of abstract justice. Vehement denunciation had greeted Paine’s doctrine that what a nation chooses to do, it has a right to do. There can be no rights, it was confidently asserted, superior to the right [of the majority of the nation]. The people may legislate, [said Brahmanists *, who sided with ‘abstract justice’], * ‘Brahmin’ depicts intellectuals who divine dogma to control society and by their power thereby, appoint rulers to placate the organic value predicates of their divine right-based interests: as deductively derived from ‘Brahmanism,’ the dogmatically believed divine right-based natural function of upper class Hindu Brahmans (Intellectuals), was to emulate the Hindu god ‘Brahman,’ which was believed to be the essence of everything. (The quote is contd.)

but it remains to determine the validity of statutes in light of justice; that which is unjust is ‘ipso facto’ null and void. It was Coke’s doctrine of judicial review, set up in America after its repudiation in England, and Jefferson’s hostility to it was bitter. As an intellectual he had none of the lawyer’s complacency with legal principles, or conceit of the law’s sufficiency; and as a democrat he would not yield

Sovereignty

sovereignty into the hands of the judiciary. He had no veneration for the Common Law of England: it had grown up by slow accretions during centuries of absolutism; how should it be expected to answer the needs of a freer age? It must be purged of outworn elements, imbued with democratic sympathies. The Revolution had been fought in defense of rights which are broader and more human than legal principles; and to hand over those rights to be interpreted away by lawyers, seemed to him moonstruck madness. American Brahmanist bias had determined by dogmatic belief that physis-based human reason only yielded bogus prescriptive value predicates, as applied to their dogmatically believed positive temporal material world. However, because such value predicates were not reasoned so to be concurrently fitted to value predicates of the ‘immaterial’ spiritual (soulful) principles, they expediently failed to fit the believed dogmatic ‘positive’ human need, as positivism’ dogma popularly had inculcated. "" However, oddly, i.e., fallaciously choosing to ‘believe’ absolutely, the expedient dogmatic doctrine of ‘abstract justice,’ as Jefferson had observed, this dogma-based convention has been successful, and still considers human exemptions provided for in the Bill of Rights as immaterial and, therefore, valueless. Myriad examples confirm that this Brahmanist political dogmatic bias-based belief retains great popular orthodox vitality. * * When two persons’ mutually engage in what is called a tryst, conventional mechanist Brahmins (And Calvinism is a mechanist religious form) always appear among the first sponsors to deem that a ‘sin’ was committed. However, when business managers (want to be Brahmins) meet at similar times and manner, in a tryst form, however, laissez faire or ‘innocence until proven guilty,’ is the then deemed immediate sponsorship that is given, to allay such common belief-based prejudice. The Supreme Court’s

Dealing only in ‘positive’ aspects of phenomenal facts, i.e., rejecting reason-based inferences, which are considered to be ‘abstract’ in nature. So, what is ‘abstract justice’ about if not an abstraction from positive thought?

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

interpretation of Due Process, specified by the Fourteenth Amendment, gave to organic mechanists Brahmins this legal excuse to allay religious sinful bias, i.e., gave this self serving legal excuse to organic mechanists’ who often politically feign religious belief but fail to practice what they claim to believe. This peculiar, fickle, Brahmin conventional dogmatic prejudice deems laissez faire-license in the one instance and condemns with ‘abstract justice’ the other, which routinely tyrannizes the laissez faire liberties that apply to all who are not Brahmin caste members, for being ‘sinful’: Which politically biased view was of Congress in impeachments of both Presidents’ Johnson and Clinton. In Adam Smith’s view, however, ‘collusion and contrivances’ agreed to at business meetings, which, as Congress, are trysts of sorts, inevitably tyrannize unalienable human rights far more than personal trysts ever can do, when engaged in by mutually consenting adults (and this observation has no intent to encourage or condone licentious behavior in either instance) What is intended, however, is the answer to this question: About justice (‘abstract’ particularly), which poses the greater ‘sin’? Prudish notions of virtue, as designed and ordered by Brahmanists’ fickle politics, allows freedoms to business that is subtly but legally denied to common individual humans? Think critically about this organic fickle political value, as was made legal, and vast dogmatic advantages to business are apparent: are human inhibitions resulting from determined official organic socioeconomic policies, as enacted, an official form of tyranny? And does this tyranny naturally then gravitate into terrorism? When humans are legally mechanistically inhibited, inferentially or coercively, are they prone to respond to irrational organic forms of stress? And, when stressed enough, are they prone to violence? Then, in reaction to the violence, are socioeconomic policies (doctrines) then adopted to make the stressed humans accountable for their violent acts, particularly when defined as sin? In this, has society officially violated inalienable human sovereignties: thereby effecting greater official tyrannies? Unless critical reason discovers broken links, in this escalating determinist chain of events

Sovereignty

resulting from the ratchet like effects of government’s official policy, "" the chain-reactive causal-nexus between ‘reactive official socioeconomic prejudice’ and ‘reactive violence’ are frightful indeed. This means to say that official dogma-based social prejudice is blameworthy for the geometric increase in violent acts, in which human stress is a factor: And, as ‘prescriptive intent’ determines ‘perjury,’ the official dogma-based mechanist prescriptive value predicates, which caused resulting stress, infer a mechanist culpability for committing perjury. Summarizing, a legal exemption is ‘necessary’ for the existence of individual liberty and freedom. An individually free agency is ‘necessary’ for individual actions to occur as they might, rather than as mechanistically determined. Both ‘necessary’ conditions are of the definition of laissez faire, and more important to the liberty, which underpins democracy. However, far greater official measures of laissez faire have paternally been adjudicated to business enterprise than to human sovereignty; this imbalance has opened the door of opportunities to the stressful extortion of human rights, the results of which are increasing tyrannies effected by official mechanisms’ (causal determinism) driven policies. Unfortunately, non coerced, critically reasoned value predicates are a necessary requirement to achieve constitutional ‘tranquility.’ G. R. Morrow wrote this about ‘the Law of Nature.’51

The dilemma of the fifth-century thinker is nicely exemplified in the attitude of Socrates. Before the Athenian court he declares firmly that he must “obey God rather than men.” Yet he was a loyal subject to the laws of Athens, and according to Xenophon he fully concurred in the

Temporal truth (‘beliefs’ or ‘illusions,’ which usually are dogma-based), critical or not, cannot qualify as ‘critical reason:’ Until official predicate values reasonably are found to possess ‘is true’ truth with natural values of probity (Smith’s ‘moral approbation’, for instance), tyrannous prejudice will increase simply by filling truth’s ‘is true’ void with affirmed ‘is false’ truth.

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

current opinion that justice means conformity to laws. About this cultural dilemma, Morrow wrote: There seemed no escape from the tyranny of nomos. Greek culture had mythological gods, to which Socrates openly expressed his disbelief. His deliberate reasoning inferred by natural phenomena, which transcended experience-based belief, convinced Socrates that an orderly God of Natural intelligent Creation truly existed. Socrates, in this declaration, confirmed that, while his critical reasoning was more important than the court’s authority which demanded his accedence, he was obliged to obey the state’s authority and power. In faith to his ‘is true’ truth’s predicate values in logos, Socrates could neither compromise his reason nor his respect of law (Truth’s value-based conceptions as Laissez faire were not then a commonly reasoned consideration). Instead, rationalizations of mythological dogma then greatly influenced the law, which prevailed with typical intent to stamp out sedition. Unwittingly, in ignorance, the Athenian court had thwarted the germ of natural truth, which Socrates had to offer: truth’s naturally ‘necessary’ foundations to pure morality and justice, were forestalled. Remaining faithful to his reasoned truth, Socrates drank the hemlock-laced-potion, which the state had required. Four hundred years later, in a court of the Roman Empire, similar absolute dogma-based prejudice, sponsored charges which led to Christ’s crucifixion (The greatest ever tyrannous act of nomos). Was, therefore, dogmatic cultural prejudice blameworthy for cultural decline to the point of an absolute cultural intelligence vacuum, which existed during ‘The Dark Ages?’ Is dogmatic prejudice blameworthy for other myriad tyrannous martyrs? : as witch-hunts of New England, for instance? 52

Hutchinson, Anne Marbury (1591- 1643) was a religious leader in colonial America. She was born in Lincolnshire, England, and came to Massachusetts with her husband, William, in 1634. Her kindness and generous care of the sick made her a popular figure. She began to attack the prevailing views at religious meetings in her home, and advanced the idea of a direct, personal contact with divine grace and love without regard to church or minister. The resulting argument split

Sovereignty

the whole colony. Henry Vane, then governor, and the famous preacher John Cotton, together with most of Boston, supported her. John Winthrop, a colonial leader, and people in the outlying towns opposed her. She was brought to trial and banished in 1637. She was expelled from the church in 1638. Was President Clinton in the cross-hairs of this dogmatic Brahmin-based Puritan prejudice? Was his Impeachment aided and abetted by a Brahminlike orchestration of popular dogmatic prejudice as based on feigned religious doctrine? : Accomplished not on the basis of moral truth-values, but instead, to satisfy the prejudice-based notions of a mechanist Federalism-based ‘abstract justice’? Wasn’t the Bill of Rights, which amended the Constitution, intended to apply to all? Or was the Constitution, the supreme law of the U.S., craftily designed to serve ‘some’ more than ‘others’? According to what right, as specified in the Bill of Rights, can a ‘special right’ transcend the Constitution’s specified intent? Shouldn’t the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments apply equally to ‘all’? Were they equally applied, as intended? Among other things, these Amendments intended to allow personal privacy (security of person and property) from effects of law. And when a crime was charged, and a legal search warrant issued, ‘what’ was sought was to be specified in the Warrant (So, why didn’t this specified procedure apply in the impeachment of President Clinton?). And when legally indicted, legal ‘due process’ was to apply (So, why didn’t legal ‘due process’ apply?): without a trial by jury, to prove guilt or innocence, the special prosecution of President Clinton was more like an ‘inquisition’ than a legal trial, which findings then were considered by Congress as factual evidence. Didn’t skillfully orchestrated political prejudice supersede the constitutional specification, in effect, tyrannizing Clinton’s constitutional ‘unalienable right?’ Did political prejudice misuse the special prosecution law? History will tell! , But never can it or will it undo the social effects done by the mechanist conservative Congress majority’s martyr-like tyranny, which acting as a cabal, unconstitutionally sponsored the impeachment!

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

The following statement, as inferred by the facts, represents the tyrannous oxymoron-based truth value predicates unconstitutionally agreed to by this cabal like conservative Congress! :

As elected representatives, we have sworn to uphold the Constitution, but then when entrusted with consented constitutional authorities, we, acting as a cabal, remembered those personal constitutional rights to think and act freely, and thereby chose to act in concert, by supplanting our mutual constitutional personal freedom, as the antecedent to our constitutional pledge, with disregard to the false truth value our personal belief in our cabal’s prejudicial values, thereby we rendered our oath-based, pledged constitutional prescriptive truth value predicates invalid. Our Oath’s of Office, to uphold the Constitution, were thereby violated? Nicholas Dent explained the ancient meaning of logos .53

Logos. A Greek word, of great breadth of meaning, primarily signifying in the context of philosophical discussion the rational, intelligible principle, structure, or order, which pervades something, or the source of that order, or giving an account of that order. The cognate verb legein means ‘say’, ‘tell’, ‘count’. Hence the ‘word’ which was ‘in the beginning’ as recounted at the start of St. John’s Gospel is also logos. The root occurs in many English compounds such as biology, epistemology, and so on. Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, makes use of a distinction between the part of the soul which originates a logos [our spiritual reason] and the part which obeys or is guided by a logos [our visceral instinctive emotions]. The idea of a generative intelligence (logos spermatikos) is a profound metaphysical notion in Neoplatonic and Christian discussion. Words as logic, logarithm, logistic, . . ., are compound meanings related to logos . Logos and Sovereignty are naturally bequeathed to each human’s

Sovereignty

inalienable nature. Exploitative preemptions, contrivances, and usurpations of human inalienable sovereignty are also hostile to nature’s ‘necessary’ truth: whenever they ravage humans’ natural ‘unalienable rights.’ 54

Discovering in the principle of liberty, the cardinal principles of American democracy, [G. W. Curtis] was disposed to accept a wide application of laissez faire; yet when it opened the door to extortion he was willing to curb an anti-social individualism. [Was the door to extortion not opened by the official affirming of tautological fallacies?] If ultimate temporal individual sovereignty connotes ‘impunity’ along with ‘supreme liberty,’ which are existential in nature, then critical reason is of the beneficence-based virtuous sovereign freedom, in which ‘impunity’ neither is needed nor granted: and as Pojman had stated, is purely philosophical: 55 ‘Philosophy begins in wonder in the pursuit of truth and wisdom and ends in life lived in passionate moral and intellectual integrity.’ F. A. Wolf observed that understanding Plato’s concept of the human soul is ‘necessary’ for to advance in the science of metaphysical truth about natural energy as gravity, magnetism, light, . . .. Aristotle expanded Plato’s concept of logos by distinguishing ‘between the part of the soul which originates a logos [our reason] and the part which obeys or is guided by it [i.e., our emotional instinctive visceral substance].’ The allegations of President Clinton’s ‘high crimes,’ that led to his Impeachment, provides a comparative study of Plato’s Truth Forms: Clinton demonstrated all Plato’s Forms. In conducting the public’s ‘business,’ he demonstrated a pinnacle quality of ‘deliberate reason’ (Form B): His cogent explanations of critical reason-based knowledge demonstrated what Plato called ‘pure thought’ (Form A). And, as with all of us living in the temporal viscerally instinctive world, the truth Forms, of which naturally is an opinionbased mix of Plato’s Forms C & D: Clinton was certainly not an exceptional role model, particularly as regards his viscerally motivated or enticed acts. He charisma apparently was attractive, and many women found him to be viscerally attractive and willing. His personal social conduct surely was human, maybe in an extraordinary sense. The biased allegations charged that he was unconventionally promiscuous of the public’ trust. However, about

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

‘high crimes,’ constitutionally and legally, he was ‘innocent until proven guilty,’ which applied due process supposedly guaranteed that the cabal-based prejudice should not extend to him, except by due process. The Conservative cabal of elected legislators, deliberately ignored this constitutional specification, as regarded both Presidents’ Johnson, and Clinton. About libidinous conduct, Aristotle reasoned each human’s mind should be the master to control the human instinctive visceral conduct. Mosaic dogma-based moral law, which aligns with conservatively, mechanist divine rights-based government (Plato’s Form C), if it were applicable here, and it is not, would have cited Clinton’s sin, and then would have stoned his willing female partners to death. ‘Critical reason’ (Form B) of today, in the United States, allows mutually consensual adult trysts as sovereign-based acts, which are coeval of government, therefore, are based on an equal authority as that of civil law. However, ‘is true’ ‘critical reason,’ which is philosophical, cannot and does not condone acts, which viscerally are aberrant, but must leave the lawful judgement to the courts and politically to polling results. Under political duress, President Clinton admitted his inappropriate behavior, which in Shakespear’s view was maybe ‘habitual.’56 How use doth breed a habit in a man? Refrain to-night, and that shall

lend a kind of easiness to the next abstinence; the next more easy; for use almost can change the stamp of nature, and either curb the devil or throw him out with wondrous potency. So, President Clinton had admitted to a personal value weakness in his logos, which included visceral-based carnal knowledge, but had not violated civil law. So what was the political ‘cabal-made big deal’, trumpeting politics over the Constitution, thereby, impeaching Clinton for a ‘High Crime’? Which normal human, in moments of instinctive secreted values, is void of carnal instinct, which even as inactive predicate value in logos might also become habitual? : Or, please tell me, why does Hustler Magazine sell so well? Anyway, circumstantial evidence and Clinton’s admission showed that he was normal as St. Paul was in life’s temporal setting: in which visceral instinct is temporal life’s ever present condition, for which St. Paul had thanked God for having provided means of temporal redemption. Anyway,

Sovereignty

Clinton’s carnal acts with many willing but unindicted partners, contemporarily exemplified ‘contingent’ visceral-based truth, which had fit Plato’s truth Forms C & D, the predicate value of which is mostly ‘is false.’ And, this ‘is false’ predicate value applies to Clinton’s agreeable partners as well as to Clinton. We, as citizen subjects of the law, should worry when selective indictment and prosecution occur, and also if Clinton only exemplified Plato’s truth Forms C & D, as many conservative members of the indictment and impeachment cabal had consistently displayed? Clinton, while politically pragmatic, also displayed a keen sense and application of Plato’s truth forms A & B. Our maybe greater concern, therefore, should make a U turn onto President Clinton’s accusers, who ‘believe’ their dogmatic Brahmanist intellectual prejudice is superior to their pledge to uphold the Constitution: Belief that dogmatic truth values qualify them with ‘divine right’ to adjudge and convict sinners of their choice, but seldom of their political allies (despite whatever dogma-based fiction rests protected at the foundation of this belief). Dogmatic value predicates, of belief, probably require greater analysis: belief’ that is stuck in ‘contingent’ predicates values of Plato’s opinion-based truth Forms C & D, instead of transcending to ‘antecedent’ values of A & B. President Andrew Johnson was the only other U.S. President that was impeached. He became the U. S. president when President Lincoln was assassinated. And like President Clinton, his values were democratic. And, despite his intent to carry-forward President Lincoln’s agenda, a conservative mechanist valued cabal of Congress, also as with Clinton, politically prosecuted this impeachment. This fact not only underlies the Brahmin political desire to remove democrats from office, but also probably addresses the fact that when the Civil War ended, this political cabal had not agreed with Lincoln’s agenda in his second term in office: Peace with the South. Brahmanist mechanist values tyrannized Johnson and Clinton’s democratic sovereign values, and, therefore, as regards retributive justice, these Brahmanists should be held to account for having failed to first consider and resolve their own habitual sins before acting as a cabal to indict Mosaic ‘sin,’ which Calvin’s interpretation had theistically defined as lawfully actionable

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

despite Christ’s atonement which had afforded absolution to all humanity: i.e., to expediently preserve their paternally licensed mechanism-based economic exploitations, which, in fact, represents sinful concupiscence, which concern is St John’s primary First Epistle issue. Democrats’ efforts to socially level the mechanism-based economy, when in charge of government, apparently threaten to diminish conservative Brahmanists mechanism-based profits taken paternally by licensed economic exploitations. The government administered nomos-based law, to be distributively just, must consider, but has not, the irregular source of the cabal’s allegations: i.e., that dogma-based religious morality is a constitutionally reserved matter for each religion’s belief to settle on its own. Religious allegations of sinful acts are constitutionally unfit for secular government’s adjudications. Congressional cabals, therefore, should be expelled from holding secular offices along with their sponsorship of sinful allegations. Or, when was the First Amendment to the Constitution, separating ‘church’ from ‘state,’ abridged to reunite constitutional secular law of legal procedures for sinful acts, to which this constitutional exemption was intended and specified? * * However, religions are not entirely exempt from the nomos-based law. A religion cannot, with impunity, disregard secular constitutional law, as regard its conduct with members, who are subjects of a state and the nation. The state of Texas acted responsibly and appropriately when the constitutional abuses being practiced by the polygamous cult known as the YFZ Ranch became indicted. The religious exemption does not grant such practices as Texas then charged: Minor female residents are conditioned to expect and accept sexual activity with adult men at the ranch. 57 Despite Old Testament doctrine that ‘good women are respectful and receptive,’ or Mormon fundamental doctrine of polygamy, the unalienable rights of individuals are constitutional rights that extend lawfully to a religion’s conduct equally as to secular organic conduct. This religious cult should be disfranchised by a fine that will result in a complete dissolution should it fail to change in conduct so to be constitutional law abiding! Roger Williams’ dictum adds clarity to this situation: 58

Sovereignty

”The conclusion at which he arrived, then, from the merging of divine ordinances and natural law, was expressed in a doctrine that sets apart the individual citizen in all his spiritual and intellectual rights, from the subject of the commonwealth, and provides the basis for his principle of toleration. “A Civill Government is an ordinance of God, to conserve the Civill peace of the people, so far as concerns their Bodies and Goods,” and no farther. [exempting human sovereignty, as being cardinal, therefore antecedent and superior, by doctrine that sets apart the individual citizen in all his spiritual and intellectual rights; as Jefferson’s separation of Church from state was conceived to do.]. Conservative mechanists live the earlier mentioned oxymoron! : We, acting as a cabal, belatedly remembered personal constitutional rights to think and act freely, and by so doing, mechanistically chose to agree to act in concert, disregarding the prejudicial truth value of the cabal’s values, thereby have supplanted the mutual constitutional independent personal freedom specified and implied by our antecedent constitutional

pledge to uphold the Constitution, thereby have rendered our pledged constitutional prescriptive truth value predicate invalid. Parrington described James Russell Lowell as the prime representative of New England’s dogmatic mind: ‘The Authentic Brahmin.’ 59 Regarding this, Craig Thomas gave this predicate value to religious conservatism:60

(most importantly in the instance of those who may so easily be characterized as radical only in religion, and religious in their opinions of the sublunary sphere of government) In his intimate moments with Monica, Clinton’s libidinous habit, as in Shakespear’s view, might have overwhelmed his critically reasoned values. But an active human libido, has never been shown to adversely affect human capability to reason deliberately and critically. Absent any causal nexus, which shows that Clinton’s prescriptive logos was compromised, as it appertained to serving the public, therefore, cannot reasonably be impugned.

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Special Prosecutor Starr’s report documented ten encounters with Monica beginning in November of 1995 and ending in May of ‘96: Kissing, fondling, . . ., but not ‘copulation,’ i.e.,‘sexual intercourse,’ which ‘having sexual relations’ now contemporarily implies, was not reported by Starr; citing also, that Clinton stopped the blossoming affair although this displeased Monica. Starr’s report was unconvincing to those of classical Brahmanists’ dogmaprejudiced morality: still, ten days during six years as President is an insignificant indicator of rampant preoccupation of thought and action. But six years of active legal proceedings affecting many political initiatives and government’s cost (which exceeded $50 million paid by tax payers), shows how costly the cabal’s political preoccupation with consented sin was. Adult consensual trysts are legal, and particularly, they are not acts against the state. Brahmanists, however, ‘believe’ they are ‘divinely appointed’, i.e., a priori rather than coeval of law, therefore above reproach or indictment; also they ‘believe’ that only they are ‘faith qualified’ to publicly cite and advertize personal acts of sin, which only in their believed prejudice they claim is the public’s business. Still. Prosecutors must respect personal-immunities that are constitutional. Brahmanists are not above the law (but twice now, as a cabal, they have achieved this preemptive organic allowance). And their popularly regarded opinions, even when officially made, cannot legally and should not, therefore, supersede the Constitution. Anyway (as most did), we all should realize that when personal immunities of the President are violated (they were) everyone must be concerned that their personal immunities are in peril. To subdue tyranny, official authorities and powers entrusted to Brahmanists must particularly be a concern as regards their irrational truth’s value predicates (particularly when entrusted to Supreme Court members). Starr reported salacious details to the House of Congress. This fact revealed more about Starr’s personal logos than about the evidence of Clinton’s ‘High Crimes:’ Clearly, Starr’s abhorrences of carnal ‘sin’ and his tyrannous desire to put the brand of ‘sinner’ on Clinton provided evidence of Starr’s ‘Brahmin’ caste membership. But in other more legal matters he was more pragmatic: His corporate clients, whose business was tobacco related,

Sovereignty

had paid him more than a million yearly for his legal services; this fact evidently infers that he has either a lower moral tolerance for corporate rationalized business ‘values,’ or his biased Brahmanist morality condones, as a caste privilege, self economic enrichment paid in return for government’s paternalism (legal adjudications and tax breaks) as given to corporate entities. Where ‘good’ and ‘right’ are found About telling truth or lies, an important distinction exists naturally: Pure Truth transcends the individuals who embrace it: Independent of the human logos, ‘necessary’ truth (Forms A & B) exists where ‘good’ and ‘right’ are found; Lao-Tse’s ‘Sinderesis,’ like Christ’s ‘golden Rule, like Kant’s Categorical Imperative is evident; all of which according to Kant, Descartes, Leibnitz, . . . , is critically differentiated from Plato’s ‘contingent’ truth (Forms C & D). Human values in human logos, which are imbued with pure love, for instance, consistently prescribe and posit facts that have no critical-reason-based opposites. Those who think and acts in accord with pure truth never tell lies while maintaining ‘pure’ predicate values in logos . When lies are told, all ‘necessary’ predicate values of pure truth in logos are breached; as Confucius observed, ‘truth departs.’ Lies have no inferential correspondence with the values of pure truth: However, teleological ethics of purpose, as Mill suggests, is more important than deontological ethics. 61

Mill defends utilitarianism, a form of teleological ethics, against more rule bound deontological systems [as in Kant’s categorical imperative, for instance,”to act as you would will others in the same situation to act”].

Teleology is from the Greek “telos” which means “end” or “goal.” That is, the (antecedent) standard of right or wrong action for the teleologists is the comparative consequences of the available actions. That act is right which produces the best consequences. Whereas the deontologist is concerned only with the rightness of the act itself, the teleologist assert that there is no such thing as an act having intrinsic worth. While there is something intrinsically bad with lying for the deontologist, the only thing wrong with lying for the teleologist is the

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

bad consequences it produces. If you can reasonably calculate that a lie will do even slightly more good than telling the truth, you have an obligation to lie. [In war, for instance, do we not expect our soldiers taken as prisoners to not tell about military positions and purposes?] About the truth predicate confusion, which Mill’s analysis suggests, I resolved my own thoughts by limiting teleology (no necessity to lie) to Plato’s truth Forms A and B, to which paradoxical deontology fails to comport: The better ‘good’ of a lie, therefore, only applies only to irrationalism inherent of paradoxical deontology, which Plato described as truth Forms C and D. Contrarily, as regards teleology, about deontological duties, thinking and acting in accord with value predicates from Plato’s Visible Realm, truth Forms C & D, prescribes factual posits that inferentially are paradoxical: in which natural truth predicate opposites ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ routinely is existing. When truths’ correspondence frames are ‘contingent’ upon ‘beliefs,’ or ‘illusions’, truths’ value predicates are contingent upon falsehoods inherent of the value predicates of the dogma, or illusion believed, and must be regarded as simply symptomatic of irrational actors ‘telling their perceived truth’: logically fallacious truth is, in these circumstances, are ‘the stories chosen to believe and tell.’ They are fallacious because tautologically, mostly the logical ‘consequent,’ is affirmed as the ‘antecedent’: whereby dogma supplants principle: Tautologically, the predicate value ‘is false.’ For instance, many ‘believe’ that President Clinton lied after having sworn ‘to tell the truth’: just “look at him,” many in high government and religious positions declared, “you can tell that he lied.” And as a cabal, in their believed ‘truth,’ they ‘were sure that Clinton committed perjury. And, contingently, upon their ‘belief’ or ‘opinion,’ which Plato categorized as truth Form C and D, they Impeached him. ‘A man for

all Seasons’ (about an Englishman who could not be corrupted by the tyrannous dogmatic pressures of government’s authorities and powers) and ‘The life of Emile Zola’ (his role in persuading French public opinion and

Sovereignty

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

thereby overturning a wrongful conviction of Captain Dreyfus) are docu dramas about tyrannous extremes, which deductive rationalizations from ‘belief’ and ‘illusion’ have inspired. The sides of argument depicted in these movies are analogous to the sides of argument, which occurred in the proceedings of President Clinton’s Impeachment and Trial. The movie, ‘Tucker: The Man and His Dream,’ is an American version of Brahmanist mechanist corporate predicate values, which, to suppress interloping competition, ‘bought’ paternal regulatory favors from the cabal prone legislators.

must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically.

Clinton said steadfastly that he did not lie. If his oath was ‘true’ and until the crime of ‘perjury’ is proved by his peers in a court of law, which did not occur, Clinton’s version of truth, is constitutionally innocent, and therefore, lawfully, ‘superior’ in truth value to the truth value of those who ‘believe’ he lied. Whether Clinton Lied or not, his professed truth, absent legal factual adjudication (and allegations or opinions do not qualify as facts), is surely legally of superior legal truth value to any contingent ‘truth’ value of visual opinion-based ‘belief’ that he lied: although the belief-based truth is more popular. As Kant observed, the charismatic political appeal of truth based on ‘belief’ and ‘opinion’ generally, as popular orthodoxy, politically is stronger than truth that is based on reason: Because of the classical preconditioned inculcating of Brahmanist values, common prejudice always had the popular political advantage. Dogmatic ‘belief’ never seeks after ‘necessities,’ of ‘Sinderesis‘, i.e., for consistent, ‘is true,’ value predicates of ‘necessary truth.’ 62

New England’s Brahmanist mechanist elitist upper caste inculcated this classical federalist dogma alongside Calvinism that was commonly preached. (For more on this, see Parrington Vol. I, 359) Constitutional ‘freedom of speech’ protects speech that is ad hominem, which tyrannizes often, without reprisal, an adversary’s character (And indictments of slander seldom go to court). There is little doubt, however, that the above inculcated ad hominem-based hate, called the dogma of Harrison Gray Otis’, resulted in a common political hate of democratic equality, which incidently was a dominant factor of the Constitution’s formulation. And, probably, it was this politics of dogmatic ‘belief’ or ‘opinion,’ that became the basis of legal constitutional laissez faire-based ‘freedom’, that allows confusion with both truth and lies, which authoritatively are routinely claimed to be the truth: the Supreme Court’s Federalist dogmatic mechanist belief, like that of Otis, authoritatively claims to be truth, however, have predicate value, which ‘is false.’ In Christ’s view, however, to harm others, he declared, was the equal of doing harm to Christ himself, and still, Christ, by the redemption of his atonement, forgave all, which redemption blesses those of hate equally with those of love: 63 antinomianism became a popular form of faith. Akin to antinomianism, the Supreme Court authoritatively extended First Amendment rights to business organizations where, for organic expedience, lying and ignoring constitutional values had become common. Nefarious dogma, as that of Otis,’ in predicate values of organic logos, then also enjoyed constitutional First Amendment freedoms, and with authoritative ‘Due Processes,’ mechanist liability, was akin to dogmatic prejudice of Otis’,

“Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason ‘without previous criticism of its own powers,’” and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, not yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which

In this dogmatic manner, Kant described the supposed ‘intellectual superiority’ that assumes to be ‘divinely appointed’ for deductively to contrive from it, more ‘absolute’ dogma, without critical review. I call such prideful men Brahmins and the dogma of Harrison Gray Otis’ provides an example. Otis’ dogmatically believed this:

“If some means are not adopted to prevent the indiscriminate admission of wild Irishmen and others to the right of suffrage, there will soon be an end to liberty & property.”

Sovereignty

i.e., were given legal ‘impunity’: so, could this be the expedient basis of giving legal organic corporate fictions, human ‘sovereign status?’ "" Probably, therefore, trials by jury were never intended? When the only just legal standard for determining guilt or innocence is a judgement determined fairly by a jury trial, how can fiction be put on trial? And, if trials are legally made difficult, if possible, for corporate individuals who legally hide behind their licensed legal ‘fictitious person’ businesses (Because retributive Law intends to hold both parties of a contract responsible, while legal business licence allows organic irresponsibility with impunity, how, can contracts between businesses and individuals be legally, constitutionally binding?). Paradoxical opposites, which humans contend are ‘their truths,’ exist with equal lawful presence until adjudicated. Then, since ‘contingent’ truthforms exist naturally, and because of ‘free-agency,’ (and since nature fails to force humans to subscribe value predicates of pure truth), sovereignty, to exist at all, requires immunity from coercions of government and law. Otherwise, tyrannies of organic authorities and power would crush, into fictitious nothingness, human individual prerogatives and sovereignty. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not sufficiently shown concern for necessary human immunities: Our (Imperial or Brahmanist) Federalist Supreme Court alone, without legislated law, decided that immunities were appropriate, with far broader laissez faire applications, to ‘fictitious person’ corporations, by merely authoritatively extending what was naturally bequeathed to humans, to legally created corporate ‘fictions.’ While intra competition may exist, size, as determined by financial strength (unlimited discretionary corporate funding ‘for a hefty fee’ is apparently available from the banks of The Federal Reserve), dominates in the market places. Do ‘bigger fishes’ ‘consume’ the ‘smaller fishes, as Hesiod had observed,’ because ‘right’ does not naturally exist in ‘legal organic entities’ and

Maybe the greatest curiosity, involving truthfulness, is centered in Federalist mechanist politics, which openly espouses Auguste Compte’s positivism (exclusive phenomena), then, expediently, legally justifies organic rights on a basis of fiction, which is consistent only if fiction is of ‘positive’ phenomena, which it is not?

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

increasingly is found lacking in government ‘which masquerades as ‘the public servant, while primarily it mechanistically serves a dogma-based, legalized fictional Leviathan? : American System of Political Economy, which is mechanism-based, with government licensing ‘fictitious organic persons,’ the owners of which are Brahmanists which were given license to exploit human culture in the manner, which Hesiod had described as not fitted because of human intelligence, called ‘right.’ Glen R. Morrow wrote this about nomos: 64 . . . The word ‘nomos’ is as old as the epic poets, and seems originally

to have been used to denote the ways of behavior characteristic of any group of living beings, whether men or wild beasts. Thus Hesiod uses it in ‘Works and Days:’ The Son of Cronos has ordained this ‘nomos’ for men. Fishes and beasts and winged fowl devour one another, for ‘right’ is not in them; but to mankind he gave ‘right,’ which proves far the best (Evelyn-White’s translation). In later days ‘nomos’ was applied only to human ways of behavior; but it never lost its original meaning of custom, nor its association with justice. . . . Law is primarily an embodiment of justice, and conversely the just man is he who obeys the laws. But two other elements came to be associated with the idea of ‘nomos:’ the element of constraint, and the element of enactment. Customary law in its early stages is usually felt by a people as only vaguely compelling; conformity results without the machinery of courts and penalties. Similarly these customs are usually regarded as owing little to human contrivance; they are the gift of the gods, or a part of the unchanging order of things. For the Greeks this state of innocence was ended by the process of political unification and the colonization. When two or more communities found it expedient to join forces for mutual protection and benefit, their tribal and local customs had to be harmonized, and something like a common law, the law of the city, had to be set up, in some respects overriding the earlier and more familiar

Sovereignty

customs. Such a law of the city was felt to have, and would need to have, more explicit legislation or enactment, by deliberate choice of “the best.” . . . By the beginning of the fifth century the Greeks were well aware of this element of human judgment and positive enactment in the laws under which they lived. The course of political events in the fifth century only deepened this awareness. At Athens, for example, the successive changes in the constitution, the increasing resort to legislation, the growth of litigation, the widespread contact with other peoples and other laws, and the heightened sense of individual interests distinct from those of the community, all converged in their influence to give the Athenian citizen the conviction that his laws were to a great extent the result of legislation or enactment, and derived much of their authority from the sanctions explicitly attached to them. Yet, so strong was the traditional association of law with justice, it appeared inconceivable that there should be justice apart from law. The relations of the two concepts had to a great extent been reversed. Whereas in the beginning law was regarded as finding its norm in justice, in the fifth century justice came to be defined in terms of law. Under these circumstances the only recourse open to one who felt the injustice of his city’s law was to appeal to a higher law. . . . In short, there seemed no escape from the “tyranny of nomos.” The dilemma of the fifth-century thinker is nicely exemplified in the attitude of Socrates. Before the Athenian court he declares firmly that he must “obey God rather than men.” Yet he was a loyal subject to the laws of Athens, and according to Xenophon he fully concurred in the current opinion that justice means conformity to the laws. In our modern constitutional world in which fictitious states and corporations are legally paternally given consented organic powers and authorities that naturally are the inalienable properties of persons, a human individual can no

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

longer become a tycoon: Individuals cannot compete with the mechanized organic fictions, states and corporate entities, which legally are licensed to act as human persons in a mechanized political economy. Should anyone not believe this, consider this obvious natural fact: the natural human longevity is regulated by life’s definite naturally limited mortal features, whereas legal perpetual charters are granted licence to function as ‘fictitious’ entities. Also, humans consume to exist, whereas legal ‘fictitious persons’ do not. So, what natural principles do fictions possess? : They have no natural principles! Key distinctions results from evaluating truth’s predicate values of ‘necessity’ as naturally applicable to humans, compared to the predicate of ‘contingent’ truth values that is licensed to legal ‘fictitious persons.’: Mortality, for instance, is a natural truth: the ‘necessity’ of which is naturally, but fortuitously scheduled. And this eventual mortality is the great equalizer of human sovereign power and authority. When ‘fictitious state’ authorities independently act to license ‘fictitious legal person’ entities with a perpetual existence without liability-based penalties of laws that apply to humans, that fictitious licensed authority, unwittingly, or worse wittingly, have legally aborted by license, the natural effects of human mortality. American Whigs used their positions of authority to design and empower, with greatly disproportionate mechanized economic paternalism, as delivered by The American System of Political Economy. Parrington called this political economy “an ingenious scheme to ‘milk the cow’ and distribute the ‘milk’ to those who superintended the ‘milking.’” A perpetual existence of accumulation, sans consumption, affords unlimited economic paternalism to licensed ‘fictitious person’ corporate entities, and holistically, natural commensurate debt to humans of naturally limited birthrights and sovereignties that arrive and leave naturally with their human life. Parrington gave this account of New England life: 65

There is a certain historical fitness in the fact that the Wits should have arisen in Connecticut and been the intellectual children of Yale. For generations the snug little commonwealth had been the home of a tenacious conservatism, that clung to old ways and guarded the

Sovereignty

institutions of the fathers with pious zeal. Nowhere else in New England did the ruling hierarchy maintain so glacial a grip on society. The Revolution of ‘76 had only ruffed the surface on Connecticut life; it left the social structure quite unchanged. The church retained its unquestioned control of the machinery of the commonwealth; and the church was dominated by a clerical aristocracy, hand in glove with a mercantile aristocracy. Fresh currents of thought that were stirring the pulpits of eastern Massachusetts – suggestions of an Arianism that was to lead to the Unitarian schism – did not reach so far as New Haven, and Yale was content to remain the bulwark of an obsolete Calvinism. In such a soil Federalism would flourish like Jonah’s gourd; and it exuded a special odor of sanctity from the Calvinism in which it was rooted. To stout federalists like Timothy Dwight, the current dogma of total depravity sufficed to disprove the validity of all democratic aspiration. It was a presumption little short of blasphemous to assert that sinners are competent to manage the temporal affairs of society. The doctrine of equalitarianism was a particular stench in the nostrils of the aristocratic clergy, who disliked all leveling. The Irish immigrants seem to have been the most offensive equalitarians. [In 2008, the issue of undocumented Hispanic immigrants is made complicated by this dogmatically authoritative Federalist U.S. aristocracy.] About other affirmed rationalization, Will Durant wrote:

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

for the average worker, life has increasingly become more tenuous and less secure. Our modern empiricism-based economic truths, has nothing more in support of them, than the acquisitive dogma-based rationalizations proffered by our Brahman aristocracy, i.e., have ‘contingent’ acquisitive predicate values, affirmed as principle values, which invariably are of Plato’s Forms C & D: Our orthodox economic truths, are only based on what our corporate Brahman orthodoxy chooses to believe. Before considering Special Prosecutor Starr’s values in logos, since he represented a part of the organic political dogmatic prejudice like that of Otis, called ‘conservative,’ ‘conservative’ values are first considered here. The predicate values of dogmatic ‘conservatism,’ is based on dogmatic philosophies as ‘materialism,’ ‘mechanism,’ ‘determinism’ and ‘positivism’: ‘Ontological Empiricism,’ which is based on one or more of these dogmas, is mechanist conservatism’s main philosophical foundation. What is nihilistically missing from this dogma deduced ‘conservative’ doctrine is Plato’s deliberate reasoning (Forms A or B): a critical analysis of the dogmatic assumptions, which are affirmed doctrines fallaciously representing ‘absolute truth,’ which is of ‘belief’ rather than ‘reason’, the predicate truth value of which is paradoxical: i.e., is at least partly ‘is false.’ ‘Materialism’ (unitary phenomenal substance) is dogmatic doctrine, which lumps into the believed paradoxical unitary substance, which is both commonly characteristic of phenomena (is definable) and commonly characteristic of noumena (is undefinable), dogmatically believes that the human body and the human soul’s logos are one and the same substance. On this unitary materialist basis, ‘Mechanism’ is dogma about causal relationships of the contemporary temporal present with that which transcends (is prior to and will follow) temporal life: tautologically it affirms fallaciously empirical ‘contingent truths,’ as rational antecedents. ‘Positivism,’ for instance, is dogma affirming that only ‘positive’ reality is of necessity, provides the only ‘necessary’ foundation to knowledge. In Plato’s view of truth, these dogmatic beliefs constrict mechanist ‘conservatives’ to Plato’s ‘Visible Realm’ (Forms C & D), which Plato’s Allegory of the Cave is about. And Kant’s comments about dogmatism,

Sovereignty

which refuses to critically review its affirmed foundational dogma as necessary principles, is about this belief-based ‘conservatism.’ 66

I cannot even make the assumption -- as the practical interests of morality require -- of God, freedom, and immortality, if I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which, in fact, extend only to the objects of possible experience, and which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into phenomena, and thus rendering “practical extension” of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish “knowledge,” to make room for “belief.” The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that it is possible to advance in metaphysics without previous criticism, is the true source of unbelief (always dogmatic) which mitigates against morality. ...

This critical science is not opposed to the “dogmatic procedure” of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles “a priori” [before experience] -- but to “dogmatism,” that is, to the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing -without first inquiring in what way and by what reason has come into the possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason “without previous criticism of its own powers,” and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, not yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

scholastically. In carrying out the plan which the “Critique” prescribes, that is, in the future system of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. . . . He would have been peculiarly well fitted to give truly scientific character to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of the “organum,” that is of pure reason itself. That he failed to perceive the necessity of such procedure must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at once the method of Wolf, and of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy. To compare Empiricist Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) with Empiricist John Locke (1632-1704) is to confuse classical mechanist conservative dogmatic ontology with reasoned teleology, materialism-based dogma with reasoned thought, physical reality with perception, determinism with liberty and choice, . . .. And surprisingly, if truth is fact (as positive dogmatic common definition now represents), and fact is reality (again as common dogmatic definition now represents), then, deductively speaking, truth is unitary material-based reality. But if this ‘is true’, then ontology (reality) is epistemology (knowledge): which it surely is not! (A child, for instance, is real, however, is without knowledge) ‘Conservative’ predicate values of Hobbes’ truth are ‘contingent’ upon dogmatic belief (in materialism and divine right: the King can do no wrong). ‘Liberal’ predicate values of Locke’s truth, are the reasoned ‘antecedent’ ‘necessities’ (Principle values, which Lincoln had observed to be of Jefferson). The predicate difference between conservative and liberal is the difference between what mostly ‘is

Sovereignty

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

false’ because it is belief that is based on dogma, and what probably ‘is true’ because it is based on deliberate reason. Maybe unfortunately because of conservative ‘positivism’-based influence on word meaning, predicate results of reasoning deductively from common classical word definitions are as unreliable as the results of reasoning deductively from dogma: they are the predicate values of ‘belief,’ (Plato’s Form C), and ‘illusion,’ (Plato’s Form D), still classically they are affirmed as truth: logically, this belief-based orthodoxy nihilistically veils dogmatic fallacies. *

rather than of the true nature of things. In Plato’s conception, empirical truth, therefore, never advances beyond ‘belief’ or ‘opinion.’ About reality: therefore, empirical truth is always ‘contingently’ predicated upon dogmatic theory called idealism: ‘opinion’ that provides an unreliable foundation to knowledge. Only ‘necessary,’ pure truth that is critically reasoned, qualifies as the fiducial foundation of knowledge. Wisdom, or pseudo knowledge, derives from ‘contingent’ empirical truth that is paradoxical. Therefore, its predicate is a gamble (might be ‘is true’, but mostly ‘is false’).

* For instance, mechanist conservative dogmatic positivism veils the predicate value’s noumena (undefinable) definition (precisely, involving, dogma-based predicated affirmations, assertions, etc.): 67

The prefix ‘meta’ finds seminal meaning in Latin and Greek: in Greek it means ‘with’ or ‘after.’ The seminal meaning of physics also is found in the Greek, in which ‘physis’ meant ‘nature’: The works of Aristotle were, therefore, called ‘The Metaphysics.’ Keeping with original meanings, things which comport to ‘with’ or ‘after’ ‘nature’ can, therefore, should be thought of as being ‘metaphysical.’ Things which comport with, or are the result of, human designs (of concupiscent will) are not ‘metaphysical’: are neither ‘consistent’ nor ‘necessary’ : Lao-tse would say, they lack ‘Sinderesis.’ While it is ‘consistent’ to say pure truth is the metaphysic of (with or after)Plato’s ‘pure thought’ or ‘reason,’ this cannot be said about untested by critical reason human originated (inferred or affirmed) truths: they are ‘with’ or ‘after’ Plato’s ‘beliefs’ and ‘opinions,’ which mostly are of the ‘designs’ or ‘the concupiscent will’ of men. Metaphysical pureness is required for knowledge to be consistent. Wisdom is exercised as a spontaneous act and, therefore, never can claim consistency. Still, whatever wisdom is, it like, ontological concern, should influence ones’ critical reasoning. 68

Logic. That which is said of the subject in a proposition: the second term of a proposition. . . . 2. predicated. --v.t. (1) to found or base (a statement, action, etc.) on something. (2) to declare, assert, or affirm to be real or true: “Most religions predicate life after death.” (3) to conote; imply. (4) to declare to be an attribute or quality (of some person or thing) Truth, of predicated ‘necessity’ (the predicate of which‘is true’) or of predicated ‘contingency’ (the predicate of which often ‘is false’), is conceptual, i.e., of the mind’s perceptions that is analogous, as gravity is to mass, (so, try if you will, in positive terms, to describe gravity: it is an enigmatic metaphysic like truth, life, and all other noumena). ‘Necessary truth,’ however, provides a stable (eternal) metaphysic of knowledge. Its quest is the Epistemological. Reality of origination, of which, by denial (i.e., a form of nihilism), a positivist chooses not to know. On the other hand, conceptual human experience, is Ontology, which in the temporal estate of life, provides first hand experiences that ends in the quest for truth about things which are real (i.e., to garner knowledge of experience-based reality): Reality, however, is both material and immaterial: things of nature as they ‘necessarily’ originated and are, and not ‘necessarily’, i.e., ‘contingently,’ as humans conceive of them. Plato reminded that conceptions of things, derived from human sensory experience, are conceptions of surfaces or shadows

The unexamined life is not worth living.

Socrates

Hobbes’ published in 1651 his famous work, Leviathan, in which he asserted this:

men are moved only by selfish considerations, and, therefore, without an all-powerful sovereign to rule them, men’s lives would be ‘poor, nasty, brutish, and short’. The encyclopedia gave this account: 69

Sovereignty

Hobbes was influenced by two developments of his time. One was the new system of physics that Galileo and others were working out. From their ideas, Hobbes concluded that only matter exists [materialism dogma] and that everything that happens can be predicted in accordance with exact, scientific laws [of dogmatic mechanism]. Many men of his time believed that his view ruled out the existence of God and a free, immortal human soul. Hobbes’ was more a mechanist account of historical ontology than a new philosophy of origins. Still, his presentation of mechanist or ‘deterministic unitary materialism’ and his conclusion of an ‘absolute fictitious state’ (Leviathan), made his philosophy the ‘ruler’ of classical popular contemporary life. His analysis was about the precedent-status-quo, and in this, his mechanist ‘conservatism’ was tuned to the etymological meaning. Even the dominant religions modeled their dogmatic doctrines on Hobbes’ opinions which governed society: The cultural realities upon which Hobbes’ philosophy was based were anything but metaphysics. Craig Thomas, contrasting Hobbes, wrote this about John Locke’s philosophy, which justified human rights:70

What finally, is being insisted upon by the Levelers is the continuing and untransferable sovereignty of the people, the necessitous protection of individual rights and liberties, the requirement that political society be founded upon consent and ‘justly’ and equally so, and the significance of suffrage to undermine entrenched and especially landed interests. Wildman’s may therefore be the final word from them when he remarks that ‘a just subjection ought to be founded upon an assent of the people to their governor’s power . . . how governors shall derive a just power from the people but by an assent of the people, I understand not.’ They are the inheritors, whether entirely consciously in all cases, of the tradition of natural law theory, together with (most importantly in the instance of those who may so easily be characterized as radical only in religion, and religious in their

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

opinions of the sublunary sphere of government) humanism’s divorce of the secular from the theological -- the rescue of natural law theory from its theological constraints, which allowed the perpetration of feudalism, of hierarchy and enslavement on the one hand and the aggrandizement of property on the other simply because ‘only our souls were equal.’ Precedent society always has far too much ‘reality’ at stake for Locke’s ‘liberal’ philosophy about sovereign ‘leveling’ " to dominate politically. Mechanist incentives politically perpetuate ‘unitary materialist’ dominions: mechanist ‘conservative’ philosophy, as hinged upon as ‘materialism’ dogma, was seminally rationalized to perpetuate the dominions of power and wealth. In the following about Alexander Hamilton’s truths value predicates, Parrington referred to Hobbes, for example:71

It is sufficiently clear that in tastes and convictions Hamilton was a high Tory. The past to which he appealed was a Tory past, the psychology which he accepted was a Tory psychology, the law and order which he desired was a Tory law and order. His philosophy was not liked by republican America, and he knew that it was not liked. Practical business men accepted both his premises and conclusions, but republicans under the spell of revolutionary idealism, and agrarians suffering in their pocketbooks, would oppose them vigorously. He was at pains, therefore, as a practical statesman, to dress his views in a garb more seemly to plebeian prejudices, and like earlier Tories he paraded an ethical justification for his Toryism. The current Federalist dogma of the divine right of justice -- ‘vox justiciae vox dei’ -- was at hand to serve his purpose and he made free use of it. But no ethical gilding could quite conceal a certain ruthlessness of

Because liberty and human rights were established but unprotected, Locke wrote in exile and wished to remain anonymous, C. Thomas said.

Sovereignty

100

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

purpose; in practice justice became synonymous with expediency, and expediency was curiously like sheer Tory will to power. In certain of his principles Hamilton was a follower of Hobbes. His philosophy conducted logically to the leviathan state, highly centralized, coercive, efficient. But he was no idealist to exalt the state as the divine repository of authority, an enduring entity apart from the individual citizen and above him. He regarded the state as a highly useful instrument, which in the name of law and order would serve the interests of the powerful, and restrain the turbulence of the disinherited. For in every government founded on coercion rather than good will, the perennial unrest of those who are coerced is a grave menace; in the end the exploited will turn fiercely upon the exploiters. In such governments, therefore, self interest requires that social unrest shall be covered with approbium and put down by the police power; and the sufficient test of a strong state lies in its ability to protect the privileges of the minority against the anarchy of the majority. . . .. In his plan of government presented to the Convention, the principle of centralized power was carried further than most would go, and his supporting speeches expressed doctrines that startled certain of his hearers. He was frankly a monarchist, and he urged the monarchical principle of Hobbesian logic. “The principle chiefly intended to be established is this -- that there must be a permanent ‘will’.” “There ought to be a principle in government capable of resisting the popular current.”

religious in rhetorical debate about matters of government -- to perpetuate feudalism, hierarchy and enslavement on the one hand and aggrandizement of property on the other -- abides as hidden but dominant dogmatic prejudice, commonly called ‘classical,’ ‘orthodox,’ or ‘conservative.’ Mechanist orthodoxy successfully sanctioned fresh cultural nomos for America: At some point, religious and political dogmas were sponsored by ‘conservative’ American political dialectics which successfully fused Hobbes’ empirical mechanist doctrine with the American ‘liberal’ republicanism, and this dogmatic hybrid politics became the driver (“whiggamore”) of the American political economy. About this political dialectic, The Good Society refers to ‘The Rise and Fall of the American Century’; Parrington, almost a hundred years earlier, had referred to ‘the return to sixteenth century from which the seventeenth was a reaction.’ Parrington, had referred to America’s political choice, for expedient economic reasons, to adopt Hobbes’ classical orthodoxy rather than build upon the rational path which Locke’s ‘liberal’ philosophy had influenced and Adam Smith had endorsed. The Hobbes’ choice was, of course, also strongly influenced by English and European mechanist orthodoxies. Parrington mentioned Harriet Beecher Stowe for his observation:72

Craig Thomas’s predicate phrase, those who may so easily be characterized as radical only in religion, and religious in their opinions of the sublunary sphere of government, represent the rationalized nature of dogma-based, selfserving value in the conventional logos of Leviathan-based oligarchy: Visceral values in logos that would modify religious tenets and still appear

Locke, clearly a liberal of Plato’s Idealism, was an Empiricist. Unlike Hobbes, however, Locke appealed to ‘reason’ and neither to natural laws nor dogma to persuade philosophically that each human has unalienable God-bequeathed properties. Hume had convinced Kant that experience is the source of all temporal knowledge: ‘at birth the mind is a blank tablet, on

In seeking for an explanation of the unhappy union of a reactionary theology and revolutionary political theory, Harriet Beecher Stowe suggested in ‘Poganuc People’ that the Puritan immigrants were the children of two different centuries; that from the sixteenth century they got their theology, and from the seventeenth their politics, with the result that an older absolutist dogma snuggled down side by side in their minds with a later democratic conception of the state and society.

Sovereignty

101

which experience later writes,’ Kant then concluded. But he did not completely yield to Hume’s position that had caught the fancy of English and American classicists.73 He did not because the host of truth is the natural epistemological (the originating) antecedent to experience, i.e., pure truth is not the consequent of experience. Kant confronted this philosophical dilemma and sought to find answers for it. Locke’s purely reasoned philosophy (1632-1704), a century previous to Hume and Kant, became the darling of the seventeenth century, and it inspired religious ‘separatists’ to demand their God-bequeathed human liberties. The logically predicated ‘necessities’ of Locke’s truth, as Plato also had pondered, are exclusively of the Intelligible Realm: Plato’s truth, Form B. ‘Conservatives’ have consistently dogmatically denounced Locke’s reasoning for failing to comport to the predicated absolutely ‘contingent,’ dogma of materialism, ‘mechanism,’ and the ‘determinism-based,’ truths of them, i.e., for seeking truthful answers by reasoning rather than ‘dogmatically believing’ in the prejudice which Hobbes had documented and Burke had argued to denounce the ‘liberal’ radicalism that had inspired Revolution in England (1688), America (1776), and France (1789). Dogmatic belief in unitary ‘materialism’, i.e., absolute belief that all action, thought, and feeling is explainable by the movements and changes in matter, i.e., determinism, 74 distinguishes the mechanist ‘conservative’ predicate of truth in Hobbes’ empiricism (which tautologically ‘is false’) from the ‘liberal’ predicate (‘is true’) of antecedently, reasoned truth in Locke’s empiricism. But the rub shows in the paradoxes: for instance, If criminal acts are ‘determined’ by natural material forces that are beyond human control, which inculcated dogmatic ‘determinism’ represents, why are ‘conservatives’ so harshly disposed to punish criminals whose acts are naturally beyond their control, i.e., determined by the mechanisms of conservative materialist design? Does this paradox show that ‘conservatives’ either do not believe what they dogmatically claim to believe, or they ignore the effects of mechanism when laws they make are violated. Do they instead, use determinist dogma expediently to retain dominant political power? : assuring official, paternalistic support for the legally licensed mechanisms of ‘The

102

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

American System of political Economy,’ and thereby, assuring that the arbitrary Brahmanist political power of wealth is held intact, when selectively punishing the believed mechanism determined human acts? This being so, conservative belief in dogma is akin to living and telling lies? Parrington wrote this:75

The creative influence of the French Revolution upon the western world resulted from the enormous impetus which it gave to the movement to democratize American life and institutions. In no other country to which the sparks of revolution drifted was there such quantity of combustible material ready for the torch; and in setting afire this native material the French upheaval put a stop to the aristocratic reaction which had carried everything before it during the previous decade. It spread widely the spirit of leveling, and destroyed the last hope of the “monarchy men.” But it did more -- it gave a wide and popular currency to the ideal of democracy. Before the French Revolution the American mind had been curiously sensitive over the term democrat; even Samuel Adams had been driven by expediency to reject the word, and amongst the radicals, few had the boldness to avow themselves democrats. By common consent the term had been covered with opprobrium; democracy was no other than a ‘bellua multorum capitum,’ the hydra-headed monster of earlier Tories, licentious, irreligious, the very spawn of anarchy. But now the old conceptions were rapidly swept away, and democracy was accepted by liberals as the ultimate form of political organization, to which the American experiment was to be dedicated. Edmund Burke’s concept of ‘pre Contract’ which was based on the dogma of an absolute, but fictitious state, like Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan,’ resurfaced in the arguments which favored to impeach President Clinton: ‘the law is supreme’ was argued by conservative absolutists who politically have succeeded to deny constitutional democracy. This resistence to democracy is evident in

Sovereignty

103

Publicola, which appeared in the Columbian Centinel of Boston, in which John Quincy Adams took Burke’s side in the extended debate against Robert Treat Paine’s liberal appeals for democracy. (Parrington, at some point later, now continues)

Concerning the repository of the ‘eternal and immutable laws of justice and morality,’ which are paramount to all human legislation, Adams is as vague as other Federalists; but he seems to imply that it is the body of English Common law, and that abstract justice is somehow interwoven with the British constitution. In other words, his argument conducts straight to the familiar [dogmatic] doctrine of ‘vox justiciae, vox dei,’ with its implied sovereignty of the judiciary. In this, with other thinkers of the abstract justice school, Adams was upholding the principle of judicial trusteeship in opposition to the democratic principle of the majority will. The distinction reveals exactly the different positions of the two parties: the democrats accepted the principle of utilitarian expediency; the Federalists espoused the doctrine of the ethical absolute as the final law. To a generation still strict in religious professions, the doctrine of the ethical absolute made strong appeal; but the democrats attacked it so sharply that it survived only by skillfully metamorphosing itself into judicial sanctions. [By this, Parrington concludes that the political conservative bastion of opposition to democracy ultimately depended on the arbitrary conservative control of judicial sanctions?]

The final outcome of the long acrimonious discussion of fundamental principles was a curious reversal of positions: whereas the democrats were charged with being political and social romantics, appealing to a false psychology and following abstract theory, they were in fact idealists who pointed to the sordid facts of economic and social reality, in justification of new programs. The Federalists, on the other hand, finding the appeal to realism making against them, and

104

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

fearful of the majority that was discontented with the ‘status quo,’ took their stand upon abstract principal that was cousin german to a rigid legalism. It was a significant impasse to which they were brought by the exigencies of the political struggle. A critical inspection of all dogma uncovers absolute assumptions similar to the ‘ethical absolute’ upon which ‘conservative’ Federalist ‘fictitious justice’ is based. The reversal of positions which Parrington observed, Kant, much earlier, had observed this: foundations of dogma

must not be immune to critical analysis of the scientific method of critical review. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason “without previous criticism of its own powers,” and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, not yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole" science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. The dogma-based doctrine of ‘legal positivism’ is additional evidence of absolutist amoralities in ‘Federalist’ legal minds.76

Kant described Brahminism: Supposed ‘intellectual superiority’ is assumed to be ‘divinely appointed’ to contrive, without critical review, ‘absolute’ dogma, as the ‘dogma of Otis,’ for instance.

Sovereignty

105

Craig Thomas had observed the ‘divorce of secular values from religious values.’ As my paraphrase suggests, his observation applies as well to a values-divorce of ‘legal’ from ‘moral’:

in the instance of those, who may so easily be characterized as willing to be radical only in moral compromise to particular results of legal application (no concern for particulars of those on trial), and strictly zealous in legal opinions about the sovereign sublunary sphere of law: In other words, argument which conducts straight to the familiar doctrine of ‘vox justiciae, vox dei,’ with its implied sovereignty of the judiciary as ‘the king of government.’ His ‘choirboy’ persona, not withstanding, about Special Council Starr’s logos,‘ Federalist,’ as above defined, or ‘Brahmanist,’ which I have described for being mechanist conservative driven, infers his ‘is false’ predicate value: In his mind, ‘Mechanist Conservative’ is of antecedent value, and constitutional ‘abstract justice’ of jurist interpretation is of consequential value. Starr absolutely ‘believes’ the ‘Federalist’ doctrine (dogma of ‘vox justiciae, vox dei’). His Federalist brotherhood (most jurists serving offices of the Supreme Court, and many ‘conservative’ members of Congress), achieved to have the already sitting special Prosecutor dismissed, for to appoint Starr. The ‘absolute beliefs’ of this Federalist cabal (‘elitist brotherhood’) include ‘conservative’ dogma , which Parrington had observed, took their stand upon abstract principal that was cousin german to a rigid legalism. (As fundamentally ‘absolute fictitious contract’ and ‘absolute fictitious sovereignty’ of ‘fictitious states,’ among others) which fundamentals they called ‘abstract justice, for to administer ‘strictly,’ the Constitution’s intent as they believed it to be. Parrington’s sentiment about federalist belief:

To stout federalists like Timothy Dwight, the current dogma of total depravity sufficed to disprove the validity of all democratic aspiration. It was a presumption little short of blasphemous to assert that sinners are competent to manage the temporal affairs of society. In this sentiment, which is tantamount to making ‘a pact with the devil,’ this

106

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

‘brotherhood,’ or cabal, routinely ‘believes’ the dogmatic values of their Federalist logos: values which allow members to claim allegiance to the flag of American Liberties and swear to uphold the Constitution, while, by the subtle means of controlling by ‘Abstract Justice’ (Who would be appointed as ‘The Independent Prosecutor,’ for instance) they control official actions which denigrate the Constitution’s principles, by compromising the ‘separate powers of government’ and, more egregious to individuals, ‘equal justice for all’ (particularly, President Clinton’s personal unalienable rights were tyrannized by this Abstract Justice influence). Their excuse: ‘not the prosecutor, but the special prosecution law was flawed’! Do members, of this Federalist cabal, commit perjury when they swear to uphold the Constitution and then supplant their personal Federalist value predicates, which do not accord with constitutional principles? Worse, they claim that because they are the constitutional experts, only they are qualified to adjudicate constitutional matters. This contention is another form of dogma which must eventually be evaluated by critical deliberate reason. Because predicate values of Federalist ‘conservative’ truth are ‘contingent’ upon the dogmatic ‘belief,’ or ‘opinion,’ they are suspect, maybe fraudulent (paradoxically bearing ‘is false’ as their predicate value); their truths are of Plato’s Forms C & D. And still, Federalist ‘conservatives’ are the backbone of classical orthodoxy. And if orthodoxy is ever to emulate pure truth, it must reject the believed ‘absolute’ dogmas, which translates to yielding foundations upon which their authoritative power derives: this, Federalist ‘conservatives’ will never do voluntarily: Is it maybe the forerunner of a political U.S. Armageddon! (?) 77

Sovereignty

107

under oaths, one after another, in turn, and with seeming conviction, told the Congressmen conducting the hearing that they knew of no evidence to support the charge that smoking caused sickness and death. Loyal to the corporate logos upon which their high positions were predicated, they denied what surely knew! Clearly, they openly committed perjury! Neither contrite nor worried, in fact, they were confident that Congress would or could not indict, punish, or cause their removal from the corporate offices they held? Why? Because the tobacco industry regularly contributed to the political campaigns of those elected to Congress (supporting both ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ politicians), have legal fees and political donations, as in this instance, become a similar but legalized form of ‘the mafia’s protection racket’? Do the predicate values of (for profit) corporate businesses clearly show in paradoxical results? , which are of Plato’s Visible Realm, Forms C or D? Are they, therefore, generally amoral?

108

Wise Men shut themselves away because the world confuses their minds: Wise Men are all children. 67

I possess three treasures which I hold and guard: The first is called ‘affection’: The second is called ‘moderation’; The third is called ‘Not venturing to be a leader in the world.’ He who is affectionate is capable of courage: He who is moderate is capable of liberality: He who does not venture to lead the world is capable of discharging the highest offices.

Necessary consistent predicate values of human life The predicate values’ motive must be coherent with deeds (facts) that are posited for consistent necessity to exist: Lao-tse’s Sinderesis must exist, for instance. Six hundred years before Christ, Lao-tse considered ‘primordial substance’ as the basis of his philosophy: predicate values in Lao-tse’s logos were, therefore, i.e., were deliberately patterned on the original predicate values of nature’s logos: ‘The Way’ served as the intelligent pathway for this philosophy, logos, of Lao tse’s philosophy: ‘Primordial Substance’ is nature’s substance: 78 49 The Wise Man does not have a constant mind, But he takes the mind of the people as his mind. To the righteous we must be righteous, And to the unrighteous also we must be righteous: This is the Sinderesis of Righteousness. To the truthful we must be truthful, And to the untruthful also we must be truthful: This is the Sinderesis of Truthfulness.

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Today we have courage without affection: We have liberality without moderation: We have leaders but no followers. This is to perish. He who assails through his love will conquer: He who is assailed through love will be secure: Heaven protects he who saves others through his love for them. 77

The Way of the Cosmos is like the drawing of a long bow: The head is bent down and the heel is bent up: That which is excessive is reduced, That which is insufficient is increased. For The Way of the Cosmos is to take from that which has too much

Sovereignty

109

And to add to that which has not enough. The Way of men is not like this, For they take from those who have insufficient That they may give more to those who have superfluity. Who can possess abundance and give it to the World? Only he who possesses The Way [of the Cosmos]. Therefore the Wise Man acts but does not rely on his actions: He achieves merit yet holds not official position: He has no desire to appear to be wise. 81

Sincere conversation is not elegant; Elegant conversation is not sincere. An honest man does not discriminate; He who discriminates is not honest. A man who is discerning is not ostentatious; He who is ostentatious is not discerning. The Wise man does not spare himself: The more he gives to others the more he has for himself. The Way of the Cosmos brings profit without hurt: The Way of the Wise Man brings achievement without conflict. Lao-tse perceived necessary consistency of cosmic values that differ starkly when compared to the inconsistent Brahmanist values of belief and opinion. Epistemological concerns, in temporal life, are about pure truth and probity, the inferred reasoning of which opens to approximations of ultimate eternal knowledge. Having dedicated some retiring years to this noetic metaphysical challenge, I humbly offer for consideration this personal conception of Pure Truth:

A temporal partial knowledge of Pure Truth is the uncommon reward

110

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

for diligent perceptive etymological ambition, which profoundly respects nature’s inferred predicate values in LOGOS: Faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty and promise have been registered as representing these predicate values of the natural troth inferred by this LOGOS. The reward for living these values yields untellable assurances and securities, as temporal knowledge, as when burdened with concupiscence might never be yielded. Yet, pure knowledge is found by living in accord with these predicate values, which accords with the covenant-named Jehovah. Holiness describes these values, as they are lived in conformity to the nature and the will of the ultimate intelligence we in reverence call God, respectfully faithful to all of nature with unequivocal fidelity, loyalty, and promise. Pure Truth is holistic, something that remains ubiquitous of definition excepting in the context of being consistent with the whole, comprising all forces and creations of nature, i.e., effects all foundations and adornments of the evidential cosmos, which human perceptive ambition, in holiness, seeks to comprehend the cosmic real and ethereal appurtenances thereof. Humans’ ambitions, however, are impeded by the mortality of life and the inordinate concupiscent impediment of orthodoxy with its ordinary paradoxical fragmentation. Pure Truth is a constant quest of life that in fulness humans can never reach. Then, causal events of life rudely cause an awakening to life’s temporal realities: some common experience, as hunger, pains, or another’s pressing need for assistance with a common bond or chore, reminds that temporal life is unfit for extended pursuits of epistemology: but rather, maybe better fits with Loa-tse’s wisdom. ‘The song of Moses’ (Deuteronomy 32), which Moses told was God’s instruction to him, endorses this inferential pursuit of nature’s predicate value. Ancient philosophies from the Orient, as Loa-tse and Confucius,

Sovereignty

111

spoke of an ‘I Am’ for being the intelligence of Creation. When confronted with this history, Christ allowed that he was this ‘I Am’ of Creation. Plato and his followers, as Deists generally, by the deliberate reasoned inferences of nature, derived a knowledge of this intelligent Creation. Locke observed this about reasoned inferences of nature that were preferred to passive dogmatic belief that knowledge came only by way of revelation in reward to practiced faith alone: 79

He that takes away reason to make way for revelation puts out the light of both, and does much the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope. Locke Here, Locke described the nihilistic effect of dogmatic positivism. Dogma is introspective, and socially offered as a prejudicial placebo, which Brahmanists administer to the masses to provide an intransigent anchor to what classically, officially has been decided or achieved. Discovery, naturally, however, requires introspection of a far different sort: dogma that naturally is consequential has no place in this creative realm of inferential prescriptive thought and action, where critically open minded exploration is of antecedent inferential necessity. Invariably, when reason threatens dogma, those administering the dogma, ferments social rejection of the interloping reason-based, challenges. The ‘Song of Moses’ routinely remains passively interpreted, as its intended reasonable inference is socially rejected. About this, G. E. Lessing’s statement comes to mind:80

If God held all Truth in His right hand and in His left hand the eternal Quest for Truth, and said to me, ‘Choose!’ I would with courage touch His left and say, ‘Father give me this! The pure Truth is fit for you alone.’ B. Spinoza contemplated ‘necessary’ predicate values for to live in accord with moral ethics; his focus narrows to truth’s division between ‘consistency’ and ‘necessity’: 81 28. The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the

highest virtue is to know God.

112

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

35. So far as men live in conformity with the guidance of reason, in so far only do they always necessarily agree in nature. 36. The highest good of those who follow after virtue is common to all and all may equally enjoy it. 37. The good which every one who follows after virtue seeks for himself he will desire for other men; and his desire on their behalf will be greater in proportion as he has a greater knowledge in God. . . . 40 Whatever conduces to the universal fellowship of men, that is to say, whatever causes men to live in harmony with one another, is profitable, and, on the contrary, whatever brings discord into the state is evil. Truth’s predicate values’ spectrum captured my interest: Plato’s cosmic philosophy, Cicero’s stoicism, Descartes and Kant’s ‘critical reason,’ Hume, Locke, and Hobbes’ empiricism, Adam Smith’s economic postulations and moral approbation, and democracy, captured my interest: I admire Adam Smith because his economic postulations embodied ‘probity.’ Smith, after all, was a philosopher of note.* * [R. L. Heilbroner wrote this: 82 ] At Glasgow, Adam Smith lectured on

problems of moral Philosophy, a discipline a great deal more broadly conceived in that day than in ours. Moral Philosophy covered Natural Theology, Ethics, Jurisprudence, and Political Economy: It thus ranged all the way from man’s sublimest impulses toward order and harmony to his somewhat less orderly and harmonious activities in the grimmer business of gouging out a living for himself. [Smith’s ‘moral approbation’ is provided later on.] Mechanist conservative ‘Classical liberal’ values embraced Smith’s economic postulations but often quite deliberately failed to embrace the antecedence of his ‘moral approbation.’ * * ‘Classical’ meaning, as used here, is dogma motivated by mechanist expedience that fallaciously supplants conservative dogma for Smith’s intended atomistic moral approbative economic liberality: subtle predicate values of ‘orthodox or traditional mechanist conservatism’ are thereby

Sovereignty

113

deductively the inferred meaning of classical here. Democracy does not exist without the common practicing of antecedent unalienable principles of human sovereignty: the American republican form of government is constitutionally an example of democracy, however, like the conservative meaning of classical, mechanist conservatives dogmatically, politically, and philosophically misrepresent meaning by subtle modifications to organic legality and economic causal absolutism, which in another organic instance is commonly called fascism. Libertarians argued to persuade that each human has an independent ‘free will’ and is, therefore, individually responsible for ‘his’ independent actions: this proposition lent support and just credibility to our retributive system of justice (accepting that authoritative Federalist legal modification was made to the judgements, Federalist Brahmans expediently introduced legal systemic fiction and impunity for to expedite Brahmanist legal authorities of dogmatic federalist conservative ‘positivist’ belief to the libertarian systemic individual equality, which modifications introduced diabolical legal results, however, were expedient to adopting the Libertarians’ individual intent while retaining Brahmanist oligarchical authorities and power in matters of economy). ‘Economic Determinism,’ called mechanism, which is the consequential causal theory deduced in the manner of Hobbes empirical belief in unitary materialism causality-called mechanism, from which dogma, as ‘divine right’ is deduced ( i.e., the king can do no wrong), as necessary dogmatic affirmations supplanted for natural necessary principles. All are affirmed logical fallacies, i.e., dogmatic consequents’ affirmed to replace natural antecedent principles. And, the resulting organic economic mechanisms, which are licensed to exploit economically, i.e., are licensed to tyrannize the common human ‘free will’ by paternally aggrandizing the organic free will of the patronized Brahmanist few. By this legal modification of constitutional meaning of justice, as originally interpreted by the libertarians’, human responsibility theory, which underpins our system of justice, was modified to organic legal deduced justice in which natural antecedent individual free will equally to individuals is modified legally to aggrandize the organic free will of a privileged patronized Brahmanist few.

114

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Our official legal system, thereby, became retributive, dogmatic, and paradoxical. And, the predicate value of this retribution justice’s truth, which generally ‘is false,’ has the contingently necessary propensity of being extra beneficent to the patronized Brahmanist few organic owners of business. Because Kant’s reasoning recognized logical uncertainties, his logic is critical in this regard: while the causal source of knowledge is found in human experience, the only truthful ‘tool’ of human conviction is the human soul: the natural human intelligence bequeathed by nature to each human; ‘critical reason’ is therefore, natural human capability, necessarily scientifically logically applied, to sift and qualify human experience into truth predicate judgements that are ‘is true’ and ‘is false,’ thereby, to gain temporal approximations of Pure Truth (the predicate value of which consistently ‘is true’), which then is a fit candidate for temporal knowledge? Hobbes’ ontology of paradoxical temporal empirical realities presented stark, and important contrast to Kant’s consideration of the noumena-based synthetic a priori based inferred experience: all humans must endure the temporal empirical realities that are consequential to temporal nature. But, as phenomenal facts are not naturally antecedent principles, the affirmation of them and deductions from them, taken as the supplanted antecedents of reasoned thought, invariably ends in ‘is false’ predicate value. As for Christian religion, Christ is the ultimate focus of faithful belief: while respectful of Old Testament stories, faith always finds greater New Testament-based strength in Christ’s principles. Christ, as he testified, is Jehovah, the Creator and Savior of all temporal humanity. Surrogate symbolism or dogma fails to fulfill or countermand this necessary natural originating antecedence of Christ as the Creator and Savior. Beginning with the Roman Empire, Christian partisans were considered by the Roman Emperor to be in opposition to him. And those of Old Testament faith served to prosecute Christ for this cause: Christ’s crucifixion resulted in faith confusion lasting for more than a millennium. The Roman Emperor, whose predicate values neither were as a Christian nor did he seek this belief, but he recognized their large number, and simply proclaimed Christianity and, thereby, added Christ’s partisans to his Empire:

Sovereignty

115

While his was a bloodless coup of sorts, obliging Christian culture, compounded the Roman Empire’s values confusion. Reformers affirmed dogma upon dogma. Still, Christ’s example and admonitions provide pure predicate values to live by: Pure religion is human experience for which critical reasoning is particularly important. Socrates observed this:83 The unexamined life is not worth living. Socrates And about my personal respect of ‘conservatism,’ my career in the mathematical (actuarial science) fields of insurance, with men of great wisdom and deliberate capability, provided a rich personal wealth of experience. Particularly I appreciate Kant’s comment about Dogmatists like his ‘celebrated Wolf’ as this describes the predicate values of these men that, if asked, I expect would claim they were conservatives:

In carrying out the plan which the “Critique” prescribes, that is, in the future system of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. . . . He would have been peculiarly well fitted to give truly scientific character to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of the “organum,” that is of pure reason itself. That he failed to perceive the necessity of such procedure must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at once the method of Wolf, and of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy. [Kant used philodoxy to emphasize common opinion (doxy), which unhinges the rigid reason-based consistency of philosophy, thereby reducing its meaning to that of a doxy.] Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson,

116

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, James Monroe, and Abraham Lincoln, are respected highly for their contributions to our nation. They are my respected ‘mentors. Franklin spent his lifetime critically philosophically evaluating his own life, providing thereby, beneficent values and achievements to humanity: he was unequivocal, maybe the first in America to declare himself a democrat. Hamilton, at the extreme political opposite end, displayed unequaled intelligence and cogent communication; without his Federalist pamphlets, the Constitution probably would not have been ratified. Washington, in the political middle, as our first President, decided without bias, the merits of our nation’s formative issues’: he often sided with Hamilton but always respected Jefferson. For instance, when, because of media attacks on his character, Jefferson had declined Washington’s request that he serve as the nation’s first Secretary of State, Washington would not be swayed. Aware of Jefferson’s live-in relationship with Sally Hemings (Jefferson’s one fourth black sister-in-law-legal slave and common law wife), Washington persisted to request that he accept this appointment. Jefferson never allowed his aristocratic birthright and privileged economic circumstance to influence his reasoned predicate values. He critically evaluated each issue’s ‘right’ from ‘wrong’, and unwaveringly sided with ‘right’ principles of the common cause. Adams, reputed to be the greatest legal historian of the Constitutional Convention, lived up to this quality, which distinguished him. His keen analysis took him to and fro from liberal idealism to conservative realism (and after him, common politics of idealism and realism became politically juxtaposed). But this lingering question always dogged him: which politics best described him? Neither politics could answer this. Monroe, his Monroe Doctrine, curbed foreign colonization in the Americas. Lincoln was the original self-made and selfreliant American. His focus was always on each problem’s holistic ‘forest,’ not ‘its trees.’ As no other, his requisite qualities of character (his predicate values) provided the essential qualification to settling America’s war with itself, war that became inevitable because the conflicting organic acquisitive economic predicate values compromised the nation’s constitutional holistic moral values: resolving slavery was his Presidency’s core achievement.*

Sovereignty

117

* Lincoln’s death, however, caused a leadership vacuum as regarded political balance: Whigs, who had gained government positions on the coattails of Lincoln’s election, then could and did install the ‘right wing’(Whiggish) political economic programs of their biased conviction: Particularly, they installed The American System of Political Economy with its tax-based ‘pork barrel’ spending. Politically, I am a composite, democrat, republican, federalist, whig, (none of which are capitalized because I am independent but also strongly, holistically, persuaded by libertarian predicated merits). Political Parties are necessarily biased by common opinion to serve the extremes of message simplification: one too ‘dogmatic,’ the other too ‘ideal;’ which at expedient times, are juxtaposed. Extreme politics of either instance repulses me. I find pure truth in Christ’s teachings, in Thomas Paine’s side in the organic debate with Edmund Burke. However, while partial to ‘liberalism,’ for the pureness of ‘is true’ truth I find there, I possess a temporal body with absolute temporal needs. Therefore, to satisfy and secure absolute temporal needs, the practicality of Burke’s view is often of merit: The world’s Edmund Burke’s are a temporal reality that must be given their due, however, absolutely being ruled by them promises tyranny, thraldom, and servitude rather than democratic individual freedom. Political balance offers the most possible human freedom? Who or what should rule? Jefferson said it best:84

have we found angles in the forms of kings to govern? Democracy is not tranquil: while it sponsors individual ‘liberty,’ which freedom equally sponsors the irrational political flux of contemplative reasonableness and necessary delay in deciding, thereby persuading a preference for the absolute paradoxical organic predicate values, which frustrates such necessary democratic organic reason. About ‘authoritative truth.’ Some years ago, I tuned in Cspan: the Senate’s White Water Hearings were live, in progress: Roger Altmann, a high Treasury Department official, had endured more than eight hours of accusation and questioning. I watched an additional three. Whatever ‘truth’ Altmann had to tell, his answers were

118

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

limited to nothing more than yes or no. The Senator Committee Chairman rigidly controlled the hearing: what was stated, answered by a nod or an audible yes or no, appeared as the predetermined record? : Only, the accusations stated were audibly recorded in the official public record. My interpretation of the Chairman’s intent seemed clear: to publicly chastise Altmann, by repeatedly calling him a liar and demanding that he resigns. The absolute intolerance of an audible response demonstrated the official anti-democratic hearing predicate values. Having earlier personally experienced the awesome authoritative power of Congress when personally giving my testimony at a congressional hearing about insurance company practices, my sympathies for Mr. Altmann when he was allowed only to nod his response to the tirade of political allegations, which authoritatively were paraded at him without his audible response: His nods clearly showed his disagreement, but nods were not recorded on the audio only Public Record. I concluded that what came from this hearing represented a form of ‘truth,’ which organic authority had predetermined would be allowed: surely it did not represent ‘truth’ in any sense of Altman’s suppressed testimony. What ‘authoritative truth’ the Official Record would show reminded me of V. L. Parrington’s account of Joseph Dudley’s High Tory authoritative encounter with a colonial American wood carter (which story will come later). As the Chairman Senator’s tirade reached its crescendo, the senatorial political opposition then erupted: a senator, of the minority politics, interrupted the Chairman’s tirade to remind him that the Congressional candidate from Virginia, running for a seat in Congress, had not only lied to Congress, but was campaigning on the fact that he had lied when testifying to Congress: he inquired, “Do you judge Mr. Altmann by the same standard, with which you now support the Virginian?” The Chairman, became livid, uttering expletives and gesturing a physical attack on the dissenting Senator, which later on he recanted. The Federalist Supreme Court decided that the nation’s official sovereign acts (at times bearing predicate values, ‘is true’ and ‘is false’) were legally commissioned with impunity: while the official organic acts posit

Sovereignty

119

facts that undeniably are both good and bad, the official authoritative acts cannot legally be held accountable. In the correspondence sense of truth’s common definition, the predicated ‘truth’ of posited ‘authoritative facts,’ even when the predicate value, ‘is false’, the causal ‘authoritative’ source, which has legal impunity, is not accountable (perjury is generally not chargeable!). This factual empirical-based organic dilemma, also existed in Thomas Hobbes’ divine right-based affirmation, in which ‘Kings can do no wrong?’* * Courts determine ‘authoritative truth’ about ‘guilt’ and ‘innocence’ (And court authority, of ‘authoritative truth’-based justice, is what made Socrates drink the cup of Hemlock and Christ crucified!). Government’s Legislators determine laws, which result in official acts and ‘adjudicated facts’ (similarly, as the ‘authoritative truth’ which had adjudged Socrates, Christ, and many others as guilty of crimes punishable with death, and in other acts of authority, have impeached Presidents); additionally, the U.S. President metes a form of ‘authoritative truth’ when he uses his constitutional authority to sign or veto legislation, or to pardon those whom he alone chooses. And, with the presidential election of 2000, this organic constitutional sovereign authoritative truth of the U.S. government was preemptively tested as never before: this election legally was, with impunity, decided by the High Court. By myriad extensions of organic authorities, as granted, assumed, or affirmed, and apart from law, ‘codes of honor’ intend to preserve impunity for those who authoritatively rule a group’s actions (when the ‘codes of honor’ are destroyed, the gang or club’s allegiance is destroyed). ‘Codes of honor’ are homogenous sets of predicated values which describe the official group’s predicate of some logos, which often is organic fiction. When the group’s predicate is moral, the group’s organically prescribed acts, generally are moral i.e. ‘is true’: when amoral, the predicate generally prescribes amoral ‘is false’ acts, and an evil predicate prescribes ‘is false’ evil acts. Only Plato’s Intelligible Realm of reasoned morality can consistently deliver organically democratic ‘is true’ predicate value. And when organic reasoning fails, the consistent organic predicate values ‘is true’ also fails. This democratic failure happens whenever democracy’s philosophical spiritual aspect is conflated by the orthodox popularity of unitary materialism forms.

120

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

‘Impunity’ means absolution, exemption, immunity, indemnity, pardon, . . . : entrusted assurances to power and authority, as was originally justified by ‘divine rights’ dogma, as applied to kings’ acts. ‘Impunity’ is the alter-ego of organic ‘power’ which legitimatized a king’s authorities. ‘Ruling authorities, or their impunity,’ as of the American Constitution, for instance, are partitioned with intent to nullify the potential tyrannies of ‘authoritative truth,’ as maybe are unintentional, however will, and do occur. Constitutional predicate values, as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, intend to prescribe moral actions by those of constitutional empowerment. Oaths of office intend to restrict individual ‘codes of honor’ (and therefore, personal predicate values) to the ‘code’ specified by the Constitution as,

‘we, the people, to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.’ A predicated ‘code of honor’ other than this Preamble is not granted to elected officials, but individual ‘liberties’ are often recited and practiced unconstitutionally by many when in office. However, elected officials cannot uphold the Constitution, as their ‘oath of office’ requires of them, without adopting and upholding the Constitution’s predicated ‘code of honor,’ in all its parts. Minnesota’s recent Governor was correct when he expressed this modification to his vow to uphold the laws of Minnesota: about this vow to uphold the Minnesota laws, he said that he gave up his personally held ‘First Amendment rights’ (Inferring that his personal predicate values must always yield to the state’s constitutional predicated values when official responsibilities were involved that required him to faithfully fulfil his oath as Governor.). ‘Fiducial’ and ‘probity’ apply to sovereignty’s constitutional meaning of democratic sovereignty in a similar manner as they apply in conjunct with truth: predicates of ‘fiducial’ and ‘probity’ in this constitutional sense, are dependent on truth’s ‘is true’ or ‘is false’ predicate. *

Sovereignty

121

* Fiducial 85 [ Latin fiducia a trust fidere to trust, is closely related to ‘troth’ (the predicate values of which is faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, promise . . . )]. Like ‘a troth,’ fiducial has ‘is true’ predicate value inferred by nature: A fiducial point or line, for instance, is an axiomatic (fiducial) reference to all theoretical applications of geometric points or lines. The Constitution is our nation’s ‘fiducial document’ and all elected officials are ‘fiduciaries’ of this organic public trust (this trust (or the troth) involves ‘all the people’ rather than only those of a state, district, faction, or an economic caste which select or validate an election). Violations of the ‘Public trust’ originate when personal predicate values are supplanted for those constitutionally specified. " However, ‘authoritative truth,’ which prescribes facts, is the same as truth, which corresponds to the prescribing predicate of posited facts: whether it is a personal predicate, or a fiducial organic predicate of the American ‘fiducial Constitution.’ The predicated result, ‘is true,’ or ‘is false,’ show the factual resulting value: ‘is false,’ always the result when personal authoritative predicate values masquerade as the fiducial organic troth’s predicate values? Too often, official positions are misused with full knowledge that legal impunity applies to the elected or appointed organic office. Is an official license to commit perjury with absolution provided in instances of official misuse of office? The predicate values of Hobbes and Burke were those inherent of dogma, which underpinned property-based-determinist-mechanist doctrine. Both Hobbes and Burke were not persuaded by Kant’s critical finding of ‘synthetic a priori’, i.e., rejected Kant’s finding of exceptions to absolutely believed theoretical temporal experience-based dogma as causal determinism, "

Tautologically, by fallaciously affirming that the predicate value of sovereign consent to organic predicate value is consequential, (i.e., Denying the tautological Antecedent predicates), or by affirming the consequential organic predicate as the antecedent predicate, (i.e., Affirming the tautological Consequential predicate), results as logically fallacious: ‘is false’ applies?

122

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

called mechanism, (the theory 86 that everything in the universe can be explained by mechanical or material forces): * Hobbes could not consider ‘synthetic a priori’ since he lived at an earlier time (1588-1679), however, since Burke’s life (1729-1797) was contemporary of Kant’s (1724-1804), Burke, a seminal mentor of conservatism, probably was aware of Kant’s ‘synthetic a priori’ finding of exceptions to the absoluteness of dogmatic unitary materialist causal mechanism. If the evidence shows that Burke was aware of Kant’s finding, then his intransigent dogmatic belief in mechanism infers that his rejection of Kant was deliberate (in this, Burke qualifies as Kant’s described “celebrated Wolf”). * Theoretical belief in causal determinism, was affirmed without logical substantiation, as official dogma in seminal organic times: i.e., was based on a few cases of experience, which, Hume decried as insufficient and to which Kant’s reasoned ‘synthetic a priori’ was found, could not scientifically reasonably represent consistent causal principle of nature, which particularly failed to consider the economic causality linked to the human free will. Both Hobbes and Burke are indictable in Kant’s critique: 87

science is not opposed to the “dogmatic procedure” of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles “a priori” -- but to “dogmatism,” that is, to the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing -- without first inquiring in what way and by what reason has come into the possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason “without previous criticism of its own powers,” and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, not yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary

Sovereignty

123

preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In carrying out the plan which the “Critique” prescribes, that is, in the future system of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. . . . He would have been peculiarly well fitted to give truly scientific character to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of the “organum,” that is of pure reason itself. That he failed to perceive the necessity of such procedure must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at once the method of Wolf, and of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy. Kant’s critical reasoning uncovered inconsistencies (paradoxes) which the dogmatic doctrine of property-based determinism had sponsored. Doctrine, which empowered kings and special others, and generally excused the impugning of the human ‘free will’: which nature-based-necessity, Kant reasoned, was essential to preserving morality in society’s culture. What is curious is how effective dogma, as that of Harrison Gray Otis’ has been applied politically to effectively perpetuate the official application of mechanisms as the absolute foundation to the American Political economy. Parrington commented about the predicate-values-war embroiling ‘authoritive truth’ in the seminal American predicate values (This values-war continues in our contemporary political debate.):88

The maturest elaboration of Paine’s political philosophy is found in

124

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

“The Rights of Man.” This extraordinary work, the most influential English contribution to the revolutionary movement, was an examination of the English constitution in the light of what Paine held were the true source and ends of government. It is a brilliant reply to Burke, who rested his interpretation of the English constitution on the legal ground of the common law of contract. Following the Revolution of 1688, Burke had argued, the English people through their legal representatives, entered into a solemn contract binding “themselves, their heirs, and posterities forever,” to certain express terms; and neither in law nor in equity were they, of whatever generation, free to change those terms except by the consent of both parties to the contract.* (continued below) * Only the materiality of property ownership is a ‘reasonable’ consideration when comparing a material-based contract to an organic Constitution of chartered rules and procedures that are intended for human sovereign subscriptions? : Which sovereign consent to a constitution has a quantified material value, and which party to a contract should be granted immunity with impunity? : And by what principle ruling authority, other than antecedent sovereignty, as consented, do ‘the elected parties’ of an organic Constitution, act? : Should unalienable ‘rights and liberties,’ as naturally bequeathed to humans, then by their consent to this organic authority, be squandered by an appointed legal authority, to effect the authoritative granting by legal affirmation, (which affirmation is consequential to the unalienableness of sovereignty, as consented) to license organic business entities for the explicit purpose of exploitation with paternal constitutional organic preferences, to act as constituent humans? A fundamental difference between modifying England’s national organic Charter and creating an American Constitution involved a precedent existing authority in England, and none in America. England’s precedent dogma-based (i.e., ‘fictitious’ organic authority administration) had furnished reasons why Colonial Americans had emigrated to America: England’s

Sovereignty

125

dogma-based organic authority, therefore, failed as a rational basis for creating the American Constitution. Instead, however, caste-based political predicate values (both Brahmin-Tory and Brahmin-Federalist-Whig) wisely yielded to ‘the common colonial values’ to found the American Constitution: not as a property ‘contract,’ as mechanists contend with the support of Burke’s argument, but as the supreme ‘fiducial’ document of ‘living’ human sovereignty consented, as the agreed constitutional compact basis.

This was an elaboration of the theory of government tacitly held by the old Whigs, which derived government from a perpetual civil contract as opposed to the radical doctrine of a revocable social contract; and in attacking it Paine allied himself with such thinkers as Price, Priestley, Franklin, and Rousseau (For an excellent discussion of this, see C. M. Walsh, The Political Science of John Adams, pp 203-226). He pointed out the absurdity of carrying over law of private property into the high realm of political principle -- to seek to impose the dead past upon the living sovereignty. If sovereignty inhered in the English people in 1688, it must then inhere in the English people in 1793, unless it had been violently wrested from them; no parchment terms of another age can bind that sovereignty other than voluntarily. Over against Burke’s theory of a single, static contract, Paine set the doctrine of reaffirmation of natural rights. Any generation -- as the generation of 1688 -- is competent to deal with its affairs as it sees fit, but it cannot barter away the rithts of those unborn; such a contract on the face of it is null and void. ‘Every age and generation must be free to act for itself “in all cases” as the generations which preceded it. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most rediculous and insolent of all tyrannies. . . .. Every generation is, and must be, competent to all the purposes which its occasions require. It is the living and not the dead, that are to be accommodated.’ (From The Rights of Man, Part I, p 278) Among precedent examples of ‘authoritative truth,’ Parrington’s

126

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

account of Colonial values, which favored democracy, is diabolical to Royal Governor Joseph Dudley’s Colonial authority, as provided in the Charter.89

The struggle for ecclesiastical democracy was a forerunner of the struggle for political democracy which was to be the business of the next century; and in founding his ecclesiasticism upon the doctrine of natural rights, John Wise was an early witness to the new order of thought. II SOCIAL DRIFTS Great changes, . . . as the future might determine, were to come to Massachusetts from the new order with its Charter provision establishing a property qualification for suffrage. The venture in idealism was over and economic determinism reasserted its sway. New England was to swing back into the broad current of English political development. Following the Revolution of 1688 a new theory of the political state was rising in England -- the theory that the state originated in private property and exists primarily for the protection of property; and this conception, thrust upon New England, was to cut sharply across the cleavages of the old order and create new ones. " It substituted the dominance of wealth for the stewardship of righteousness; the stake-in-society principle for the Mosaic code. It set a premium upon acquisitiveness and subordinated the Puritan to the Yankee. It prepared the way for class alignments which must grow sharper with the increase of wealth, and would eventually produce a Tory group with natural longings for titles and a colonial aristocracy. How powerful this mercantile-Tory element was to become would depend upon the counter strength of the rising democratic group, with

Take note of the expedient supplantation of propertied ‘wealth’, making it of antecedent value to the ‘stewardship of righteousness.’

Sovereignty

127

its freehold tenure of land, its town meeting, its Congregational church, and its distrust of aristocratic orders. For the persent, the world of John Wise was the real New England, thrifty, parsimonious, intensely local, driving straight towards homespun democracy. The older fashioned New Englander, whatever his social position, did not take kindly to Toryism; and when it made its appearance in the train of the royal officials, swaggering somewhat and a bit insolent, it seemed to the colonial both alien and wicked. . . . How great was the chasm that separated the two worlds is sharply revealed by an episode in the career of Joseph Dudley, son the the emigrant, who was made royal governor in 1702. Dudley had lived much in England, had sat in Parliament, and had imbibed prerogative notions of government. He little relished the homely ways of New England and he bore himself somewhat haughtily. One December day in 1705, as he was driving along a country road with high snowdrifts on each side, he met with two loads of wood. The chariot coming to a stop, Dudley thrust his head out of the window and bade the carters turn aside and make way for him; but they were enclined to argue the matter in view of the drifts. Words were multiplied, and one of the carters cried -- to quote Sewall -- “I am as good flesh and blood as you . . . you may go out of the way.” In rage the governor drew his sword and struck at the fellow, who snatched the sword away and borke it. “You lie, you dog; you lie, you devil!” cried Dudley beside himself. “Such words don’t beecome a Christian,” retorted the carter. “A Christian you dog!” Cried Dudley; “a Christian your devil! I was a Christian before you were born!” And he snatched the carter’s whip and lashed him roundly. Being in great passion: “threatn’d to send those that affronted him to England.” He arrested both carters and threw them into jail, whence

128

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

they were released by the help of Sewall, who took their side though connected to Dudley through marriage. They were of good yoeman families, yet the matter hung on for nearly a year before they were discharged from their bonds. (The account with affidavits is given in Sewall, Diary, Vol. II, p. 144-147.)

Had Sewall not sided with the wood carters, Dudley’s ‘authoritative truth’ would surely have prevailed. Parrington tells how classical mechanist framers of the U. S. Constitution, acted as ‘Steuart’s Statesman’: giving democratic values no special accommodation. 90 Steuart’s statesman prefers self-centered constituents because he thinks he knows how they’ll behave in any situation. In the same way, economists assume they know what greedy economic man will do. We are all too prone to forget the wide popular disfavor with which they received the new Constitution. No sooner did the second debate [about ratification] open than the majority opinion evidently held quite a different conception of sovereignty of the people than was expressed by the Convention." It had no desire to tie its own hands [by agreeing to accept the terms as presented]; it did not take kindly to the proposal to transfer power from the several states to the Federal government. From this historical fact, Brahmanist mechanists should have concluded -- many seem not to have -- that public held-values must not be underestimated. Although Machiavelli, Hobbes, John Adams, Hamilton, et al, dogmatically assumed that the public was innately unqualified, at critical times, the sovereign public had wisely, with ethical solidarity, exercised their antecedent authority -- which exercise always invigorated the only ‘is true’ national sovereignty -- as ‘We, The People’ then living did, when the Constitution’s draft was presented for ratification. ‘We, Those People’ then living, entrusted to the federal government organic sovereign authorities only

Rather than the propertied notions of the Brahmanist framers.

Sovereignty

129

after specific constitutional protection was given to the coeval natural sovereignties of human individuals. Has the Supreme Court, by affirming tautological fallacies as fiction, impunity and states’ rights, from which business licensing is practiced, thereby, violating this Constitution’s fiducial trust by their expedient ‘authoritative truth, for the explicit purpose to protect paternally the mechanist values of the few? * * Because strategy is designed prescription to achieve specific results, and the Constitution is the supreme law for ordering and deploying national strategy, in this constitutional sense, predicate values specified by the Bill of Rights are antecedent strategic assignments to those that are elected to administer the nation’s Constitution: this strategy is the Constitution’s logos. ’ All humans, whether elected or appointed, must agree to consign their personal values to the Constitution’s predicate values, as specified, to marshal the achievement and maintenance of the nation’s strategic purposes: as the Constitution’s Preamble clearly states. As the condition of sovereign consent, which was entrusted to, and confirmed in the Constitution, ‘We, the people’ still expect elected representatives and appointed administrators of this Constitution’s public trust to honor their ‘oaths of office’ by adopting, as their own, the explicit predicate values of the strategic constitutional purposes. Too many instances of ‘authoritative truth’ confirm that these solemn oaths are now quite routinely confused with rationalized license and entitlements of an election, or appointment, in which only a small part of the nation’s antecedent sovereign consent is represented. When special interest issues violate or disadvantage some, this is evidence that official perjury was committed? Parrington recognized this paradox: Parrington also records the events and circumstances that allowed the Whigs to mold the Grand Old Republican Party’s dogma of economic determinism into a ‘Fairy Godmother’ to business’ interests: 91

130

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Democrat Republican was still Jeffersonian laissez faire, and until it was determined which wing should control the party councils there would be only confusion. The politicians were fertile in compromises but in nominating Lincoln and Johnson the party ventured to get astride two horses that would not run together. To attempt to make yoke-fellows of democratic leveling and capitalistic paternalism was prophetic of rifts and schisms that only the passions of reconstruction days could hold in check. In 1865 the Republican party [the GOP] was no other than a war machine that had accomplished its purpose. It was a political mongrel, without logical cohesion, and it seemed doomed to break up as the Whig Party had broken up and the Federalist Party had broken up. But fate was now on the side of the Whigs as it had not been earlier. The democratic forces had lost strength from the war, and democratic principles were in ill repute. The drift to centralization, the enormous development of capitalism, the spirit of exploitation, were prophetic of a changing temper that was preparing to exalt the doctrine of manifest destiny 92 which the Whig party stood sponsor for. The practical problem of the moment was to transform the mongrel Republican party into a strong cohesive instrument, and to accomplish that it was necessary to hold the loyalty of its Democratic voters amongst the farmers and working-classes whilst putting into effect its Whig program. Under normal conditions the thing would have been impossible, but the times were wrought up and blindly passionate and the politicians skillful [in words that Plato would use, ‘their truth -- if truth at all -- was of ‘opinion,’ not ‘reason’]. . . The rebellion of the Independent Republicans under Horace Greeley in 1872 was brought to nothing by the skillful use of Grant's military prestige, and the party passed definitely under the control of capitalism, and became such an

Sovereignty

131

instrument for exploitation as Henry Clay dreamed of but could not perfect. Under the nominal leadership of the easy-going Grant a loose rein was given to Whiggish ambitions and the Republican party became a political instrument worthy of the Gilded Age. From their respective postures, each party argues that they can best serve the interests of the nation. Unfortunately, though, little thought, and less dedication, is given to solving the nation’s macro-economic problems, as the Constitution intends that ‘all’ are served. Our politics, in fact, has become an enterprise as Eric Hoffer observed: 93

When a mass movement begins to attract people who are interested in their individual careers, it is a sign that it has passed its vigorous stage; that it is no longer engaged in molding a new world but in possessing and preserving the present. It ceases to be a movement and becomes an enterprise. And, our macro-economy is ignored because the political desires of affluence are economically affirmed to sustain American System paternalism that now has government front running international markets to business: simply an ever expanding dimension of American System of Political Economy’s paternalism, which emanated from the Gilded Age, but remains as the servant of acquisitive mechanisms’ economic determinism to leave many on the sidelines of our mechanist interpreted legal ‘poker game,’ and many losers still in ‘the game,’ without constitutional representation, which is evidence of a definite political tyranny of the masses. ‘The American System of Political Economy,’ refers to ideas credited to Henry Clay of the Jacksonian era. Parrington wrote this about Clay:94

The spirit of Henry Clay survived his death and his followers were everywhere in the land. The plain citizen who wanted a slice of the rich prairie land of Iowa or Kansas, with a railway convenient to his homestead, had learned to look to the government for a gift, and if he got his quarter section and his transportation he was careless about

132

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

what the other fellow got. A little more or less could make no difference to a country inexhaustible in resources [This, we can no longer afford to believe]. America belonged to the American people and not to the government, and resources in private hands paid taxes and increased the national wealth. Parrington had previously described how political philosophy was adapted to sponsor business interests and as Eric Hoffer has observed, to make politics into an enterprise:95

Citizens had saved the government in the trying days that were past; it was only fair in return that government should aid the patriotic citizen in the necessary work of developing national resources. It was paternalism as understood by speculators and subsidy-hunters, but was it not a part of the great American System that was to make the country rich and self-sufficient? The American System had been talked of for forty years; it had slowly got on its feet in pre-war days despite the stubborn planter opposition; now at last it had fairly come into it own. The time was ripe for the Republican party to become a fairy godmother to the millions of Beriah Sellerses throughout the North and the West. Despite the evolution which gave our nation deterministic paternalism via ‘The American System of Economy,’ truth about ‘shadows instead of reality,’ as Plato had observed, remains to be ‘is true’ as regards our believed dogma, as Parrington reported:

However attractive the disguises it may assume, it is in essence the logical creed of the profit philosophy. It is the expression in politics of the acquisitive instinct and it assumes as the greatest good the shaping of public policy to promote private interests. It asserts that it is a duty of the state to help its citizens to make money, and it conceives of the political state as a useful instrument for effective exploitation. How

Sovereignty

133

otherwise? The public good cannot be served apart from business interests for business interests are the public good and in serving business the state is serving society. Everybody’s eggs are in the basket and they must not be broken. For a capitalistic society Whiggery is the only rational politics, for it exalts the profit-motive as the sole object of parliamentary concern. " Government has only to wave its wand and fairy gifts descend upon business like the golden sands of Pactolus. It graciously bestows its tariffs and subsidies, and streams of wealth flow into private wells. [Parrington, at another point, wrote this: Whiggery springs up as naturally as pigweed in a garden.] [a fly in the Whiggish honey works against holistic government]

But unhappily there is a fly in the Whiggish honey. In a competitive order, government is forced to make its choices. It cannot serve both Peter and Paul. If it gives with one hand it must take away with the other. And so the persuasive ideal of paternalism in the common interest degenerates in practice into legalized favoritism. Governmental gifts go to the largest investments. Lesser interests are sacrificed to greater interests and Whiggery comes finally to serve the lords of the earth without whose good will the wheels of business will not turn. To him that hath shall be given. If the few do not prosper the many will starve, and if the many have bread who would begrudge the few their abundance? In Whiggery [the GOP’s politics] is the fulfillment of the Scriptures. Anyway, Business interests or the political enterprise of Business Interests, in Hoffer's view, is the more cohesive politics. It provides a solid but fallacious dogmatic nucleus for Republican Party politics while the

134

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

populist interests, or the enterprises of democrats, repels such common political focuses. However, only a consensus of democratic views can represent a ‘holistic government’ that is dedicated to serve ‘all’ the people. In a stable, growing economy, the Party of democrats is highly unlikely to win favor of a wealthy national public faction whose primary interests are their individual careers: the satisfaction level can be far less than 50% of the population for Republican politics to be effective attractive. Populist interests of one community are often not consistent with other communities. As observed by many others, there is not one Democratic Party but, rather, many democratic factions with fewer common interests: each endeavoring to cater its own community's populist interests. And because of their diversity, democrats do not often present themselves as a romantic political force: their history of success shows that their politics is attractive only in the backlashes of economic failure and because of grand breaches of constitutional ethics in Capitalistic maneuvering. In this reality, Democrats have an interest in the economic failures of Republican influenced Political Economies: similarly, Republicans have an interest in the failure of populist programs of the Democratic Party’s sponsorship. And this philosophic schism must be recognized as related to the natural phylum of human being: in Kant’s view, the fundamental differences between the human noumenon and phenomenon (All humans have material needs, and as well, although not often used, a capability to reason critically). When successful, the democratic response with social insurance to everyone, * as it must to compete as a political enterprise in the officially mechanized and codified Whiggish ‘American System of Political Economy,’ has provided too little to those in need of it. This observation is not made with intent to diminish any social need of insurance but rather the intent is critical of the social effects produced by the politically official Leviathan like economic mechanisms that are licensed to compete with humans. * [Social insurance is required democratically because otherwise it would emulate the] fly in the Whiggish honey. In a competitive order,

Take note that acquisitive values were the supplanted antecedent value.

government is forced to make its choices. It cannot serve both Peter

Sovereignty

135

and Paul. If it gives with one hand it must take away with the other. And so the persuasive ideal of paternalism in the common interest degenerates in practice into legalized favoritism. [Political Illegitimates (Bastards) aptly describes government’s politics-based organic choices that mechanistic economic paternalism has fathered.] These Illegitimates are thrust upon society by the abundant acquisitive concupiscent enterprises of the mechanist acquisitive political desires. In the predicate values analogous sense, if the source, i.e., the political parents of Political Bastards are generally recognized, sophists’ rhetorical predicate values that cloak the untrustworthy concupiscent political motives will become apparent. With this values based political division exposed, we might then recognize, as fact, that government’s paternalism to business or to society generally has not resolved the problems of poverty: Propertied treasure (which, in Adam Smith’s view, is not wealth) becomes increasingly concentrated as holistically its primary counterpart (poverty) expands in an opposite proportionality. On this values-treasures spectrum, one mechanist with a billion-dollar treasure is equivalent to 100,000 separate accumulated treasures, each of $1,000 net worth: so how many in the counterpart of this holistic result must naturally live day to day with no treasure, from which to personally insure them? Adam Smith’s view of wealth was conceived holistically, as produced goods and services by ‘each’ for ‘all,’ distributed naturally by atomistic entrepreneurial business and exchange without caste or class distinction. Adam Smith’s capitalism differs starkly from the Whiggish classical Political Economy of the American System. Supreme Court decisions reflect jurists’ predicate values that often are extra constitutionally prescribed: officially, Federalist predicate values, at times, have reaffirmed what Colonial Americans repudiated by the fact of emigrating to America, to be free, and withholding ratification of the Constitution until the modifying document known as The Bill of Rights was promised: only when the adequate guarantee to preserve the living constituents’ individual sovereign rights was promised, did the American

136

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Colonists ratify the Constitution. About this, those who carried Parrington’s work to his noted conclusion, wrote this: 96

From the beginning -- the scholars discovered -- democracy and property had been at bitter odds; the struggle invaded the Constitutional Convention, it gave form to a party alignment between Hamilton and Jefferson, Jackson and Clay, and then during the slavery struggle, sinking underground like a lost river, it nevertheless had determined party conflicts down to the present. In this ceaseless conflict between man and the dollar, between democracy and property, the reasons for persistent triumph of property were sought in the provisions of the organic law, and from a critical study of the Constitution came the discovery that struck home like a submarine torpedo -- the discovery that the drift toward plutocracy [rule by wealth] was not a drift away from the spirit of the Constitution, but an inevitable unfolding from its premises; that instead of having been conceived by the fathers as a democratic instrument, it had been conceived in a spirit designedly hostile to democracy; that it was, in fact, a carefully formulated expression of eighteenth-century consciousness, erected as a defense against the democratic spirit that had got out of hand during the Revolution [as was expressed and adopted in the Declaration of Independence], and that the much-praised system of checks and balances was designed and intended for no other end than a check on the [agrarian] political power of the majority -- a power acutely feared by the property consciousness of the times. It was a startling discovery that profoundly stirred the liberal mind of the early years of the century; yet the really surprising thing is that it should have come as a surprise. It is not easy to understand today why since Civil War days intelligent Americans should so strangely have confused the Declaration of Independence and the

Sovereignty

137

Constitution, and have come to accept them as complementary statements of the democratic purpose of America. Their unlikeness is unmistakable: the one a classical statement of French humanitarian democracy, the other an organic law designed to safeguard the minority under republican rule. . . . When the fierce slavery struggle fell into the past, whatever honest realism had risen from the passions of the times was buried with the dead issue. The militant attacks on the Constitution, so common in Abolitionist circles after 1835, and the criticism of the Declaration that was a part of the Southern argument, were both forgotten, and with the Union reestablished by force of arms, the idealistic cult of the fundamental law entered upon a second youth. In the blowsy Gilded Age the old myths walked the land again, wrapped in battle-torn flags and appealing to the blood shed on southern battlefields. It was not till the advent of a generation unblinded by the passions of civil war that the Constitution again was examined critically, and the earlier charge of the Abolitionists that it was designed to serve property rather than men, was heard once more. But this time with far more weight of evidence behind it. As the historians dug amongst the contemporary records they came upon a mass of fact the Abolitionists had been aware of. The evidence was written so plainly, in such explicit and incontrovertible words -- not only in Elliottâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Debates, but in the minutes of the several State[s] and pamphlets and polite literature -- that it seemed incredible that honest men could have erred so greatly in confusing the Constitution with the Declaration. With the clarification of its philosophy the inflowing waters of liberalism reached flood-tide; the movement would either recede or pass over into radicalism. On the whole it followed the later course, and the years immediately preceding 1917 were years when American intellectuals were immersing themselves in European collectivistic

138

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

philosophies -- in Marxianism, Fabianism, Syndicalism, Guild Socialism. New leaders were rising, philosophical analysts like Thorstein Veblen who were mordant critics of American economics. The influence of socialism was fast sweeping away the last shreds of political and social romanticism that so long had confused American thinking. The doctrine of economic determinism was spreading widely, and in the light of that doctrine the deep significance of the industrial revolution was revealing itself for the first time to thoughtful Americans. In its reaction to industrialism America had reached the point Chartist England had reached in the eighteen-forties and Marxian Germany in the eighteen-seventies. That was before a mechanistic science had laid its heavy discouragements on the drafters of democratic programs. Accepting the principle of economic determinism, liberalism still clung to its older democratic teleology, convinced that somehow economic determinism would turn out to be a fairy godmother to the proletariat and that from the imperious drift of industrial expansion must eventually issue social justice. Armed with this faith liberalism threw itself into the work of cleaning the Augean stables, and its reward came in the achievements of President Wilsonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s first administration. Then the war intervened and the green fields shriveled in an afternoon. With the cynicism that came with post-war days the democratic liberalism of 1917 was thrown away like an empty whiskyflask. Clever young men began to make merry over democracy. It was preposterous, they said, to concern oneself about social justice; nobody wants social justice. The first want of every man, as John Adams remarked a hundred years ago, is his dinner, and the second his girl. Out of the muck of the war had come a great discovery -- as it was reported -- the discovery that psychology as well as economics has its word to say on politics. From the army intellegence tests the moron

Sovereignty

139

emerged as a singular commentary on our American democracy, and with the discovery of the moron the democratic principle was in for a slashing attack. Almost overnight an army of enemies was marshaled against it. The euginist with his isolated germ theory flouted the perfectional psychology of John Locke, with its emphasis on environment as the determining factor in social evolution -- a psychology on which the whole idealistic interpretation was founded; the beardless philosopher discovered Nietzsche and in his pages found the fit master of the moron -- the biological aristocrat who is the flower that every civilization struggles to produce; the satirist discovered the flatulent reality that is middle-class America and was eager to thrust his jibes at the complacent denizens of the Valley of democracy. Only the behaviorist, with his insistence on the plasticity of the new-born child, offers some shreds of comfort to the democrat; but he quickly takes them away again with his simplification of conduct to imperious drives that stamp men as primitive animals. If the mass -the raw materials of democracy -- never rises much above sex appeals and belly needs, surely it is poor stuff to try to work up into an excellent civilization, and the dreams of the social idealist who forecasts a glorious democratic future are about as substantial as moonshine. It is a discouraging essay. Yet it is perhaps conceivable that our current philosophy -- the brilliant coruscations of our younger intelligentsia -- may indeed not prove to be the last word in social philosophy. Perhaps . . . when our youngest liberals have themselves come to the armchair age they will be smiled at in turn by sons who are still cleverer and who will find their wisdom as foolish as the wisdom of 1917 seems to them today. But that lies on the knees of the gods. [Now, in early 2008, the young liberals are politically strong and it appears probable that they will take the reigns of government.] Designed primarily by Federalist and otherwise Brahmin-like intelligent

140

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

values with expectation that the laws, as constitutionally produced, would be given the expert oversight of the Judiciary: and in 2000, surprisingly this Judiciary decided the presidential election. Unconcerned about the antecedent democratic value of common consent, which had ratified the Constitution, elected and appointed Federalist conservatives, particularly, dogmatically authoritatively coalesce to persuade authoritative acts that their monarchical values belie, which in fact produces diabolical results to what was expected from the antecedent common values, which had ratified the proposed Constitution: Federalist charter values, by legal interpretations, have overridden the sovereign values,’ as consented by ratification and periodically given at poling times. The Federalist political foundations of ‘strict constitutionalist’ dogma, from which federalist propertied values are perpetuated by the Supreme Court’s decisions, have produced these diabolical authoritative results: they, of these Federalist monarchical chartered values, have demonstrated proclivities to fallaciously rationalize deductively from their preferred Federalist dogma, affirmed as antecedent value, and by this tautological fallacy of affirming the consequent, have achieved to abridge the Constitution‘s intent, as antecedently consented. Similarly, they have weakened federal sovereignty, by legal dictums, which transferred, to the separate ‘sovereign states,’ legal jurisdiction of economic related social issues. Supreme Court decisions now are doing to consented national sovereignty, what ‘Whigs,’ in 1215, did to the English King’s monarchical sovereignty. In both instances, the Whig’ values, as motive, demonstrate the tautological fallacy of asserting clearly consequential propertied concupiscent (sensual or lustful desire) values as their antecedent. ---Have mechanists in charge of government achieved to appoint ‘Strict Federalists’ to the Supreme Court: Whigs, whose predicate values are as Hobbes and Burke, antithetical to naturally antecedent democratic values? : Acting as an authoritative Brahmin intelligentsia and trustee of property owners,’ however, are they pawn like servants of dogma, which has legally sponsored our fascism like political economy of corporate fictitious person entities? : [Administering] faulty strategy of idealists who have too many illusions

Sovereignty

141

when they face realists, who have too little conscience. Reinhold Niebuhr As in Niebuhr’s observation, eventually mechanist ‘dogmatists’ must be held accountable for their absolute (‘is false’) dogmatic belief that officially legally was made the asserted antecedent principle: of fiction-based determinist political economy dominated by licensed organic fictitious person corporations, sovereignties, states, . . . , and other dogmatic fictions that legally have been given impunity. Do these legal affirmations of dogmatic fictions represent cases of Niebuhr’s calumnious ‘illusionist pots’ calling calumnious ‘realist kettles’ black? Mechanist Conservatives’ values surely are antithetical with regard to accepting as reasonable, let alone ‘liberals’ antecedent, predicate values,’ as reasoned then demonstrated by John Wise, Thomas Jefferson, and those common Americans that demanded The Bill of Rights as their condition for ratifying the Constitution, for instance: i.e., ‘liberal’ values which underpinned the Revolution and The Bill of Rights, before the Constitution was ratified. Instead, however, ‘Mechanist Conservatives’ authoritatively assert what they believe ‘is right,’ even though their belief in dogma is the source of their absolute 'is false’ synthetic antecedent predicated value. ---Did Brahmanist conservative Whigs strategically contend to strengthen human rights holistically, or did their strategy, in fact, economically divide society into a business caste and a wage-earning cast? And by determinism, provided paternal economic advantages to the business’ caste? : By using fiction-based States right’s doctrine as antecedent necessity to license business entities to exploit economically, have Whigs succeeded to thwart the nation’s Bill of Rights holistic intent? ---The following Court ruling belatedly asserted, antecedent state rights, of the states’ legal, but fictitious ‘unalienable sovereignty.’ This decision provides an example of legal propertied ‘authoritative truth,’ as Federalist ‘conservative’ Jurists decided, which with impunity violated the Jurists’ oaths taken ‘to uphold the Constitution’? Only new legislation, which is signed into law, can now heal such partial official legal rulings, for which Jurists are granted lifetime impunity called constitutional sovereign immunity: 97

142

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Rulings protect states A divided Supreme Court asserts that states cannot face private lawsuits to enforce many federal laws. By Laura King, A.P.

WASHINGTON -- In a remarkable assertion of the doctrine of states’ rights, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority declared Wednesday that states’ ‘sovereign immunity’ shields them from private lawsuits to enforce federal laws regulating the workplace as well as those protecting patents and trademarks. The court issued a trio of 5-4 rulings, one of which appears to leave 4.7 million state workers with no way to enforce their rights to minimum wages and overtime pay. The state of Maine had refused to pay overtime wages to a group of its parole officers as required by federal law, and the court ruled these workers cannot sue the state for the money. Another pair of rulings effectively strips inventors, publishers and software makers, among others, of a way to sue state universities and other state agencies over a stolen patent or copyright. The sweeping decisions will likely have an immediate impact on a number of patent and copyright disputes involving state universities nationwide. In 1992, Congress passed laws to make clear states could be sued for such violations, but the court [acting with granted legal impunity, trumped laws, which the legislature and the administration had set]

struck down those laws Wednesday. The rulings also cast doubt on federal environment laws and civil rights measures in cases where state agencies are the violators. Some legal experts said they were stunned by the court’s action. ‘This is a radical change in American government,’ said

Sovereignty

143

University of Southern California law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky. ‘It says the states can violate federal law with impunity, and nowhere can they be sued for damages in a federal or state court. Imagine if a state lab dumps toxic waste into someone’s back yard in violation of the federal environmental laws. This says the homeowners cannot sue the states for their damages.’ "" The states have a ‘sovereign status’ that makes them separate and independent from the national government, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said Wednesday. ‘The states’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty that the states enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.’ [This argument of states’ sovereignty is undoubtedly taken from the democratic constitutional concept of consented human sovereignty upon which the nation’s sovereignty rests, which remains as each individual’s unalienable right that was enjoyed before constitutional government in the U.S. existed: as John Adams reasoned, was coeval of government; The problem with Jurist Kennedy’s argument is that it is based on the constitutional fiction, which Jurists had decided were each state’s rights’, and, by another legal decision, were given equality, i.e., made the legal equal to coeval human rights. And this latest decision provides state agencies with impunity from federal law, as that enjoyed by jurists.]

Kennedy did not point to a passage in the Constitution that says the states are sovereign. Instead he said this belief was understood and accepted in 1787 when the original charter was written and ratified. The “founders’ silence is most instructive,” he said, because it shows the sovereign status was assumed. For most of this century, Congress has not assumed the states have such an independent status. National lawmakers have passed

In Utah, Energy Solutions, a business entity licensed by the state, has contracted with Italy to dispose of their nuclear waste, and has sites in Utah for this purpose.

144

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

broad measures regulating many aspects of American life, including the workplace, the economy and the environment, and states are covered as well. For example, state employees are entitled to minimum wages and overtime just as are those in the private sector. Until recently, these laws have gone mostly unchallenged. But the court’s conservative majority has made clear it would like to roll back the clock. “Congress has vast power, but not all power,” Kennedy said, his voice rising a note. ‘We reject any contention that substantive federal law by its own force necessarily overrides the sovereign immunity of the states.’ His opinion was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. In dissent, the four liberals [less conservative is more accurate] accused their colleagues of adopting a radical states’ rights philosophy from the era before the Civil War. In a striking scene, three of them spoke from the bench. Alternately solemn and sarcastic, they denounced the opinions as unwise and unwarranted. ‘The doctrine of sovereign immunity is more in the mind of King James I than of James Madison,’ said Justice Stephen Breyer. The most powerful dissent came from Justice David H. Souter, the normally reserved and soft-spoken New Englander. His voice dripping with sarcasm, Souter said the conservatives had invented a notion that was not adopted in the Constitution and had expired with the Union’s victory in the Civil War. ‘The state is not the ultimate sovereign. The national government is,’ he said, looking across at Kennedy. ‘The majority could not be more fundamentally mistaken.’ He added that the court has created ‘a very peculiar state of affairs’ for many workers and private businesses.

Sovereignty

145

Federal laws on patents and overtime rates remain on the books but they cannot be enforced when states are the violators. This ruling demonstrated Jurists’ divergent predicate values, thereby exposed the diabolical divergence between rights involving property and humans’, that Parrington had noted when defining a prescriptive strategic difference between Federalist mechanist ‘conservatives’ and rationally inclined ‘liberals.’ This Jurists’ majority ruling is about this prescriptive strategic difference, which Parrington had cited as: 98

“spokesmen [who] were commonly members of the aristocratic group, among whom the Tory philosophy was common,” and who stupidly overlooked and ignored the existence of native American liberalism, which claimed ‘extra-constitutional’ sovereign rights. The Declaration of Independence, however, had in fact, represented the ‘liberal’ values, which had not only gained colonial independence, but also were not addressed by mechanists by mechanists (who stupidly overlooked and ignored the existence of native American liberalism) in the original formulation of the Constitution (of people, by people and for people), as had been ordered: declaring human sovereignty as naturally antecedent: i.e., unalienable rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, which naturally are the natural antecedents to any temporal property rights. When Russia sent troops to Kosovo, were they sent with organic orders, the strategic predicate value of which did not comport with NATO’s strategy? Otherwise, why did Russian troops not fit in with NATO’s war? Did Russia intend to upstage the U.S. in command of NATO forces? This history provides a parallel scenario from which to beg this question: Is the Federalist prescriptive property-based strategy, the Court’s antecedent predicate value from which the rulling that a state’s sovereign immunity came? : The only difference between the Russian strategy’s prescriptive property-based values and Federalist conservative strategy’s prescriptive property-based values, is a difference in organic form of dogmatically believed unitary materialism. Hegel’s dialectical materialism was a deliberately integrated

146

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

philosophy of ideas with materialism. Hegel (1770-1831), claimed that he was not a materialist. However, he had concluded from his integrated philosophical explanation, what he called dialectical materialism. It was from this that Marx provided the unitary materialist philosophical basis to Lenin’s communism. The American Federalist conservative prescriptive property-based value was based on the earlier unitary materialism that had defined European monarchs as Kings (which common organic form gave rise to Hegel’s dialectical materialism, and Thomas Hobbes’ much earlier history and theoretical work, which he called Leviathan)? This Russian strategic scenario acted out in Kosovo was surely not unlike the American colonial Tories’ ‘conservative’ strategy acted out in America, which willingly served England’s Sovereign King, in all its dogmatic baggage (particularly the dogma of ‘divine right’). Then following the American Revolution, as a Federalist Brahmanist intellectual caste, or political cabal, has continually colluded to control common ‘liberal’ democratic values with legal constitutional impunity, by means of Federalist property-based values that function as the third leg of the American constitutional government, as the Supreme Court of the U.S.? Parrington confirmed property basis of Federalist mechanist conservatism: 99

Sovereignty

147

conceived by the fathers as a democratic instrument, it had been conceived in a spirit designedly hostile to democracy; that it was, in fact, a carefully formulated expression of eighteenth-century consciousness, erected as a defense against the democratic spirit that had got out of hand during the Revolution [as was expressed and adopted in the Declaration of Independence], and that the muchpraised system of checks and balances was designed and intended for no other end than a check on the [agrarian] political power of the majority -- a power acutely feared by the property consciousness of the times. [This account leaves little doubt that the propertied strategic basis of the American mechanist driven economy was legalized authoritatively by the dogmatically believed unitary materialism of Federalist Jurists.] Parrington noted, Hamilton’s federalist predicate values: 100 [Hamilton’s] notorious comment -- which the American democrat has

148

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

upon the power of the democracy.” Before the American Revolution, American Brahmanists had selected Pitt, a ‘Legal Positivist,’ to argue the American Colonists’ rights.* * Parrington described Pitt’s predicated values, as a Whig who thought himself above learning anything from Franklin: i.e., Pitt’s Brahmanist, Whiggish prescriptive values, which produced war and ‘heavy debts which the wars of Pitt had bequeathed to the English Empire,’ made him unsuited: Pitt acted similarly as our Federalist conservative Jurists now act: Pitt put out of his mind’s consideration, the inherent metaphysical unalienable human values, which the Declaration of Independence had specified. Both Pitt and our Supreme Court, therefore, committed fallacious strategic errors, of prescribing judgements based on absolute belief in affirmed dogma, then deducing therefrom to adjudicate unconstitutional strategic values: in short, they violated their pledge to support the Constitution with its Amendments, by supplanting their personal dogmatic propertied values in replacement of constitutionally protected unalienable Rights, ‘which Colonials’ demanded as the condition for ratifying the Constitution: mass injustice has resulted! * * According to law, if intent of such fallacies are provable as deliberately intended lies, criminal perjury would normally be charged, excepting, of course, that these official acts of government enjoy the impunity that Jurist Kennedy called the doctrine of sovereign immunity. What is this organic immunity that Justice Kennedy argued in his majority opinion, above, i.e.,

The states have a ‘sovereign status’ that makes them separate and independent from the national government, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said Wednesday. ‘The states’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty that the states enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.’ (that the vestige of English sovereignty or immunity Chartered by the King to Colonists, was the immunity that American states had before Colonists

Sovereignty

149

fought and won the Revolution?) " Did the Revolution free all colonists to choose and create a totally new system of justice, which Colonists then did by creating the Constitution to include the Bill of Rights? Whatever states then existed, or not, England’s organic sovereignty and immunity were won by an act of war, then, the American Colonists’ consented sovereignty empowered the new Constitution: provisioned all concepts, and organic freedoms, of the new US federal government, and only by this consent to whatever separate states that then existed: if Jurist Kennedy’s idealized concept that ‘The states’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect

of the sovereignty that the states enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today’, then he must have referred to the constituent sovereignty of the colonists that were then freed from England’s rule. Particularly, post constitutional states’ ‘sovereignty,’ only then could exist, as State Constitutions could be provisioned, also by consent, both by fitting with the Federal government’s Charter and the states’ citizens. Jurist Kennedy’s majority opinion tautologically is rationalization

In Utah, Energy Solutions, a business entity licensed by Utah, has contracted with Italy to dispose of their nuclear waste in sites located in Utah. Reported in the Salt Lake tribune (April 2008): neither the State of Utah nor the Federal Government has the authority to stop this private business from transferring and disposing of this nuclear waste in Utah. Undoubtedly, this immunity assures that residents cannot sue Utah or the Federal government as a result of this fallacious Supreme Court decision. Days later, another article, “Gov springs to fight nuke junk,” reported this short history: Federal law gave regional groups called “compacts’ authoruity over all of the low-level radioactive waste going in and out of member states. The Northwest Compact has eight member states. Utah joined in 1982. Compact members are expected to hear Energy Solutions request on Italian waste May 8: Utah’s Gov., despite a waste limiting agreement he signed with the company last year, now says he’ll use Utah’s vote in regional council to halt Italian waste. Weeks later, May 6, 2008, the Salt lake news reported that “Energy Solutions went to court to protect its plan to import low-level waste from Italy,” to obtain a ruling that the Northwest Interstate Compact has no authority over its Utah disposal site.

150

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

rather than reason-based: History clearly shows that English sovereignty fell short of reaching all American Colonists: most did not enjoy privileges as citizens of England were granted. And the U.S. Supreme Court’s impunity is of the same organic sovereignty from which state’s rights naturally inhere: from free consent of then Colonials’ and now US citizens, as consented at poling times, to the US Constitution. Neither Federal nor State sovereignty had inhered in the interim of Revolution and the Constitution’s ratification by the common consent: The Confederation of colonial States (1789) undoubtedly factored into Jurist Kennedy’s majority opinion. The Supreme Court’s decision is surely legal authoritative truth, however, is not consistent with consent given to the Constitution? When will American Brahman mechanist ‘conservatives’ acknowledge that human citizens are the only antecedent justification for constitutional sovereignty? : that this Federal government (including all states of it) is ‘of the people, by the people, for the people,’ as immortalized by Lincoln so clearly? 1 0 1 Certainly never of, by, or for property or organic government entities or fictitious economic entities to which constitutional sovereignty is licensed or paternally granted? Whenever human constituents are fallaciously authoritatively made devoid of sovereignty, by government’s sovereignty or licensed organic sovereignty, which then is no more than fiction, which ontologically is not of reality, as nihilism is also not ontological. And, only if rocks have naturally inherent sovereignty, can organic sovereignty inhere in economic result of accumulating property or treasure. Sovereignty does not inhere in the substantial (material) realm of humanity. Rather, it only inheres in the natural essential reality of humanity: As Plato reasoned and Descartes reconfirmed, it is of Plato’s Intelligible Realm of human reason, as consented, and not from Plato’s temporal Realm of opinion: belief or illusion. Roger Williams’ thoughts surely apply here! 102 ”The conclusion at which he arrived, then, from the merging of divine ordinances and natural law, was expressed in a doctrine that sets apart the individual citizen in all his spiritual and intellectual rights, from the subject of the commonwealth, and provides the basis for his principle of toleration. “A Civill Government is an ordinance of God, to conserve the

Sovereignty

151

Civill peace of the people, so far as concerns their Bodies and Goods,” and no farther. [Williams’ exempted cardinal, therefore, antecedent and superior human sovereignty, by doctrine that sets apart the individual citizen in all his spiritual and intellectual rights; as Jefferson’s separation of Church from state was conceived to do.]. Roger Williams issued his dictum about human emotion’s desiderata, which added to Plato’s spectrum of truth and particularly to predicate adjectives’ definition, which describe the human prescriptive logos. Virtue and vice originate in this cardinal human sovereignty, as do common understandings of truth’s meaning also (when telling ‘the truth,’ for instance, we swear to accurately tell about our perceptive experience of a fact or facts). And in the organic sense, Williams’ Dictum greatly affects and limits the understanding of organic authority’s ordinal spectrum:103 Without natural human cardinal agencies, organization cannot exist. The noumenal aspects (as intelligence, truth and morality) of an organization, therefore, do not and cannot exist apart from the unalienable qualities (the natural noumenon ) provided by the human constituents of an organization. Roger Williams’ dictum considers the indigenous source of organic authority.

152

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

(Parliament held this organic English sovereignty for a hundred years when the American Revolution erupted, and any organic English sovereignty won by American colonial states’ had failed miserably to justify any constituent benefits that had been delivered to American colonists.). About taxes then, Parrington wrote this:104

When the order reached Ipswich, John Wise, minister of the second church, gathered the chief members of his flock together, and it was agreed by them to choose no such commissioner [to collect the taxes] at the town meeting -- “We have a good God, and a good king, and shall do well to stand for our privileges,” the minister is reported to have argued. Soon thereafter John Wise was summoned before a starchamber court on the charge of sedition. Upon his plea of colonial privilege, the president of the court, Dudley, is said to have retorted, “You shall have no more privileges left you than not to be sold for slaves.” “Do you believe,” demanded Andros, “Joe and Tom may tell the King what money he may have?” “Do not think,” put in another judge, “the laws of England follow you to the ends of the earth.” Thereupon with five others, John Wise was thrown into Boston jail, where he lay one and twenty days, and whence he was released only after payment of fifty pounds, giving bond in a thousand pounds for good behavior, and suffering suspension from the ministry. “The evidence in the case,” he remarked afterward, “as to the substance of it, was that we too boldly endeavored to persuade ourselves we were Englishmen, and under privileges.” Was Jurist Kennedy’s majority opinion compatible with the stark realities, which Colonists, as John Wise, had experienced?

The states have a “sovereign status” that makes them separate and independent from the national government, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said Wednesday. “The states’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty that the states enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.”

Sovereignty

153

The “sovereign status” that the states enjoyed, to which Jurist Anthony Kennedy referred, is not the ‘English sovereignty as it existed in America before American colonists’ won their independence by winning the American Revolution, because the colonists’ could not depend on English sovereignty? This ‘English sovereignty’ in Colonial America was particularly unjust: The Kings chartered patron government’s claim to being just had not inhered in America: property-based rights in America failed in responsible reciprocity regarding colonists’ natural human rights. The American sovereign condition, before the Constitution, was the Colonies’ independent natural sovereign condition to which ‘Articles of Confederation’ were addressed. These articles, were adopted in 1781. (A select group of Colonists covertly, at their own peril had taken necessary risk to establish these articles for colonists’ self agreed organic order among the thirteen American Colonies.) The Continental Congress first met covertly in Philadelphia on Sept. 5, 1774 and called their Colonial Confederation the ‘United States of America,’ which agreed name also was used in the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, marking the end of England’s Chartered Rule of the American Colonies. Maybe more accurately, this was the beginning of declared liberty and freedom for Colonists, as a sovereign entity, to act and organize, at will, on their own. The Revolutionary War ended in 1781, with the American Colonies the victor. The Constitution was ratified by common consent in 1789, and with this sovereign consent, only then had organic American sovereignty inhered to the American Colonists: England’s sovereignty then, as before, had nothing to do with independent sovereignty in America. Only sovereign American colonials’ could effect the new Federal nation’s sovereignty. As John Wise was charged with sedition for claiming privileges as an English citizen, what then should have been the charge for members of the Continental Convention meeting covertly to discuss their independence from England? The Articles of Confederation was at best a necessary expedient, and not a fiducial standard which can or should be considered as the antecedent or precedent to constitutional states’ rights. So,

154

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

whether or not the doctrine of ‘mechanism,’ Burke’s doctrine of ‘fixed contracts,’ or some other unitary materialist ‘contingent’ prescriptive value which Jurist Kennedy, a Federalist, fallaciously used as his antecedent basis of argument from which to deduce his authoritative truth about English sovereignty transferring, or in another unknown manner inhering to the American colonies, as English sovereignty was, and is still based on the fallacious ‘divine right’ dogma, it could not be fitted to a free and independent organic American sovereignty. And, while American sovereignty was established by suffrage, i.e., the common consent that ratified the Constitution, this consent clearly, freely expressed the God-given unalienable sovereign rights of Colonial American citizens. Jurist Kennedy’s majority opinion, as joined by those jurists who voted with him, was, therefore, based on a fallacious sophist rationalization, considered as an antecedent principle without specific documentation for critical review: Jurist Kennedy, with the four other Federalist Jurists, who agreed with him, enacted as constitutional law based on the Federalist dogmatic doctrine, i.e., official authoritative truth-based law, which covertly retains fallacious ‘divine right’ dogma as its affirmed basic antecedence of argument: unfortunately, additional ‘positive’ laws will undoubtedly be deductively rationalized from this official authoritative truth-based law. Did the Supreme Court, in this instance, perpetrate an ‘authoritative truth’ (of ‘is false’ truth value)? And if this sophist rationalization was deliberately intended, was perjury involved? But can it be prosecuted? The answer, because of impunity, unfortunately, is no! * * Of course, Jurists of the Supreme Court enjoy impunity for their official acts. Certainly this impunity did not inhere from the English organic sovereignty which the American Revolution had won for Americans’. States’ Rights inhere from the same sovereignty as does the Court’s impunity: from the consent of sovereign constituents, to the Constitution, then with strategic values to protect individual human rights in place, to governments: both federal and state. And Jurists, while appointed for life, can be impeached! But, another, maybe more serious, concern arises with Jurist Kennedy’s authoritative majority opinion. Since the Supreme Court’s

Sovereignty

155

constitutional empowerment and their impunity, by what authority did the Supreme Court adjudge historical maters in this decision which came before the Constitution? In these historical matters, did Jurist’s honor their oaths to uphold the Constitution, when reaching beyond the Constitution for antecedence on which to base their desired authoritative judgement, and authoritative truth and law. What happened before the Constitution, particularly as fallaciously deduced from a consequent (that before the Constitution, in fact, had not existed) then asserted as the antecedent basis of argument, surely had nothing to do with the Jurists’ constitutional authority and impunity? However, should have Roger Williams Dictum applied as the ‘is true’ antecedent in this matter? 105

Every lawful Magistrate whether succeeding or elective, is not only the minister of God, but the Minister or servant of the people also (what people or nation soever they be all the world over), and the Minister or Magistrate goes beyond his commission who intermeddles with that which cannot be given him in commission from the people. [“The Bloudy Tenent Yet More Bloudy,” in Narragansett Club Publications, Vol. IV, p. 187] Was this Supreme Court decision based on an illusion of prior sovereignty, as Jurists had supposed or wished for its existence before the Constitution? A similar illusion also appears in the Court’s ‘Broad Powers’ decision, which decision came years after the fact in support Hamilton’s economic proposal to install banking, as an integral of the Treasury department’s constitutional role. Did this legal doctrine also violate, with impunity, Federalists’ claim to ‘strict constructionist’ values? Do the above tautological rationalizations fit this analogy: by asserted antecedence, “picking your self up by your bootstraps,” which naturally is impossible, representing the tautological fallacy of either ”Affirming Consequents” or “Denying Antecedents?”, Which tautological fallacy is a common strategic practice of mechanist materialist sophists with concupiscent desires to achieve paternal political favors by law based on legal ‘authoritative truths’? While the consensus of common natural individual predicate values

156

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

called for independence from England and by ratification established the unique American Constitution, these natural values had also bound Colonists together, and they are the predicate values, which distinguish liberals (as Wise and Jefferson) from conservatives (as Hamilton’s Federalist following). Liberal values, because they are more fundamentally natural, therefore, are the more logically antecedent. Parrington commented at length about the origins of American sovereignty. He wrote this about Daniel Webster’s politics as a mechanist Federalist, which therefore, reflects predicate values that are common with Jurist Kennedy’s views:106

Of these four theses, two may be regarded as Webster’s chief contribution to the great debate: the doctrine of immediacy, and the doctrine of an executed contract. . . . As developed by Burke the theory is somewhat tenuous, but as applied by Webster to the interpretation of a written document it is extraordinarily plausible to the legal mind. [Webster’s] reputation was extraordinary, and he seemed as fixed and brilliant as the north star. After the reply to Hayne, his fame as the defender of the Constitution was in every mouth. That celebrated speech, perhaps the most celebrated in our congressional history, was delivered on January 26, 1830, and awakened an amazing response. Men were moved to tears by its eloquence, and its circulation in pamphlet form exceeded that of any other pamphlet since the founding of government. It is not a great constitutional argument, but it better served the purpose of inspiring in the public a grandiose conception of national unity under the organic law, than any reasoned statement could have done. For political purposes rhetoric was more effective than historical argument, and its sonorous sentences, and in particular the stately conclusion vastly appealed to the taste of the generation. Three years later Webster applied himself more closely to the subtleties of the question. Calhoun’s masterly argument with its exposition of the theory of concurrent majorities could not be answered

Sovereignty

157

by rhetoric, and on February 16, 1833, Webster spoke on “The Constitution not a Compact between Sovereign States” (‘Works,’ Vol. III, p. 449). His argument is strictly legal and rests on four theses: that sovereignty inheres in the people; that as individuals acting collectively in their sovereign capacity, they ordained and established the Constitution; that the Constitution thus established is the supreme law of the land, acting immediately upon the individual citizen and recognizing no intermediary sovereign state; and that as an “executed contract” it is irrevocable and final, with the necessary functions to construe its powers and execute its will. Of these four theses, two may be regarded as Webster’s chief contribution to the great debate: the doctrine of immediacy, and the doctrine of an executed contract. The latter, quite obviously, is no more than Burke’s theory of the British constitution as founded on a compact entered into following the Revolution of 1688, and as such, by analogy from the common law, inviolable without the consent of both parties to the instrument. As developed by Burke the theory is somewhat tenuous, but as applied by Webster to the interpretation of a written document it is extraordinarily plausible to the legal mind. The doctrine of immediacy, on the other hand, would seem to have been derived from Judge Story. The argument of Webster in expounding the principle of immediate compact between the individual citizen and the Constitution follows the argument of ‘Story’s ‘Commentaries too closely to escape comment. Theodore Parker explicitly states that Webster got his argument from Story, and circumstances bear out his assertion. . . . ‘Home Rule’ was general, national in scope, rather than about any particular state’s sovereignty. Maine became the twenty third State of the United States, admitted in March of 1820. Maine, however, comprised territory exclusively controlled by Massachusetts. Parrington wrote this:107

IMPERIAL SOVEREIGNTY AND HOME RULE

158

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

The American Revolution remains after a hundred and fifty years somewhat of a puzzle to historians. Much careful investigation has been done in the last two decades, but we still know too little to speak confidently or with a sense of finality. The appeal to arms would seem to have been brought about by a minority of the American people, directed by a small group of skillful leaders who like Indian scouts, covered their tracks so cleverly that only the keenest trailers can now follow their course and understand their strategy. On the other hand, the philosophy of revolution is familiar to us. Revolutions are born of an abnormal state of mind, sensitized by an accumulated body of experience. They are psychological explosions, resulting from irritations commonly economic in origin, and they are conditioned in their programs by the stock of knowledge and aspiration peculiar to their time and place. Two determining facts, then, seem to lie at the root of the American Revolution: American psychology which shaped the colonial outlook, and the peculiar situation of the British Empire at the close of the French and Indian war. In old age John Adams “hazarded an opinion, that the true history of the American revolution could not be recovered, for ‘the revolution was effected before the war commenced. The revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people’* (* Letter to Mr. Niles, January 14, 1818.). Accepting Adams’s thesis of a change in American psychology, we may hazard a further opinion that the revolution resulted from the emergence in two countries of divergent interpretations of the theory and practice of sovereignty, which may be sufficiently distinguished by the terms local home rule and imperial centralization. In the beginning it was a clash of jurisdiction between colonial self-government and absentee paternalism; but later it developed into an open challenge of the monarchical principle. . . . [A similar challenging situation has arisen from the philosophical organic

Sovereignty

159

form and values that attend government’s legal paternal grant to mechanist organic entities of commerce, which emulate a monarchical form.]

An American mind had been created by the silent pressure of environment. A large measure of economic freedom had developed an American liberalism, frankly and vigorously individualistic. It was not consciously democratic, or even republican. . . . The existence of this native liberalism had been stupidly overlooked and ignored by responsible statesmen. With the exception of Franklin, colonial spokesmen were commonly members of the aristocratic group, among whom the Tory philosophy was spreading fast. Gentlemen in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston fashioned their manners upon the polite world of St. James’s * and caught the Tory ways in politics as naturally as the London style in wigs. They associated with the royal officials, traveled in England, corresponded with members of Parliament, advised in all matters of colonial policy, and proved themselves the most shortsighted of counselors. Upon their heads rest in part the blunders of the ministry. In failing to understand the native liberalism of America, they not only shared responsibility for an unwise policy, but they hastened their own destruction. . .. * ‘St. James,’ incidently, was also referred to in the Court’s minority opinion about State’s rights: “The doctrine of sovereign immunity is more in the mind of King James I, than of James Madison,” said Justice Breyer.” Internal insurrections changed England’s Constitution and, along with immunities, sovereign organic powers, were changed.: As spoils of the Whig victory, sovereign powers were transferred from the King to Parliament, however, colony charters had originated and remained as the King’s sovereignty. American Colonists were in a philosophical quandary: whom or what sovereignty ruled them, and more important, provided for their

160

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

security interests. Parrington continues:

ARGUMENT AND PROPAGANDA We understand the ways of propaganda today better than our fathers understood them, and the official pronouncements of diplomats and statesmen we have grown somewhat skeptical of. Historians of the American Revolution have paid rather too exclusive attention to formal speeches and state papers, forgetting that those speeches and papers too often served the purpose of obscuring and evading the real issues. The ten years of dreary debate preceding the clash of arms, during which theory and precedent were examined by partisan lawyers, did little more than serve party purposes on both sides of the Atlantic, investing immediate interests with nationalistic or imperialistic idealism. . . . On the American side the argument fell into two broad divisions: an attempt to justify the colonial position by appeal to the British constitution, and when that failed by an appeal to the extralegal doctrine of natural right. To understand the obscure constitutional wrangle, it must be recalled that important changes in English constitutional practice had taken place since the colonies were founded. Parliamentary sovereignty had superseded royal sovereignty, or in other words, the sovereignty of property had superseded divine right autocracy; and this in turn was undergoing change in the second half of the eighteenth century -- the sovereignty of landed property was challenged by the rising capitalism. . . . [Both of which philosophically practiced materialist mechanist values.] A new theory of virtual representation was developed -- a theory upon which turned much of the early revolutionary debate. In brief the theory asserted that as Parliament speaks for the total body of Englishmen, it makes no practical difference who elects them, where they live, who they are, or what interests they represent. Within the halls of

Sovereignty

161

Parliament they can be trusted to think and legislate for the nation as a whole. . . . Such was the parliamentary situation in 1763, and when appeal was made to colonials to the principle of no taxation without representation, it was answered by appeal to the theory of virtual representation. American constitutional practice, on the other hand, had developed in a contrary direction. Quite as consciously as Parliament, the several colonial legislatures rested on the principle of property rights, but a different system of representation had developed. By easy logic a geographical theory had emerged, by the terms of which a legislator must be a freeman of the district rather than of the realm, that he should hold power for a short period and frequently submit his conduct to the scrutiny of the electors, and that a district should bear a just per capita relation to the total population. . . . The debate over this vital question was involved in obscurities by reason of the vagueness of the British constitution. If an unwritten constitution be no other than established practice -- and it is true of the English constitution in spite of the body of principles existing in such pronouncements as Magna Charta, the settlement of 1689, and the Common Law -- then the current practice of Parliament must be accepted as constitutional. This was the fatal weakness of the colonial argument, as it was of Pitt and other defenders of America in Parliament. When Pitt exclaimed with characteristic grandiloquence, “I come not here armed at all points with law cases and acts of Parliament, with the stature-book doubled down in dogears, to defend the cause of liberty,” he abandoned the legal ground to appeal to the sense of justice and right of Englishmen. But the question could not so easily be transferred from the domain of constitutional law. For upwards of a hundred years Parliament had been sovereign, and for the colonials now to deny its sovereignty meant

162

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

one of two things: either go back to the obsolete principle of divine right, or to postulate an extra-parlimentary body of constitutional law, unknown to English practice. A sovereignty inhering neither in King nor Parliament, but in a super-constitution, was a conception which had been played with by Coke in an endeavor to exalt the common law, and hinted at by later Whig statesmen, but which had never established itself in practice. The colonials recognized the dilemma and made half-hearted attempts to evade it. John Adams and Franklin endeavored to argue that as the colonial charters were from the crown, and antedated the rise of Parliament, Americans owed allegiance to the King and not to Parliament, and hence parliamentary pretensions to sovereignty over America were only a new form of unconstitutional prerogative. . . . (For an excellent discussion of the constitutional questions involved, see C. H. Van Tyne, The causes of the War of Independence, Chapters VIII and IX.)

It finally became clear to American leaders that if their cause were to make headway, appeal must be made to broader principles. Their case must rest on philosophical rather than on legal grounds. This suffices to explain the shift from constitutionalism to abstract rights, which marked the middle period of the debate. By 1773 it had become evident to thoughtful observers that the cause of American liberalism must fail, or become revolutionary in purpose and intent, and to become such it must seek justification in extra-constitutional principles. And this justification it discovered in the writings of English liberals of the seventeenth century -- in Sidney and Milton, and above all in Locke. Justice Kennedy’s explanation:

‘The states’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty that the states enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today,’ without facts to support it, is an indisputable example either of the existing

Sovereignty

163

confusion of soverign rule or of rationalized sophistry. And with the Supreme Court’s majority opinion, as based on this false dogmatic materialist divine right-based view of American sovereignty, a grand authoritative legal fraud was perpetrated: But for what purpose? Is a nefarious Court agenda afoot to weaken further the extra-constitutional principles which are the legal foundation of independence, human rights and human justice? Anyway this Court’s ruling is nonsensical in any sense of Kant’s call for ‘critical reason,’ renews serious questions about the practice of “judicial review”: which became the sole kingly judge of the U.S. Constitution and legislation." Parrington’s account of John Adams furnishes a view of sovereign controversy which the Revolution brought on.108 During the revolutionary struggle [John Adams] had been a member of

the left wing; during the early struggles under the Constitution he was a member of the right wing. The young man had been a stalwart defender of human rights, the old man was a stalwart defender of property rights; and this shift of position was fatal to his reputation with the rising democratic party. . . . In his contributions to the colonial debate Adams concerned himself mainly with questions of constitutional law. He placed little reliance on the appeal to natural rights, and showed scant respect for “popular talk and those democratic principles which have done so much mischief in this country.” (“Autobiography,” in Works, Vol. II, 310.) The American cause, he believed, should be based on constitutional principles, but those principles required restatement in the light of existing fact. They must be rescued from the narrow interpretation of little Englanders and adapted to meet the pressing needs of imperial federation. The English people were not all

Similar Court decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall established “judicial review,” which as in this instance, seems of intent to make the ‘authorities’-‘immunities,’ of the Judiciary, the U.S. King.

164

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

residents of the British Isles, and a constitutional practice suited to compact groups in a common environment, was ill adapted to the needs of widely sundered bodies of British subjects. Into this difficult and momentous business of imperial federation, Adams plunged earnestly in an endeavor to chart the unexplored field. That the problem was the gravest then confronting Englishmen is abundantly evident today; that it received grossly inadequate consideration on both sides of the Atlantic is equally clear. . . .. This fact, too frequently overlooked, has been emphasized by a recent student, who has summarized the final results of Adams’s thinking in the following theses: that the empire was an association of equals, each with independent legislative powers; that the British constitution was the fundamental law of the empire, defining the relationship of the constituent parts; and that it was the function of the judiciary to disallow a legislative act of any of the several legislatures which did not comport with the fundamental law, or which attempted to impose the will of one of the partners in violation of the fundamental understanding and its guarantee (R. G. Adams, Political Ideas of the American Revolution, Trinity College Press, 1922, 9293).

Such, in compressed form, was Adams’s elaboration and justification of the dogma of Otis, that an act [only if liberal] against the constitution was void.* [continued as indicated by (--)] * ‘The dogma of Otis’ is classical Brahmanism which saturated the minds of New England’s mechanist elitist upper classes: 109

Sovereignty

165

Irishmen and others to the right of suffrage, there will soon be an end to liberty & property” (Quoted by Samuel Eliot Morrison in Harrison Gray Otis, Vol. I, p. 107.). To prevent if possible, such an unhappy out come, the upper classes of New England fell to organizing and drilling all the elements of conservatism for a vigorous defense. They wrote and spoke and preached, til the mind of respectable New England was saturated with prejudice. The democratic principle was converted into a bogey to frighten the simple. Such a hideous misshapen imp of darkness, such a vile hag of anarchy had never before been painted for the imagination of honest Yankees to shudder at; and if democracy seemed to them a wild and fearsome thing making ready to destroy their venerated social order, they only believed what the minister preached on the Sabbath and the squire asserted on week days. The plebeian democrat, very likely in debt, was quite overwhelmed by the organized forces of village respectability. [Parrington’s quote of Adams now continues] -- In its relation to current English constitutional practice it [American

orthodox conservatism] was at once revolutionary and reactionary [it was at once liberal]. It implied a double attack upon parliamentary sovereignty, first in limiting its powers by a super-parliamentary constitution, and then in subjecting its acts to judicial review. The final result would be the transfer of sovereignty from the legislature to the judiciary. The idea had been toyed with by English lawyers [Coke, for one], but never seriously considered; it was alien to the whole theory and history of parliamentary development. English landed gentlemen have never been minded to grant the veto power to the judiciary, but have persistently retained sovereignty in the legislature. Nevertheless in such early speculation is found the germ of our later practice, as it finally developed through the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall.

166

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

[Research of ‘this germ’ is pursued in Duty without Principle (my section 240: Deontology without Teleology, or Americans’ original sin)] Parrington’s account of Jefferson includes the following comments about “judicial review.”110

As Jefferson grew older, his fear of judicial encroachment on the popular will became acute, but it shifted from distrust of the Common Law to concern over the Supreme Court. . . .. “It is a misnomer to call a government republican, in which a branch of the supreme power is independent of the nation.” [Jefferson in Writings, Vol. X, 189] “It is very dangerous doctrine to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions. It is one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. . . . The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. [Parrington’s account continues] As Jefferson watched Chief Justice John Marshall gathering all things within the purview of the Federal judiciary, preparing future strongholds by the skillful use of ‘obiter dicta, legislating by means of judicial interpretation, nullifying the will of the majority, and with the power of repeal made nugatory by the complexity of the process, he saw clearly what the outcome would be. Surely that was no democracy where judge-made laws were enforced by bench warants, and where the sovereign power lay beyond the immediate reach of the popular will. The government that he desired would not rest on the legal fiction of an abstract justice above the statutes and constitutions, whereof a group judicial gentlemen were the repositories and guardians. It would be like Paine’s, “a plain thing, and fitted to the capacity of many heads”; for “where the law of the majority ceases to be acknowledged, there government ends; the law of the strongest takes its place.” State’s rights issues

Sovereignty

167

Nullification and Interposition are related doctrines. Both embroil States’ Rights. Nullification was settled by the Civil War when eleven Southern States seceded from the Union. Interposition, however, seems fundamentally implicated in the above Court decisions, and it resembles Nullification. 111 Interposition is legal argument that a State can “interpose the [State’s]

sovereignty against the encroachment upon the reserved power of the state.” Under this doctrine, a state has the power to overrule a decision of a federal agency if it conflicts with a state law, and all persons in the state must obey the state, not the federal, law.” Interposition, if valid in legal matters of an “Imperial State” (of John Adam’s seminal argument of Imperial Federation), then Interposition should also be valid in matters of consented sovereignty involving an “Imperial County,” “Imperial City,” or “Imperial individual?” : However, since each individual’s sovereignty is naturally cardinal, the consent of this cardinality is antecedent to all organic sovereignty forms, i.e., constitutionally has the quality of equality (none is greater than another), this Interposition hypothesis is logically fallacious in all instances of organic sovereignty, which in results transcend Williams’ Dictum. And since neither ‘monarchical’ nor ‘imperial’ government was constitutionally adopted in America, all organic American organic sovereignty is commensurate, i.e., inheres from the consent of sovereignty from individual citizens. ‘States’ rights’ is mentioned in a single-paragraph, Amendment 10, of the Bill of Rights:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people. Justice Kennedy failed to consider or address the significance of the phrase, or to the people, instead to impose interposition as an exclusive state’s right. The Bill of Rights was ordered as a condition of individual consent to ratifying the Constitution, i.e., to preserve human rights which are coeval of government and law, whether of a state or the nation. Whatever sovereignty is claimed by government, federal or state, it not only existed unorganized with the individual constituents before the Constitution, but after the

168

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Constitution it remains unorganized with individual constituents, for them, to grant or withhold their consent with each suffrage act. Securing the unorganized cardinal sovereignty, of individual human rights, was the constituent citizens’ reasoned demand for the Amendments added to the Constitution: called the Bill of Rights. For Justice Kennedy to adjudge for the State of Maine as deduced on an Imperial State’s philosophical basis, rather than from the constitutional consensual organic sovereignty of Maine’s citizens’ cardinal sovereignty, he did so in violation of the constitutionally protected unalienable citizens’ rights, which constitutionally have equal protection in matters of law including wages and overtime compensation. Instead, by imposing a legal but fallacious ‘authoritative truth,’ as law, which by reasonable standards is unjust, he meted an unjust decision with impunity that was not at all retributive in results, and which unless impeached, its doctrine of impunity unjustly protects fictional sovereignty, which had applied to define an ‘Imperial State’s rights’: the state was thereby considered King and can do what the King (The Supreme Court in this instance) wills to do. The proposition that each state has rights cannot constitutionally be challenged: the federal government must respect this right, however, the Constitution specifically instructs the federal government to make any law that is ‘necessary and proper’ for carrying its specific powers into effect. ‘Immunity’ from prosecution, is an expedient of this power, which had originated in monarchical sovereignty: neither as compatible nor necessary whenever pure truth and justice (beneficent or retributive) are practiced, i.e., when the resulting organic predicate value of administrative practice consistently ‘is true.’ American Tories, Federalists, and Whigs, of predicate values in property, imported from England the ‘contingently,’ ‘fictitious’ notions of ‘Imperial Sovereignty’ which had resulted in deep-seated internal grievances which quite necessarily have been settled by insurrections rather than adjudications (as the terrorism that would soon be defined in Russia and France by uprisings that resulted in complete revolutions). American forms of injustice were inextricably prescribed by the imported ‘Imperialistic’ notions, including causal mechanisms and mercantilism thereof. [More on

Sovereignty

169

Politics without Principle is pursued in my research about paradoxes (section 230, About Truth and Paradox)]. 112

Mechanism is one of the two great philosophical theories of cause and effect in the universe. Opposed to the theory of mechanism is the theory of teleology. Any thing that grows and develops can be explained in two ways. Mechanism explains it from behind, in terms of its origins. Teleology explains it from the front, in terms of the goal it is seeking. The Supreme Court’s imperialist decision, in question here, leaves citizens without legal recourse. And while the Supreme Court actions should legally be repressible, legal impunity leaves only the adjudicating jurists secure? As a rule, while Presidents have been impeached, Supreme Court Jurists have enjoyed the security of life time appointments. 113

In the background of the Chase impeachment, and possibly that of Pickering, was the fact that most of the judges of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts had been appointed by Federalist Presidents. Some anti-Federalist congressional followers of President Thomas Jefferson, who had been elected in the autumn of 1800, felt that impeachment was a proper means of keeping the courts in reasonable harmony with Congress and the executive branch of government . . . Chase was acquitted in March 1805. His acquittal provided a significant rejection of the theory that the tenure of judges should depend on the political climate of the times. Anyway, American constitutional sovereignty, was uniquely patterned after Coke’s thought to improve English sovereignty. a sovereignty inhering neither in King nor Parliament, but in a superconstitution, Because tradition resists change, American consented, Sovereignty confronts a unique dilemma: the materialist mechanist traditional political expectations of accumulating property, position and power (nomos) will always both strategically and mechanistically, confront those whose expectations are found in the ethical reasoning of physis, regarding unalienable human rights,

170

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

as protectes by the American Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Materialist Nomos, which mostly was imported, perpetually has challenged American constitutionally acquired physis: affecting individual sovereign human rights particularly. While individual, cardinal sovereignty of voting Americans empower all government in the U. S., dogmatic forms of sovereignty continually agitate the political controversy between propertied nomos and rational physis: each American partitioned government entity is a ‘Muse’ of sorts, which politically reflects the mix of this political sovereign duality. While this mixture, as consented, reflects the beauty of pure virtue, behind which puissant visceral attractiveness defines our ‘Muse’: she, in fact, has a rogue glint that evidently shows in her official acts. Her power, or forcefulness, represents nomos that belie her beautiful appearances of pure physis. As for ‘government controling itself,’ our beautiful Muses’ ethical physis, as consented by suffrage, too often now hides in the shadows of official nomos-based mechanistic economic Leviathan like policies, which politically mechanists have made the antecedent of constitutional physis:

As a means of securing a necessary balance between rival interests, Madison approved a republican rather than a democratic form of government. [So, what happened to this balance?] Most individuals pay no heed to the naturally immutable ‘correspondence frame of truth’ which puts ultimate personal responsibility on qualities which describe the predicate values of choice in our intelligence, called logos, which selected value, either ‘is true’ or ‘is false’, is the willed cause of individual action that posits forensic evidence, which naturally is imprinted on or intrinsic of the posited facts. We fool ourselves, along with others, of common belief in rationalized sophistries as ‘Do as I advocate,

not as my willed (nomos-based) predicate values prescribe and I do.’ Glen R. Morrow wrote this about this nomos: 114 . . . The word ‘nomos’ is as old as the epic poets, and seems originally

Sovereignty

171

for men. Fishes and beasts and winged fowl devour one another, for ‘right’ is not in them; but to mankind he gave ‘right,’ which proves far the best. (Evelyn-White’s translation). In later days ‘nomos’ was applied only to human ways of behavior; but it never lost its original meaning of custom, nor its association with justice. . . . Law is primarily an embodiment of justice, and conversely the just man is he who obeys the laws. But two other elements came to be associated with the idea of ‘nomos:’ the element of constraint, and the element of enactment. Customary law in its early stages is usually felt by a people as only vaguely compelling; conformity results without the machinery of courts and penalties. Similarly these customs are usually regarded as owing little to human contrivance; they are the gift of the gods, or a part of the unchanging order of things. [As belief in divine right dogma, for instance] For the Greeks this state of innocence was ended by the process of political unification and the colonization. When two or more communities found it expedient to join forces for mutual protection and benefit, their tribal and local customs had to be harmonized, and something like a common law, the law of the city, had to be set up, in some respects overriding the earlier and more familiar customs. Such a law of the city was felt to have, and would need to have, more explicit legislation or enactment, by deliberate choice of “the best.” . . . By the beginning of the fifth century the Greeks were well aware of this element of human judgment and positive enactment in the laws under which they lived. The course of political events in the fifth century only deepened this awareness. At Athens, for example, the successive changes in the constitution, the increasing resort to legislation, the growth of litigation, the widespread contact with other peoples and other laws, and the heightened sense of individual interests distinct from those of the community, all converged in their influence to give

172

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

the Athenian citizen the conviction that his laws were to a great extent the result of legislation or enactment, and derived much of their authority from the sanctions explicitly attached to them. Yet, so strong was the traditional association of law with justice, it appeared inconceivable that there should be justice apart from law. The relations of the two concepts had to a great extent been reversed. Whereas in the beginning law was regarded as finding its norm in justice, in the fifth century justice came to be defined in terms of law. Under these circumstances the only recourse open to one who felt the injustice of his city’s law was to appeal to a higher law. . . . In short, there seemed no escape from the “tyranny of nomos.” The dilemma of the fifth-century thinker is nicely exemplified in the attitude of Socrates. Before the Athenian court he declares firmly that he must “obey God rather than men.” Yet he was a loyal subject to the laws of Athens, and according to Xenophon he fully concurred in the current opinion that justice means conformity to the laws. Christ, however, when assessing the results of values that accord with sophistries, which in fact are lies, said this:

“For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?” Reluctantly, our (common interests-based) ‘Muse’ responds to a synthesis of our chosen predicate values, which define the consented sovereignty of our ‘Muse’. And human morality, is naturally only about the virtuous truthful predicate value ‘is true’ in human logos , therefore, only partly contributes to making culture the agency of our ‘Muse’s predicated values synthesis. Anyway, our ‘Muse’ neither legislates nor imposes law. Unfortunately, however, elected representatives of our ‘Muse,’ with sovereign impunity protecting them have too often substituted Brahminism (values of materialist sophistries), which they deem of greater antecedent order or more preferable to the unalienable predicate values constitutionally specified as their public

Sovereignty

173

commission, as was based on their ‘oath of office’ taken at the outset of their official commissions. Democrats’ liberal values at times have also been deemed of higher order than their official organic commissions have specified. The organic fallacy difference appears on a political spectrum of seeming categorically opposite extremes, with very little commonality in the middle. About this political middle, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, et all, reasoned that only the mean of ‘excess’ and ‘deficiency’ was virtuous (without a common mean of the extremes, does virtue exist?): The extremes, ‘excess’ and ‘deficiency’ are vises, they proclaimed. Cicero, foresaw the causes of democratic decline in the Roman Empire. Cicero’s example, therefore, furnishes a worthy history, and unwanted end, which too often has resulted from a conflated virtuous middle of the physis-nomos quandary The unitary materialist, generally a conservative, believes, often boasts, “only what I believe can be seen and felt.” In this dogmatic belief, conservatives’ generally believe in Positivism! : they rationalize from visceral-material-based values,’ which they dogmatically assert as antecedent values, as A. Comte’s positivism doctrine advocated, and on which mechanist dogmatic values are based. Conservative Federalist-Whig dogmatic proclivities’ have sponsored our traditional constitutional ‘positive laws.’ These dogmatic proclivities align GOP Republican political values with the ‘absolute monarchical’ values, which are diabolical to oaths of office taken by those elected to offices that control government? : The American constitutional Democracy, which protects freedom to choose, is important to mechanists’ organic entities administrative license, which allows mechanists’ freedom to preempt and exploit in both a nomos and physis sense. Parrington gave this tribute to John Adams.115

Midway between Hamilton and Jefferson stands John Adams, the most painstaking student of government and the most widely read in political history, of his generation of Americans. . . . The severest critic cannot deny to John Adams excellent qualities of mind and heart. . . . A stubborn intellectual independence and a vigorous assertiveness were his distinguishing characteristics. He revealed to the full the Adams trait of going its own way and coming to its own conclusions. He loved

174

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

to be in the public eye and he studied the little arts of seff-advertising. In his youthful diary he set down these characteristic words: “ ”Reputation ought to be a perpetual subject of my thoughts, and aim of my behavior. How shall I spread an opinion of myself as a lawyer of distinguished genius, learning, and virtue?” Self-confident, domineering, and jealously suspicious -- always on the lookout lest some honor due him should fall to another -- he struggled through a career strewn with animosities and heart burnings that a nicer tact and a more generous nature would have avoided. He was his own worst enemy. Adam’s did not or would not choose his actionable predicate values with the same critical analysis that he applied to things external to him: only in the external sense, was he maybe akin to Kant’s Dogmatist:

Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason “without previous criticism of its own powers,” and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, not yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In carrying out the plan which the “Critique” prescribes, that is, in the future system of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. . . . He would have been peculiarly well fitted to give truly scientific character to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of the “organum,” that is of pure reason itself. That he failed to perceive the necessity

Sovereignty

175

of such procedure must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at once the method of Wolf, and of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy. The ‘dogma of Otis’ befitted both Adams’ and Kant’s Dogmatist. In this dogmatic mind set, others could not be their equal. And as Kant observed of ‘his Wolf,’ the same could be said of Adams:

He would have been peculiarly well fitted to give truly scientific character to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of the “organum,” that is of pure reason itself. That he failed to perceive the necessity of such procedure must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times. With Parrington’s documentation of critical analysis of dogmatism, ‘contingent’ truths, the silent conflated predicated truth values (‘true’ and ‘false’) on which hinge the resultant truth values of the dogma, can be evaluated. His account of Adams provided the following ‘contingent’ truth which Adams believed absolutely.116

Adams erected his political system upon what he called “self-evident truths.” He went to the root of the matter and directed his inquiry into the validity of the humanitarian psychology which asserted that men are good by nature, and may be trusted to deal justly with their fellows. He appealed to the whole unhappy record of past misrule to disprove the thesis. Instead of discovering in the average man a kindly, rational being -- as Jefferson professed to discover -- Adams found quite the contrary; and he summoned a host of historians and philosophers to witness that Machiavelli was right in his contention that “those who

176

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

have written on civil government lay it down as a first principle . . . that whoever would found a state, and make proper laws for the government of it, must presume that all men are bad by nature; that they will not fail to show that natural depravity of heart whenever they have a fair opportunity.” (See “Defense of the Constitution, etc.,” in Works, Vol. VI, pp. 9, 57, 97.) . . .

This Calvinistic doctrine that “human nature is not fit to be trusted,” and that “men are never good but through necessity,” being accepted -- and John Adams was as clearly satisfied of its truth as “ of any demonstration of Euclid” -- he proceeded to translate it into political terms, and examine the bearing of it upon systems of government. At once a second fallacy of the humanitarian school emerged -- men are impelled not by ideals but by needs, not by reason, as Godwin argued, but by the desire for goods. The ‘critical flaw’ of dogmatic ‘conservatism’ 117

“Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason ‘without previous criticism of its own powers.’” Kant Adams turned from ‘liberalism’ and became a ‘conservative.’ Kant’s dogmatism represents conservatism’s critical flaw. Baruch Spinoza added these introspective qualifications to evil’s definition: his focus was to isolate the highest ‘good’ of the prescriptive human mind, which necessarily prescribes values, which he called objects (of the human will).118 (29) No individual object whose nature is altogether different from our

own can either help or restrain our power of acting, and absolutely nothing, can be to us either good or evil unless it possesses something in common with ourselves, (30) Nothing can be evil through that which it possesses in common with our nature, but in so far as a thing is evil to us is it contrary to us. (31) In so far as an object agrees with our nature is it necessarily good. (32) In so far as men are subject to

The critical flaw of ‘conservatism’

177

passion, they cannot be said to agree in nature. (33) Men may differ in nature from one another in so far as they are agitated by effects which are passions, and in so far also as one and the same man is agitated by passions is he changeable and inconstant. (34) In so far as men are agitated by passions can they be contrary to one another. (35) So far as men live in conformity with the guidance of reason in so far only do they always necessarily agree in nature. (36) The highest good of those who follow after virtue is common to all and all may equally enjoy it. (37) The good which every one who follows after virtue seeks for himself he will desire for other men; and his desire on their behalf will be greater in proportion as he has a greater knowledge in God. When we fail to recognize our own proclivities for self aggrandizement, or excuse them for glories of the Brahmanist or ‘club’ appeal, we are our own worst civic enemy: as Parrington observed of Adams. And Spinoza observed much the same as Kant, when he wrote this:

‘So far as men live in conformity with the guidance of reason in so far only do they always necessarily agree in nature.’ Whenever we espouse values of self, which supposedly distinguish us pridefully (as concupiscent materialist values appear to cause), our values often fail the test of civic virtue, and if ‘passionately inward turned,’ they might probably be evil: In this view of willful values, Jefferson’s are virtuous and Adam’s are not. Jefferson’s introspection of self is found in his retort, ‘have we found angels in the form of kings to rule us?’ And Christ evaluated humanity with the retort: “no man is ‘good’.” A wise person said, anyone that has not erred, has done nothing. When errors are made and values of intent are proper, beneficent justice should never punish the error: But, can justice in the nomos setting, ever be beneficent? : is this justice retributive? As 1998 ended, moralist William Bennett asked this: 119

“is there such a thing as moral truth?” Regarded by many as our ‘contemporary moralist,’ William Bennett had maybe concluded that what he considered ethical predicate values and truth

178

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

had failed to correlate? His argument was not new. It was in fact an example of dogmatic legal positivism, which conservatives have often expressed.120

Legal positivism, intending to oppose natural law theory, denies any ‘necessary connection between law and morality’. Central theses among a loose cluster: (1) law is definable and explainable without evaluative predicates or presuppositions; (2) the law (e.g. of England now) is identifiable from exclusively factual sources (e.g. legislation, judicial precedents). Some versions deny that there is knowable moral truth. Most understand positive law as products of will, some as imperatives. John Finnis Bennett avowed ‘conservative’ faith reveals that he is an Empiricist of the Hobbes-Burke-Comte genre * who, as Will Durant observed, dogmatic politics has compounded our social troubles:121

Ultimately, our troubles are due to dogma and deduction; we find no new truth because we take some venerable but questionable proposition as the indubitable starting point, and never think about putting this assumption itself to a test of observation or experiment. * Empiricists of the Hobbes-Burke-Comte genre ‘believe,’ as absolute dogma, that ‘Materialism,’ ‘Mechanism,’ ‘Determinism,’ ‘Positivism,’ . . ., all of which are focused on quantitative reality rather than qualitative reality, represent all that is temporal nature-based knowledge. Note how they have denied the existence of qualitative reality. Empiricists generally are dogmatic: ‘believers’ who, without critical testing of the believed dogma, allow dogma-based predicate values to dictate what they say and do; and by reasoning deductively from their dogmatic ‘belief,’ they politically posit added dogma as legal positivism, economic determinism (called mechanism), . . ., which underpin official Imperialistic policies, as ‘Mercantilism,’ ‘Manifest Destiny,’ ‘Dollar Diplomacy,’ Internal Improvement, . . ., and now ‘Preemption’ (the general inference of which is that their predicate values are property based, i.e., quantitative and monarchical, rather than qualitatively rational and democratic).

The critical flaw of ‘conservatism’

179

About truth-based knowledge, Hobbes Empiricism trusts only sensebased quantitative experience.122 The fallacious propertied policies mentioned above were deduced from quantitative dogma and affirmed as axioms (antecedent principles) of our nation’s fallacious mechanism-based economic system called The American System of Political Economy, which, to critical reasoning humans, represents the fascist political glint of our cultural-based democratic American ‘Muse.’ The official politically driven organic American System’s predicate values are not nearly as qualitatively ‘virtuous’ as they must become if America is to deserve what only in pride we now claim that ‘We are the shining light of democracy.’ John Locke’s qualitative Empiricism is a virtuous exception to American conservative’ ‘positive’ empiricism: Locke represents Rational Empiricism or ‘true’ philosophical democracy in which qualitative reason is the equal of quantitative experience based dogmatic belief. Achieving the ideal culture of an unfettered education afforded to everyone capable to learn is more fiction than fact in America, as administered by dogmatic belief. While we lead the world in particulars of what proudly, but fallaciously, we call democracy, but in practice is mechanists’ propertied imperialism, we have much to learn about our natural cardinal individual sovereignty and the naturally necessary organic responsibilities practiced in maintaining it: our society now lags many nations’ in prescriptive values that have lead to unfettered achievements in education. To preserve American democracy with probity and honor, and exercise our uniquely physis-based individual cardinal sovereignty, we must deliberately and critically reorganize our economic propertied values to inculcate an unfettered education for all, who are capable. Then our society’s essential fundamental democratic value will be recognized, instead of the Imperialism, which now shows in our economic GDP. I define dogma as ‘authoritative truth’ which oligarchical power has inculcated in the nefarious manner of “Otis’ dogma.” This dogma is the cultural fermenting of dogmatic prejudice against democratic values, which originated with New England’s Brahmanism, and is perpetuated by

180

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

mechanist conservatism. 123

The Irish immigrants seem to have been the most offensive equalitarians. A New England gentleman, traveling in Pennsylvania . . ., wrote home: “I have seen many, very many Irishmen, and with few exceptions, they are . . . the most God-provoking Democrats on this side of Hell.” And in 1798 Harrison Gray Otis wrote, “If some means are not adopted to prevent the indiscriminate admission of wild Irishmen and others to the right of suffrage, there will soon be an end to liberty & property.” (Quoted by Samuel Eliot Morison in Harrison Gray Otis, Vol. I, p. 107.)

To prevent if possible, such an unhappy out come, the upper classes of New England fell to organizing and drilling all the elements of conservatism for a vigorous defense. They wrote and spoke and preached, til the mind of respectable New England was saturated with prejudice. The democratic principle was converted into a bogey to frighten the simple. Such a hideous misshapen imp of darkness, such a vile hag of anarchy had never before been painted for the imagination of honest Yankees to shudder at; and if democracy seemed to them a wild and fearsome thing making ready to destroy their venerated social order, they only believed what the minister preached on the Sabbath and the squire asserted on week days. The plebeian democrat, very likely in debt, was quite overwhelmed by the organized forces of village respectability. William Bennett had recently expressed grave concern about ethical consequences and social responsibilities caused by human cloning, gene altering, and fertility enhancement; until recently, these creations exclusively resulted from nature’s genetic prescriptions. Human capability to duplicate living facts of nature has now become a ‘real’ or ‘positive’ fact, with humans rather than nature doing the prescribing. But, until society is sufficiently civilized in ethical, responsible teleological morality, our science is maybe

The critical flaw of ‘conservatism’

181

probing too deeply into nature’s essential foundations? : having posited real life forms that the designing humans must agree is their exclusive human causal responsibly? Because moral truth is now framed in ‘real,’ ‘positive’ terms, serious contemplation by conservatives, particularly, is now an essential belated quest, which embarks on the crucially important metaphysical quest of ‘moral truth.’ The time has arrived for propertied positivist ‘conservatives’ to confront, with critical introspective reasoning, the philosophical dilemma which their restricted dogmatically positive values in logos have routinely posited factually for society then to deal with: Conservatives, as Bennett, must now abandon their ‘Positivism’ to contemplate critically nature’s inferential principle predicate values which underpin cosmic realities. As a starting point, they might reassess the critical deliberate reasoning of Plato, Descartes, Kant, Locke, Jefferson, Lincoln, Russell, Einstein, to guide their critical review. When conservatives open their minds to contemplate inferentially but logically the unseen, unheard, unfelt natural, but enigmatic realities of human nature, they must then admit what liberal minds have repeatedly concluded; Moral truth is about natural principle values of “highest good and order” and particularly, not only about dogmatically ‘believed’ carnal laws of the Old Testament or Koran (Putting full faith in carnal laws is like putting full faith in ephemeral rather than eternal aspects of life): Eternal values of human nature are inseparably the foundation of the cosmos while visceral qualities are inseparably of the temporal human body, which St John observed will pass away. They will admit, as critically important, self-evident truths, as those expressed in the Declaration of Independence, are, purely reasoned examples of pure self-evident truth: the values of which correlate with pure values inferred by nature. These natural facts embody values which humans must adopt as reasoned axiomatic values to formulate moral human logos. Gleaning such values is to understand a small bit of life’s teleology. When conservatives, who traditionally represent orthodoxy, admit that ethically moral truth is fundamental to improving temporal justice and morality (as Kant explained), they will revisit, with introspective deliberate

182

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

critical reason, a plethora of, rush to judgement for advantages found there, empirical-based dogma; they will adopt pure values of moral truth to mollify if not replace their prescriptive dogma-biased predicate values to reposit ethical morality in law and inculcate proper conduct to guide its administration; personally, they will abandon the harshness of character which, for example, was demonstrated toward President Clinton; They will follow Lee Atwater’s example of penitence for nurturing defectively dogmatized human values in their prescriptive logos: in a word, they will abandon sophist sanctimony, which posited great public discord centuries before and during the years of Clinton’s Presidency? They will become concerned with laws and court decisions which increasingly compromise the unalienable rights of cardinally sovereign humans; They will revisit laws based on the dogma of economic determinism and the Supreme Court’s decisions which gave grand legal preferences as paternally delivered by mechanism to corporate “fictitious persons” and to “fictitious absolute states.” Christopher Wood’s article, A WAR ON THE WEST, was about the unsettled Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s and ‘80s. Wood’s article is about the firestorm of controversy that embroils the use and exploitations of natural resources on public land. These issues are about the American physis-based individual sovereignty that with increasing frequency has become nomosly coerced. 124 Advocates [of the Sagebrush Rebellion] are not swayed by U.S. Supreme

Court decisions that such rights apply to political and sovereignty rights, not economic issues. Sagebrush Rebellion’s politics is about the economic issues which gained broad political value during the Gilded Age, and achieved to officially install, as the codified nation’s economy, Henry Clay’s “American Plan,” now commonly called ‘The American System of Political Economy’: which system’s political foundation is causal-based dogma-called mechanism, which is ‘economic determinism.’ The Supreme Court’s decision to strengthen State’s Rights might have the

The critical flaw of ‘conservatism’

183

advocacies of the Sagebrush Rebellion in focus. Maybe they have set the stage to turn all public lands over to the states and thereby eliminate federal programs and jurisdiction. Whether by nefarious design or not, should this happen, as I suspect it eventually will, without legislation by Congress as critically reviewed by ‘the sovereign people,’ and consented to, the court will have again transgressed the constitutional principle of “rule by consent.” In effect, states will then be allowed with impunity to take land and resources, which federal taxes had purchased, to benefit the State’s affluent propertied few. (Incidently, is this what Laura King, A.P. article is about? : Rulings protect states: A divided Supreme Court asserts that states cannot face private lawsuits to enforce many federal laws) * * As Articles of Confederation were considered, this issue confronted the Continental Congress: Some colonies had included western public lands in their definition of statehood. Until they gave up their claims to western lands, to the Confederate United States, the Articles of Confederation would not or could not be ratified.125 A substantial quintessence of democratic-sovereignty in America rests on the continual processes, motivation and support of a generalized transcendence into ethical-based knowledge -- what might be more particularly considered as the common political value predicate that is required to realize "democratic-leveling." Apart from the ideal of an unfettered education of everyone, which, for natural reasons of life’s transiency, has not been and can never be fully achieved, the substantial quintessence of sovereignty in America, as in all societies, is founded in the inculcated customs, traditions, applications and interpretations of law, and economic standards (now all are nomos jaded) which have or will become the official dictums to represent the American Sovereign Will. At any historical moment, our American Sovereignty has more aptly been about practical sovereignty: based on inevitable material influences as accumulations of propertied treasure. Alexander Hamilton’s prescriptions contemplated the practical sovereignty of the nation. And he was selfless in serving these values. While knowledge (available to all) remains the prevailing liberal value objective of

184

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

society, Hamilton’s practical sovereignty also serves to bless society materially. But this value objective has many barnacles. It is eroded by many growing fronts of organized nomos-based mechanist corruptions. American physis-based sovereignty also presents many paradoxes for society to wrestle with. Although the traditional sophistry of wealth, position and power (nomos) is effectively confronted by the reason-based constitutional physis of the Bill of Rights, in the trenches’ politics casts the unique and fragile American physis as opposing a mature, and growing in power nomos. What physis opposes, however, is dogmatic irrationality of nomos-based excesses? Only in physis are principles that fulfill teleology found. James Madison explained the prevailing political philosophy. The American paradoxical dilemma and the American advantage as well are implicit in Madison’s explanation:126

It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices [checks and balances] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. What they sought was a balance that Madison called "mixed government" and "free government," a compromise between monarchy and democracy as they knew them. The American government’s democracy depends on partitioned organic authority, as consented by human constituents’ cardinal sovereignty-based

Truth’s predicate values War

185

suffrage, which cardinal aspect, like that of a number, has a given name, which identifies it uniquely. This individual human cardinal sovereignty transcends the consent given to actualize government’s organic ordinally quantified sovereignty. Constitutionally protected free speech and assembly also are a constitutional democratic aspect of individual cardinal sovereignty, however, the constitutional right to free speech and assembly has also been afforded to business entities. James Madison’s American ‘monarch’ is the Constitution, as amended to include the Bill of Rights in which free ‘speech’ and ‘assembly’ are protected from government’s ordinal sovereignty-based laws and power, yet these rights often are authoritatively misrepresented, tyrannized, and fraudulently indicted by political opposition, whose values and interests were legally made equal and were also been given constitutionally protected rights. Those selected to design the American form of government, by combining monarchy with democracy, never thought it was or would be a panacea. As all things of value must inevitably and naturally involve effort, and struggle, and confusion of definition, as regards natural cardinality, they believed correctly, that effort and struggle would be constantly required for ‘good’ government to exist: The importance of the Constitution with its Bill of Rights must be broadly comprehended; elected officials must adopt its predicated ‘good’ purposes as specified in oaths of office, i.e., replace their own predicate values; and ‘we the people’ must take seriously the democratic responsibilities of suffrage: we must reasonably exercise our individual cardinal sovereignty, and to resolve the legal dilemma posed by constitutional rights, as licensed to business organic entities, must withstand the adverse political influence of monarchical value’s influence. About Truth’s predicate values’ war The nomos-based ‘philodoxy’ (as Kant had referred to as dogmatic theory in The Critique), called materialism, masquerades as purely reasoned philosophy when, in fact, it is intrinsic of conventional absolutely believed dogma. Materialism, as defined, dogmatically assumes, as ‘is true,’ that human thought and viscera are both of the same ‘substances’ (matter).127

MATERIALISM is a philosophy based on the ideas that matter is the

186

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

only thing in the universe that has reality. . . . Predicate values of Materialism with its corollary Mechanism’s, are conceptually nomos-based theories that appear evidently as ‘is true,’ except they represent values that contrast starkly with human values on the spiritual side of democracy’s physis-based predicate that philosophically are temporally coequal but antecedent (and transcendent) of matter. Fallaciously, for instance, materialism’s dogmatically believed ‘positive’ predicate conceptually annihilates the eternal predicate of metaphysical democratic essence, as they also annihilate conceptually the seminal predicate of God. The value predicates of democracy embrace principle values of natural ‘necessity’ (both in terms of essence and substance), whereas materialism’s predicate values are dogmatically limited to being ‘positive,’ which irrationalism 128 is ‘contingent’ on belief, which dogmatically is made intrinsic of the believed absolute reality. Dogmatic materialist rationalization, as belief the earth is flat, for instance, saturates the human heritage (customs, hierarchies, and mechanisms of oligarchical-based ‘conservatism’) that sustains Brahmanist determinations of belief to resist deliberately reasoned ethical utilities as Roger William’s ‘social usage’ (which is the basis of mutual insurance in America). This observation indicts materialist rationalization, which denies to society the crucially necessary essence (physis-based principles) in official authoritative applications: interpreting, and managing government by ‘positive’ laws. * * George Will, on ABC’s This Week program, May 21, 1995, said that the federal budget proposal of Congress was based on ideas rather than desires. Will’s comment puts the physis-nomos contest into a practical correlative perspective: Ideas are noetic (thought rather than substance), while desires are viscerally emotion linked to the human body, which surely is of substance. Therefore, if Will’s observation of ideas represents physis, then we might be delighted or worried that the Republican dominated Congress has transgressed onto the rational fields of pure liberalism. However, the real test of Will’s observation is whether or not the value predicates of ideas are based on predicate values of natural ‘necessity.’ Instead, I expect Will observed the ‘contingent predicate values’ of pseudo liberalism found in

Truth’s predicate values War

187

Whiggish traditions: the Whiggish forms of progressive dynamism, inferring still that these ideas deduced of mechanism, are contingently deduced from materialism’s dogmatic predicate values. The presence of physis in the philosophy, culture and politics of society -- that is necessary to effectively confront and balance the dictums of the nomos-jaded American ‘practical materialist sovereign will’ -- is critically affected by pervasive ‘contingent dogmatic viruses,’ of proliferating materialist rationalization. This Predicate Values’ War is politically won or lost by the manner of mind inculcating and conditioning. And, it is not new, as the following definition attests:129

Like Western philosophy in general, philosophy of law in particular first emerged in ancient Greece. In the 5th century BC the Sophists and Socrates, along with his followers, took up the question of the nature of law. Both recognized a distinction between things that exist by nature (physis) and those that exist by human-made convention (nomos). The Sophists tended to place law in the latter category, whereas Socrates put it in the former, as did Plato and Aristotle. The Sophists materialist rationalization ignored the pure essence of deliberate critical reasoning as represented in the accounts and works of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. And, legal positivism is dogmatically, ‘contingently’ found on the sophist line of property-based causal mechanism:130

legal positivism, intending to oppose natural law theory, denies any ‘necessary connection between law and morality’. Central theses among a loose cluster:(1) law is definable and explainable without evaluative predicates or presuppositions; (2) the law (e.g. of England now) is identifiable from exclusively factual sources (e.g. legislation, judicial precedents). Some versions deny that there is knowable moral truth. Most understand positive law as products of will, some as imperatives. John Finnis Mechanists’ dogma-based predicate values of conservatives’, are

188

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

clearly on the Sophists’ line, i.e., exist by human-made convention (nomos), and are propertied predicate values of causal mechanism,

everything that exists now is the result of factors and conditions that existed before. [What rational proof has ever confirmed that what exists now, existed before?] Clearly, the inculcated acceptance of mechanisms’ nomos-based dogmatic causal theory, which was the values base of the Colonial oligarchic order, served the propertied interests of American mechanist conservatives.’ Still, and surprisingly, in the light of the physis-based American desiderata uniqueness (inalienable rights, as individual liberty and freedom, as constitutionally protected by the Bill of Rights, had no nomos-based theoretical organic precedent), deliberate-critically-reasoned ethical organic utilities also were substantial concerns in the Convention’s deliberation of American sovereignty. * * Benjamin Franklin’s ‘Mutual Insurance’ had become an American organic reality long before he served as the senior member of the Constitutional Convention. Franklin was maybe the first Convention leader to avow American democracy, as had been influenced by Roger Williams’ reasoned concept of organic-based ‘social usage.’ Also, Franklin was intimately aware of French Enlightenment. U.S. constitutional sovereignty, i.e., consented-individual-sovereignty, which naturally is the cardinal antecedent of constitutional organic sovereignty, is therefore quite amazingly based in uniquely American physis. This unique American philosophical consideration of organic essence expands greatly the cardinal importance of physis, as reasonably applicable to the American constitutional dichotomy of physis and nomos, which James Madison called

a compromise between monarchy and democracy as they knew them, routinely the conservative materialism-based organic values mechanistically officially continued to exacerbate social economic paradoxes:131

Except in its scientific and dialectical forms, ‘materialism’ has not attracted as widespread popularity among philosophers as it has among scientists and laymen. [Steuart’s Statesman was a materialist]

Truth’s predicate values War

189

Parrington tells how Brahmanist framers of the Constitution, acted as ‘Steuart’s Statesman ’ when they chose mechanist materialist values and assumed democratic values needed no constitutional accommodation. 132

Steuart’s statesman prefers self-centered constituents because he thinks he knows how they’ll behave in any situation. In the same way, economists assume they know what greedy economic man will do. We are all too prone to forget the wide popular disfavor with which they received the new constitution. No sooner did the second debate [about ratification] open than the majority opinion [Rather than the propertied notions of the Brahmanist framers] evidently held quite a different conception of sovereignty of the people than was expressed by the convention. It had no desire to tie its own hands; it did not take kindly to the proposal to transfer power from the several states to the Federal government. [Clearly, this reluctance was expressed by sovereign constituents and not sovereign States, which existed before the Constitution, as Jurist Kennedy had expressed in his majority Court’s Opinion above.] From this historical fact, Brahmanists should have concluded -- contemporary Federalists (as Jurist Kennedy) seem not to have recognized this fact-- that physis-based public-cardinally sovereign values must not be underestimated. Although Machiavelli, Hobbes, John Adams, Hamilton, et al, dogmatic Brahmanists all, assumed that the public was innately unqualified, at critical times, the cardinally sovereign public has wisely exercised ethical solidarity -- which exercise always invigorates the only ‘is true’ national sovereignty -as ‘The People’ did when they ratified the Constitution only when the Brahmanists promised to provide physis-based Amendments. In this, dogmatic belief, the deliberate-critical-reasoned discipline of philosophy stands distinctively alone, recognizing that enlightenment of deliberately reasoned thoughts -- totally distinct from matter and that which existed or happened before -- is the most distinguishing factor in the progressive existence of man. Without the enlightenment of truths founded in the deliberate-critical-reasoning of ethics and morality, if existing at all,

190

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

life would still be stuck in the Dark Ages. Liberal minds, in the purest sense of liberal, are those which have broken with nomos to gain syllogistic enlightenment by the physis-based values of their deliberate-critical-reason. In this pure sense, liberal is ‘outwardturned,’ therefore, objective in nature, while conservative is ‘inward-turned’ and subjective in nature (as Goethe had observed). The Stoic legal philosopher Cicero put forward the first full-blown theory of natural law, in Commonwealth, in 51 BC:133

True law is right reason in accord with nature; it is of universal application, unchanged and everlasting . . . [The Federalist Jurists, on the U. S. Supreme Court, deny Cicero’s natural law] The ‘Leveling’ of sovereignty, deemed an essential for democracy to exist, has been tried at various times and places and always was confronted by established Brahmanist nobility with mechanist situations of position, power, and control at stake. Political struggles, subtlety embroiled in exercises of ‘practical’ sovereignty (materialist in nature), apparently are constants in all democracies where an organic, traditional, conservative (often oligarchical) and intransigent Brahmin aristocracy has proved its powerful and capable command prowess: albeit nomos rationalized, as always maintained irrationally by inculcated belief-based dogmatized sophistries. The great American experiment with democracy has demonstrated the political American paradox in which the political extremes struggle for organic control of government and its official mechanistic economic Leviathan, the unitary materialist determinism of which delivers property-based paternalism to the privatized business entities that legally, with impunity, the Supreme Court gave the equal of human rights specified in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Still, the political struggle has become analogous to a never-ending neck-toneck horse-race. Many call this political paradox ‘gridlock.’ Parrington described it as it had existed more than a century ago: 134

In its reaction to industrialism America had reached the point Chartist England had reached in the eighteen-forties and Marxian Germany in the eighteen seventies. That was before a mechanistic science had laid

Truth’s predicate values War

191

its heavy discouragements on the drafters of economic determinism, liberalism still clung to its older democratic teleology, convinced that somehow economic determinism would turn out to be a fairy godmother to the proletariat and that from the imperious drift of industrial expansion must eventually issue social justice. Armed with this faith liberalism threw itself into the work of cleaning the Augean stables, and its reward came in the achievements of President Wilson’s first administration. Then the war intervened and the green fields shriveled in an afternoon. With the cynicism that came with postwar days the democratic liberalism of 1917 was thrown away like an empty whiskeyflask. Clever young men began to make merry over democracy. It was preposterous, they said, to concern oneself about social justice; nobody wants social justice. . . . Out of the muck of war had come a great discovery – so it was reported – the discovery that psychology as well as economics has its word to say on politics. But, this irrationally determined political nomos must eventually concede to the naturally antecedent principles of physis. Why? Because, given life’s existence, nature’s principles, of God’s LOGOS are of eternal physis, while materialities, by their temporal nature, have a natural limited existence: natural principles, when ignored, or denied have natural consequences, cannot be transgressed and sustained. The common irrationalism is becoming more recognized as inconvenient truth. These thoughts were expressed in conjunction with Al Gore’s movie, “An Inconvenient Truth”:

192

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

And he advocated a natural law of right reason to support his call for ‘leveling’ the Roman sovereignty. Cicero's eloquent advocacy -- as based in physis alone -- was made possible by the unusually enlightened democratic society which existed before the Roman Empire. But democracy’s predicate values threatened those of the oligarchical authority and power. And when Cicero refused to join the Triumvirate of Julius Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, he was banished from Rome. His outspoken physis reasoned advocacy eventually incited his death warrant. Of Cicero's perception of natural law, C. Thomas wrote this:

Cicero encapsulates the whole theory of natural law when he says: "There is in fact a true law -- namely, right reason -- which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal . . . The man who will not obey it will abandon his better self, and, in denying the true nature of a man, will suffer the severest of penalties, though he has escaped all the consequences which men call punishments.” BK III John Locke's ethical reasoning clearly built upon Cicero. But Locke critically reasoned not to draw upon the irrationally controverted theories of natural law to support his advocacy. In doing this, Locke sidestepped the sophistries of dogma-based assumptions of authority and rank, i.e., the inculcation of superiority-inferiority relationships among members of society. Letting natural laws to remain uncontested, Locke, in deliberate-criticalreasoning alone, defined the substantial quintessence of individual (i.e., ‘leveled’) sovereignty for a democratic society and on the basis of this clear physis-based philosophy, American democratic-sovereignty was adopted to underpin the U.S. Constitution. However, apart from The Bill of Rights, this democratic sovereignty can be thought of only as a strategic value (of individual human predicate values only). Actualizing democratic sovereignty by suffrage was left to the people. Craig Thomas commented:135

Locke deliberately employs the idea of the 'state of Nature' rather than the 'law of Nature.' He insists not upon uncovering any 'laws' of nature (i.e., human nature) but rather upon the capacity of human 'reason' to

Truth’s predicate values War

193

promulgate a code of civil law that is the 'constitution' of a just political society. . . . Human reason alone was 'universal' among human beings, and by its application would men be able to develop a concept of equivalence linked to necessary justice . . . The 'State of Nature' is that which is governed by a 'natural' law or 'right Rule of Reason' (i.e., the admission of the equivalence of others). Locke [while] not out to prove the existence of any law of nature . . . '[Locke] assert[s natural law] in the contemporary,' to radically 'claim' that it is true by the admission of any individual that his or her requirements of liberty and freedom must be admitted to others, 'unless' the form of political society under which they live is unjust. C. Thomas then commented on Locke’s reasoning:136

The right to property is defined as an essential or basic right for the purpose of defining the sovereignty of the individual and the necessity to guarantee his rights and property 'against' others, 'not' so as to allow him to acquire, to control, to achieve domination through landed property. --Every Man has a 'Property' in his own 'Person.' --Men living together 'according to reason' are properly in the 'State of Nature.' --No individual has a right or power over the life of another.. --Force without Right, upon a man's person, makes a State of War. . . . --It is a 'right,' a possession of each individual which must be protected together with his other freedoms, protected from others who are in a 'State of War' against the individual . . . --He that in the State of Nature, 'would take away the Freedom,' that belongs to anyone in that State, must necessarily be supposed to

194

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

have a design to take away everything else, that 'Freedom' being the foundation of all the rest. . . . Lockes’ warning deserves repeating, and with emphasis:

He that . . . 'would take away the Freedom,' that belongs to anyone . . . must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else, that 'Freedom' being the foundation of all the rest. But again, clear reasoning of democratic sovereignty, as represented by Locke and many before and after him, must contend with sophistries of mechanist ‘conservative’ oligarchical orthodoxy. More concisely, such clear reasoning must withstand the onslaughts of the unitary materialist inclined values in ‘conservative’ minds as represented in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and in acts of American Whigs, which without legislation signed into law, immediately following Lincoln’s assassination, became institutionalized. Whiggish (GOP) politics, as entrenched religious doctrine, which is recognizable in contemporary wars, is based in dogmatic fundamentalism: in mechanized concupiscent biased competitive orthodoxy of the sort -- mine is better or more important than yours -- of contemporary ‘divine right’based inculcation in religion and of business and sports’ doctrine. Hobbes provided an empirical foundation to sophistry, which undermined John Locke's reasoning of ethical based individual sovereignty. The following quotation from the Grolier Electronic Encyclopedia confirms this as fact:137

In marked contrast to natural-law jurists, legal positivists such as Thomas Hobbes argued that the essence of law is the command or will of the sovereign [monarch] and that an "unjust law" is a contradiction in terms because the existing law is itself the standard of justice. Jean Bodin had anticipated Hobbes in the former respect when he claimed that "law is nothing else than the command of the sovereign in his exercise of sovereign power." Bodin had added, however, that the prince "has no power to exceed the law of nature," and he expected natural law to be found in constitutional constraints. Thus, Bodin had not broken unequivocally from the natural-law tradition. John Locke's criticism of Hobbesian theory set the stage for modern

Truth’s predicate values War

195

theories of Civil Disobedience and for independent government in the American colonies. Clearly, democratic nations must clearly understand that democratic philosophy is naturally rebellious of monarchical divine right-based rule and sovereignty. Locke's concept of naturally endowed individual sovereignty, which he defined as each individual’s “property of person,” is the antecedent core of Locke’s argument to rebel: Unless each person’s essential “natural property” is defined as Locke had reasoned, democracy fails to exist:138

The right to property is defined as an essential or basic right for the purpose of defining the sovereignty of the individual and the necessity to guarantee his rights and property 'against' others, 'not' so as to allow him to acquire, to control, to achieve domination through landed property. This definition in a democratic nation is of highest official priority and purpose, and requires that a strategy to ensure and insure each individual's sovereign rights is explicit and carefully maintained. Anything short of this, will fail to protect democracy’s philosophical spiritual properties of each person, which rational empiricism defines:139

‘Rational Empiricism,’ the philosophic basis of democracy, believes that the world is both material and spiritual. It holds that change and progress occur by applying reason to experience, and human nature can be changed and improved by experience. On the basis of these principles, democracy stresses discussion and the use of reason as a way of arriving at conclusions. It emphasizes the importance of tolerance and freedom in developing intelligent, loyal citizens. [When the spiritual aspect of democracy is conflated by belief in unitary materialism forms, which abridges the guarantee of his rights and property by allowing others to acquire, control, and achieve domination through landed property (the material aspect of this definition), effectively conflates the spiritual aspect. Democracy then fails to exist; fascism or communism is then an outgrowth of conflating the human spirit.] Locke’s reasoning did not, in any way or manner allow democratic authority

196

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

to license individuals (including legal ‘fictitious corporate individuals’), factions or state governments (whose organic sovereignty is derived from the consent of subject individuals’ cardinal sovereign “property of person”) to compromise humans’ individual sovereignty exploitations of landed property. And while each individual’s 'Property of Person’ is subject to no other -- in the sense of natural responsibility (which is a Categorical Imperative) to respect each other as an equal -- each individual is concurrently and naturally responsible for respecting each other person’s sovereignty, i.e., to respect, as if their own, each other individual’s property of person. Whigs, however, subscribed Locke’s philosophy only to the extent of applying it to their Brahmanist caste, then, with subhuman rationalization, blamed (left out) wage-earners from the caste because they were not Brahmans: Calhoun had rationalized the American democracy to included slavery, because it had existed in Greek culture, for instance. The American pseudo democratic physis-based strategy (i.e., reasoned predicate values, which necessarily is the value-based cannon of consented cardinal sovereignty, which empowers and acts to guide government’s fiducial conduct) was added to the Constitution as The Bill of Rights, only because the cardinal sovereigns would otherwise not ratify the Constitution. And if ‘we’ -- contemporary society -- fail to actualize our individual sovereign rights as The Bill of Rights intends, organic failure most likely is causally linked to society’s failure to maintain processes, motivation and support to ethical-based education -- what I interpret as the essential official processes of inculcating democratic-leveling as Locke strategically had provided for: reasoned predicates necessarily acting as the cannon of collective organic cardinal sovereignty and government’s conduct to fiducial results, as the human rights Amendments to the Constitution intended. Craig Thomas provided the following explanation of our perpetual political struggle, the one side of which not only allows but inculcates fundamentally antagonistic doctrine: antagonism which is based on the oligarchical mechanist rationalization of causality, which infers this:140 only our souls [are] equal.

What, finally, is being insisted upon by the Levelers is the continuing

Truth’s predicate values War

197

and untransferable sovereignty of the people, the necessitous protection of individual rights and liberties, the requirement that political society be founded upon consent and "justly" and equally so, and the significance of suffrage to undermine entrenched and especially landed interests. [John] Wildman's may therefore be the final word from them when he remarks that "a just subjection ought to be founded upon an assent of the people to their governors' power . . . how governors shall derive a just power from the people but by an assent of the people, I understand not." They are the inheritors, whether entirely consciously in all cases, of the tradition of natural law theory, together with (most importantly in the instance of those who may so easily be characterized as radical only in religion, and religious in all their opinions of the sublunary sphere of government) humanism's divorce of the secular from the theological -- the rescue of natural law theory from its theological constraints, which allowed the perpetration of feudalism, of hierarchy and enslavement on the one hand and the aggrandizement of property on the other simply because "Only our souls were equal." the "subsequent" Whig oligarchy Maybe John Locke, because of his intellectual association with Anthony Ashley Cooper, the first Earl of Shaftesbury, has been falsely represented as the voice of the "subsequent" Whig oligarchy. Shaftesbury, having been a member of the renowned "Cabal" under Charles, was at the nucleus if not himself the essential nucleus of England's Whig party. Craig Thomas wrote this:141

Shaftesbury may be regarded as many things -- direst of radicals, the creator of the party system by his unification of 'Whig' factions, someone who gladly enrolled into the peerage, undemocratic, bitter, arrogant, spontaneous, and idealistic -- but not, in the general catalog of political theory, as a radical who may have inspired Locke . . .

198

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

The Whig party indeed engaged politics of sophistry, even intrigued, to arrest oligarchical sovereignty from the Crown and this appeared as being akin to liberalism but as Thomas wrote:

Whiggish -- in the first half century succeeding the [English] Revolution, meant the ally and even propagandist of certain landed interests intent upon the exclusive control of power. In this, Whigs did not intend to achieve individual cardinal democratic sovereignty. Instead the Whiggish oligarchy, by perpetuating the dogma of a ‘divine right,’ to apply fundamentally to their arrested sovereignty, intended to assume the potentate sovereignty of the King, and surely did not intend that this sovereignty is shared democratically. Whigs’ intent is monarchical sans a monarch. Add Parrington’s account of this Whig intent:142

Massachusetts . . . property interests were as secure as any old Federalist could have wished. Gentlemen of principle and property were still in control of the state; and if less emphasis was laid on principle [physis] and more on property [nomos] -- if less regard seemed to be paid to gentlemen of breeding and manners, and more to assertive self-seeking -- business was no less secure than in the good old days, and its profits were greater. And so, master of the looms and a growing home market, New England industrialism regarded genially the great western movement, fostered by a benevolent paternalism, confident of extending its markets with every mile of westward expansion. To encourage the development of the West and South by a Federal policy of internal improvement became, therefore, common business foresight, provided of course that the Constitution should follow population and safeguard business interests against local agrarianism and the menace of particularism. By the year 1830 both dangers lay black against the political horizon. The triumph of Jackson had enthroned the agrarian menace at Washington and produced such a scrambling of frightened interests -- such a rattling among the old bones of Federalism and scurrying

Truth’s predicate values War

199

among the young limbs of industrialism -- as the country had not seen for many a year. Henry Clay appealed to his followers in the West, and Webster marshaled his adherents of the East, and from the coalescing of these incongruous elements emerged the Whig party to do battle with Old Hickory . . . In the hour of peril, principles go by the board. The Whig party was the lineal heir of the old Federalism, but it denied its philosophical patrimony. It substituted expediency for the old economic realism, and began and ended intellectually bankrupt. Its bitter and unseemly squabbles over the Bank and tariff, its platitudes of patriotism and it pose of disinterestedness, the venom of its personal attack upon Jackson, were the earmarks of shallow opportunism that failed to make use of such victories as fell to its lot, for the simple reason that it could never agree on what to do. Such cohesive power as held together -- aside from petty antagonism to Jackson -- was the vague assumption that the well-being of the American people was dependent on governmental patronage; the belief that each economic group and section must receive its special favor, and that through tariffs and bonuses and internal improvements the country as a whole must prosper. Of this principle of special favors -- a return to the seventeenth century from which eighteenth century liberalism was a reaction -- the American System of Henry Clay was the chief expression, and it remains the most significant bequest of the Whig party to our political history. The following comments intend to provide context to some of Parrington phrases: -- the menace of particularism * * Colonial Political Economy was essentially agrarian-based. ‘Particularism’ referred to each state of the federation keeping its own prior laws and promoting its own interests (what I believe Justice Anthony M. Kennedy referred to, as ‘the fundamental aspect of the sovereignty that the states enjoyed before the Constitution’s ratification). Justice Kennedy’s

200

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

majority opinion, however, failed to recall the factional meanings of organic sovereignty, which existed in America before the Constitution was ratified. But ‘particularism’ also depicts the official attention given to a particular political agenda. It refers to the political mechanist ‘particularism’ sponsored by Henry Clay, which founded the Whiggish ‘American Plan’: Then to the ‘liberal’ agrarian political opposition, i.e., to the common political reaction to mechanist economic effects of the ‘American Plan’ which produced a common political ‘social usage’ backlash that eventually achieved to establish Social Security, Medicare and eventually promises to produce Universal Health Care. In a very real sense of cardinal democraticsovereignty, these social usage-based insurance programs, of the U.S. constitutional government, are, in fact, necessary reactive byproducts of the federal government’s ‘social mechanism’-based paternalism that Brahmanist Whigs had instituted, when, without legislation enacted as law, they administratively officially installed the American System of Political Economy as benevolently paternalism to antecedently foster private exploitative interests of materialist affluence at an expense to the non affluent mass of wage-earning Americans. Social usage-based insurance programs of the Federal government are necessary to restore economic beneficence equity to wage-earners in offset to the t paternalism mechanistically provided by the American Political Economy to owners of exploitative private enterprises. Parrington identified this dogma: Whig Brahmanists had inculcated belief, as orthodox truism, that ‘internal improvement’ paternalism to each economic faction must receive its special favor from Federal government, and that through tariffs, bonuses and internal improvements, all U.S. citizens, must thereby prosper. ** 143 [All citizens have prospered by this truism, however, the mechanist delivered paternalism is mathematically exponential in nature and over many years has become onerous and must be redressed by social usage -based insurance. ** Block Grants to States proposed by the 1995 Congress, to revise Crime Legislation, are akin to the Whigs’ paternalism installed by the American

Truth’s predicate values War

201

System of Political Economy. Shouldn’t our avowed Brahmanist mechanist ‘conservative’ sponsors of this legislation be proud to wear the proper name given to their ‘true’ values political allegiance, which is not an allegiance to the equitable values of democracy? : And should they not prefer to wear their American Whig value’s moniker, surely ‘progressive liberal’, as the English preferred, depicts more accurately their material value’s dogmatic ‘progressivism’, i.e., nomos, rather than physis (Was it not President Theodore Roosevelt that more truthfully claimed that he was a ‘progressive’). Radically progressive Whigs in both England and America indeed paraded mechanist conservatism while masquerading as liberals , as early English Whigs preferred to call themselves. But the Whiggish purpose was and remains to be that of certain landed interests [property and treasure interests, which are concupiscent in nature, as St. John’s First Epistle clearly defined], and it remains today with full intent to realize exclusive control of power [centralized organic sovereignty] and by this to emphasize the selfish concupiscent Whiggish predicate values that mostly are diabolical to physisbased predicate values, which sponsored constitutional equality to ‘all,’ as ‘The Bill of Rights,’ ‘Social Security,’ and ‘Medicare’ intend. And in being diabolical to democratic strategy, the nomos-based strategic purposes of American Whigs lack probity and honor -- particularly in matters of democratic-sovereign-equality -- that is essential to foster ‘liberal’ democratic spiritual values and objectives. Proportionally to extremes, Whigs endanger democracy. And because the contemporary rampant Whig form, which Leon Trotsky labeled dollar morality, has pervaded all sides of American politics, the scenario which Locke himself posed remains as the substantial concern for those interested to preserve the U.S. constitutional foundations of democratic sovereignty. Any redressing of this concern, by means of suffrage, is the real and difficult problem, however. William Greider’s title, which he selected for his recent book, appropriately defines the looming problem -- Who will tell the people? Again, Locke posed the essential sovereign scenario:144

The right to property is defined as an essential or basic right for the

202

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

purpose of defining the sovereignty of the individual and the necessity to guarantee his rights and property 'against' others, 'not' so as to allow him to acquire, to control, to achieve domination through landed property. . . It is a 'right,' a possession of each individual which must be protected together with his other freedoms, protected from others who are in a 'State of War' against the individual . . . He that in the State of Nature, 'would take away the Freedom,' that belongs to anyone in that State, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else, that 'Freedom' being the foundation of all the rest. . . . Classifying human predicate values -Values of ‘Divine right’ distinguish King James I. -Values of ‘Father of the Constitution,’ and the Bill of Rights author distinguishes James Madison. Madison mediated the divide between Hamilton and Jefferson’s extremes. Back when most put state’s rights ahead of national interests. Hamilton’s propertied values favored national government. Madison’s main interest, as Jefferson’s, was to strengthen justice-based beneficence. Madison, however, tended to soften Jefferson’s ideals. 145

Truth’s predicate values War

203

conducted logically to the leviathan state, highly centralized, coercive, efficient.). About Madison’s favor of Jefferson, Parrington recorded this: 146

Soon after the formation of the new government, Hamilton had provided himself with a newspaper, “The United States Gazette,” that was an effective advocate of all Hamiltonian policies. The editor, John Fenno, seems to have been a vigorous fellow, into whose hands Hamilton threw much of the public printing, and whose debts he paid when they became pressing [from funds of the Federal Treasury?]. Alarmed at the influence wielded by the newspaper, Jefferson and Madison approached [Philip] Freneau, who had been contemplating a new venture, with the suggestion that he set up a rival democratic paper. To encourage him Jefferson gave Freneau a small post as translator in the State Department, worth $250 a year. The “National Gazette” was thereupon established, and for two years a war between the hostile papers went on fiercely. If the “United States Gazette” lauded the virtues of the English government, extolled the wisdom of Hamilton and abhorred all Jacobins, the “National Gazette” retorted in kind, attacking the Secretary of the Treasury and applauding the growing Jacobite spirit that struck at every form of Aristocracy. It became the common clearing house for democratic propaganda, and Freneau’s influence spread so widely that he may justly be regarded as “the leading editor in America” during those critical years. . . . Probably more largely than any other writer, Freneau awakened a popular distrust of Federalist men and measures, which a few years later was to break the party. [Federalism rooted and remained active.] James Madison had taken leave from politics when in 1798 Congress passed four Alien and Sedition Acts. The chief purpose behind these acts was the desire of Federalists to defeat Jefferson’s run for the presidency. Jefferson had won the support of many foreign writers and speakers who then resided in the U.S. Ten men were arrested for violating the Sedition Act.

204

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Jefferson with Madison drew up the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions in reply to these laws, declaring them unconstitutional. ‘Conservative,’ Federalists’ prescriptive oligarchical values are forensically inferred in several Supreme Court decisions? In fact, the Federalist persuaded Jurists had, therefore, with impunity, deliberately celebrated their personal oligarchical political values, in supplantation to the essential constitutional values specified in the Bill of Rights, thereby issuing antithetical judgements that should have been based on the Constitution’s cannon of unalienable cardinal essential values, as specified in the Bill of Rights? : These ‘Conservative’ Jurists subscribed Hamilton’s Federalist political agenda? : about this, Parrington wrote this: 147 [Hamilton’s] notorious comment -- which the American democrat has

never forgiven him, “the people! -- the people is a great beast! -- was charactoristically frank. . . . He was at pains, therefore, as a practical statesman, to dress his views in a garb more seemly to plebeian prejudices, and like earlier Tories he paraded an ethical justification for his Toryism. The current Federalist dogma of the divine right of justice -- ‘vox justiciae vox dei’ -- was at hand to serve his purpose and he made free use of it. . . . He was frankly a monarchist, and he urged the [fallacious] monarchical principle with Hobbesian logic. “The principle chiefly intended to be established is this -- that there must be a permanent ‘will.” “There ought to be a principle in government capable of resisting the popular current.” [In ‘Works, Vol. II, p 415] The only effective way of keeping democratic factionalism within bounds, Hamilton was convinced, lay in the erection of a powerful chief magistrate, who “ought to be hereditary, and have so much power. “ He devoted himself to the business of providing all possible checks upon the power of the democracy.” For instance, a political cabal of Federalist Conservatives, holding elected and appointed government positions, achieved to have Ken Starr appointed as the

Truth’s predicate values War

205

special prosecutor to present evidence to Congress for to impeach President Clinton. This special prosecution, which, cost $50 million unbudgeted dollars, and failed to remove President Clinton from office. The ‘conservative’ majority values in Congress along with the Supreme Court’s Federalist jurists’ values, had strengthened states’ rights thereby to weaken President Clinton’s national policies. Added to this conservative thrust, President Clinton’s policy to ecologically protect natural Forests from ‘free cutting’ by private economic exploitations, was immediately reversed by President G. W. Bush’s policy, which authorized exploitative mature forest cutting in national parks. Predicate Values are critically important President G. W. Bush appointed Justices to replace retiring justices: the values issue is more crucially important? Parrington’s commented: 148

206

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

democratic spirit that had got out of hand during the Revolution [as expressed and adopted in the Declaration of Independence], and that the much-praised system of checks and balances was designed and intended for no other end than a check on the [agrarian] political power of the majority -- a power acutely feared by the property consciousness of the times. It was a startling discovery that profoundly stirred the liberal mind of the early years of the century; yet the really surprising thing is that it should have come as a surprise. It is not easy to understand today why since Civil War days intelligent Americans should so strangely have confused the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and have come to accept them as complementary statements of the democratic purpose of America. Their unlikeness is unmistakable: the one a classical statement of French humanitarian democracy, the other an organic law designed to safeguard the minority under republican rule. . . . When the fierce slavery struggle fell into the past, whatever honest realism had risen from the passions of the times was buried with the dead issue. The militant attacks on the Constitution, so common in Abolitionist circles after 1835, and the criticism of the Declaration that was a part of the Southern argument, were both forgotten, and with the Union reestablished by force of arms, the idealistic cult of the fundamental law entered upon a second youth. In the blowsy Gilded Age the old myths walked the land again, wrapped in battle-torn flags and appealing to the blood shed on southern battlefields. It was not till the advent of a generation unblinded by the passions of civil war that the Constitution again was examined critically, and the earlier charge of the Abolitionists that it was designed to serve property rather than men, was heard once more. But this time with far more weight of evidence behind it. As the historians dug amongst the contemporary records they came upon

Truthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s predicate values War

207

a mass of fact the Abolitionists had been aware of. The evidence was written so plainly, in such explicit and incontrovertible words -- not only in Elliottâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Debates, but in the minutes of the several State[s] and pamphlets and polite literature -- that it seemed incredible that honest men could have erred so greatly in confusing the Constitution with the Declaration. With the clarification of its philosophy the inflowing waters of liberalism reached flood-tide; the movement would either recede or pass over into radicalism. On the whole it followed the later course, and the years immediately preceding 1917 were years when American intellectuals were immersing themselves in European collectivistic philosophies -- in Marxianism, Fabianism, Syndicalism, Guild Socialism. New leaders were rising, philosophical analysts like Thorstein Veblen who were mordant critics of American economics. The influence of socialism was fast sweeping away the last shreds of political and social romanticism that so long had confused American thinking. The doctrine of economic determinism was spreading widely, and in the light of that doctrine the deep significance of the industrial revolution was revealing itself for the first time to thoughtful Americans. In its reaction to industrialism America had reached the point Chartist England had reached in the eighteenforties and Marxian Germany in the eighteen-seventies. That was before a mechanistic science had laid its heavy discouragements on the drafters of democratic programs. Accepting the principle of economic determinism, liberalism still clung to its older democratic teleology, convinced that somehow economic determinism would turn out to be a fairy godmother to the proletariat and that from the imperious drift of industrial expansion must eventually issue social justice. Armed with this faith liberalism threw itself into the work of cleaning the Augean stables, and its reward came in the achievements

208

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

of President Wilsonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s first administration. Then the war intervened and the green fields shriveled in an afternoon. With the cynicism that came with post-war days the democratic liberalism of 1917 was thrown away like an empty whiskyflask. Clever young men began to make merry over democracy. It was preposterous, they said, to concern oneself about social justice; nobody wants social justice. The first want of every man, as John Adams remarked a hundred years ago, is his dinner, and the second his girl. Out of the muck of the war had come a great discovery -- as it was reported -- the discovery that psychology as well as economics has its word to say on politics. From the army intelligence tests the moron emerged as a singular commentary on our American democracy, and with the discovery of the moron the democratic principle was in for a slashing attack. Almost overnight an army of enemies was marshaled against it. The euginist with his isolated germ theory flouted the perfectional psychology of John Locke, with its emphasis on environment as the determining factor in social evolution -- a psychology on which the whole idealistic interpretation was founded; the beardless philosopher discovered Nietzsche and in his pages found the fit master of the moron -- the biological aristocrat who is the flower that every civilization struggles to produce; the satirist discovered the flatulent reality that is middle-class America and was eager to thrust his jibes at the complacent denizens of the Valley of democracy. Only the behaviorist, with his insistence on the plasticity of the new-born child, offers some shreds of comfort to the democrat; but he quickly takes them away again with his simplification of conduct to imperious drives that stamp men as primitive animals. If the mass -the raw materials of democracy -- never rises much above sex appeals and belly needs, surely it is poor stuff to try to work up into an excellent civilization, and the dreams of the social idealist who

Truth’s predicate values War

209

forecasts a glorious democratic future are about as substantial as moonshine. It is a discouraging essay. Yet it is perhaps conceivable that our current philosophy -- the brilliant coruscations of our younger intelligentsia -- may indeed not prove to be the last word in social philosophy. Perhaps . . . when our youngest liberals have themselves come to the armchair age they will be smiled at in turn by sons who are still cleverer and who will find their wisdom as foolish as the wisdom of 1917 seems to them today. But that lies on the knees of the gods. Dogmatic v.s. Idealist Value mind sets The following excerpts from Parrington’s volumes provide the mind sets that embroil the constant political values war in the U.S.:149

How many members preferred monarchy to republicanism, in principle, it is impossible to determine; but they all realized the inexpediency of attempting to set it up; even Hamilton yielded to the logic of Colonel Mason’s argument: “Notwithstanding the oppression and injustice experienced among us from democracy [This reference undoubtedly had the democracy of homespun American commonwealths in mind.], the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted.” Accepting then the principle of republicanism as a compromise between the extremes of monarchy and democracy, the practical problem remained of erecting a system that should secure the [business-owner] minority against the aggressions of political faction. If the danger lay in an uncontrolled majority will, the way of safety lay in imposing restraints upon that will. In elaborating a system of checks and balances the members of the convention were influenced by the practical considerations of economic determinism more than by the theories of Montesquieu. They were realists who followed the teachings of the greatest political thinkers from Aristotle to Locke in asserting that the problem of government lay in arranging a stable

210

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

balance between the economic interests of the major classes. The revolutionary conception of equalitarianism, that asserted the rights of man apart from property and superior to property, did not enter into their thinking as a workable hypothesis. . . . Property, they argued, is the stabilizing force in society; it is conservative and cautious; having everything to lose by social upheavals, it is a restraining force upon factional unrest. The propertyless, on the other hand, having nothing to lose, easily become the victims of demagogues and embroil society with foolish experiments. . . . Certain members of the convention did not go so far in their fear of the propertyless, but relied upon the ability of property to protect itself by extra-legal means. “Give the votes to people who have no property,” argued Gouverneur Morris, “and they will sell them to the rich, who will be able to buy them.” 150 But the more general view was expressed by Madison: The landed interest, at present, is prevalent, but in process of time . . . when the number of landholders shall be comparatively small . . . will not the landed interests be overbalanced in future elections? And, unless wisely provided against, what will become of our government? . . We are too prone to forget the wide popular disfavor with which the new Constitution was received. . . . it became evident that the majority opinion held quite a different conception of the sovereignty of the people than was expressed by the convention. . . . The villagers and small men were afraid of the new instrument; they asserted that it had been prepared by aristocrats and moneyed men, and they repudiated the stake in society principle. . . . The state of mind of the agrarian majority was thus expressed by Amos Singletary of Sutton Massachusetts: These lawyers, and men of learning, and moneyed men, that talk so finely, and gloss over matters so smoothly, to make us,

Truth’s predicate values War

211

poor illiterate people, swallow down the pill, expect to get into Congress themselves; they expect to be the managers of this Constitution, and get all the power and all the money into their own hands, and then they will swallow up all us little folks, like the great Leviathan. . . . 151 The argument for a unitary, sovereign state, developed by Hamilton, and the argument for justice, developed by Madison, rest upon the same basis and are regarded as the twin problems of government. The true sanction of government is found, not in good will, as Bentham and later democratic thinkers have urged, but in coercion; and coercion is accepted as necessary because of universal selfishness. “Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without restraint.” Granted coercive sovereignty, government must guarantee justice to all; and justice demands that the majority shall suffer needful restraint equally with the minority. The great and insidious danger to good government has always been faction, the argument runs, the disasters of factional ambition. “Complaints are everywhere heard from the most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflict of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.” . . . As a means of securing a necessary balance between rival interests, Madison approved a republican rather than a democratic form of government: . . . In such argument Madison was adapting to his purpose the views of Milton and other seventeenth-century republicans, to whome the dangerous days when the puritan Commonwealth was breaking up,

212

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

the “noise and shouting of the rude multitude,” the drunken ribaldry of the London rabble, was prophetic of “new injunctions to manacle the native libertie of mankinde.” But it has long since become commonplace of political observation that the minority [the business interest] and not the majority is the more dangerous to the common well-being, for it is the [business] minority that most frequently uses government to its own ends. As our nation began, Federalists, Tories, and neo-mercantilist Whigs clearly have constituted the political factional minority and they remain so today. However, about their asserted practical property-based sovereignty, theirs became the practical and dominant control of government (particularly after Whigs installed governments paternalism-based economic mechanism for to deliver profits to business owners); the golden rule of Plutocracy (He who has the gold rules) is the result of their concupiscent property-based values; and they effectively alternatively use both the federal and state government to achieve their prescribed ends. Not only did they abuse the essential interests of the democratic agrarian majority, which constitutionally were protected by the Bill of Rights, they craftily turned the puritan arguments, as adopted by Federalists (who were interested to install a unitary materialist state to secure business from external economic aggressions and restrain the agrarian majority will so to ensure justice to the minority business faction) to serve their concupiscent ambitious material-based acquisitive ends. They, with unabashed preferences to Hobbes’ doctrine of Leviathan and political economy, as based on absolute mechanism-based Deterministic Materialism, as achieved by officially installing The American System of Political Economy, as Parrington noted, they achieved to return American nomos to Sixteenth Century (old world ‘conservatism’) from which Seventeenth Century’s (new world physis-based ‘liberalism’) was a reaction. These footprints in American history are distinct and well defined. Parrington, for one, had followed Puritanism’s influence to American Colonialism. He wrote the following about Roger Williams and the growing problem embroiling deliberate-critical-reason-based morality, versus proliferating evidence of

Truth’s predicate values War

213

political dogma-based factionalism found among those who proclaimed their faith as the foundation of their politics: which problem had led to separating ‘church’ from ‘state?’ 152

No other man in New England comprehended so fully the difficulties involved in the problem, as Roger Williams, or examined them so thoroughly; and out of his long speculations emerged a theory of the commonwealth that must be reckoned the richest contribution of Puritanism to American political thought. The just renown of Roger Williams has too long been obscured by ecclesiastical historians, who in emphasizing his defense of the principle of toleration have overlooked the fact that religious toleration was only a necessary deduction from the major principles of his political theory, and that he was concerned with matters far more fundamental than the negative virtue of non-interference in the domain of individual faith. He was primarily a political philosopher rather than a theologian -- one of the acutest and most searching of his generation of Englishmen, the teacher of Vane and Cromwell and Milton, a forerunner of Locke and the natural rights school, one of the notable democratic thinkers that the English race has produced. Much of his life was devoted to the problem of discovering a new basis for social reorganization, and his intellectual progress was marked by an abundant wreckage of obsolete theory and hoary fiction that strewed his path. He was a social innovator on principle, and he left no system unchallenged; each must justify itself in reason and expediency or be put aside. Broadly the development of his thought falls into three stages: ---- [1] the substitution of the compact theory of the state for the divine right theory; ---- [2] the rejection of the suppositious compact of the earlier school and the fictitious abstract state -- still postulated by many thinkers -- and the substitution of a realistic conception of the political state as the sovereign repository

214

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

of the social will, and the government -- or agent of the state -- as the practical instrument of society to effect its desired ends; ---- [3] and finally, the difficult problem of creating the necessary machinery of a democratic commonwealth, as the exigencies of the Rhode Island experiment required. Throughout, the inspiration of his thinking was social rather than narrowly political or theological, and the creative source would seem to have been the middle ages with their fruitful principle of men in a given society enrolling themselves voluntarily as members of bodies corporate, finding in such corporate ties a sufficient and allembracing social bond. 153 In his substitution of the compact theory for divine right, Williams was brought face to face with the fundamental assumption of the Massachusetts theocracy, based on numerous passages of Scripture, that the political state is established and sanctioned by the God of the Hebrews -- an assumption that was freely used to justify the engrossing of authority by the magistracy. As a theologian he critically examined the Scriptural authorities, and while conceding the divine source of government in general, he was careful to cut away all autocratic deductions from the Pauline assertion that “the powers that be are ordained of God.” “Government and order in families, towns, etc., is an ordinance of the Most High, Rom. 13, for the peace and good of mankind” 154 he admitted; but he agreed with Richard Hooker in discovering this order of government to be no other than natural law. The state is divine in origin because it is natural, and what is natural is of God. The Hebraic commonwealth had been established immediately in an ordinance of Jehovah, but Christ [who acknowledged to be that Jehovah, the world’s Creator and ‘The

Truth’s predicate values War

215

Covenant’s’ author] and his disciples regarded the state and God as distinct authorities, not to be confused -- “Render, therefore, unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.” The conclusion at which he arrived, then, from the merging of divine ordinances and natural law, was expressed in a doctrine that sets apart the individual citizen in all his spiritual and intellectual rights, from the subject of the commonwealth, and provides the basis for his principle of toleration. “A Civill Government is an ordinance of God, to conserve the Civill peace of the people, so far as concerns their Bodies and Goods,” and no farther [exempting human cardinal sovereignty by doctrine that sets apart the individual citizen in all his spiritual and intellectual rights]. 155 Having thus reduced the divine-right field within narrow limits and translated it into an abstraction [if applicable, only to ‘Bodies and Goods’], he preempts all the ground of practical politics for his compact theory. In accord with a long line of liberal thinkers running back through Richard Hooker to Augustine and the earlier Roman school, he accepted the major deductions from the compact theory of the state: that government is a man-made institution, that it rests on consent, and that it is founded on the assumed equality of the subjects. He had only to translate these abstractions into concrete terms, and apply them realistically, to create a new and vital theory. The covenant idea of church organization had long been familiar to separatists. To this the Pilgrims had added the Mayflower compact and Thomas Hooker had drawn up the Connecticut compact. Government resting on consent and authorized by written agreement was then no untried novelty when Roger Williams began his long speculations on the nature and functions of the political state. With

216

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Hobbes he traced the origin of the state to social necessity. The condition of nature is a condition of anarchy -- a war of all against all; and for mutual protection the state takes its rise. “The world otherwise would be like a sea, wherein Men, like fishes, would hunt and devour each other, and the greater devour the lesse.”156 But unlike the fiction assumed by Hobbes and Locke, this was no suppositious contract between ruler and ruled in prehistoric times, but present and actual, entered into between the several members of a free community for their common governance; nor on the other hand, like Burke’s irrevocable compact, was it unyielding constitution or fundamental law; but flexible, responsive to changing conditions, continually modified to meet the present needs. It is no other than a mutual agreement, arrived at frankly by discussion and compromise, [i.e., Rational Empiricism, which philosophically defines democracy] to live together in a political union, organizing the life of the commonwealth in accordance with nature, reason, justice and expediency. From this conception of the flexible nature of compact law came the sharp delimitation between state and government that he was at pains to make clear, and that constitutes a significant phase of his theory. Having rejected in his thinking the fictitious abstract state, the repository of an equally fictitious abstract sovereignty, he located sovereignty in the total body of citizens embraced within the community consciousness, acting in a political capacity. The state is society organized, government is the state functioning -- it is the political machinery devised by the sovereign people to effect definite ends. And since the single end and purpose for which the body of citizens erect the state is the furtherance of the communal well-being, the government becomes a convenient instrument to serve the common weal, responsible to the sovereign people and strictly limited

Truth’s predicate values War

217

by the terms of the social agreement. . . .

[For this, and there is more, property-based Federalism is at fault, for having deliberately violated the purposes stated in the Constitution’s Preamble, which are limiting predicated value terms of the social agreement.]

The state, then, is society working consciously through experience and reason, to secure for the individual citizen the largest measure of freedom and well-being. It is armed with a potential power of coercion, but only to secure justice. . . . But if sovereignty inheres in the majority will [which Federalists affirmed to be propertybased rights], what securities remain for the individual and minority rights? Only with written guarantees that human rights were constitutionally protected from the ‘practical propertied sovereignty’ of the ‘business’ minority, by an official Bill of Rights appended as amendments to the Constitution, would the democratic majority ratify the Constitution. Then and only then did the Commonwealths’ compact prone American Colonists ratify the Constitution. The American Commonwealths, as they then existed, were those for which the living Constitution, as a compact rather than a contract, was ordered. Roger William’s deliberately reasoned thoughts were incorporated in the amendments, which were specified in The Bill of Rights. Detecting the fork in our American values’ heritage As historical forensic inferences are inspected, factual footprints of the predicated official organic prescriptive logos are detected: a primary fork in our values’ heritage, as detected by Roger Williams, is on the liberal fork. This value’s fork defines what is “the left” or “liberal” American value. Orthodox Pauline doctrinal religion, as based on ‘divine-right’ dogma, and faith-based service to the will and purposes of some fiction, as ‘magistracy,’ are of the original property-based ‘conservative’ fork.’ This values fork defines ‘the right’ or ‘conservative’ value. Inspecting these paradoxical foundations, clarifies an understanding

218

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

of the growing abyss of these parting paths’ values: These conclusions resulted from my inspection of this divides’ growing abyss : ---Roger Williams deliberated critically to find necessary truth, and with mentors of this ilk he was branded ‘a liberal heretic’. ---Orthodoxy, as based on fictional magistracy, was content in dogmatized belief of faith-based absolute theory. And orthodoxy served to perpetuate belief in dogma, positions, and power, because they seemed always to exist. ---Liberals, as Williams, are concerned with ‘is true’ antecedent, principle causes and effects that correlate with nature-based physis. ---Conservatives are concerned with preserving a ‘divine-right’-based heritage and while naturally contingent they fallaciously affirm absolute dogmatic nomos-based theory as their antecedent principle. ---Liberals, as Williams,’ are scientific: Conclusions are always tentative, subject to continuous critical deliberate review, and are adjustable. ---Conservatives believe ‘absolutely’: they advocate that all theoretical errors and supposition must be routinely dispelled by their dogmatically absolute nihilist ‘positive’ belief, as Immanuel Kant observed of his celebrated Wolf’s dogmatism: the virtue of absolute belief is a contingent of its organum’s error: 157

Thus, while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to posterity, in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in accordance with the “Critique of Pure Reason,” still the value of such a bequest is not to be depreciated. It will render an important service to reason, by substituting the certainty of the scientific method for the random groping after results without the guidance of principles, which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of metaphysical studies. It will render an important service to the inquiring mind of youth, by leading the student to apply his powers to the cultivation of genuine science, instead of wasting them, as at present, on speculations which can never

Truth’s predicate values War

219

lead to any result, or on the idle attempt to invent new ideas and opinions. But above all, it will confer an inestimable benefit on morality and religion, by showing that all the objections urged against them may be silenced for ever by the “Socratic” method, that is to say, by proving the ignorance of the objector. For, as the world has never been, and no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is of the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error. This important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its fancied possessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does not prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity. The advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure reason are not at all impaired. The loss falls, in its whole extent, on the “monopoly of the schools,” but does not in the slightest degree touch the “interests of mankind.” I appeal to the most obstinate dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul after death, derived from the simplicity of its substance; of the freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of nature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of subjective and objective practical necessity; or of the existence of God, deduced from the conception of an “ensrealissimum” -- the contingency of the changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able to pass beyond the limits of schools, to penetrate the public mind, or to exercise the slightest influence on its convictions. It must be admitted that this has not been the case and that, owing to the unfitness of the common understanding for such subtle speculation, it can never be expected to take place. On the contrary, it is plain that “the hope of a future life” arises from the feeling, which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature.

220

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

In like manner, it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to the consciousness of “freedom,” and that the glorious order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, give rise to belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe. Such is the genesis of these general convictions of mankind, so far as they depend on rational grounds; and the public property not only remains undisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance by the doctrine that schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight into a matter of general concernment than that to which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools should, therefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of these universally comprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply satisfactory proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant pretensions of the schools, which would gladly retain, in their own exclusive possession, the key to the truths they impart to the public. At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the public without its knowledge -- I mean, the “Critique of Pure Reason.” This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for finespun arguments in favor of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and, thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is only by criticism that metaphysicians (and as such theologians too) can be saved from the subsequent

Truth’s predicate values War

221

perversion of their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious -- as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public. If governments think proper to interfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well for those of society to favor a criticism of this kind, by which alone the labors of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel. This critical science is not opposed to the “dogmatic procedure” of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles “a priori” -- but to “dogmatism,” that is, to the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing -- without first inquiring in what way and by what reason has come into the possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason “without previous criticism of its own powers,” and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, not yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In carrying out the plan which the “Critique” prescribes, that is, in the future system of metaphysics, we must have

222

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

recourse to the strict method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. . . . He would have been peculiarly well fitted to give truly scientific character to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of the “organum,” that is of pure reason itself. That he failed to perceive the necessity of such procedure must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who [by belief alone] reject at once the method of Wolf, and of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy. Because dogmatic rationalization has prevailed to perpetuate doctrinal errors, as deterministic unitary materialism, which materialist conservatives dogmatically called nature’s causal mechanism, (which Kant exposed as fallaciously deduced irrational affirmation), or the divine-right doctrine that Roger Williams (with Hooker, Locke, and others) exposed as similarly irrational, or the deterministic materialism-based doctrines that government best serves society when those of property-based sovereignty control the state’s consented sovereignty, as Tory-Federalist-Whigs’ consistently, and presently fallaciously dogmatically affirm. The following historical footprints of absolute dogmatic ‘conservatism’ (more particularly neo-mercantilism-Whig doctrine) show the deliberate nefarious departures from the Constitution’s purposes, as stated in the Preamble, but unfulfilled in the Constitutions main body, which the mass of those who ratified the Constitution had mandated, and were given, solemn promises of fulfillment in amendments called the Bill of Rights! : ----

About Hamilton’s initiative, as the Treasury Secretary, to install a

Truth’s predicate values War

223

federal bank, Parrington documented the political debate between Jefferson and Hamilton. Not surprisingly, this debate remains as the foundation to present political debate about banking:158

With the political principles of Godwin and Paine he [Jefferson] was in hearty accord. With them he accepted as an historical fact the principle that government is everywhere and always at war with natural freedom, and from this he deduced the characteristic doctrine that the lover of freedom will be jealous of delegated power, and will seek to hold the political state to strict account. From this same principle, following Paine, he deduced the doctrine of terminable nature of compact, which he set over against the legal doctrine of inviolability. In this matter French liberalism and English legalism were at opposite poles. Replying to Burke’s doctrine of irrevocable compact, Paine had written “The Rights of Man,” which Jefferson did much to popularize in America, and with the broad principles of which he was in complete accord. “The earth belongs in usufruct * to the living,” Paine had argued, and the dead possess no rights over it. Government from the grave is a negation of the inalienable right of the newborn ** [and is in practice an example of dogmatic nihilism] hence social justice demands that a time limit should automatically revoke all compacts. Since no generation can rightly deed away the heritage of the unborn [which has happened regularly when government operates on deficit spending], the natural limit of every compact is the lifetime of the generation ratifying it. “No society,” Jefferson said, “can make a perpetual Constitution, or even a perpetual law.” In this suggestive theory of the terminable nature of compact is to be found the philosophical origin of the later doctrine of states rights. . . . *** * Usufruct 159 was the archaic natural seminal basis of law, which protected the natural human right to use and enjoy the earth and its fruits without

224

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

injuring or destroying nature: was an early legal form of environmentalism, which American Indians quite incidently religiously had practiced? ** As another example of dogmatic nihilism, Kant’s critically reasoned natural proclamation appertains fundamentally to predicate values that embroil in politics over abortion. ‘Right to life’ advocates generally are materialist conservatives in matters of both the human essence and its materiality, particularly as regards life’s embryonic period of gestation in the mother’s womb, in which the life to be, being completely naturally dependent on the mother for any and all temporal ‘right to life’ aspect (The mother’s ‘right to life’ is clearly antecedent to any temporal ‘right to life’ of the child to be "" ). So, why is it that the longevity of temporal life excludes the gestation period of life? And, what kind of life’s temporal existence is prescribed by the dogmatic deterministic conservative political values? Are government’s laws tyrannous when the laws enforce births to occur that are then consigned by economic deterministic mechanism to exist in the ravages of oppression and squalor, about which conservative politics legally politically had established with impunity, which both deny all truthful correspondence and responsibility? Paine’s reason-based natural proclamation, of ‘government from the grave’ negates, in the temporal legal sense, unalienable aspects of ‘right to life’ of the unborn, and also appertains fundamentally to ‘conservative’ predicate values that politically installed the mechanism-based economic determinism: which inference of crass predicate values dispels all claims of an intellectually virtuously truthful correspondence between conservative predicate values and the political advocacy for a natural ‘right to life’: While, supposedly, ‘conservatives’ support all ‘births,’ they consign the ‘living’ to laws and contracts which increasingly execute an existence that is ‘ruled from the grave.’ Only selfishness of Brahmanist-aristocracy posits such crass

By legally assigning Birth Certificates, with the date of life’s origin, affixed as the date of birth, legally, at least, life does not begin in any temporal legal sense, until birth occurs and the child is independently alive.

Truth’s predicate values War

225

rationalization. And this is not Christian in the sense of concupiscence, which St. John wrote about in his First Epistle, for being of the ‘world’s temporal sin.’ *** Is it not reasonably clear? ‘State’s rights’ doctrine, as Nullification’ and ‘Interposition,’ cannot deductively be a result of any ‘absolute legal contract’ doctrine. And, logically, Conservatives violated their claim to being ‘positive’ for to have rationalized from such ‘liberal’ deliberations as Jefferson’s ‘terminable nature of compact,’ which was expediently applied because ‘conservative’ politics had failed to gain constitutional adoption by suffrage-based consent: however, while Burke’s ‘absolute legal contract’ doctrine, was rationally diabolical to conservative predicated advocacies in this case particularly, it irrationally, remained to be dogmatic. Try to dispute this: i.e., find a rational answer to this question. To what extent can (do) fixed contracts, as dogmatically restricted to positive reality, have anything to do with fiction and, therefore, more particularly to fictions that legally were made intrinsic of legally defining state’s and fictitious person corporations’ rights? 160 Tautology Tautology, the form of mathematical logic, is commonly and officially largely unknown: briefly mentioned in the dictionary and not at all in the Encyclopedia, it probably was not known by Federalists and Whigs. If not for continual mathematical refinement, in its attempts to make it language applicable, thereby, broadened general understanding, tautology would not be available for veracity testing of truth. John N. Fujii gave this reason-based veracity test.161

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

226

conclusion as the consequent that form a valid argument form, will always result in a tautology. Testing compound statements to see whether they are tautologies is thus equivalent to testing an argument for validity. J. N. Fujii gave three classical valid arguments (P = compound premises, Q = consequent, - = denial, = therefore): (a) Modus ponens P6Q P

(A)

Q and classical invalid Argument: (d) P 6 Q Q

(b) modus tollens (c) hypothetical syllogism (B)

P6Q -Q

- P

P6R and classical invalid argument: (e) P 6 Q

-P -Q

P (d) Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent, and (e) Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent, Fujii warned, are invalid argument forms. With all forms of ‘hypothesizing a tautological argument,’ the invalid argument form (d) Affirming the Consequent is mostly applied. Fallacies of ‘Affirming Consequents’ of nomos, is a particular Sophist pseudo philosophic proclivity intrinsic of nomos-based dogmatic belief. The Federalist Agenda, as Parrington noted provides an example of this rampant political sophistry. 162 [Hamilton’s] notorious comment -- which the American democrat has

Truth’s predicate values War

227

prejudices, and like earlier Tories he paraded an ethical justification for his Toryism. The current Federalist dogma of the divine right of justice -- ‘vox justiciae vox dei’ -- was at hand to serve his purpose and he made free use of it. . . . He was frankly a monarchist, and he urged the [fallacious] monarchical principle with Hobbesian logic. “The principle chiefly intended to be established is this -- that there must be a permanent ‘will.” “There ought to be a principle in government capable of resisting the popular current.” [In ‘Works, Vol. II, p 415] The only effective way of keeping democratic factionalism within bounds, Hamilton was convinced, lay in the erection of a powerful chief magistrate, who “ought to be hereditary, and have so much power, .. “ He devoted himself to the business of providing all possible checks upon the power of the democracy.” This Federalist agenda continues. Parrington cited the Federalist-Whig tautological proclivity to fallaciously ‘deny antecedents’ and ‘affirm consequents’:163

228

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

but it denied its philosophical patrimony. It substituted expediency for the old economic realism, and began and ended intellectually bankrupt.. . . aside from petty antagonism to Jackson -- was the vague assumption that the well-being of the American people was dependent on governmental patronage; the belief that each economic group and section must receive its special favor, and that through tariffs and bonuses and internal improvements the country as a whole must prosper. Of this principle of special favors -- a return to the seventeenth century from which eighteenth century liberalism was a reaction -- the American System of Henry Clay was the chief expression, and it remains the most significant bequest of the Whig party to our political history. Clearly, classical dogma fraudulently usurps rational consented sovereignty. It has not only transformed American democracy’s Categorical Imperatives to appear as fascism, and threatens to make this fascist appearance permanent. And classical dogma does the same to Categorical Imperatives, which are common to Islam and other nation societies as well. Maybe more interesting, however, is how fluid value positions in the founding organic debate have reversed positions; neo-classical-conservatives, for instance, which had furnished the main impetus to establishing Constitutional government, and to which Jefferson argued on behalf of agrarian lifestyles his proposition to limit federal government: after the fact of gaining political control, particularly as regards government’s Judicial function, then mechanist neo-classical-conservatives adopted Jefferson’s proposition to limit advancement of government administered social programs: from the paternally granted fictitious businesses’ states rights, which gave businesses license to act as humans, with constitutional human rights, the ‘conservative’ business owners could and did argue to limit the federal government’s administering role with social programs, which, as those who finished Parrington’s work from his notes, had cited the plutocratic ‘systemic paternalism’ from which ‘conservatives’ had gained their positions

Truth’s predicate values War

229

and treasures. " In this factual result, is the inference that hidden irrationally predicted values-based conservative purposes foster and preserve a superior plutocratic political-power-base of ‘practical propertied sovereignty, ‘as paternally was granted to business by government, and which gives the U.S. the appearance of fascism: Corporations are chartered by a plethora of fictitious legal authorities broadly called ‘State’s Rights’: the Supreme Court legal ruling of Amendment 10 to the Constitution provided for this result. To empower their corporate entities, ‘Conservative owners’ rationalize deductively from ‘State’s Rights’ doctrine: And, with unlimited perpetual corporate economic existence and powers, they essentially also enjoy the ‘Fictitious State’s immunities and licensing authorities.’164

The Congressional enactments of the first twelve years had further clarified the issue. The funding plan had visibly increased the number and wealth of the rising capitalist group. The first banks were being erected and the complex machinery of modern credit -- the hated “paper system” that had driven out the traditional metallic currency -was being rapidly built up. A small financial group in northern cities was growing powerful from discounting and money-brokerage. The truth was slowly coming home to the farmers and small men that war is profitable to the few at the cost of the many; that from the egg of war-financing was hatched a brood of middlemen who exploited the post-war hardships and grew rich from the debts that impoverished the producing farmers. This ambitious class, hitherto negligible in America, was provided with the means to make a vigorous fight; it invoked the political state as an ally, and under Hamilton’s leadership

Accepting the principle of economic determinism, liberalism still clung to its older democratic teleology, convinced that somehow economic determinism would turn out to be a fairy godmother to the proletariat and that from the imperious drift of industrial expansion must eventually issue social justice.

230

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

used the administration to serve its financial interests [in fact, Federalists administered a variation of Hegel’s dialectical materialism "" ] It looked with open hostility upon every agrarian program, was cynical towards French romantic theories, and was restrained by no scruples. [Contrarily, however, the avowed and logical purposes of the Jeffersonian Republicans was] to loose the hands of this capable [self-serving Federalist] class from the helm of government, to keep America

agricultural, and the Federal state secondary in all but necessary police powers to the several commonwealths. Distinction between mechanist conservatives and democratic liberals is found not so much in particulars of this central fluid dialectical materialist argument, but rather is insidious of a fundamental difference in predicate values and purposes, the predicates of which are diabolical as causal teleology differs from mechanism. 165

Mechanism is one of the two great philosophical theories of cause and effect in the universe. Opposed to the theory of mechanism is the theory of teleology. Any thing that grows and develops can be explained in two ways. Mechanism explains it from behind, in terms of its origins. Teleology explains it from the front, in terms of the goal it is seeking. For instance, to be ‘liberal,’ in Kant’s view, is to be reasonably deliberate, ‘outward-turned,’ objective, and democratic. And while to be ‘conservative’ is also to be deliberate, again in Kant’s view, the deliberation is absolute and dogmatic belief-based, the predicate values of which, posit results that are oppositely oriented. With consequents affirmed as principles from which to deduce acquisitively wants, they are ‘inward-turned,’ subjective, and monarchical. With the greatest difference hidden in the values of mind’s

Which, as communists had interpreted, maintained that social and economic conflict between economic classes, must inevitably proceed through stages of dictatorship of the proletariat. (See Dictionary, 549)

Truth’s predicate values War

231

logos, sophistries of inferential intent become very important to consider. Parrington’s comment about Tory values confirms this: 166

Hamilton was a high Tory. The past to which he appealed was a Tory past, the psychology which he accepted was a Tory psychology, the law and order which he desired was a Tory law and order. . . . and like earlier Tories he paraded an ethical justification for his Toryism. The current Federalist dogma of the divine right of justice -- “vox justiciae vox dei” -- was at hand to serve his purpose and he made free use of it. But no ethical gilding could quite conceal a certain ruthlessness of purpose; in practice justice became synonymous with expediency, and expdiency was curiously like sheer Tory will to power (His philosophy conducted logically to the leviathan state, highly centralized, coercive, efficient.). Predicate Values in human logos prescribe outcomes in reality! This either ‘is true’ or truth’s correlative frame falter. Organic predicate values are specified by charters and plans: a ‘strategic plan’ stresses values, the ‘operations plan,’ action. And business often fails without careful planning of both values and action. With this consistent (logical) foundation in mind, Parrington’s analysis of the Whigs’ predicate values, which installed The American System of Political Economy, should be carefully deliberately reevaluated: 167

232

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

extending its markets with every mile of westward expansion. To encourage the development of the West and South by a Federal policy of internal improvement became, therefore, common business foresight, provided of course that the Constitution should follow population and safeguard business interests against local agrarianism and the menace of particularism. By the year 1830 both dangers lay black against the political horizon. The triumph of Jackson had enthroned the agrarian menace at Washington and produced such a scrambling of frightened interests -- such a rattling among the old bones of Federalism and scurrying among the young limbs of industrialism -- as the country had not seen for many a year. Henry Clay appealed to his followers in the West, and Webster marshaled his adherents of the East, and from the coalescing of these incongruous elements emerged the Whig party to do battle with Old Hickory. . . . In the hour of peril, principles go by the board. The Whig party was the lineal heir of the old Federalism, but it denied its philosophical patrimony. It substituted expediency for the old economic realism, and began and ended intellectually bankrupt. The values’ disposition of Congress became recognized by the predicated division of ‘do nothing’ and ‘know nothing’ members: ‘Do nothing’ ‘liberals’ seldom united: reason the only foundation of any possible unity. And, liberals were more easily derided by ‘Conservative’ orthodox members who comparatively, had dogmatic, prejudiced belief as their uniting problem: political uniformity in myriad dogmatic beliefs provided the lessor political problem, which gave rise to quick-witted quips, the popular ‘positive’ dogmatic appeal of which mostly derided liberals, as this example shows: 168

A liberal is a man with both feet firmly planted in the air. The recurring Balanced Budget Amendment, which those of dogmatic belief in Edmund Burke’s Whig doctrine, implicit of ‘absolute compact and

Truth’s predicate values War

233

interminable contracts,’ is a fundamental conservative proposal, which is as fundamentally confronted by a reactionary liberal response, whose rational predicate values consider the Constitution to be a terminable compact as consented to only by the living, rather than a fixed contract that binds present, past and future subjects to the contractual deficit spending of government. The liberal concern hinges on the rational conclusion that such an amendment transcends, i.e., compromises each living generation’s democratic sovereignty, and consent. In 2008, the government’s accumulated deficit has reached $9 trillion. The only dent in this accumulation of deficit spending has been the eight year period during which the government was administered by a liberal administration. The conservative values of the proposed Balance Budget effect, therefore, fail to fit conservative administrative intent, and eventually promise to destroy the Constitution as a ‘living’ flexible compact: As Jefferson’s deliberated argument, was confirmed to him by many of reason: Government from the grave is a negation of the inalienable right of the newborn. [M echanist C onser va t ive administrations have produced deficits now totaling $9 trillion (as of 2008) and dogmatically advocate constitutional ‘right to life’ of the unborn, however, by official impunity dispel accountability for deficit spending.] When considering the political economy effects from which public-funded ‘pork barrel’ projects, the origin of which is Whig ‘internal improvements’ policy, mechanistically provide great privatized profit or treasure (which, in Smith’s view, is not wealth) that mechanistically paternally is paid out currently to a select few, while the required new taxes, over time, are repaid by wage-earner-income taxes, as required by the added new mechanized and socialized public tax-based debt, to amortize the public debt over longer and longer time: this Whiggish ‘conservative’ mechanist policy of ‘internal improvements’ advances contractual public-debt’s envelope farther and farther into the future: now more frequently lamented is the resulting reality that public debt has mortgaged each newborn population’s future. The Official systematic mechanism-based economic paternalism, the

234

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

licensed “entitlements” to which have afforded greater privatized treasures (not wealth in Smith’s view) as time passes, is thereby enjoyed exclusively by the concentrated few of paternal licensed affluence, who are organically legally licenced and selectively contracted to gain immediately (paid upon completion) from the ever increasing public-debt (that is repaid over time). In this nomos-based reality, neo-classical-conservative values inferentially fail as being derived from rational moral ethics. They are instead, nefariously fallaciously derived values, which expediently were rationalized to replace the Jeffersonian argument for agrarian-like independence of mechanized wage-earned lifestyles. And by the Federalist-Whig mechanist rationalizing, the antecedent principles of Jefferson’s argument were rendered moot: which opposed dogma-based economic laws, as Locke also had expressed his opposition? : 169

The purpose of law in that ideal polity is simply the prevention of private immorality invading the morality of others. . . . There are no laws of human nature, merely diverse human faculties; the only one of these that may be regarded as universal is the faculty of reason itself, which is to be the implement employed to imagine and then create the just political society. In the paradoxical results of dogma-based political economy and apart from considerations of blame, as excused by impunity, rather than inducing from logically moral-based predicate values of economically independent lifestyles, mechanist conservatives deduced from dogmatic beliefs, to expediently produce economic growth to the few? *, * The funding plan had visibly increased the number and wealth of the rising capitalist group [rising Plutocracy]. The first banks were being

erected and the complex machinery of modern credit -- the hated “paper system” that had driven out the traditional metallic currency -was being rapidly built up. A small financial group in northern cities was growing powerful from discounting and money-brokerage. The truth was slowly coming home to the farmers and small men that war

Truth’s predicate values War

235

is profitable to the few at the cost of the many; that from the egg of war-financing was hatched a brood of middlemen who exploited the post-war hardships and grew rich from the debts that impoverished the producing farmers. This ambitious class, hitherto negligible in America, was provided with the means to make a vigorous fight; it invoked the political state as an ally, and under Hamilton’s leadership used the administration to serve its financial interests.170 Consumers’ debt is now (in the late 1990s) greater than $5 trillion and rising: the combined private debt is now greater than $16 trillion. Spread onto 150 million individuals paying 10% interest (credit card interest is far greater), the average monthly interest payment on debt (not including taxes) now exceeds $800. And, advocates of debt restructuring, now advertise home mortgages for 125% of home values as the solution to the expanding personal burden of debt. This is patent evidence that contractual personal debt is perilously high: Economic growth due to increases in consumption largely now must depend on increases in contractual socialized public and personal debt: Political Economy is stressed as never before! (The economic effects of this fact are a primary cause in the economic downturn of 2001 and particularly are shown in California’s economic plight.) Footprints of U.S. Foreign Policy, i.e., The Monroe Doctrine as proclaimed in 1823, determined that the United States would act to protect its republican democratic form of representative government by protecting all American nations from monarchical foreign acts like, chartering puppet colonies in either North or South America.171

The Monroe Doctrine grew out of conditions in Europe as well as in America. The three leading absolute monarchies of Europe were Russia, Austria, and Prussia. They had pledged themselves to “put an end to the system of representative government, in whatever country it may exist in Europe.” The United States feared that these three powers (sometimes inaccurately called “The Holy Alliance”) might also try to suppress representative government in the Americas.

236

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

During and after the Napoleonic Wars, most of the Spanish colonies in America had taken advantage of unsettled conditions in Europe to break away from the mother country. As they won independence, these colonies formed themselves into republics with constitutions much like that of the United States. Only Brazil chose to keep its monarchy when it declared its independence from Portugal. From the point of view of trade, the Monroe Doctrine probably did the United States no good whatever. Europe continued to get the larger share of Latin-American trade, most of which went to great Britain. Nor did the doctrine improve relations between the United States and the Latin-American Countries. The nations which the doctrine was supposed to Protect resented the way the United States assumed its own superiority over them. Besides, they feared “the Colossus of the North” far more than they feared any European nation. Until 1890, Great Britain and other countries generally ignored the Doctrine. . . . In the early 1900's, President Theodore Rooaevelt gave new meaning to the Monroe Doctrine. He pointed out that weakness or brutal wrongdoing on the part of any of the smaller American Nations might tempt European countries to intervene. It seemed to Roosevelt the European nations might well feel justified in trying to protect the lives and property of their citizens or to collect debts justly owed to them. Roosevelt asserted that the Monroe Doctrine required the United States to prevent such justified intervention by doing the intervening itself. Under this Big stick policy, the United States sent armed forces into the Dominican Republic in 1905, into Nicaragua in 1911, and into Haite in 1915. In general, President Woodrow Wilson continued Roosevelt’s policy. But Wilson promised that the United States would “never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.”

Truth’s predicate values War

237

Manifest Destiny and Dollar Diplomacy were pseudo imperialistic, dogmabased adaptations (rationalizations) of Monroe Doctrine. By these fallacious adaptations to foreign policy, as enacted by individual state’s licensed fictitious person corporations that legally enjoyed fictitious ‘states rights’ and ‘impunity’ protection from the nation’s constitutional laws, mechanist ‘conservative’ corporate owners sponsored aggressive economic exploitations in all American nations. Liberals’ critical reasoning, however, remained focused on the ethical purposes of Monroe Doctrine: From this predicate values distinction, Whigs were branded‘Hawks,’ Democrats ‘Doves.’ Foreign nations of South America, particularly, perceived the official U.S. doctrinal strategy as a two headed monster, the predicate of one wielding a ‘big stick’ while the other offered an ‘olive branch.’ Result:

They feared “the Colossus of the North” far more than they feared any European nation. To consider the critical importance of a strong or colossal U.S. economy in the community of powerful nations, is to consider Alexander Hamilton’s ‘conservative’ predicate values contribution to America. Hamilton’s values were surely not ‘intellectually bankrupt’ as Parrington had observed of Whiggish ‘conservative’ values. * * The Whig party was the lineal heir of the old Federalism, but it denied its philosophical patrimony. It substituted expediency for the old economic realism, and began and ended intellectually bankrupt. Hamilton’s Federalism concerned the nation’s economic role, which would necessarily compete to qualify itself for world leadership; his values were pure and noble with some dogmatic exceptions: he subscribed Hobbes’ dogma-based values of monarchy rather than the homespun American democracy of individual cardinal sovereignty. Footprints of Hamilton’s initiative were about the substantial reality of competing on the established ‘playing field’ of foreign nations:172

Almost all nations have central banks, and among developed countries that of the United States is one of the more recently established. The

238

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

central banks of Sweden and England, for example, were each founded in the seventeenth century. Central banking services in the United States prior to the Federal Reserve were provided from time to time by other institutions. The First and Second Banks of the United States, large private institutions chartered and partly owned by the federal government, were able to exert some deliberate influence on the supply of credit. . . . Jefferson vigorously opposed Hamilton’s initiative to charter the First Bank of the United States, then used the quasi private bank, partly owned by the government, to make the Louisiana Purchase.173 Here was an expedient reversal of values, to coopt political success.

When the new United States government was established in 1789, many of the leaders favored the creation of a national bank. Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, thought such an institution would strengthen the new government politically and promote its economic growth. . . . Thomas Jefferson viewed a national bank as a powerful financial monopoly, dangerous to American [agrarian] freedoms. Some Congressmen doubted the constitutionality of such a bank. But, in spite of opposition, a charter was granted, and the bank opened its doors in Philadelphia in December 1791. . . . The bank was authorized to issue notes, make loans, and hold deposits. It had eight branches in important commercial cities. . . . It kept state-incorporated banks from issuing excessive amounts of notes which they might not be able to convert into coin. The enterprise was well managed and profitable. When the government sold its stock in the bank in 1802, it did so at a good profit. But many persons still opposed the bank. Its charter was not renewed when it came up, and the bank ceased to exist in 1811. On the eve of the War of 1812, the Treasury lost a well-managed financial

Truth’s predicate values War

239

institution. . . . The second bank began in 1816 . . . The government again owned one fifth of the capital . . . The bank established branches throughout the country, and its powers were in general like those of The First Bank of the United States. . . . Unfortunately, the bank incurred the hostility of President Andrew Jackson and his political advisers. During Jackson’s administration, the government severed all connections with the bank, and it ceased to exist as a federally incorporated institution in 1836. Andrew Jackson’s purpose was that of Jefferson’s:

To loose the hands of this capable class from the helm of government, to keep America agricultural. However, in results, federal paternalism to banking and the reciprocal banking control of government greatly increased during his presidency. Loco-Foco provides another footprint of radical liberal resistance to the government’s central banking role:174

Loco-Foco was a nickname given in 1835 to the radical faction of the New York Democratic Party. In October, 1835, New York Democrats held a meeting in Tammany Hall. The radical Democrats spoke against favoritism in banking laws. They wanted to form an organization to fight that kind of organization. The conservative party members were not strong enough to stop the proposal. They turned out the lights and left the hall. Members of the radical faction used phosphorus friction matches, newly invented and called “loco-focos,” to rekindle the lights, and continued the meeting. The Democratic press immediately named the reform Democrats “loco-focos.” And, Jackson’s liberal politics had a popular foundation. 175

Jackson properly interpreted his re-election as public approval of his

240

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

bank policy. He ordered Secretary of the Treasury Louis McLane to remove the government’s deposits from the Bank of the United States and place them in state banks. Both McLane and his successor, William J. Duane had been appointed even though Jackson knew that he opposed the presidents bank policy. . . . Jackson named Roger B Taney to the office. Taney carried out the order. In 1834, however, the Senate rejected Jackson’s nomination of Taney. This was the first time a Cabinet nominee had been rejected. The withdrawal of the government’s funds reduced the powers of the national bank. In 1836, it became the Bank of the United States of Pennsylvania. The dispute over the Bank of the United States occurred during a period of heavy speculation in land, the opening of the West, and increased foreign trade. The government was receiving more money from tariffs and the sale of public land than it was spending. On Jan. 8, 1835, Jackson paid off the final installment of the national debt. He was the only President ever to do so. Congress provided that any surplus above $5,000,000 should be divided among the states in 1837 as a loan. But the panic of 1837 struck before the money could be distributed to the states. The prospect of more money in circulation had encouraged speculation [we see this perceptive public response, with investments in stock ownership whenever the Fed lowers the rate of interest on money loaned to banks]. Many states spent recklessly

on huge public construction programs, such as roads and canals. Hundreds of “wildcat banks” issued their own money. By 1836, most banks had only 1 gold dollar in reserve for every 10 or 12 paper dollars in circulation. As a result, the value of money dropped steadily. Inflation became so serious that Jackson hastened to act before the boom crumbled. On July 11, 1836, he issued his “Specie Circular.” It directed government agents to accept only gold

Truth’s predicate values War

241

and silver in payment for public lands. This order shocked the West, because speculators there had been buying land with “cheap” paper money. The circular helped end speculation in land. The inflation of money, overexpansion of business, and overinvestment in public improvements brought on a panic that struck shortly before Jackson left office. Jackson’s successor, Martin Van Buren, faced a depression about two months after he became President. This historical note should pique contemporary rational concerns as a grand distribution of funds from illegal contraband, tobacco law suits, or budget surpluses that since 1984, the surplus Social Security Contributions Tax is a primary source (and, SS will never need it). State legislation had already allowed and given license to “for profit” corporations, to which the federal government’s Judiciary had given unalienable human rights as specified in the Bill of Rights:176

Beginning about 1780 the corporate form of organization began to be used in the United States. The early corporations were chartered by state legislatures, most of them to operate businesses of a public nature such as toll roads, toll bridges, and water systems. In 1811 New York State enacted the first general corporation-for-profit statute. Under this statute any group of persons who complied with the procedures established in the statute would be granted a corporate charter. However, incorporation tended still to be viewed as a privilege and many restrictions were placed upon corporations. Incorporation was permitted for only relatively short periods of time, maximum limits on capitalization were relatively low, the purpose of the business had to be specifically and narrowly defined, and limits on land and personl property holding were often restrictive. Today these trstrictive provisions have disappeared in most states and the incorporation statutes are mostly enabling, permitting the controlling persons very great flexibility in establishing, financing, and operating the

242

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

corporation. The cozy relationship between government and commerce that we call Political Economy, when looked at rationally, will find Roger Williams’ compact theory of state in the predicate values’ wreckage pile, where federalist values discarded the values that clearly were in the minds of those who ratified the U.S. Constitution, only after Federalists promised the Amendment called the Bill of Rights. When sifting the moral wreckage to find answers to amorality, we should constantly reminisce on the radically moral predicate values which Williams’ natural-law theory had provided moral virtue to American colonials: 177

The state is society organized, government is the state functioning -- it is the political machinery devised by the sovereign people to effect definite ends. And since the single end and purpose for which the body of citizens erect the state is the furtherance of the communal wellbeing, the government becomes a convenient instrument to serve the common weal, responsible to the sovereign people and strictly limited by the terms of the social agreement. . . . The state, then, is society working consciously through experience and reason, to secure for the individual citizen the largest measure of freedom and well-being. It is armed with a potential power of coercion, but only to secure justice. . . . But if sovereignty inheres in the majority will [which presently is the power of corporate wealth], what securities remain for the individual and minority rights? The American System of Political Economy, i.e., mechanism-based economic patrimony to business and reciprocal mechanist Plutocratic legal control of government, the influence of which has evolved as ‘the most dominant fictitious state of the U.S. government and the world. R. William’s confirms that this legality is only fiction:

the state is society organized, government is the state functioning -- it is the political machinery devised by the sovereign people to effect

Truth’s predicate values War

243

definite ends [and certainly not fictitious ends]. Federalist dogmatic predicate values of elected and appointed officers, as affirmed to supplant the consented organic constitutional values, have amorally devitalized key constitutional purposes. Unfortunately, representative government is now dominated by the shrinking affluent portion of society, the affluence of which has grown exponentially: an economic mechanism run Plutocratic government of those with ownership of materialbased treasure: as Upton Sinclair observed:

It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it. However, to the extent any problem becomes commonly clear, a democratic sovereign society can resolve it, if they only will? ---if sovereignty inheres in the majority will [as measured by property and treasure], what securities remain for the individual and

minority rights? The footprints of our ‘Leviathan’ (our Plutocratic state called the American System of Political Economy) is now left for other sections. Our mechanism-based economic ‘Leviathan’ interpreted:178

During the thirty-odd years between the Peace of Paris and the end of the War of 1812 that older America was dying. The America that succeeded was a shifting, restless world, youthfully optimistic, eager to better itself, bent on finding easier roads to wealth than the plodding path of natural increase. " It concieved of human nature as acquisitive, and accounted acquisitiveness a cardinal virtue, it set out to inquire what opportunities awaited it in the unexploited resources of the

The Greeks associated this natural economic increase, of about 1%, with an irrational number like B (Greeks were also aware of irrationals N and ,).

244

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

continent. The cautious ways of earlier gernerations were become as much out of date as last year’s almanac. New commonwealths were rising in the wilderness; immigration from war-torn Europe was pouring in; wild lands were daily coming on the market. Money was to be made by the enterprising, and the multitude of the enterprising was augmenting with the expansion of the settlements. The ideal of a static society having been put away, progress was assumed to be the first law of nature, and innovation was accepted as the sign and seal of progress. It was our first great period of exploitation, and from it emerged, as naturlly as the cock from the mother egg, the spirit of romance, gross and tawdry in vulgar minds, dainty and refined in the more cutlivated. But always romance. The days of realism were past, and it was quietly laid away with the wig and smallclothes of an outgrown generation. Unfortunately economic romance is more imperious [despotic] in its demands than literary romance. Its dreams follow objective desires, and in America of those days of new beginnings the desires of diverse economic groups conducted straight to antagonistic imperialisms. The major interests of the three great sections of the country differerentiated more and more sharply. The East was discovering its Utopia in an industrial capitalistic order. With the flocking of immigrants to the factories began the extraordinary expansion of the cities and the movement of centralization that was eventually to transform America from a rural to an urban society, supplanting the farmer by the businessman and disintegrating the traditional psychology. The new manufacturing and the new finance were subjecting an agrarian people to the dislocations and readjustments implied in the industrial revolution, the outcome of which no man could foresee. The reaction of the new industrialism upon the South was immediate. With the improvements in textile manufacturing came greater demands upon the new southern staple,

Truthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s predicate values War

245

and an agriculture that had long been static with its traditional crops of indigo, rice, and tobacco, began to look forward confidently to a Utopia founded on cotton, and conceived an imperialistic dream of expanding fields of white bolls and black slaves, reaching into Mexico and embracing the West Indies. The new South left off apologizing for slavery and hoping for its ultimate extinction. Slavery had become enormously profitable and it proposed to exploit the negro as frankly as New England was exploiting the Irish immigrant, but more humanely if possible, in something of a patriarchal spirit. Meanwhile in the Inland Empire was arising an economics that looked with little favor on the imperialism of eastern capitalism or southern slavery; and economics equalitarian in temper, decentralizing in impulse; nourished on the idealism of the Declaration of Independence, but interpreting it to mean the natural right of every free citizen to satisfy his acquisitive instinct by exploiting the national resources in the measure of his shrewdness. Democratic in professions, it was middle-class in spirit and purpose. Discovering the inflowing tide of immigration to be favorable to speculation, it sought its Utopia in county-seat towns where land holdings mounted in value with every new wave. No narrow horizons bounded a realm that stretched to the Pacific and into the remote Northwest, and no stodgy ways of money-getting could satisfy men whose imaginations ranged through such spaces. This country was theirs to do with as they chose, and if eastern capitalism or southern slavery interfered with their inalienable rights, their Sharpâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rifles were at hand for defense. His volumes published in 1927, Parrington had also written this:179

The Gilded Age had begun and Old Bullion Benton had outlived his time. In the tumultuous decades that followed there was to be no bargaining with corporations for the use of what the public gave; they took what they wanted and no impertinent questions were asked. The

246

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

hungriest will get the most at the barbecue. A careless wastefulness when the supply is unlimited is perhaps natural enough. There were hard-headed men in the world of Beriah Sellers who knew how easy it was to overreach the simple, and it was they who got most from the common pot. We may call them buccaneers if we choose, and speak of the great barbecue as a democratic debauch. But why single out a few, when all were drunk? Whisky was plentiful at barbecues, and if too liberal potations brought the Gilded Age to the grossest extravagancies, if when we cast up accounts it found its patrimony gone, it was only repeating the experience of a certain man who went down to Jerico. To create a social civilization requires sober heads, and in the carousal of economic romanticism sober heads were few -the good Samaritan was busy elsewhere. The doctrine of preemption and exploitation " was reaping its harvest. The frontier spirit was having its splurge, and progress was already turning its face in another direction. Within the next half century this picturesque America with its heritage of crude energy -greedy, lawless, capable -- was to be transformed into a vast uniform middle-class land, dedicated to capitalism and creating the greatest machine-order known to history. A scattered agricultural people, steeped in particularistic jealousies and suspicious of centralization, was to be transformed into an urbanized factory people, rootless, migratory, drawn to the job as a magnet. It was to come about the more easily because the American farmer had never been a land-loving peasant, rooted to the soil and thriving only in daily contact with familiar acres. He had long been half middle-class, accounting unearned increment the most profitable crop, and buying and selling

Hopefully, but doubtful, the Preemptive war of 2003 was not related to exploitation.

Truth’s predicate values War

247

land as if it were calico. And in consequence the vigorous individualism that had sprung from frontier conditions decayed with the passing of the frontier, and those who had lost in the gamble of preemption and exploitation were added to the growing multitude of the prolitariat. It was from such materials, supplemented by as vast influx of immigrants, that was fashioned the America we know today with its standardized life, its machine culture, its mass psychology -an America to which Jefferson and Jackson and Lincoln would be strangers. Predicate Values, expedience, preemption and exploitation, dominated the first century of the American experiment with democracy. And the evidence shows that these acquisitive predicate values were, if not first introduced by Whigs, were perfected by them. Honest ‘intelligence,’ as that of Parrington, assigned this truthful judgement of Whigs: 180

The Whig party was the lineal heir of the old Federalism, but it denied its philosophical patrimony. It substituted expediency for the old economic realism, and began and ended intellectually bankrupt. Should one believe that ‘conservatives’ of the Whig genre unduly vilified President Clinton, they, as Parrington was, are honestly astute. But, such vilification was also typical of Roosevelt (F.D.R.), Wilson, Johnson, Jackson, Jefferson, Christ, Socrates, with other philosophical liberals, as Thomas Paine. Fallacious dogmatic belief bolsters a popular cabal, which is driven by nefarious predicates. If ‘hot britches’ had antagonized conservatives’ predicate values, why are liberals the only ones conservatives vilify? The predicate values’ posited by footprints of the American Leviathan State grow larger with time. These symptoms of Leviathan’s values began with causes, which, in the nihilistic shrouds of dogma, are denied. Instead, preferring dogma to preserve acquisitive material ends, to ourselves, we willingly make our truth’s predicate value ‘is false,’ as the White Rabbit in Alice’s Wonderland had portrayed. In denying the natural realities of pure truth (morality’s natural values), we trade our ‘old wine for

248

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

new,’ our ‘birthright for pottage:’ we fail to preserve our uniquely moral American heritage: which, instead of Puritan dogmatism, was of the deliberately critical reasoning, which yielded a ‘democratic sovereigntybased.’ republic. Contemporary philosophers and scientists, as Fred Wolf’s reasoning " contained in his book, The Spiritual Universe, are confirming Plato’s view of truth’s spectrum with a predicate of ‘intelligence’ separated from the predicate of temporal experience (i.e., intelligent physis as separated from materialist nomos). The following sample of Etienne Henry Gilson (18841978), a contemporary philosopher, explains why very great men like Alexander Hamilton did not comprehend Plato’s ‘pure thought’ based ‘intelligence,’ but instead engaged deliberate, critical deductive reason, as was based on his experience, laced with dogmatic ‘intelligence’ (when considering this statement, weigh the fact that Plato was neither a Christian nor Jew: that Greek culture was not greatly influenced by the biblical culture of Moses): Plato’s truth Form, which he called ‘pure thought,’ inferentially transcended to the metaphysical realms of God where the pure predicate values of truth, morality and justice are found, whereas the predicate values of Plato’s Form, he called ‘reason,’ do not necessarily transcend to God’s Realms of truth. Gilson wrote this:181

“Love not the World, nor the things which are in the world. If any man love the world, the charity of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world in the concupiscence [latin com (intensive) + cupere (desire)] of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life; which is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passeth away, and the concupiscence thereof: but he that doth the will of God abideth forever.” Bossuet recalls these words of the first Epistyle of John at the end of his ‘treatise on Concupiscence’ and he adds to them this brief but pithy commentary: “The last words of this Apostle show

Wolf is a quantum physicist, which surely is refined and detailed science.

Truth’s predicate values War

249

us that the world, of which he is here speaking, is those who prefer visible and transient things to those invisible and everlasting.” Allow me to add simply in my turn that, if we attain to an understanding of the meaning of this definition, the mighty problem we have to examine together will resolve itself. ... What is true of nature is eminently true of the intelligence, the crown of nature. In the evening of creation, God looked at his work and He judged, says the scripture, that all that was, was very good. But what was the best in His work was man, created to His image and likeness; and if we seek the basis of this divine likeness, we find it, says St. Augustine, ‘en mente’: in thought [as Plato, the critical reasoning heretic of Greek culture, had found]. Let us go further, still following the same doctor: we find that this likeness is in that part of thought which is, so to speak, the summit, that by which, in contact with the divine light of which it is a sort of reflection, it conceives truth. To seize truth here below by the intelligence, be it an obscure and partial manner, while waiting to see it in its complete splendor -- such is man’s destiny according to Christianity. Indeed far from scorning knowledge, it cherishes it: ‘intellectum valde ama’ [love the intelligence intensely]. Now a footprint of human ‘concupiscence’ (acquisitive lust), which, by practical dogma-based sovereignty, has for two centuries more or less and with few exceptions, dominated our nation’s Federalist organic strategic economic predicate values.182

Nearly three quarters of all the murders of children in the industrialized world occur in the United states and American youngsters are 12 times more likely to die by gunfire than their counterparts, federal health officials said [Feb. 6, 1997]. In releasing an extraordinary international scorecard of youth violence, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that the United States had the highest rates of childhood homicide, suicide and

250

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

firearms-related deaths of any of the 26 richest nations. The suicide rate alone for children age 14 and younger was double that of the rest of the industrialized world, the agency said. As childhood death rates from pneumonia, influenza, cancer and other diseases fell since 1950 in the United States, childhood homicide rates tripled and suicide rates quadrupled. About absolute Dogmatists’ deficient moral values, which exclusively are belief-based on their subscribed doctrines of faith, which like absolute ‘positive’ belief that irrational numbers, as B for instance, is not real (i.e., by choosing absolute dogmatic belief, they reject Kant’s reasoned finding that their dogmatism represents ‘synthetic a priori deductive’ reasoning), which is a nihilism of sorts, which their belief in dogma has produced. Although irrational numbers, as B, were only found to be real by inductive experiencebased reasoning, inductive reasoning, while always theoretical, has produced knowledge of antecedent first principles, the existence of which is prior to all human experience, and therefore is antecedently important. Which, only those that reason objectively, logically, and inferentially, transcend the nihilism of positive belief to gain knowledge modicums of the critically ‘necessary’ moral discipline of deliberate reason, the predicate values of which are of God’s LOGOS, for which ‘necessary’ moral discipline was the price paid for obtaining the antecedently a priori knowledge, which is infinitely more important than beloved contingent dogma is. Unfortunately, Dogmatists deny the ‘living source’ of ‘moral truth’ and ‘ethical justice’ and by their example more than thought and words, they inculcate and posit their amorality. And, by sophistries as false pride, they blame general amorality on the hedonism, which their silent inculcation of empty moral values stood the sponsor for. 183

Values ‘war’ being waged in obscurity Although it’s fought by a moral minority, the struggle to define America, shapes the existence of the majority. Washington -- There’s a “war” going on in this country, but most people might not notice it. It’s about whether absolute right and wrong

Truth’s predicate values War

251

exist, and whether Americans can tell the difference. In the midst of prosperity, some thinkers see a decline in things money can’t buy -- values, morals, old truths. Commentator Pat Buchanan promised at the onset of his third presidential campaign to “clean up all that pollutes our culture.” Another prominent activist from the right, Paul Weyrich, has gone as far as suggesting conservatives separate themselves from U.S. culture -- “an even wider sewer” -- because the “enemy” has won. A president who lied [However, until allegations are proved in courts of law, he is officially and legally innocent. And, he was acquitted of Impeachment.] and still leads is held out as an example of cultural decline, as are magazine covers peddling sexual gratification and raunchy television. Even the effort to turning George Washington’s birthday into a generic Presidents Day is cited as a sign of how the country has fallen [Is evidence of cultural decline exclusively in results of sin, or, is it more in doctrinal predicate values prescriptions and posits of dogmatic human logos?].

“I wonder if, after this culture war is over that we are engaged in, an America will survive that will be worth fighting to defend,” Rep. Henry Hyde, R-Illl, the leader House impeachment prosecutor, told the Senate in his effort to unseat President Clinton. The culture war is an apocalyptic struggle ranging across the landscape of national life yet hardly visible to so many. It takes multiple forms: the constitutional impeachment drama, Hollywood fare, billboard advertizing, the teaching of history, behavior on college campuses, Internet content and more. The question about absolute truth vs. Relativism has engaged philosophers since the earliest time: Is truth eternal and unchanging, or is it relative, depending on circumstance, time and place? To the cultural warriors, the United States is slouching toward Gomorrah, the biblical city destroyed for the sinfulness of its people.

252

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

[neo conservatives surely belief this] The disquiet is hard for many to

fathom. Most social indicators either are good or improving. “There is a cultural war among the elite,” says Alan Wolfe, author of “One Nation After All.” “But it doesn’t go much further than that.” James Hunter, who popularized the phrase in scholarly circles with his 1980s book “Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America,” agrees the fight mobilizes no more than 10 percent of the population. But he says that does not diminish its intensity or importance. Elites, after all, shape what is taught to children, shown on TV, turned into law and resolved in courts. “Certainly the majority of Americans live their lives fairly removed from these kinds of tensions,” he says. “That doesn’t mean there’s not a culture war.” The culture war often is traced to the 1960s, the decade of protest and free love. Some slogans from that time hold meaning today -- “do your own thing,” for example. “Americans are pretty tolerant,” says Tod Gitlin, once at the vanguard of the counterculture as president of Students for a Democratic Society. “They have their judgments. They just don’t think people should enforce their judgments.” Gitlin, who wrote “The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America Is Wracked by Culture Wars,” concedes the 1960s eroded traditional authority and brought on the “rambunctious relativists” -perhaps the sort of people who later would judge that Clinton should stay in office. That is how GOP Rep. Tom Delay of Texas, the majority whip, saw the impeachment struggle. He told the House it was “a debate about relativism vs. Absolute truth.” Some public opinion research indicates Americans, while more religious than many cultures and hardly freewheeling about sex, are

Truth’s predicate values War

253

moving toward consensus on many social issues. No seething cultural conflict is apparent. Wolfe ticks off areas where he is finding common ground among most Americans. “Working women,” he offers. “That used to be a big fight. Race -- we used to have overt and explicit racism. No one questions the principle anymore of racial equality. God -- we used to have furious battles between Catholics and Protestants.” An August poll by The Washington Post and the Kaiser Family Foundation found majorities supporting both “traditional family values” and the idea that people should be tolerant of those who live by moral standards that they consider wrong. But for some warriors, there remains too much moral equivocation, too much garbage on the tube, too far adrift from verities. Weyrich, president of the Free Congress Foundation, declared that his side has “probably lost the culture war.” He is suggesting conservatives consider such steps as hove schooling and getting rid of TV. “We have to look at what we can do to separate ourselves from this hostile culture,” he said. Hunter believes that what is driving the cultural war is a distinctively American, “almost irrational, concern for perfection.” “There are ways in which we as Americans at the end of the 20th century are just as much Puritans as our Puritan forebears,” he said. “There is this impulse to build a city on a hill and for that to be a bright and shining light, and we won’t accept anything short of it.” He says the advocates hold firm to their positions; some argue abortion is murder, while others, on the opposite side, believe in homosexual marriage. Stay tuned, he suggests. “Any conflict that is institutionalized in a number of very

254

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

prominent, well-funded organizations and whose historical and cultural roots go back as far as I think they go back, is not going to go away anytime soon,” he says. So much for making love, not war. Try to change the belief-based predicate values, which are perpetuated by dogma called ‘materialism,’ ‘determinism,’ ‘mechanism,’ ‘divine right,’ . . . and the ‘value predicates war’ waged by mechanist ‘conservatives’ of a propertied ‘moral majority,’ which, in fact, is the social minority, are then confronted: they are the values of those who claim that their dogmatic belief, provides a moral political basis for doctrinal policies, as ‘right to life,’ for instance, even while also their values, as posited by their actions, uncover political strategies, which maintained ‘slavery,’ ‘poverty,’ ‘irrationality,’ each of which unsavory propertied exploitation has bred the amoral social values, which rhetorically they claim to abhor? Emerson observed this mechanist ‘conservative’ sophistry, when he wrote this:

That which we are we are all the while teaching, not voluntarily, but involuntarily. Yes! Constantly, a political values-war is being waged to control the predicate of official organic logos: which, when asserted as organic policy, always is most politically agitated when democratic values hold the stronger position in social influence. Consider the politically organized litany of political ad hominem attacks: then comparatively consider with these the amoral predicate values of our absolute, often religious, dogmatists. About this nefarious politically predicated nature, also consider similarities in the ongoing debate about campaign financing and the vote to kill the NuclearTest Ban Treaty: About the ‘Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty 184 Linda Douglas reported, that President Clinton had said ‘This was partisan politics of the worst kind.’ And, the Senate majority leader saying ‘We’re not a rubber stamp for the President on a treaty we think is flawed.’ But, the political intent was to humiliate.

The defeat of the Test Ban Treaty humiliated the President before the

Truth’s predicate values War

255

World. The next day he could hardly contain his rage, when he said to the nation, ‘In recent days, members of the congressional majority have engaged in reckless partisanship. It threatens America’s economic wellbeing, and now our national security. Yesterday, hardline Republicans irresponsible forced a vote against the comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.’ But Republicans charged the President and Democrats had played a political trick that backfired: They demanded a vote on the Test Ban Treaty never dreaming GOP Senate leaders would schedule one. The Majority leader, bristled at charges he was just trying to embarrass the President. Lott charged, the president would rather attack him in press conferences than negotiate: ‘not a single phone call, no suggestions,’ he said. Douglas furnished a clip of Senator Helms, on the Senate floor, mocking President Clinton’s friendship with England’s Prime Minister, at the end of which he suggests the Prime Minister signs off with ‘give my regards to Monica.’ Senator Torecelli said that Senate Republicans had not gotten over the impeachment trial of Clinton in which not enough votes to uphold it were, were cast. Senator McConnel in effect said, ‘we cannot trust the President.’ This emotional politics surely caught the public’s attention and should cause concern about politicians’ nefarious materialist values that intend to capture an election during the millennial year. But, how would the argument play in a court trial? : ‘they attempted to trick us and it backfired’: would an impartial judge allow those who are responsible for nefariousness to shift the blame? Does sycophantic political belief allow this political shift to become a political fact? Should Senators be accountable for their actions? , And should their actions be attuned to specified constitutional values that holistically serve the ‘best interests of the nation’? : When should political biases officially be placated to officially supplant a dogmatic propertied causal mechanism for specified constitutional values? : Whenever persons, elected by the public of their district to serve in Congress, or as President, does their oath of office require each elected person to adopt the specified

256

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

constitutional values, which officially specify service to the nation, as a whole? : to be truthful, their own predicate values must defer to Constitution’s values and purposes? Do personal biases ever support the Constitution, or truth’s predicate ‘is true’? The political Campaign Financing debate185 Neither party alone is an effective sponsor of the necessary changes. The debate simmered down to a Bill proposed by Senator McCain and opposed by Senator McConnell. McCain made the issue a key to his bid to become the Republican presidential nominee in 2000, and he lost his political campaign. ‘Soft’ political contributions “corrupt the processes of government,” McCain claimed. Senator McConnell baited McCain ‘to specify, on the Senate floor, “which senators are corrupt,” i.e., allow ‘soft’ money to corrupt them?’ About this dare, however, George Will, on TV, said that McConnell had set a trap: he knew that McCain could not specify ‘the whom’ and ‘the what’ of “corruption” without violating Senate rule 19, section 2:

‘No Senator in debate shall directly or indirectly by any form of words impute to another senator or to other senators any conduct or motive unworthy or unbecoming of a senator.’ McCain, therefore, could go no further than his general charge: ‘corruption is everywhere but no one in particular is corrupted.’ McConnell’s ‘Ace’ in this Senate Rules ‘poker game’ says a lot about dogmatic values, which like ‘gang values’ lurk as inherent rules of Senate conduct (what the public can never learn because it cannot be told in debate on the Senate Floor, shields personal corruptions from public view). Is Senate Rule 19, section 2, a code of moral ethics, or like gang immorality, is it a code of secrecy? On Meet the Press, the same morning, a clip of McConnell’s sentiments expressed in a closed session of Senators, admitted that without corporate ‘soft’ money, Republicans could not easily win elections: “Hell

will freeze over before Republicans will agree to legislation that eliminates corporate ‘soft’ contributions,” McConnell was reported to

Truth’s predicate values War

257

have said. Was this sentiment right, but not for public disclosure? And, since McCain-Feingold became law, the election in 2004 might expose the plutocratic machinery effects that mechanistically are constantly at work for propertied value-based Republicans: As of August 2003, they still greatly enjoyed a huge political spending advantage. Political ad hominem appeals to human emotions, not reason. All that is habitual has emotional appeal. Dogma, for instance, has emotional appeal, which like the inculcated dogma of Otis, is, therefore, emotional and habitual rather than reason. And anything unreasonable is logical fallacy that when believed as truth, must still bear ‘is false’ truth value. L. Pojman wrote about the gnawing effects of unitary materialismbased-mechanist Determinism: mind conditioning dogma upon which mechanists,’ particularly, have ‘fallaciously’ based most ‘conservative’ values on, and, deductively therefrom, have based many of our government’s official policies and laws on:186

The man who used the idea of determinism more effectively than anyone before him was the great American criminal lawyer Clarence Darrow. In the 1920s two teenage geniuses from the University of Chicago, Leopold and Loeb, committed what they regarded as the perfect murder. They grotesquely dismembered a child and buried the parts in a prairie. Caught, they faced an outraged public who demanded the death penalty. The defense attorney was Clarence Darrow, champion of lost causes. He conceded that the boys committed the deed, but argued that they were, nevertheless, “innocent.” His argument was based on the theory of determinism. It is worth reading part of the plea. We are all helpless. . . . This weary world goes on, begetting, with birth and with living and with death; and all of it is blind from the beginning to the end. I do not know what it was that made these boys do this mad act, but I do know there is a reason for it. I know they did not beget themselves. I know that

258

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

any one of an infinite number of causes reaching back to the beginning might be working out in these boys’ minds, whom you are asking to hang in malice and in hatred and injustice. . . . Nature is strong and she is pitiless. She works in her own mysterious way, and we are her victims. We have not much to do with it ourselves. Nature takes this job in hand, and we play out part. In the words of old Omar Khayam, we are: “But helpless pieces in the game He plays Upon the chess board of nights and days; Hither and thither moves, and checks and slays, And one by one back in the closet lays.” What had this boy to do with it? He was not his own father, he was not his own mother; he was not his own grandparents. All of this was handed to him. He did not surround himself with governesses and wealth. He did not make himself. And yet he is to be compelled to pay (Clarence Darrow, “Attorney for the Damned, Simon and Schuster, 1957). This was sufficient to convince the jury to go against public opinion and recommend a life sentence in lieu of the death penalty. If Leopold and Loeb were determined by antecedent causes to do the deed, we cannot blame them for what they did, any more than we can blame a cow for not being able to fly. When officially we base economic policy and law on the affirmed dogmatic foundation of causal determinism (called mechanism), as if this determinism ‘truly’ is naturally antecedent principle, upon which only our experience is the basis of this judgement, we need be far more concerned about the moral damage we do to the heritage of our Constitutional society. Truth, morality, justices, . . . , have metaphysical antecedent causes (necessary predicate values) that are unrelated to our believed experience-based dogma. And this natural antecedent causes are paradoxical to our dogma, the results of which exist only because of the officially applied dogma.

Truth’s predicate values War

259

Youth is the time . . . to circumnavigate the metaphysics’ Robert Louis Stevenson About the metaphysics of life One can spend a lifetime studying and pondering, and Philosophers do this. The Provence of metaphysics is consciousness, not of reality as experienced, but reality as is inferentially consistent and necessary, where the human noetic journey continuously unfolds mysteries in personal wonderlands, the make up of which is a ubiquitous necessary thing as ‘right,‘ ‘truth,’ and causal teleology, which naturally confront the diabolical paths of life’s experience, which is believed to be reality.

Metaphysics’ dichotomy is quantitative, about the nature of things, and the order of things, and qualitative, about origins and nature of knowledge, which include ‘necessary’ truth, moral ethics, and moral justice: Ontology is quantitative (the ultimate nature of things), Cosmology is also quantitative (the order of things) and Epistemology is qualitative, including Qualitative Ontology, about origins and nature of knowledge, which include ‘necessary’ truth, moral ethics, and moral justice. Qualitative Metaphysics, confronts myriad consequential nomos-based theories, opinions, doctrines, the beliefs which claim dogma, as materialism, divine right, mechanism, and other dogma as deduced from these. Kant’s finding of synthetic a priori applied to the dilemma, which paradoxical consequential experience-based belief had caused, and is critically important to qualitative reasoning of ‘right’ and ‘truth’ about natural causality, as Darrow had cited in the above legal case. But these tangible experiencebased consequents of Quantitative Ontology (Plato’s Visible Realm) fail to provide reasoned proof of logical fidelity, the pursuit of which fails to adhere to quantitative experience. Until consequential experience-based theories, as postulated to explain the antecedent metaphysical reality (as which came first, the chicken or the egg?), of life’s ubiquitous mystical temporal journey, are reasonably logically proved, rather than just dogmatically believed, and

260

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

fallaciously affirmed as antecedent principles, we entrap ourselves and others in the temporal morass, which had produced deeds as Darrow had cited. Particularly when we deduce economies, edicts and laws on the basis of mechanist belief alone (i.e., on unitary materialist belief), as if belief in ‘absolutely fallaciously affirmed organic determinism,’ is qualitative in nature, and because officially deemed legal while intending that the factual organic posits represent epistemological truth, we should note, however, that the determined objects of our belief-based truth, i.e., the factual things posited, fit Plato’s Visible Realm (and not Plato’s Intelligible Realm), are unruly as regards the epistemological truth predicate ‘is true’ or ‘is false.’ Like the Rabbit had answered: It means exactly what I want it to mean (the Rabbit retorted to Alice about the garbled writing in the mirror). Alice in Wonderland ---Is there one ultimate substance from which the supreme power constructs all things (Monism), or two (Dualism), or more (Pluralism?) Is thought a substance? Is ‘intelligence’ a substance? ---Are all things ordered, i.e., determined (Determinism)? If determined, how can the human Free Will, or Deliberate Critical Reason logically be explained? Can a system of justice be based on Determinism and also be ethical? Is ‘is true’ ever the predicate of retributive justice, or must, ‘is true’ justice always be beneficent? We enter the abode of Monism-Dualism-Pluralism and find theoretical consequential doctrines called Idealism (the mind or spirit is fundamental and, therefore, of antecedent cause) and Materialism (matter is fundamental and, therefore, of antecedent cause). Each is convincing, at least to some. And this paradoxical belief results in making belief-based theories diabolical. On the side of Idealism, a plethora of human martyrs litters the landscape: Cicero, Socrates, Christ, . . ., . Their crimes? All were idealists as opposed by more popular commonly dogmatized absolutisms! We continue the journey of enlightened understanding, not as shocked to find great diversities in philosophical explanations: for instance, between the Existential Ethics of Jean-Paul Sartre and the Ethics of Nobility of Friedrich Nietzsche. A philosophical paradox of Free Will and Determinism is this: 187

Truth’s predicate values War

261

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL and determinism is one of the most intriguing and difficult in the whole of philosophy. It constitutes a paradox. If we look at ourselves, at our ability to deliberate and make choices, it seems obvious that we are free. On the other hand, if we look at what we believe about causality (i.e., that every event and thing must have a cause), then it appears that we do not have free wills but are determined. . . . Determinism is the theory that everything in the universe is governed by causal laws (including things of mind). The outline of the argument for determinism goes something like this: ---- Every event (or state of affairs) must have a cause. ---Human actions (as well as the agent who gives rise to those actions) are events (or state of affairs). ---- Therefore, every human action (including the agent himself) is caused. ---- Hence determinism is true. . . . It was Immanuel Kant who first suggested that the [popularly affirmed] principle of universal causality is a synthetic “a priori” -- i.e., an assumption that we cannot prove by experience but simply cannot conceive not to be the case. . . . The necessary idea of causality is part and parcel of our noetic structure. We are programmed to read our experience in the causal script. Kant saw that there was a powerful incentive to believe in determinism, but he also thought that the notion of morality provided a powerful incentive to believe in freedom of the will. Hence Kant’s dilemma. Is Kant’s dilemma, society’s dilemma? : i.e., is a result that effects humans, the necessary idea of causality [that] is part and parcel of our noetic structure: Are we programmed to read experience in the causal script? Does all humanity rationalize to get what it wants? Then tells about it so that ‘the truth’ predicate is as they want it to be, not as it is? Parrington wrote this about the Whig’ bequeath to America: 188

Citizens had saved the government in the trying days that were past; it

262

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

was only fair in return that government should aid the patriotic citizen in the necessary work of developing national resources. It was paternalism as understood by speculators and subsidy-hunters, but was it not a part of the great American System that was to make the country rich and self-sufficient? The American System had been talked of for forty years; it had slowly got on its feet in pre-war days despite the stubborn planter opposition; now at last it had fairly come into it own. The time was ripe for the Republican party to become a fairy godmother to the millions of Beriah Sellerses throughout the North and the West. Parrington also recorded the events and circumstances that allowed Whigs to mold the Republican Party’s mechanist dogma of economic determinism into the ‘Fairy Godmother to business’: 189

Democrat and Whig no longer faced each other conscious of the different ends they sought. The great party of Jefferson and Jackson was prostrate, borne down by the odium of slavery and secession . . . The Whig Republican was still Hamiltonian paternalistic, and the Democrat Republican was still Jeffersonian laissez faire, and until it was determined which wing should control the party councils there would be only confusion. The politicians were fertile in compromises but in nominating Lincoln and Johnson the party ventured to get astride two horses that would not run together. To attempt to make yoke-fellows of democratic leveling and capitalistic paternalism was prophetic of rifts and schisms that only the passions of reconstruction days could hold in check. In 1865 the Republican party [the GOP] was no other than a war machine that had accomplished its purpose. It was a political mongrel, without logical cohesion, and it seemed doomed to break up as the Whig Party had broken up and the Federalist Party had broken up. But fate was now on the side of the Whigs as it had not

Truth’s predicate values War

263

been earlier. The democratic forces had lost strength from the war, and democratic principles were in ill repute. The drift to centralization, the enormous development of capitalism, the spirit of exploitation, were prophetic of a changing temper that was preparing to exalt the doctrine of manifest destiny 190 which the Whig party stood sponsor for. The practical problem of the moment was to transform the mongrel Republican party into a strong cohesive instrument, and to accomplish that it was necessary to hold the loyalty of its Democratic voters amongst the farmers and working-classes whilst putting into effect its Whig program. Under normal conditions the thing would have been impossible, but the times were wrought up and blindly passionate and the politicians skillful [in words that Plato would use, ‘their truth -- if truth at all -- was of ‘opinion,’ not ‘reason’]. . . The rebellion of the Independent Republicans under Horace Greeley in 1872 was brought to nothing by the skillful use of Grant's military prestige, and the party passed definitely under the control of capitalism, and became such an instrument for exploitation as Henry Clay dreamed of but could not perfect. Under the nominal leadership of the easy-going Grant a loose rein was given to Whiggish ambitions and the Republican party became a political instrument worthy of the Gilded Age. Despite the evolution which gave our nation deterministic paternalism via ‘The American System of Economy,’ truth about ‘shadows instead of reality,’ as Plato had observed, remains to be ‘is true’ as regards our believed dogma, as Parrington reported:

264

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

conceives of the political state as a useful instrument for effective exploitation. How otherwise? The public good cannot be served apart from business interests for business interests are the public good and in serving business the state is serving society. Everybodys’ eggs are in the basket and they must not be broken. For a capitalistic society Whiggery is the only rational politics, for it exalts the profit-motive as the sole object of parliamentary concern. " Government has only to wave its wand and fairy gifts descend upon business like the golden sands of Pactolus. It graciously bestows its tariffs and subsidies, and streams of wealth flow into private wells. [Parrington, at another point, wrote this: Whiggery springs up as naturally as pigweed in a garden.] [a fly in the Whiggish honey works against holistic government]

But unhappily there is a fly in the Whiggish honey. In a competitive order, government is forced to make its choices. It cannot serve both Peter and Paul. If it gives with one hand it must take away with the other. And so the persuasive ideal of paternalism in the common interest degenerates in practice into legalized favoritism. Governmental gifts go to the largest investments. Lesser interests are sacrificed to greater interests and Whiggery comes finally to serve the lords of the earth without whose good will the wheels of business will not turn. To him that hath shall be given. If the few do not prosper the many will starve, and if the many have bread who would begrudge the few their abundance? In Whiggery [the GOP’s politics] is the fulfillment of the Scriptures. American Whigs used their positions of authority to design and empower, with greatly disproportionate mechanized economic paternalism, as delivered by The American System of Political Economy. Parrington called this

Take note that acquisitive values were the supplanted antecedent value.

Truth’s predicate values War

265

political economy “an ingenious scheme to ‘milk the cow’ and distribute the ‘milk’ to those who superintended the ‘milking.” As Parrington had explained above, did mechanist Whigs, in America in the mid 1800s, who were or should have been familiar with unitary materialism’s deterministic causal paradox, in the first place, deliberately rationalized economic causal theory on evidence of experience alone, then, officially affirmed mechanist theory as antecedent economic causality? Did Whigs, thereby ignore Kant’s finding of synthetic a priori, i.e., did they ignore that Kant’s work was epoch making in that Kant had established the main lines for philosophical developments since his day? 191 : Didn’t Whigs engage fallacious deductive reasoning? In this political instance, didn’t Whigs make The American System of Political Economy their “truth” as they wanted it to be? And, didn’t Whigs, by politically affirming their dogmatic experience-based causal theory, as the official antecedent economic causality, make the mechanist American System of Political Economy, the official authoritative truth’, i.e., the exclusively experience-based predicate of which posits paradoxical organic results? Life’s Wonderland is paradoxically complex, i.e., has myriad dilemmas stemming from the above cited Free Will-Determinism paradox: Before Sartre and Nietzsche, others as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, for instance, represented the philosophical metaphysical opposites: Locke treading the epistemological qualitative high road of the human free willdeterminism paradox. Hobbes, however, paid dogmatic attention to quantitative empirical results. In this, qualitative thinking persons might accurately suggest that Hobbes dogmatism had conflated his qualitative reasoning capabilities. Locke’s reason-based empiricism pursued the natural antecedent causes. Therefore, his philosophy was about naturally antecedent principle causality, and was qualitatively Epistemology-based: was about Categorical Ethical morality and ‘intelligence,’ about truth. Hobbes’ philosophy, was deduced from empirical-based determinism, and, therefore, his was quantitatively Ontological about history, about believed ‘divine rights’-based monarchy, and, disregarded Qualitative

266

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Epistemology. Kant wrote this about empirical-based belief: [They are about] assumptions that we cannot prove by experience but

simply cannot conceive not to be the case. [Epistemology, which always is qualitative, and not quantitative, Hobbes failed to show any concern for, " " still his empirical materialist causality (because quantitative must be respected, even though it, fails to qualify as a metaphysic of knowledge); Tautology, which tests for Epistemology, always seeks the antecedent causality of reason-based intelligence, as its principle.] Constantly life is confronted with temporal dilemmas, which result from irrationalism, 192 which routinely supplants quantitative materiality for qualitative intelligence, thereby exacerbating the paradoxes of life. We do this by denying Qualitative Epistemology either by celebrating rationalizations, as mechanism’s deterministic unitary materialism, or, by quantitatively denying holistically natural material needs, which to placate extreme ‘ideals’ of some, are forgiven. In extremes, we either inhibit the qualitative organic noetic to celebrate the quantitative material-based passions and emotions of some, or we starve the naturally dependent material qualities of some to placate the noetic desires of the elite few. Wholeness and health require a temporal balance. And constitutional tranquility only exists where the balance is disciplined epistemology by noetic-based ethical morality. In the general results of relaxing moral ethics to placate desires of some, our common understanding of Epistemology is conflated to materialist desire, and more often now is as portrayed by the White Rabbit’s of Alice’s Wonderland:

“exactly what we want it to mean.” One can effectively argue that we cannot know what pure truth and knowledge is about. For society and heritage, results of unhealthy cultural

The dictionary definition of qualitative (page 1588) included this interesting quote: Both the qualitative and the quantitative facts . . . are important. Whenever, the qualitative reasoned facts of Epistemology are conflated, as Hobbes had done, morality and truth consciousness are conflated.

Truth’s predicate values War

267

extremes that in Biblical times were called Sins, the pendulum effect is the only constant. I now leave this section’s pursuit of truth and knowledge with this temporal thought, which Hilary Lawson had expressed: 193

All our truths are, in a sense, fictions - they are stories we choose to believe. Lawson added this: 194

Although truth may be a fiction, it is the most powerful fiction we have. The surest, maybe the only, way for intelligent consciousness to gain a fruitful command of subconsciousness is found in the epistemological quest for truth: one can only garner tranquility in pure truth and knowledge through the processes of deliberate critical reasoning, which transcend all believed dogmas. Still, all conscious commands of will that lack moral ethics, with purpose (Teleology) inevitably explores the realms of intrigue where, similarly, others’ design exploitative mechanisms, even deadly, entrapments. Pondering the nuances of will is also in the province of metaphysics and Philosophy. While profoundly unenlightened here, I find comfort in the notion that thoughts about the abstract foundations of things find few experts there. Nietzsche’s philosophy is interesting but so different. Rather than ethics based in rational, objective Epistemology, Nietzsche celebrated ‘nihilism’ to develop his philosophy of power. His description of the ‘Blond Brute’ fairly describes the introspective aristocrat, the Brahmanist, the American ‘Captain of industry.’ If more than a coincidence, then one might inquire whether our ‘Captains of industry’ have a problem with critically objective Epistemology, particularly with moral based ethics. Parrington made few redeeming comments about Nietzschean philosophy, while the last hundred or so pages of his volumes contain many references to him. The following sample did not and could not, then, include the effect Nietzsche had on Hitler and the Holocaust. 195 (And now we can add children shooting children as happened at Columbine and maybe even Timothy McVeigh whose sympathies were with fundamentally dogmatic beliefs of Branch Divideons, and now in the new millennium, the newly defined terrorism that supposedly is external of American society, but more surely is not?)

268

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

YOUTH IN REVOLT--CERTAIN PURVEYORS OF THE HECTIC A group of youthful poseurs at the mercy of undigested reactions to Nietzsche . . . overbalanced by changes in American critical and creative standards, and in love with copious vocabularies and callow emotions. Given to satirizing the educational methods of “alma mater”; quick to espouse new causes; enthusiastic for revolt as a profession. A prolific movement which as yet has accomplished nothing seriously creative. We might contemplate what Parrington would observe about the unleashed effects of deterministic materialism embroiling Nietzschean philosophy following many more wars as we enter the Twenty First Century. Our contemplations should consider the effects of Social Security and Medicare as these social programs moderate the paradoxical extremes of our deterministic political economy (my research about political economy and sovereignty, particularly, shows that these social programs have provided great benefits to society)? We might contemplate the Twenty First Century and what Parrington’s comments might be as we entered the Twentieth Century:196

THE PROBLEM NOVEL AND THE DIVERSION FROM NATURALISM* The years 1903-1917 were a distinctive period -- a time of extraordinary ferment, when America was seeking to readjust her ideals and institutions to a revolutionary economic order that had come upon her [Parrington referred to the economic deterministic “American System of Political Economy]. The popular phase was revealed tn the muckracking movement, a movement which instructed the American middle class in certain elements of economics -- particularly the close connection between economics and politics. But underneath, and intellectual revolution was in progress, setting steadily towards a new social philosophy. The old America had been intensely conservative,

Truth’s predicate values War

269

naively provincial and self-satisfied, compassed by a complacence founded on optimism -- the gospel of the business man. The new America was eager and hopeful, impatient to square institutions to the new conditions. The total movement was profoundly democratic -- a new Jacksonianism rising in protest against a menacing plutocracy. I. The movement of Criticism. The work of a vigorous social idealism. Passed through three broad phases. --- a. Political. The movement of Progressivism, 1903-1912. And attempt to democratize the machinery of government to the end that the will of the majority shall prevail. Its impulse and much of its program came from Populism; and it resulted in a clarification of the issue between republicanism and democracy. An attack on the representative system and the checks and balances of the Fathers. I gave rise to a critical examination of the spirit and purpose of the Constitution (See J. Allen Smith, “The spirit of American Government;” W. A. White, “The Old Order Changeth”). --- b. Economic. A growing conviction that talk of political democracy is futile except in so far as it leads to economic democracy. That power is economic in origin and that those who control the economics will control the government. The gospel of economic determinism. Certain conclusions emerged: 1. That capitalism is no longer competitive but monopolistic. 2. That “laissezfair(ism)” no longer suffices. 3. That centralization has submerged the individual citizen; that he is impotent before the leviathan corporation; and that henceforth the struggle is to be between organized groups for control of the state [He lists representative books]. --- c. Literary. An examination and rejection of traditional literary and cultural ideas. An attack upon: 1. Puritan reticence and smug respectability. 2. Middleclass optimism and sentimentality. Led by H. L. Mencken, Ludwig Lewisohn, and the younger intellectuals. The bias aristocratic. II. “The Incoming of Old-World Thought.” The breaking-down of the older provincialism and the

270

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

reception of new ideas. a. The philosophy of collectivism. Derived chiefly from Germany and England; largely Marxian and Fabian. The conviction that the state must absorb the trust. Later the appearance of syndicalism and guild socialism, based on a distrust of the bureaucratic, omnicompetent state. Anarchism has remained alien in spirit [He lists representative books]. b. The new aristocracy. A reversion from an easy-going Jacksonianism based on the doctrine of equalitarianism. A direct denial of that doctrine and the theory of leadership. In business the doctrine of the intellectual aristocrat -- a suggestion of Nietzsche and the will to power. Thus Mencken joins hands with Judge Gary in upholding the ethics of the strong. The total result an effective denial of our traditional ideal of democracy. c. The problem novel. All this ferment entered into literature, tyrannizing in its insistence. Old forms became old-fashioned over night. The novel was so useful that it was drafted by a new crusading enthusiasm. Romance and naturalism alike were swept away; the political novel and the economic novel took their place to arouse public opinion to action. It was the glorification of propaganda. . . . * Lecture notes. -Publisher As we gain accountability on our life’s journey, our experiences with life’s temporal nature inferentially provide essential answers to why and where we are. Mostly, early in life we realize that our ‘birth’ resulted from copulation in which our parents were either voluntary or involuntary partners in that instinctively passionate natural occurrence. While copulation between consenting adults violates no law, even in the troth of marriage many believe this human instinct is sinful. And, others find, in the bonded agreement of the marriage troth, that the human instinctive sexual destiny is the path of truth, love, and tranquility. But, still we bristle at thoughts of aberrant sexual acts, in which others have claimed to find tranquility. Many find comfort (or pain) as their thoughts spin on their birth. The curious pursue answers about origins and heritage: answers based in logical reason, in pure truth and knowledge. Generally, common-ground is found:

Truth’s predicate values War

271

that an indescribable ultimate reality, we call God, Nature, or LOGOS, uniquely prescribed natural human existence with realities as instinct and intelligence, both in substantial reality (materiality) and metaphysical abstracted reality (unmateriality of Metaphysical Epistemology). Some hypothesize that individuals are composites of both parents and that they individually are composites of their parents' parents, on and on, and that we are integrals of the natural environment and the community as well: our physical self has no natural elements uncommon to the world and the organic and inorganic things of it; the fortunate of us are blessed with heritage lines of rich circumstance and fraternal order. The unfortunate, while organically and inorganically the same, have heritage lines of lesser order and circumstance. While our common uniqueness concerns undefinable qualities and capabilities that ultimately end in independent thoughts and actions, both the instinctive mechanistic wired carnality of life and the teleologically rational capabilities of it, are ascribed to life’s nature. With the Biblical story of creation believed, God’s instruction, as the purpose of human life’s dominion, ‘be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it,’ is important, also paradoxical: When humans fail to replenish, they fail teleologically to comply with Biblical instruction, however, with active focus on exploitations, for instance, their empiricism with natural paradox is emphasized. And when humans fail to regulate natural reproductive instincts, of all life forms under their dominion, they fail to fulfill the Biblical teleological purpose: to subdue the world. This seminal story’s teleological purpose was of creation’s LOGOS, before anything was substantially created, i.e., before temporal materialities of life occurred.197 Therefore, this teleology existed before human temporal experience was possible. This analysis begs for answers to the following questions and more: --Did pre life souls exist when God’s teleological purpose of creation, of the world and human life, was envisioned? --- Were pre life souls, contemporary of Logos, given the Biblical teleological assignment? --- And about God’s Image: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: --Were these pre life souls, contemporary of Logos, represented by ‘us’ in the sentiment: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness? Which also

272

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

begs for answers: --- If the temporal human ‘image’ (human souls in human bodies) is in the likeness of God, and other temporal life forms are not, is this likeness, thereby, more particularly found in man’s independent intelligible spiritual nature, which is reflective of God’s intelligence? --- Another critically important aspect of this ‘spiritual image’ is found in the Bible’s elaboration, So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. Both males and females have intelligent faculties that are in God’s image, however, because neither has dominion of the other, both are, charged as one, to subdue life’s natural dominion and life’s equally natural instincts (homosexuals never fulfill the ‘be fruitful’ teleology). B. Spinoza, when pondering these aspects of individual life’s creation, concluded his belief in Pantheism (which dispels notions of materiality, which often is attributed to God’s nature). And about life’s intelligent independence, Rene Descartes concluded: I think. Therefore, I am. As we contemplate evil acts in our experience, we must conclude with assurance that these deeds were spurious and therefore not a causal form of organic nature-based mechanist determinism. And, this also infers that no individual or group of society should enjoy impunity for their prescriptions or actions, either to inculcate or enact prejudice-based dogma that perpetuate evils: the noetic-based human will has an undeniable causal effect, either for humanities good or evil. Causally, God only prescribed and is accountable for the ‘good.’ Empirical evidence is conclusive. Individual accountability, as founded on morally ethical inculcation (Epistemology and Teleology), is more important to our society than are the unjust synthetic laws founded on dogmatic theories of mechanist economic determinism, as affirmed or fallaciously rationalized from equally dogmatic theories of materialism or divine right. Still, until we nullify or modify dogmatic influences, manmade laws, including the confusing paradoxical turmoil they instil, are laws that we must abide: along with inevitability of intellectual braveries and martyrdoms marking cultural change. 198

Although few sociologists would want to speak of society as a god, they

Truth’s predicate values War

273

do . . . [stress] . . . the significance of society . . . and this involves countering what they regard as the naive assumption that individuals are somehow more real and therefore more important in the explanatory scheme of things than the society to which men owe their existence and from which they derive their particular natures. The Preamble to the American Constitution has it right and we should hold government’s elected representatives accountable to form, establish, insure, provide, promote, and secure the specified intelligent constitutional purposes, which predicate values were generally ratified and routinely are periodically reaffirmed by suffrage’:

to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. As Life's adventure confronts each of us with dutiful and trustful responsibility, what we become mostly concerns each individual’s Willful choices, but still hinges upon our parents or those who filled their role: were they there for us when needed? Without them, we not only wouldn’t exist, we couldn’t hope to reach our teleological potential. As Americans, we are mostly envied when compared with the vast number of unfortunate, cold and starving human beings in the world. Collectively, what we are, is our national heritage. And, attributes of this heritage are little affected by what individually we think or do. Our beliefs, instructions and actions can, will, and do affect who, what, and heritage of those in the line of life, which follow us, but what we do or say has little or no effects on heritage as we receive, enjoy, or regret it. Heritage like subconsciousness is an abstraction of life. When consciousness is defiant by way of dogmatic belief in ‘positivism’ or nihilism, which belief forecloses on consciousness of epistemology in heritage, unfortunately, intelligible human understanding about life’s natural characteristics, as life’s most important abstraction, is muted. Heritage is the abstracted continuum of life’s registry that existed before

274

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

conscious existence, then becomes massaged by consciousness: our thoughts and actions act to register inferred predicates of factual influences upon our life’s choices, which heritage then is passed on. Heritage, the personal part, represents the inculcation registered in our consciousness and subconsciousness. This personal heritage allows either our will to independently choose the predicate and action, or we remain enslaved by subconsciousness: frequenting fresh knowledgeable pleasures, or faithfully conserving passions and habits in companionship with influence of those around us and placidly supportive in our lives. In the prejudice of nihilism, for instance, Nietzschean Ethics of Nobility expediently celebrated the Blond Brute’s materialist predicate values. Instead of Adam Smith’s deliberately reasoned moral approbation, Nietzsche’s philosophy represented expediently desired effects of his rationalized unitary materialist mechanistic theory, which about meaning, was as fictitious as the White Rabbit’s retort to Alice: it is exactly what Nietzsche wants his ethics to mean. His desired pro ‘strength and power’-based philosophy chose aspects of visceral mechanistic responsive character that unnaturally is diabolical to reasoned teleological equality; to democracy; to morality; and to Categorical Imperative truths, as of pure thought and reason. Instead of deliberate critical reasoning, which always inferentially ponders purest logically consistent truth and knowledge, Nietzschean Existential Philosophy is instead, more purely about affirmations of dogmatic desire that fallaciously, antecedently favor the dogmatic orthodox prejudice. One might consider whether or not Nietzsche had influenced the hedonistic popularity of conservative witticisms, as for instance, the common ‘aristocrat’s ‘golden rule’: “he who has the gold, rules!” Or, as surely, such causal relationship has politically inferred that “the politics, which controls’ economy, controls government.” Since democratic society can only exist when a rationally fragmented, and civil morality, politically dominate the U.S. government’s administration, and politics is surely not rational, but is the controlling factor of the U.S. government’s definition (i.e., whether government is plutocratically fascist, or rationally democratic), which at the outset established Federalist legal adjudication, and later an added Whig-based economic paternalistic causal mechanism, is the skewed basis of critical

Truth’s predicate values War

275

contention between property and essence in American politics. Answers boil down to this: Outside of social usage insurance programs, what chance exists for the U.S. political government to be defined as democratic? ---Why didn’t Nietzsche consider the philosophical problem of Kant’s “synthetic a priori?” Is the answer to this the same as why mechanist Americans did not consider Kant’s “synthetic a priori?” ---Whenever we individually or organically rationalize to affirm prejudice to achieve an expediently desired economic end, do we embrace Kant’s finding of “synthetic a priori,” or fallaciously, do we not? Consider an arithmetical model that carefully accounts the mixture of ‘contingent’ and ‘necessary’ predicate values: the model’s purpose is to quantify the net cultural effect. Equal numerical values (positive and negative) are assigned to each predicate, in which it is agreed, that the correspondence frame of truth applies, i.e., each event has an equal causal effect that is either positive or negative: i.e., the model’s applicable operations are arithmetic’s addition and subtraction. Only when the collective result is positive is the cultural effect positive. This epistemological model breaks down whenever a ‘contingent’ value is affirmed as the ‘necessary’ value, and then posits an equal corresponding fact. In this instance the inferred corresponding factual predicate value is not assured: as Leibnitz had observed: 199

There are two kinds of truths; those of reasoning and those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. If we consider that universal compatibility is only found in predicates based on deliberate critical ‘intelligence,’ as Liebnitz and Spinoza found, and incompatibility or paradox is always found in predicates which are ‘contingent’ upon ‘belief’ in dogma and ‘illusion,’ as Plato found, then we can say that, according to our model, a deliberate critical ‘intelligent’ predicate is countermanded by an affirmed predicate that is absolutely ‘contingent’ to dogmatic ‘belief’ or ‘illusion,’ thus producing no endearing effect on human culture. Also, when a theoretical causal antecedent hypothesis is ‘contingent’

276

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

upon an absolute dogma, as materialism, or is ‘contingent’ upon extreme liberal idealism (which, while supposedly of reasoned positive value, is also an absolutist form of prejudice: with all human understanding of purely metaphysical truth, there naturally exists an uncertain-something that can only be approached with the dogmatic fervor of deliberate critical reason), and results in a deduced hypothesis which also has a ‘contingent’ negative value. About truth, any philosophical theory rationalized to comport with absolute theories of ‘conservatism’ or ‘idealism’ ends in more cultural ignorance than truth. While many synthetic theories find great appeal as happened with Nietzschean Ethics, they cause a general deterioration in society’s understanding and applicability of self-determined epistemological meaning. Like Alice’s Rabbit, truth means what is wanted, instead of what is necessary. Recognizing commonly practiced irrationalism, these thoughts were celebrated in “Inconvenient Truth” told in Al Gore’s movie of the same name:

It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it. Upton Sinclair The era of procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling expedients, of delays, is coming to its close. In its place we are entering a period of consequences. Winston Churchill, 1936 We might more properly think of heritage, the impersonal part, as the culture of those who have an influence on us: this is mostly the cultural influence of our family, friends, church and schools. This impersonal heritage existed as we entered life and it continues -- hopefully improved by our own influence -- as we act to register our contributions to heritage, then involuntarily depart. The ubiquitous enigma of life and heritage present both uniqueness and challenge to the human Philosophical State.200 Immanuel Kant called deliberate reason the philosophical state of human intellect. Nietzschean ethics celebrates nihilism instead of deliberate reason. Nihilism is a prescriptive form of emotion that rationalizes prejudice by denying moral values of rationally deliberated reasoning capability: but always can only ‘approximate’ philosophical truth. Nietzsche was a materialist as

Truth’s predicate values War

277

well, a nihilist. His organic fallacy was akin to that of communism and fascism. Conservative mechanists’ values were sympathetic to Nietzschean philosophy, and in this alliance, were antithetical to democratic values. The purposeful teleology of life is to find and fulfill deliberate reason to improve heritage. ‘Good-based’ deliberate reason always will find teleology. Humans’ irrationalism, however, often fallaciously confuses deontology for teleology by affirming deontology as if teleology. And, thereby, in what humans prescribe and do, virtue is confused with vice, truth with fallacy. Where we are, what we have, and even what we will achieve relates to our parents: their genes, efforts, enterprises, accumulations, and the values of their admonishments and encouragement. What they had or achieved was largely due to their parents, on and on. This path leads to the founding fathers of our great nation, and beyond to civilizations as founded in deliberate reason, which is the philosophical state of human intellect, i.e., ‘is true’ philosophy rather than the dogmatic ecclesiastical orders of faith. Acts of Deliberate Reasoning, thankfully, had a great part in the ordering of our American constitutional society with its unique and amazing democratic Sovereignty. Our deliberately reasoned Constitution-ruled-Heritage is a unique and rich endowment secured on the simple basis of citizenship. However, this philosophically rich endowment is assured only as we accept responsibility to individually exercise our freedom to reason deliberately for ourselves and posterity. When we fail to exercise this freedom, instead, to celebrate dogmatic prejudice, we not only abdicate this teleological endowment of security-based freedom to ourselves, we also damage the constitutional Heritage of those in our realm of influence (And when our representatives in government celebrate their personal prejudice, rather than the constitutional teleological purposeful values of what are the nation’s teleology in accordance with their committed oath of office, they are liars in the sense which the Apostle John explained in his treatise on ‘concupiscence’ (The First Epistle of John), about human predicate values, which nihilistically are based on materialist desires: I. John 1:6 (from an early Greek text):

If we say that we have Fellowship with Him and walk in DARKNESS,

278

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

we speak falsely, and perform not the TRUTH. When one considers the rapid pace of change, not many of life's experiences remain common to bridge past generations to future generations. And consequently, each youthful generation uniquely engenders its own nomos-based cultural concupiscence. Cultural-change stresses, if it does not tear the fabric of tradition, heritage, and deliberately reasoned teleology. Nietzschean ‘Blond Brutes’ are inherently natural in the context of an undisciplined concupiscent human Will in each of us: Concupiscence that naturally prompts us to irreverently trample influences of tradition and even of those closest to us in our personal heritage -- in other words, to cut the Gordian knots of our subconscious inculcations -- that help to make our choices of Will totally our own (i.e., that our heritage-based ‘Blond Brutes’ ensure that our independence is intellectual, whether reason-based or not, so that our choices of action are outward-turned and personally virtuous or not). And, if not for our own ‘Blond Brutes,’ we would be prone to remain as the "timid and weak slaves" of Nietzsche’s Existentialist Philosophy (and existentialist is the operative nature of Nietzschean philosophy: I believe firmly, as personal reason-based contemplation, that he did not intend for his philosophy to be interpreted as active moral or ethical philosophy). The point I wish to be understood is this: all cultural change begins in a subconsciousconscious struggle involving one’s predicated choice. And, as all things of temporal life and nature, involve apparently opposite forces that are constants, the dialectical cultural changes of which many philosophers have called the flux of life. Whenever human choices of Will are ethically moral, truthful, and teleological, they improve the individual’s culture and, in turn, they also improve heritage (teleology, is ubiquitously, permanently beyond human intelligence); however, when ethically amoral, as instances of affirming deontology as teleology, the deteriorations in an individual’s culture, cause one’s heritage also to deteriorate. Civilization gains or loses as culture improves or it does not. In this scenario is found the universal value of ethical Truths and Knowledge, as often admonished by those who would spare us, if they could, the sadness of their own personal experiences. Lee Atwater’s amoral-based sadness, for instance, comes to mind:201

Truth’s predicate values War

279

When Lee Atwater was dying in 1991, he undertook a self-accounting and delivered a remarkable public report. "I committed myself to the Golden Rule," he wrote in Life magazine, ". . . and that meant coming to terms with some less than virtuous acts in my life." Atwater apologized to old adversaries, including Michael Dukakis, whom he had injured with his harshly negative style of politics. He expressed gratitude to old enemies, including the Reverend Jesse Jackson, for the human comfort they extended in his hour of crisis. Atwater's most touching regret, however, was about the spirit of the Republican era he had worked to create. "My illness helped me to see that what was missing in mine was a mission in that brotherhood," he wrote. "The '80s were about acquiring -- acquiring wealth, power, prestige. I know. I acquired more wealth, power, prestige than most. But you can acquire all you want and still feel empty. . . .” "It took a deadly illness to put me eye to eye with that truth, but it is a truth that the country, caught up in its ruthless ambitions and moral decay, can learn on a dime. I don't know who will lead us through the '90s, but they must be made to speak to this spiritual vacuum at the heart of American Society, this tumor of the soul." When considering the injustices, it may be fortunate for society that harsh experiences mostly fade with the generation of the experience. You may not accept this observation and then you might try to explain the student uprisings in China, South Korea, in our own country where we say we tolerate dissent (examples as Kent State or the Branch Dividians remind that dissent is not always tolerated in America), in Israel where the youth resist to perpetuate the memories of the Holocaust, in Germany, where the skinheads of Nietzschean nihilistic persuasion say the holocaust is an illusion that never happened. Worse, they say the Holocaust needs to happen. Perceptions, as illusions of subconsciousness, inherited or indulged, abide as the cognizance of successive generations? Countering the active ‘Blond Brute’ dominance in cultural thoughts and political actions, exercises

280

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

of cultural deliberate reason, provide each generation’s only civilized hope of improvement. Illusions, including those which society inculcates politically are indeed very resilient and they severely challenge each individual's will. Thoughts and philosophies that were inculcated by way of admonition or example are, therefore, very important to heritage. But, as deliberate critical predicate values begin only in independent choices of will, when the predicate choice fails to represent deliberate reasoning of ‘necessary’ ethical truth, Culture surely is ill, heritage then declines and, when the prejudice, as dogmatic ad hominem (patterned on ‘dogma of Otis,’ for instance), is politically pervasive, civilization also declines. Regardless whether our actions begin in a deliberate reasoning of ethical truth, or not, we, individually, are always accountable to our heritage, and therefore to society, for our individual actions (None can claim to be an island). When our heritage, or society is corrupt, mob-like political evils have often made martyrs of those whose predicate values are of reasoned ‘necessary’ truth. Christ, for example! : I listened to the last few minutes of the September 14, 1994 CNBC, Equal Time TV talk show. The subconscious influence of a dominant mother was the subject: the guest-authority was Mommy Dearest’s author. The final caller told how his mother's presence not only existed in him but for many years following his departure from her, her voice told him to do with his children as she had done to him: he said, ‘his past commanded his behavior.’ The key of untying this ‘Gordian Knot’ of subconsciousness, he said, was to openly discuss his experience, which had generated his subconsciousness. His story reminded me of Nietzsche’s explanation of an influential subconsciousness that can make us into "timid and weak slaves" or, worse, into a monster. When not confronted by our deliberate critical reasoning, subconscious influences can cause us, unwillingly to act benignly or monstrously (as bipolar, unbalanced emotional extremes that more often now are associated with mental illness). Also, I thought about our own Nietzschean ‘Blond Brute’ of consciousness that can trample any subconscious, hateful influence to willfully act as the noble Dr. Jekyll, rather than as Mr. Hyde which our subconscious influence can, if allowed, make us into. When the subconscious influence is benign, we more often live tranquilly, acting habitually but still lacking

Truth’s predicate values War

281

deliberate critical reasoning, and still ignorantly: We never venture far from home, or from our community of associates, or seek more knowledge, for instance. Instead, our predicate values remain ‘inward turned’ on us, family, and community of boosters. In our favor of the nomos-based memories or as Bertrand Russell said, when we have no tincture of philosophy, we resist entering upon individual and personal quests of physis-based knowledge. In my research of this contemplation, Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, compounded all answers:202

If one could observe the strangely painful, equally coarse and refined comedy of European Christianity with the derisive and impartial eye of an Epicurean "" god, I should think one would never cease marveling and laughing; does it not actually seem that some single will has ruled over Europe for eighteen centuries in order to make a ‘sublime abortion’ of man? He, however, with opposite requirements (no longer Epicurean) and with some divine hammer in his hand, could approach this almost voluntary degeneration and stunting of mankind, as exemplified in the European Christian (Pascal, for instance), would he not have to cry aloud with rage, pity, and horror: ‘Oh, you bunglers, presumptuous pitiful bunglers, what have you done! Was that a work of your hands? How you have hacked and botched my finest stone! What have you presumed to do!’ -- I should say that Christianity has hitherto been the most portentous of presumptions. Men, not great enough, nor hard enough, to be entitled as artists to take part in fashioning ‘man; men not sufficiently stong and far-sighted to ‘allow,’ with sublime self-constraint, the obvious law of the thousandfold failures

In acquisitive aggrandizements humans subscribe irrationalisms as the greatest American jurist-author called the glorious Epicurean Paradox: ‘give us the luxuries of life, and we will dispense with its necessaries.’ Oliver Wendell Holmes

282

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

and perishings to prevail; men, not sufficiently noble to see the radically different grades of rank and intervals of rank that separate man from man: -- ‘such’ men, with their ‘equality before God,’ have hitherto swayed the destiny of Europe; until at last a dwarfed, almost ludicrous species has been produced, a gregarious animal, something obliging, sickly, mediocre, the European of the present day. In this, did Nietzsche intend philosophically to support Hitler-like fascism? (And, when Nietzsche blamed church or society for subscriptions to dogmatic doctrine, did he intend his philosophy to apply beyond human Existentialism, to active consciousness? *). 203 * Existentialism holds that existence is prior to essence, and that man

makes himself what he is and is responsible personally only to himself for what he makes himself. [So. why, for instance, does this Existentialism deliberately fail to define the ubiquitousness of essence?] And, we find similarly undefinable values when observing truth’s predicate values: particularly as found in the extreme wings of American politics, for instance. Still, as to Existential Philosophy, only, critical acclaim to Nietzsche’s thoughts are due: Nature’s God has undoubtedly observed similarly the evidence of nefarious dogmatic influences on culture and heritage, which in rationalizations of an equality with God, and therefore in his name, organized religion has made: ‘divine right,’ dogma the foundation of their belief, for instance. And, this reminded me of Dr. Waldemer Read’s concerns about individual subconscious influences: What Freedom is found in the local culture? " Philosophy Professor Waldemer P. Read made this presentation on the “Great Issues Forum” program at the University of Utah on April 4, 1962. I attended "

While this document is about culture generally, it was delivered to a largely Mormon collegiate audience.

Truth’s predicate values War

283

this forum and was moved to preserve a written copy. Contemplating contemporary issues, ‘truth,’ which is a contingent of contemporary religious ‘belief,’ is the Great Issue of Professor Read's presentation, and it has never been more in common need of understanding. We all are exposed to conditioning process that Dr. Read identified to exist in all institutions, societies, and families. And of which our politics is extra loaded. Dr. Read portended a critical need for much greater public understanding of the social consequences of these processes. He carefully documented prescriptive advice, in matters of culture and individual essence, to forestall the myriad adverse influences which confront and test each in society, and the whole:204

Though we always have to act on faith, i.e., on belief, in the quest for truth, faith is no substitute for evidence. Faith usually amounts to nothing more than a psychological state of satisfaction with received beliefs. Nor is the comfort which an idea gives a mark of its truth. Ideas like husbands or wives, though false may be comforting. This is a hard lesson. When we undertake to separate true from false beliefs, we are dealing with materials where prejudice (i.e., faith) already has a weight advantage. I repeat, only two sorts of considerations are legitimate for the identification of true propositions: considerations of empirical fact, and of logical relation. The history of science shows that these are the two legs on which science walks. Why is it so hard to learn this lesson to learn it not only in theory, but in practice? For an answer to this question we must turn to a consideration of the possibilities, methods and devices for the control of human beings through control of their minds. Thought control is by far the most effective kind of human control. It has long been known that most beliefs are not reasoned; they are caused. They are effects, not conclusions. This is to say they are not freely espoused, and cannot be freely laid aside. Of course, given the beliefs, "rationalizing" has come into vogue. "Rationalizing" means

284

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

"finding good reasons as opposed to the real reasons for believing or doing what one is going to believe or do anyhow." . . . What I have hoped to emphasize is that the conditioning process is a means of manipulation, an instrument of control. Moreover, the conditioning process is equally effective whether used unwittingly or with deliberate intent. The bearing of this principle upon our problem is simple. Individuals become members of society, not through reasoning, but by conditioning. Every institution, every family group for instance, and every church group is a conditioning agency. Through conditioning it recruits and controls its members. "In order that any society may function well, its members must acquire the kind of character which makes them want to act in the way they have to act as members of the society or a special class within it. They have to desire what objectively is necessary for them to do. Outer force is replaced by inner compulsion, and by the particular kind of human energy which is channeled into character traits." 205 However, institutional control is like rain, or food; it's good up to a point; beyond that point it is deadening. Institutional control is good if the institution which provides it is open at the top; if the institution is closed, then the control is bad. That is, an institution may be such as to provide a ladder by which the individual may reach a launching pad from which he may transcend the very forms that lifted him; or, it may provide a ceiling which shields him, to be sure, but also limits him and uses him as one of the elements in the truss which holds it up. Institutions of the first sort liberate the human spirit; those of the latter kind imprison it. Bertrand Russell has written of the harm in educational systems which treat the individual child as a means to an end, not as an end in himself. "The teacher," he says, "should love the child better than his State or his Church." To so love the child is to want to liberate him. It is to refuse to treat him as mere plastic material

Truth’s predicate values War

285

to be molded to a common form; it is to cherish his individuality, his uniqueness, his independence of thought and belief, his potentials as a possible contributor to the growth and enrichment of the human spirit in the continuing progress of mankind. As features of . . . . uniform beliefs and teaching practices, certain methodological beliefs are noteworthy. These beliefs then [become tools of the institution] to reinforce uniformity. They become matters of attitude and function in the culture much like a governor functions in a locomotive or motor bus. They tend to insure that no discussion will get out of hand, that no heretic will run away with the argument, that the truth will always prevail. Three of these attitudinal or methodological beliefs are: ---- 1) belief in the absolute certainty of the doctrine (the dogmatic attitude); ---- 2) belief in the wickedness of doubt; and ---- 3) belief in the authoritative hierarchy. All three of these beliefs are conditioned responses. No one of them can be justified as an aid to cognition [the only natural faculty which allows humans to garner ‘truth’ to underpin ‘knowledge’]. They all intend to block inquiry, or, rather, to transform inquiry into rationalization. A word or two about each. Dogmatism is inimical to freedom in thought. It denies the need of inquiry - save the inquiry of the learner; it denies the need for further research. In contrast with dogmatism, science became successful when it became tentative, skeptical, self-corrective. The scientific spirit is one willing to settle for probable as opposed to certain truth. But for the scientist, no settlement is final. He wants to be as assured as possible; and that induces a willingness to look again, to re-examine. Dogmatism in its very nature is unreadiness to re-examine. It trans mutes reason into [a rationalized search for the] "right reason"; right reason is that which comes up with the accepted answers. It has little in common with that reason of which Russell spoke when he said; "Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth - more than ruin, more even than

286

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

death. Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible; thought is merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habits; thought is anarchic and lawless, indifferent to authority, careless of the well-tried wisdom of the ages. Thought looks into the pit of hell and is not afraid. It sees man a feeble speck, surrounded by unfathomable depths of silence; yet it bears itself proudly, as unmoved as it were lord of the universe. Thought is great and swift and free, the light of the world and the chief glory of man" Turning now to the adoration of faith and the distrust of doubt which characterizes . . . culture [closed by belief], it will be well to remind ourselves of remarks of John Stuart Mill: ". . . . it is the opinions men entertain, and the feelings they cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they deem important which makes this country not a place of mental freedom." "No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead." The free mind recognizes that the question of truth - the determination of truth - is prior to the obligation to believe. The insistence upon faith begs the question of truth. The . . .[closed or dogmatized] culture penalizes the reluctant believer by holding him suspect as to character. Too frequently, it is assumed that an attitude of skepticism or of unbelief is a sign of moral turpitude and of spiritual rebellion. For too many, the idea that an unbeliever may be a good man is quite unthinkable. Perhaps nothing is more popular with . . . . [Sycophants of dogmatic beliefs, as in the massacre at Mountain Meadow, followers of koresh, Jones or LeBaron] than the importance of deferring to the

authorities in matters of judgment - not only with respect to doctrinal interpretation, the reading of the scriptures, but with respect to matters of policy and practice. Social wisdom is supposedly vested in the . . . [authorities] deep moral insights. "When those who are in authority have decided, the thinking has been done." The virtue of deference to

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

287

authority is thought to be one of the strongest assurances of salvation. It is, however, an abnegation of individual responsibility in thought. When carried to extreme, it is the antithesis of freedom of mind. "If thou seest a man of understanding, get thee betimes unto him. And let thy foot wear the steps of his door. Yet accept no person against thine own soul. And let not reverence for any man cause thee to fall; But let the counsel of thine own heart stand: For there is none more faithful unto thee than it. For a man's mind is sometime wont to bring him tidings, More than seven watchmen, that sit above in a high tower." --Ecclesiasticus Dogmatism, adoration of faith, and deference to authority; all three of these conditioned beliefs tend to solidify and perpetuate the uniformity of belief. Predicate Values of Purest truth are found in ‘good’ and ‘right’ In temporal life in a material world, ‘necessary truth’ is always severely challenged by the more popular, but irrational ‘contingent truths,’ of Plato’s ‘Visible Realm,’ of ‘opinion’ or ‘belief.’ Considering the myriad forms of mind ‘conditioning,’ is there any wonder why ‘necessary truths’ are routinely and deliberately obscured? H. Lawson and L. Appignanesi’s Dismantling

Truth , gave substantial discussions, and this quote, with great references. 206 Humanists - philosophers, theologians, historians, literary critics - have to worry about whether they are being scientific - whether they are entitled to think of their conclusions, no matter how carefully argued, as worthy of the term ‘true.’ Richard Rorty Only in dedications to unfettered education does society lift itself to new standards which are based on ‘necessary’ truth and knowledge. As official dedications to popular ignorance of ‘opinion’ or ‘belief’ prevail, the moral and ethical standards of society must decline, eventually destroyed: leaving only ignorance and corruption, which are the posited results of depraved predicate

288

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

values of ‘contingent truth.’ Concerning truth and knowledge, society is never as cardinally important as each individual is. The greatest service that individuals can give to society, therefore, is found in each quest of ‘necessary’ truth: only found individually in pure logical reason, with ‘the scientific method’ applied. Examples -- as what happened in Yugoslavia and more pronounced in Somalia and Sudan -- abound: the genocide which occurred in Yugoslavia has those of faith conditioned Christian belief as perpetrators while that occurring in Sudan originated by those of faith conditioned Muslim belief. Neither form of belief conditioning has anything to do with deliberate-critically-reasoned ‘necessary truth’: the one probably is founded in a residue of the inward-turned, conditioned belief, which caused the Crusades. While both, are more surely of traditional belief conditioning as founded in ethnic dogmatism. Examples are also found in zealous politics: in the U.S., at the opinion-belief level of consideration, the reasoned issues about environment, welfare, and personal security embroil controversy with Whig ‘organic’ government as politically driven by acquisitive corporate wealth and power. Precedent to society achieving excellence, based on unfettered truth and knowledge, we individually must rededicate ourselves to the strategic truths of our Declaration and Constitution’s purposes; these were achieved by deliberate-critical-reasoning. If a sufficient commonality anchored to these transcendent truths can be reactivated, new greatness in leaders with integrity and morality will lead to greater successes in ‘good’ and ‘right.’ Hierarchical, orthodox sovereignties invariably remained to begin with and now remain in the way to dissuade ‘necessary truth’ at the ultimate level of each state’s organic sovereignty. And only self imposed deliberate-critical-reason can resolve this Epicurean paradox-based dilemma, the foundation of which is absolute dogmatic belief. Descartes, maybe the greatest mathematician ever, told us this about discipline necessary to lift humanity from the Dark Ages’ dogma. 207

First to accept nothing until we can see its truth ‘clearly and distinctly.’ We must divide any difficult problem into smaller and smaller parts until we come to some proposition so simple that we see its self-evident

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

289

290

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth PLATO’S DIVIDED LINE

truth. We can then build on this sure basis always proceeding by small, self-evident steps. The origin of existential truth, Descartes suggested, is this: [the] certainty of [ones] own existence. It was possible to doubt

everything else, but not one’s own existence. As soon as you try to doubt your existence, you see that you must exist as the doubter. You cannot doubt that which you are doubting. From this line of reasoning, Descartes proved as truth [to himself, which ultimately is the exclusive logical essential of reasoned " truth]

the existence of God. About Plato’s forms of truth, C. H. Monson, Jr., wrote this: 208

Pay careful attention to the various parts of the divided line and notice how they are exemplified in the allegory. Plato believes reality consists of two aspects, that which is visible and that which is intelligible, and that the later is the more important. The following excerpt from Plato’s ‘Divided line and the Allegory of the Cave’ caps this exposition of reasoned Truth.’

Whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of Good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light, and the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed. ---On which side Plato’s ‘divided line,’ are believed dogmatic predicate values found? Are the materialist values of dogma ever found on the side where individual ‘intelligence’ syllogistically finds ‘necessary truth’? Or, only on the ‘visible side’ where dogmatized mind conditioned ‘truths,’ as believed, analogous to ‘shadows’ are common?

Critical ‘Reason,’ assures that truth’s value predicates are of probity.

‘PHYSIS’ - - COSMIC: ‘Eternal Good’ Ascending order of truth GOD’S LOGOS 209 PURE KNOWLEDGE (The predicate of God’s LOGOS is PURE LOVE: Faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, promise: Jehovah’s Covenant. Lao-tse said this is Sinderesis,210 i.e., God’s is impartially constant) INTELLIGIBLE REALM FORMS: A B

---

knowledge pure thought reason

Human cogito is the ontological conductor between ‘NOMOS’ and ‘PHYSIS’: i.e., logos ’ values, at will, are attuned to LOGOS’ values? ‘NOMOS’ WORLD: ‘temporal, material’ HUMAN logos [as naturally corrupted by material aspects, i.e., by upbraiding dogma as imbued with a material focus. PURE LOVE is corrupted by visceral emotion, admixtures of love-hate-greed] VISIBLE REALM

Opinion

FORMS: C -belief D -illusion And, while those who reason critically and thereby understand ‘necessary truth,’ however, for expedience, have chosen dogmatic predicate values, for the popular political advantages that are found there: do they thereby ‘walk in the light of God? Or, as Bossuet suggested in comments about St. John’s Treatise on Concupiscence,211

are they those who prefer visible and transient things to those invisible and everlasting.

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

291

Mortals as Confucius, Lao-tse, Plato, Socrates, . . ., who were not conditioned by Biblical doctrine, understood pure continuous everlasting Truth: as Moses had written that he had received by ‘revelation.’212

For all his ways are Judgment: a God of Truth and without iniquity, just and right is he. The Song of Moses’ text confirms Moses’ understanding of God’s ontologismsyllogism-based inferential logic (i.e., LOGOS), which teleologically accords with natural evidences. Therefore, what Moses called ‘revelation’ he undoubtedly had obtained by critical prayerful contemplation that is the similar manner as Plato or Confucius or Lao-tse had obtained their metaphysical essence-based ‘truths’ (Which inferentially confirm that the antecedent principle ubiquitous axiom, called God, or Nature, is universal). Then also, the old-English word troth is an etymological root in the seminal origins of ‘truth.’ In the context in which Moses referred to ‘truth,’ the predicate values of ‘troth’ are purer in meaning (therefore, the fault of meaning that was lost, is with translations): The predicates of Troth, or Covenant (faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, and promise), connote the predicate values of God’s logos which posited and sustain all realities (ontology) of Creation. Unless mortals adopt and portray these values in their personal and business conduct, they fail to be ‘intellectually trustful and truthful’ to the inferred necessary Troth, or Covenant: compared with those values of God’s ’troth,’ their values are ‘incoherent’ which sentiment was documented by St. John in his first Epistle: ‘If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the [troth].’ And, since the predicate values of organizational logos are synthesized-group rather than personal, individually chosen values, ‘untruth,’ instead of ‘lying,’ is maybe a better word to depict the predicate of what is untrue or unrespectful of the continuum-based predicate of cosmic creation. Plato, Cicero, Russell, Einstein, . . . , was un religious in the sense of particularly organized religion but their value predicates were those of deliberate philosophical ‘intelligence,’ which St. John described, as ‘walking in the light of God.’ And, in this regard, Russell stands out for criticizing common believed ‘contingent truth,’ as particularly based on unitary materialist dogma. 213

292

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Some schools of philosophy . . . maintain that in all our knowledge there is an inferential element, that all knowledge is an organic whole, and that the test of truth is coherence rather than conformity with "fact.” I do not deny an element of truth in this view, but I think that, if taken as the whole truth, it renders the part played by perception in knowledge inexplicable. Einstein stands out because his whole life was an embodiment of values inferentially drawn from the deliberate, critical study of natural physics. Undoubtedly, his name would appear high on a list of greatest scientists ever and probably he was the greatest of the Twentieth Century (incidently, this was written before any formal acclaim of this came about and was given in awards to him): ‘The year 1905 was an epoch-making one . . . because Einstein

contributed three papers . . .. Each of them became the basis of a new branch of physics.’ His equation E=mc² relates mass to energy (F. Wolf, however, pursued the relationship of intelligence with energy). Einstein wrote this: 215

‘Strange is our situation here upon earth.’ Each of us comes for a short visit, not knowing why, yet sometimes seeming to divine a purpose. From the standpoint of daily life, however, there is one thing we do know: that man is here for the sake of other men -- above all for those upon whose smile and well-being our own happiness depends, and also for the countless unknown souls with whose fate we are connected

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

293

by a bond of sympathy. Many times a day I realize how much my own outer and inner life is built upon the labors of my fellow-men, both living and dead, and how earnestly I must exert myself in order to give in return as much as I have received. My peace of mind is often troubled by the depressing sense that I have borrowed too heavily from the work of other men. I do not believe we can have any freedom at all in the philosophical sense, for we act not only under external compulsion but also by inner necessity. Schopenhauer’s saying -- ‘A man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what he wills’ -- impressed itself upon me in youth and has always consoled me when I have witnessed or suffered life’s hardships. This conviction is a perpetual breeder of tolerance, for it does not allow us to take ourselves or others too seriously; it makes rather for a sense of humor. Everyone holds certain ideals by which he guides his aspiration and his judgement. The ideals which have always shown before me and filled me with joy of living are goodness, beauty, and truth. To make a goal of comfort or happiness has never appealed to me; a system of ethics built on this basis would be sufficient only for a herd of cattle. Without the sense of collaborating with like-minded beings in the pursuit of the ever unattainable in art and scientific research, my life would have been empty. Ever since my childhood I have scorned the commonplace limits so often set upon human ambition. Possessions, outward success, publicity, luxury -- to me these have always been contemptible. I believe that a simple and unassuming manner of life is best for everyone, best both for the body and the mind. My passionate interest in social justice and social responsibility has always stood in curious contrast to a marked lack of desire for direct association with men and women. I am a horse of single harness, not cut out for tandem or team work. I have never belonged wholeheartedly to country or state, to my circle of friends, or even to my

294

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

own family. These ties have always been accompanied by a vague aloofness and the wish to withdraw into myself increases with the years. Such isolation is sometimes bitter, but I do not regret being cut off from the understanding and sympathy of other men. I lose something by it, to be sure, but I am compensated for it in being rendered independent of the customs, opinions, and prejudices of others, and am not tempted to rest my peace of mind upon such shifting foundations. My political ideal is democracy. Everyone should be respected as an individual, but no one idolized. . . . Full well do I know that in order to attain any definite goal it is imperative that ‘one’ person should do the thinking and commanding and carry most of the responsibility. But those who are led should be allowed to choose their leader. It seems to me that the distinctions separating the social classes are false; in the last analysis they rest on force. I am convinced that degeneracy follows every autocratic system of violence, for violence inevitably attracts moral inferiors. Time has proved that illustrious tyrants are succeeded by scoundrels. . . . The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art and science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger, who can no longer pause to wonder and stand rapt in awe, is as good as dead: his eyes are closed. . . . I cannot imagine a God who rewards and punishes the objects of his creation, whose purposes are modeled after our own -- a God, in short, who is but a reflection of human frailty. . . .. It is enough for me to contemplate the mystery of conscious life perpetuating itself through all eternity, to reflect upon the marvelous structure of the universe which we can dimly perceive, and to try humbly to comprehend even an infinitesimal part of the intelligence manifested in nature. Kant, explaining Plato’s spectrum of truth, began with ‘The Critique.’ In this addendum Kant suggests balance is essential.216

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing awe and

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

295

admiration the more frequently and continuously reflection is occupied with them; the starred heaven above me and the moral law within me. I ought not to seek either outside my field of vision, as though they were either shrouded in obscurity or were visionary. I see them confronting me and link them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. The first begins with the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and expands the connection in which I find myself into the incalculable vastness of worlds upon worlds, of systems within systems, over endless ages of their periodic motion, their beginnings and perpetuation. The second starts from my invisible self, from my personality, and depicts me as a world possessing true infinitude which can only be sensed by the intellect. With this I recognize myself to be in a necessary and general connection, not just accidentally as appears to be the case with the external world. Through this recognition I also see myself linked with all visible worlds. The first view of numberless quantity of worlds destroys my importance, so to speak, since I am an ‘animal-like being’ who must return its matter from whence it came to the planet (a mere speck in the universe), after having been endowed with vital energy for a short time, one does not know how. The second value raises my value infinitely, as an ‘intelligence,’ through my personality; for in this personality the moral law reveals a life independent of animality and even of the entire world of sense. This is true at least as far as one can infer from the purposeful determination of my existence according to this law. This is not restricted to the conditions and limits of this life, but radiates into the infinite. Kant reminded that inferential philosophical logic confuses the masses: seemingly making the incomprehensibility of inferential truth more complex. Particularly it does this for those whose mind’s eye to reasoning is closed to deliberate critical intelligence: Their predicate value of mind conditioning preempts their mind’s natural capabilities and responsibilities. Dogma, as believed, is the foundation of their pseudo intellectual ‘visible’

296

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

world, a world in which many, who do understand, trade their nature bequeathed, values of the troth for the politically expedient belief-based values of aristocracy.217

Every ‘dominant class, as it has arisen, has done its best to use the machinery of justice for its own benefit.’ The temptation to such perversion is perennial; it is the particular and besetting temptation of an un martial [given to going to war to get its way] monied class; and in times of social stress it becomes acute. In revolutionary crises -- as in England under Lord Chief-Justice Jeffreys and in France under the Revolutionary Tribunal -- the political function overrides the judicial, the last protection of the individual is swept away, and society lies helpless before the ruling power. Thus to pervert the legitimate functions of the courts is a dangerous game to play -- most dangerous for a non-military group for whom the courts are protectors; and yet it is precisely this game that capitalism in America, heedless of the teachings of experience, has long been playing. Using the courts as a police power it has brought contempt upon them and thereby weakened the arm upon which alone it can hope to rely in periods of acute stress. In short capitalism has assumed the function of sovereignty in America, but it refused to assume the responsibilities of sovereignty. To gain immediate ends it has shut its eyes to future consequences. It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it. Upton Sinclair And,

‘If we say that we have fellowship with Him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the (troth).’218 Natural responsibilities inherent of the seminal predicate values of the ‘troth’ compel naturally those of the critical reasoned troths to act, so to dispel sophist rationalization and ‘falsehood,’ to make conventional dogmatic belief compliant with ‘necessary’ truth: Religion persuades dogmatic ‘belief,’ politics dogmatic ‘opinion.’ And since temporal truth of Plato’s Visible Realm, which

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

297

is contingent upon dogmatic ‘belief’ or ‘opinion,’ is paradoxical, i.e, no more valid as ‘is true’ ‘truth,’ than it is ‘is false’ ‘truth,’ only those who comprehend and choose value predicates of ‘necessary’ ‘is true’ ‘truth’ are qualified to evaluate the predicate values from Plato’s truth Forms C & D (of his Visible Realm), to Forms A & B (of his Intelligence Realm): Lao-Tse’s Sinderesis had distinguished the same difference. Someone once said, that ‘deeds begin in words.’ But both words and deeds begin in the predicate values, which describe the human prescriptive logos, of which logic closely if not identically is related. Abraham Lincoln may have displayed the purest example of values that put humanity before himself (Hamilton, also fits this description, but as it pertains to Federalism, which is dogmatic; and George W. Bush tapped these qualities, when with words, he described his ‘compassionate conservatism,’ however, did he walk the talk?). And Lincoln, was a ‘free soil Whig,’ the Political philosophy of which Parrington described as beginning and ending intellectually bankrupt. Parrington praised Lincoln as Dr. John H. Finley did when writing this:

I wish every immigrant could know that Lincoln spent only one year in school under the tutelage of five different teachers, and that that man still could be the author of the Gettysburg address. Allen C. Guelzo, professor of American history at Eastern College in St. Davids, Pa., wrote, ‘Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President.’ 219 After Abraham Lincoln was fatally shot on Good Friday in 1865, American preachers forgot their prepared Easter sermons and rhapsodized about the martyred president. Some compared him with Moses or even Christ. Ever since, religionists have portrayed Lincoln as an exemplar of Christian faith. But he wasn’t, not in any conventional sense. The religious aspect of the tale, in a nutshell: Lincoln was unable to believe, but was never comfortable in his unbelief. Youthful skepticism gave way to deeper respect for religion. And during the devastation of the Civil War, Lincoln’s selfmade theology reshaped Amerivan history. The key to Lincoln’s belief system was a rough-hewn version of predestination that he absorbed from his parents churches. In Kentucky, Lincoln’s parents were devoted to the hard-shell

298

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Primitive Baptists; later in his boyhood, in Indiana, his father and stepmother joined the slightly more moderate Separate Baptists. Both were rigidly Calvinistic. Young Abe had little interest in his parents’ churches. And while living in New Salem, Ill., in 1834, he wrote a ‘little Book on infidelity’ that contemporaries said attacked the divinity of Jesus and the special inspiration of the Bible. Then 25, he considered submitting it for publication in a newspaper but friends persuaded him to burn it. That was fortunate, since Lincoln was just launching a political career. As a champion of small and big business, his natural home was the Whig Party. Like today’s Republicans, the Whigs drew heavy support from Evangelical Protestants -- who wanted pub piety and the abolition of slavery. Lincoln would have gained politically by joining some church, maintaining a religious front and keeping doubts to himself. But that would have been completely out of character. ‘He was quite literally, honest Abe,’ Guelzo says. Religion became a hot issue in 1846 when Lincoln won a seat in the U.S. House over Democrat Peter Cartwright. The Cartwright camp spread talk of Lincoln as infidle and he responded in a handbill distributed days before the election. ‘That I am not a member of any Christian Church, is true,’ Lincoln wrote. But he denied disrespect toward religion in general or any Christian group. When young, he said, he became inclined toward the ‘doctrine of Necessity -- that is, that the human mind is impelled to action, or held in rest, by some power over which the mind itself has no control.’ James Smith, a Presbyterian pastor in Springfield with whom Lincoln had many chats, said Lincoln believed some form of providence was at work in the universe, but was unable to believe in a personal God or in Jesus as his savior. That amounted to Unitarianism, But Lincoln had no interest in that liberal denomination. Guelzo believes Lincoln combined two classic strains in American culture [Are not these strains those which Kant had said naturally confronted every human]. For instance, on principle he helped conquer Protestant Whig and

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

299

300

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Republican elements that despised Catholic immigrants. And after some struggle, he came to see slavery not as a pragmatic problem but a moral blight. Early in the Civil War, with the North’s effort sputtering, Lincoln came to believe that defeat was inevitable if the war was being waged only to save the Union, not a higher moral cause. At a critical cabinet meeting after the Battle of Antietam in September of 1862, Lincoln astounded his colleagues by saying he had made a vow to himself and -- he added after a pause -- ‘to my Maker’: If God allowed the North to repel Lee’s Confederate invasion, it would then be Lincoln’s duty to abolish slavery. This prewar skeptic was now, Guelzo writes, ‘offering as his reason for the most radical gesture in American history a private vow fulfilled in blood and smoke by the hand of God.’ When the Emancipation Proclamation was issued the following January, Lincoln added this conclusion, at the prompting of Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase: “Upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgement of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God.’ When Lincoln said farewell to his Springfield neighbors on February 11, 1861, he parted with these words:220

Lincoln continued in secret to Washington, arriving early on the morning of February 23.

‘Here I have lived a quarter of a century, and have passed from a young to an old man. Here my children have been born, and one is buried. I now leave, not knowing when, or whether ever, I may return, with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance I cannot fail.’ The long train trip to Washington, D.C., had been carefully planned to include stops at most large Eastern cities. This allowed many thousands of persons to see the man who would be their next President. In Harrisburg, Pa., Lincoln heard reports of an assassination plot. His advisors persuaded him to cut short his trip.

LINCOLN Free-soil Liberal The equalitarian West that bred Andrew Jackson bred Lincoln also, a man with the same homespun mind, the same sterling integrity of nature, the same instinctive democracy, but shaped by an environment in which the new philosophy of progress had displaced the older agrarianism. The road of middle-class ideals he traveled further than Jackson, but in the end he also turned back to pick up once more the democratic faith then being repudiated by the proponents of slavery, north as well as south. Long an ardent Whig of the Clay school, and thoroughly indoctrinated in a paternalistic nationalism, he was brought,

Lincoln was assassinated on the evening of April 14, 1865. John Wilkes Booth, one of the best known actors of the day, shot the President in the head from the rear of the presidential box at Ford’s Theater. Booth was hunted down and shot in a barn at Bowling Green, Va. He was born in Bel Air, Md. About historical popularity, Lincoln is considered the finest president ever and while his political mentor was Henry Clay, his philosophical mentor was Thomas Jefferson and a staunchest admirer was democrat Andrew Johnson, his vice president: this represents an odd blend of predicate values. Whig values were generally monarchical, as carried forth in the line of Federalism as the constitutional king, which alter-ego was English Toryism, with a King. Lincoln, however, was a pure product of frontier America. He was genuine and his values were deliberately balanced. While not religious in any particular organic sense, his values knew only honesty and integrity. The political Lincoln always agreed with the real Lincoln: no value complexities and, therefore, no doublespeak or actions that were contingent upon hidden personal or factional values. In St. John’s view, ‘He walked honestly in the light of his Creator.’ In Lao-Tse’s view, he possessed Sinderesis. Parrington, complimented Lincoln by comparing his values to those of Andrew Jackson.221

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

301

as every thoughtful American of the times was brought, to weigh the program of slave imperialism in the scales with the Declaration of Independence. The doctrines of that great document lay before every man’s feet in those uncertain days, to get over as one could. They could not easily be evaded or got around; they must be dealt with. Rufus Choate, representing Boston Toryism, had come upon them and dismissed them as ‘glittering and sounding generalities.’ Calhoun, representing southern imperialism, had come upon them and essayed to destroy them by a critical realism. Lincoln, embodying the spontaneous liberalism of the West, came upon them and paused to take his bearings afresh. He could neither wave them aside nor destroy them. The deeprooted equalitarianism of his simple social philosophy found in them an eloquent pronouncement of its democratic faith, that set him upon considering how such doctrine might be squared with the reality of slavery. The agrarianism of John Taylor and the Whiggery of Henry Clay could tell him nothing about that; he must seek elsewhere; and the solution he found in an amalgamation of equalitarianism and freesoilism, in an adaptation of western Whiggery to Jeffersonian principles. Whatever party name he might call himself by, in his love of justice and his warm humanity Lincoln was essentially Jeffersonian. He respected property rights, but other rights he believed more sacred. And as he watched the emergence in the South, of the ideal of a Greek democracy, as he considered how the party of Jackson had become the party of Calhoun and Douglas, bent solely on strenthening as spreading the institution of slavery, his equalitarianism took alarm. He could not sit quiet while the principles of the Declartation of Independence were being openly flouted; he must speak out; he must arouse the idealism of the people to deal with the iconoclasts. In an important pronouncement written in 1859, he set the problem before them thus: “Remembering . . . that the Jefferson party was formed upon its supposed superior devotion to the personal rights of men, holding the rights of property

302

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

to be secondary only, and greatly inferior . . . it will be . . . interesting to note how completely the two [parties] have changed hands as to the principles upon which they were originally supposed to be divided. The Democracy of today hold the liberty of one man to be absolutely nothing, when in conflict with another’s right to property; Republicans on the contrary, are for both the man and the dollar, but in case of conflict the man before the dollar. . . . But, soberly, it is now no child’s play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation. . . . The principles of Jefferson are the principles and axions of free society and yet they are denied and evaded, with no small show of success. One dashingly calls them ‘glittering generalities.’ Another bluntly calls then ‘self-evident lies!’ And others insidiously argue that they apply to ‘superior races.’ These expressions, differing in form, are identical in object and effect -- the supplanting the principles of free government, and restoring those of classification, caste, and legitimacy " . . . . They are the vanguard, the miners and sappers of returning despotism. We must repulse them or they will subjugate us.” (Letter to H. L. Prince and Others, April 6, 1859, in Works, Vol. V, pp. 125-126) Two conceptions were here competing in Lincoln’s mind, the older equalitarianism that sprang from French humanitarianism and the newer economics that came from English ‘laissez faire’; and the attempt to reconcile them suggests how far he had traveled along the path of western Whiggery. With the spirit of enterprise he had no complaint; the ideal of progress was associated in his mind with a fluid economics that permitted the capable to rise through skillful exploitation. He had no love for the stable economics of the eighteenth century that

Considered by Tautological veracity testing, these political foundations are no more than the irrationalism of logical fallacy.

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

303

Jackson preferred; the profit motive, functioning freely, he regarded as the legitimate driving force of society; but he was concerned that competition should be open to all on equal terms. As he watched the transition from an agrarian to an industrial order, he found himself more in sympathy with the new than the old. Accepting the principle of exploitation he came to the position of the little capitalist who believed that in America capitalism could be democratized by the simple method of keeping the opportunities for exploitation open to every citizen [Political Whiggery succeeded to obtain corporate ‘fictitiouslegal-person’ rights equal to the natural rights of humans and this opened exploitations in America to foreigners while substantially closing opportunities to individual citizens]. It was common view of western Whiggery, and in so far as Lincoln remained a Whig, content with a system which he accepted as peculiarly suited to the genius of the American people. In a late speech he summed it up thus: “What is the true condition of the laborer? I take it that it is best to leave each man free to acquire property as fast as he can. Some will get wealthy. I don’t believe in law to prevent a man from getting rich; it would do more harm than good. So while we don’t propose any war on capital, we do wish to allow the humblest man an equal chance to get rich with anybody else. When one starts poor, as most do in the race of life, free society is such that he knows he can better his condition; he knows that there is no fixed condition of labor for his whole life. . . . I want every man to have a chance -- and I believe a black man is entitled to it -- in which he can better his condition -- when he may look forward and hope to be a hired laborer this year and the next, work for himself afterwards, and finally to hire men to work for him. That is the true system.” (Speech at New Haven, March 6, 1860, in Works, Vol., V, pp. 360-361)

But as a western man Lincoln was far more concerned over the application of ‘laissez faire’ to the problem of western lands, and as he

304

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

contemplated the practical workings of ‘squatter sovereignty’ he learned how the free functioning of ‘laissez faire’ may be interfered with by economic imperialisms. That lesson determined his final stand. The virgin prairies beyond the Mississippi were coveted equally by northern and southern exploiters; and who should finally possess them, whether the small freeholder or the slave-master, was a question that could not be put off forever. None knew this better than the small farmers who were already staking out homesteads there. If Congress yielded to the pro-slavery demands, their economic future would be endangered. It was the free-soil West that sent the first anti-slavery men to Washington and provided the backbone of the new party. Not the respectable West, but the plain people, Whig as well as Democrat. ‘Much of the plain old Democracy is with us,’ said Lincoln in 1858, ‘while nearly all the old silk-stocking Whiggery is against us. I don’t mean nearly all the old Whig party, but nearly all of the nice exclusive sort.’ (Letter to A. C. Henry, in Works, Vol. V, p. 95) . . . The free-soiler hated slavery because it threatened his immediate interests; never the less as the great struggle developed, the moral injustice of slavery was thrust to the fore and imparted a humanitarian motive to the free-soil argument. The humanitarian motive Lincoln seized upon, wedded it to the ideal of national union, and thus doubly armed went forth to the fight. To amalgamate idealism and economics is not an easy task. ‘Public opinion,’ he said in a speech at Hartford, ‘is founded, to a great extent, on a property basis.’ But it is not the sole basis. The ideal of justice comes in to upset all purely economic calculations. ‘The property basis will have its weight. The love of property and a consciousness of right and wrong have conflicting places in our organization, which often make a man’s course seem crooked, his conduct a riddle.’ (Works, Vol. V, p. 330) Beyond question it was this recognition of the perennial conflict between economics and justice,

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

305

between realism and idealism, that explains the hesitancies and harassing doubts that marked Lincoln’s development. To reconcile the principle of exploitation with the Declaration of Independence it was necessary to stick like a flea to ‘laissez faire’ -- to eliminate slave labor and accept only free labor. Lincoln was a slow man and cautious, and he pulled himself forward to such a position by main force. He was not a rare intellect like Thoreau, to think swiftly to a conclusion and abide the consequences. He was a political leader rather than an intellectual, and he could advance only a little ahead of the slow-moving mass he sought to draw after him. A hundred invisible ties held him back -- his belief in the rights of local democracies, his respect for law and order, his devotion to the Constitution, his recognition of property interests in the slave, his understanding of the complexity of the problem, with the entire economy of the South resting on a slave basis. Here were difficulties enough to trouble an honest mind. His practical sense, which is only another name for political realism, restrained his idealism and made him of necessity an opportunist, willing to yield much to save the Union. A simple, tolerant, easy-going man, he was at bottom a realist who had come to understand what may be considered the greatest truth in political science, namely, that an enduring state must rest on willing allegiance. Force cannot compel loyalty; authority may put down revolt but it cannot destroy the seeds of discontent; for that only the sovereignty of good will is competent, and in free states the sovereignty of good will must rest upon compromise. Lincoln was a better democrat than Jackson, for he would rather persuade than drive. If Hamilton embodied the aristocratic principle of coercive government, Lincoln embodied the democratic principle of give and take, that prefers compromise to bayonets. With a cause resting on the common good will it might safely be trusted to muddle through. Slowly pushed forward by his cautious realism, Lincoln was forty-nine before he reached the ‘divided house’ position of the Douglas

306

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

debates, that was to entail such consequences. It was a bold pronouncement to address to a generation desperately engaged in erecting sham defenses against reality, in fleeing from the truth that cried aloud to be heard. But he would not let men stop their ears longer; the truth must be spoken to their understanding. “In my opinion [he said] agitation will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. ‘A house divided against itself cannot stand.’ I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved -- I do not expect the house to fall -- but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.” (Speech at Springfield, June 16, 1858) The situation could not have been put more neatly. It was an appeal of honest realism to put away all shoddy romanticisms, all mean evasions, and to face the situation fairly; and it cut across the murky clouds like a flash of lightning. Thenceforth there could be no longer a conspiracy of silence; the problem of slavery had been brought home to the common mind and common conscience, the question of its relation to our national unity and national wellbeing had been brought into the realm of homely discussion. It is the democratic way, and as an honest democrat, Lincoln stripped away all the protective coloring of lies that politicians use and appealed to the honesty of plain men. The same method he applied to the Dred Scott decision. He proposed to bring to the bar of the majority opinion the stale legal romanticisms of the Supreme Court. He refused to accept the divine right of the courts to rulership, de denied the sovereignty of the judiciary, and proposed to make a political issue of the matter. He would have settled it in town-

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

307

meetings and at the polls, by the plain people, and not by lawyers and judges. It was a reversion to Jeffersonian principles, to the simple democratic creed that fundamentals of public policy must be determined by the people themselves. Lincoln had thought his way slowly to the ‘divided house’ position, but he could not pause there. Those were hurrying times, and the liberalism of yesterday was inadequate for the liberalism of today. A weak man or a time-saver would have gone upon the rocks, and a man of unyielding policy must have broken; to be certain of one’s conclusions was possible only to one who saw less than the whole. Patience and an open mind alone could be relied on, and intelligent opportunism alone would serve during the months the country was fiercely debating with itself; and the heart-breaking hesitation of Lincoln, the troublesome doubts and perplexed questioning, reveal as nothing else could the simple integrity of his nature. He must go forward, but he must carry the people with him, the North as a whole, the border states if possible, even the rebellious South if charity might suffice. Though in arms, they were Americans, and their hearts must be brought to willing allegiance; how otherwise could a democratic people emerge from the bitterness of civil war? He was not made for a dictator, and blood and iron he accounted poor cement to mend the sundered democracies. He trusted the better impulse of men to prevail in the end, because with Jefferson he believed in the essential justice of the plain people. In this faith he exemplified his democracy. Not a great political thinker, he was a great leader because he never forgot that he was one of those he led. The slow unfolding of Lincoln’s mind is sufficiently revealed in the changing quality of his speeches. He was rarely eloquent -- never after the ornate fashion of the time; and the bits of Hebraic poetry that have come to be associated with his name are singularly few and belong to the last years of his life. His usual was plain homespun, clear and

308

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

convincing, but bare of imagery and lacking distinction of phrase. The thought seems to break into speech hesitatingly, in the way of a man visibly seeking to adapt his words to meaning. Matter he judged to be of greater significance than manner. Few men who have risen to enduring eloquence have been so little indebted to rhetoric. Very likely his plainness of style was the result of deliberate restraint, in keeping with the simplicity of his nature. When he let himself go he discovered a well of poetry in his heart. When he chose he could even play the rhetorician. In those rare moments when he put caution behind him, his words fell into a stately rhythm that suggest the orator. Witness such a passage as this: ‘In those days our Declaration of Independence was held sacred by all, and thought to include all; but now, to aid in making the bondage of the Negro universal and eternal, it is assailed and sneered at and construed, and hawked at and torn, till, if its framers could rise from their graves, they could not at all recognize it. All the powers of earth seem rapidly combining against him. Mammon is after him, ambition follows, philosophy follows, and the theology of the day is fast joining the cry. They have him in the prison-house; they have searched his person, and left no prying instrument with him. One after another they have closed the heavy iron doors upon him; and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a hundred keys, which can never be unlocked without the concurrence of every key -- the keys in the hands of a hundred different men, and they scattered to a hundred different and distant places; and they stand musing as to what invention, in all the dominions of mind and matter, can be produced to make the impossibility of his escape more complete than it is.’ (Speech at Springfield, June 27, 1857, in Works, Vol. II, pp. 327-328)

But he did not often let himself go. As one reads his speeches, one feels that an English diffidence held him back -- this and the strong prose of his environment. Like a true Anglo-Saxon he was reluctant to speak out. Only at the last did that diffidence yield to complete

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

309

unconsciousness. The Gettysburg speech and the Second Inaugural are marked by the sincerity and self effacement that ennobled the words of John Brown in the Virginia court-room -- it is the eloquence which rises from the heart when life has been felt in its tragic reality, an eloquence that Webster could not rise to. Such words come only to those who have been purified by fire; they are the distillation of bitter experience. But the mass of his speeches are in quite another manner -- that of the simple, everyday world that bred him. He had none of the itch of publicity that afflicts the second-rate mind. Webster was a magnificent poseur; Edward Everett repeated the same academic oration a hundred times; but Lincoln was too modest to pose and too honest to turn parrot and speak by rote. He was a man who loved to talk with his neighbors in homely metaphor, and it was then that his thought clothed itself in whimsical humor. He did not wear his heart on his sleeve, but like Mark Twain he let it slip out in a witticism. Even more than Washington has Lincoln suffered at the hands of the myth makers. Of late years he has come to be looked upon too often as the invaluable asset of the political party that he honored in its founding, and too rarely as the impediment of the kindly, liberal soul of our native democracy in the simpler days of a fluid economics and an unsophisticated equalitarianism. With his instinctive kindliness, his abiding faith in the good will of men, his dislike of coercion, his readiness to compromise, he may seem old-fashioned to a generation that has grown intolerant -- but that is a reflection on our own times rather than on Lincoln. The real Lincoln can grow old-fashioned no more than Jefferson. As he went back in a day of sordid imperialisms to the earlier liberalism of the great Virginian, seeking to rescue the idealism of the Declaration if Independence from the desecration of the market place where it was openly flouted, so in a day of vaster imperialisms and greater complexity we may take counsel of his humanitarianism, his open-mindedness, his trust in tolerance and good

310

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

will, his democratic faith that held firm in spite of disappointment. The market place is mighty now as it was then, and liberalism finds few friends there; but when did its gods become immortal? To compare Lincoln’s democratic predicate values with those of aristocratic Whigs who gained official offices and powers on his political coattails (those who installed H. Clay’s ‘Internal Improvements’ system,’ called the American System of Political Economy with its ‘pork barrel’ mechanisms), is to wonder about selfish values that might have had a conspiratorial role in his assassination: Like Kennedy’s assassin, John Wilkes Booth was hunted down and shot before anyone could talk to, or prosecute him (In situations involving ‘power,’ an untraceable assassin’s bullet has often been the solution choice to displace human obstacles: the report of a plot to kill Lincoln in Philadelphia, on his way to Washington, confirms an opposing and nefarious political movement -- most likely pro-slavery but possibly proaristocratic Whig). With such values divergence a given reality, an internal political contest for power got underway: on Lincoln’s side, for democratic order and the other for a traditional order of wealth and power. With Civil War, Lincoln’s utility to the G.O.P. was completed, and with him gone, the new Grand old Party of progressive Whigs, with great disadvantage to the mass of democracy, could and did accomplish its long held purpose. Since Lincoln’s assassination, the politics of democracy has been reactionary with intent to gain an equitable portion of government’s ‘Internal Improvement’ tax-based subsidy. Political argument is no longer reasonable truth in the sense of Plato’s Intellectual Realm. Now it is argument based on ‘contingent truth’ about economic issues which embroil the ‘pork barrel’ of ‘Internal Improvements’ : an argument based on ‘opinion’ and ‘dogmatic belief’ in which each statement has an equally valid opposite (both truths). Confusion reigns as values about unalienable human rights degenerate: witness humans willing to sell and buy human eggs and sperm. To understand Lincoln’s core values is to understand Jefferson’s values. Both emphatically denounced a judiciary that rules supremely in the name of some monarchical ‘divine right’: Federalist dogma of the divine right of justice -- ‘vox justiciae vox dei.’ which Republicans claimed repeatedly at

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

311

President Clinton’s Impeachment and trial. To understand Lincoln’s reasoning about the judiciary, is to understand how the judiciary has decided for slavery and against constitutional human rights: the cases of John Brown and Dred Scott particularly but also when the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was legislated, the Supreme Court decided that ‘due Process’ applied equally to licensed corporations and this opened the court’s ‘doors’ to arguments of ‘contingent truth’ as held by corporate ‘fictitious individuals’ with superior positions of wealth and by purchasing it with salaries, the negative communication. The aristocratically biased Supreme Court’s decision postponed emancipation for many years. The contemporary argument about confirming black (and Hispanic) justices and ambassadors are similarly Federalist, prejudice-based. The Values War is about truth and rights and the only ‘divine right’ is that of human intelligence which allows humans to reason deliberately until opposites of ‘contingent truth’ merge into unity. While at the bottom of the economic efficiency list, our republican form of Democracy, with divided powers of government, is unique only when it sustains to allow and protect human rights for this purpose. The incursions of the autocratic power of wealth, which followed Lincoln’s assassination, induced rationalizations to weaken the voices of democracy and compromised the divided powers of government. Lincoln wrote, 222

“Remembering . . . that the Jefferson party was formed upon its supposed superior devotion to the personal rights of men, holding the rights of property to be secondary only, and greatly inferior . . . it will be . . . interesting to note how completely the two [parties] have changed hands as to the principles upon which they were originally supposed to be divided. The Democracy of today hold the liberty of one man to be absolutely nothing, when in conflict with another’s right to property; Republicans on the contrary, are for both the man and the dollar, but in case of conflict the man before the dollar. . . . But, soberly, it is now no child’s play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation. . . . The principles of Jefferson are the principles and axioms of free society and yet they are denied and

312

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

evaded, with no small show of success. One dashingly calls them ‘glittering generalities.’ Another bluntly calls then ‘self-evident lies!’ And others insidiously argue that they apply to ‘superior races.’ These expressions, differing in form, are identical in object and effect -- the supplanting the principles of free government, and restoring those of classification, caste, and legitimacy. . . . They are the vanguard, the miners and sappers of returning despotism. We must repulse them or they will subjugate us.” The following article provides facts which confirm the erosions of power in the Executive Branch of government.223 Lawmakers erode the authority of the president to manage federal programs by earmarking spending. Even as the GOP leaders propose sweeping spending cuts that could affect every federal agency, Congress is inserting billions of dollars into the budget for local roads, sewer projects, fisheries studies and dozens of other activities in the home districts of its members. The practice known as ‘earmarking,’ has long been a way for members of Congress to bring home the bacon. But lawmakers and congressional observers said the practice has reached new heights in the annual spending bills under consideration on Capitol Hill, eroding the traditional authority of the executive branch to manage federal programs. Various bills direct the Clinton administration to study Hawaiian monk seals, consider the need for more bed space at the Etowah County, Als., Detention center, fund an astronomy exhibit at Philadelphia’s Franklin Institute, restore the Manchac Swamp in Louisiana, and lay out money for a ferry terminal at Hokes Bluff, Als. Those who have clout and are on the inside want to insure they get what they need,” said former Rep. Vic Fazio, D-Calif., referring to the efforts by members of the Appropriations Committees to put projects into these bills.

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

313

In funding the Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, lawmakers earmarked a record 314 projects valued at $473 million, or 13 percent of the agency’s budget. Sen. Judd Gregg, R-N.H., who chairs the subcommittee that funds the Justice Department, carved $15 million out of the counter-terrorism budget for a research project at Dartmouth College in his home state. Highway bills are famous ‘pork barrels,’ but the Transportation Department estimates that in the new bill, 90 percent of the funds appropriated for building highways, bridges, subways, and airports is committed to members’ projects, up from 78 percent a year ago. ‘Its out of control,’ said Frederick Wertheimer, president of Democracy 21, a public interest group that supports political reform. ‘Its an ad hoc effort by members to take over the executive branch function, which serves their purpose, and the purpose of the campaign donors and makes it much harder for citizens to get a fair consideration for competing projects.’ On Friday, House Republican leaders proposed a 1.4 percent, across-the-board spending reduction to finance the fiscal 2000 budget without touching Social Security revenues. Linda Ricci, spokeswoman for the office of Management and Budget, said ‘If the congressional majority is looking to cut down on waste through an across-the -board spending cut, these earmarked projects wouldn’t be a bad place to start.’ Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., a GOP presidential candidate, said Sunday on ABC’s ‘This Week’: ‘Its not appropriate for us to cut programs that are necessary, even if those are small cuts, while pork barrel spending and wasteful spending is at an all-time high.’ . . . About the ‘contingent economic values’ of Republicans and Democrats, Pat Buchanan said ‘there’s not a dime’s worth of difference between them.’ Economically speaking, he’s right. However, about which set of predicate values is founded on Lincoln’s values, based on the

314

(209.1) Necessary & Contingent Truth

Declaration of Independence, makes unalienable human rights issues more important than economic issues. The order of Whiggish Republican’s values is the rationalized reverse of the reasoned values of Democrats:’ Although politically both now contend for positions at the common ground center of the Parties divide, Lincoln’s sober words prevail unless the democratic order resonates with voters. ‘But, soberly, it is now no child’s play to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation. . . . The principles of Jefferson are the principles and axioms of free society and yet they are denied and evaded, with no small show of success. One dashingly calls them ‘glittering generalities.’ Another bluntly calls then ‘self-evident lies!’ And others insidiously argue that they apply to ‘superior races.’ These expressions, differing in form, are identical in object and effect -- the supplanting the principles of free government, and restoring those of classification, caste, and legitimacy. . . . They are the vanguard, the miners and sappers of returning despotism. We must repulse them or they will subjugate us.’ When President Clinton said, ‘to preserve democracy,’ he did not resign, he undoubtedly had Lincoln’s warning in mind. When Christ taught how to pray, he prescribed specific predicate values for humanity’s logos: After this manner therefore pray ye: Our Father . . ., Hallowed be thy name. [In reverent honor and respect,] Thy Kingdom come. Thy will be done in earth, as ‘it is’ in heaven. [’I resolve to make the values of Thy Logos my own,’ is the essence of this instruction.] For Christians particularly, we violate the values of God’s Logos when we dishonor or despoil God’s creations, humans particularly. As St. John wrote in his First Epistle 1: 5-6: This then is the message which we have heard of him, and declare unto you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness,

Purest value predicates are about ‘good’ and ‘right’

315

we lie, and do not the truth

[which ‘truth’ refers to the ‘Covenant (Troth) of Jehovah’ (Deuteronomy 32 provided the first mention of ‘truth’ in the Old Testament): The ‘necessary’ values in prescriptive logos required to do the ‘truth’ (troth) are faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, promise, . . ., as dedicated to logical antecedence.]. Gore-Bush vote a split decision

316

209.1 ENDNOTES

1 Letter to H. L. Prince, April 6, 1859, in Works, Vol. V, pp. 125-126 2 Parrington, Vol. I, 300-301 3 Parrington, Vol. I, 8-15 4 Parrington’s note: See “The Babylonian Captivity,” in Works, Vol. II, p. 233 (Philadelphia, 1915).

5 World Book Encyclopedia, 1965, Vol. 15, 348 6 Edited by C. H. Monson Jr., Philosophy, Religion and Science, (Charles

This was front page news reported by Knight Ridder Newspapers, May 11, 2001. The outcome depends on how the votes were counted. By 407 votes, Bush would have prevailed under the two most restrictive standards" and by 332 votes, Gore would have won under the two most permissive standards. Re counting the ballots cost The Herald, Knight Rider, and its partners about $825,000. But the saga is not over. As, then reported, another five thousand or so ballots were not counted: The computer-option to cull the votes not counted was mysteriously turned off. The article in the Las Vegas Journal confirmed my analysis, ‘About Paradox and Mechanism,’ as presented in the postscript of Truth (my Section 230). And now, September 2003, the Florida situation of truth as wanted, exists in the election to recall Governor Davis in California. The politics of intrigue is alive and well! : the loser is democratic sovereignty, as exercised by suffrage.

Scribner’s Sons, 1963) 272 (from The Conduct of Life, translated by Ku Hung Ming. London: John Murray Co., 1906, sections 1-29)

7 Law, Grolier Electronic Encyclopedia, 1993 8 Deut. 32:1-6 [However this account is taken from E. S. Bates, The BIBLE, (Simon & Schuster, 1993) 149]

9 I John: about Gods presence. 10 Hindus, World Book Encyclopedia, 1965, Vol. 9, 224-225 11 Roman Empire, World Book, vol. 16, 394 12 Culture of Complaint, The Fraying of America, Robert Hughes, Oxford Press, 1993, p. 10

13 After word by Lodowick Allison, ‘The Bible’ arranged and Edited by Ernest Sutherland Bates, (Simon & Schuster, 1993 by Lodowick Allison) 1255

14 New Dictionary of Thoughts, 529 15 I. Kant, The Critique, Great Books of the Western World (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1991) Vol. 39, p. 10-12

16 F. W. Wolf, PhD, The Spiritual Universe (Simon & Schuster, 1996) 6017

St. John gave the name LOGOS to God, the Creator (Vatican Manuscript in original Greek. John 1:1, translation to English called the Emphatic Diaglott).

18 Edited by C. H. Monson, Jr., LAO-TSE, Philosophy Religion and Science (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1963) 268. "

Four different standards can be used to count those infamous punch-card ballots.

19 C. H. Monson, Jr., 268

209.1

ENDNOTES

20 H. W. Turnbull, The Great Mathematicians, (Barnes & Noble, 1993) 141

21 World Book Dictionary (1965), 1202 22 Truth, World Book Dictionary, 1965, 2093 23 Quoted by S. West, What happens After Death? (Abbott Macdonnell

317

318

209.1 ENDNOTES

40 The World Almanac (2002) p 103 41 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 36 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1991) 485

42 Honderich, 476-77

Winchester, 1977) 62

43 World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, 1965, 48

24 Main Currents . . ., Vol III, Parrington, p. 410-13

44 Parrington, Vol. I, 281

25 V. L Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (New York,

45 Parrington, Vol. III, 152

Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927) Vol. I. 312

26 I. Kant, The Critique, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 39 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1991) 10-12

46 D. Greenwald, Encyclopedia of Economics (McGraw Hill, 1982) 600 47 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of

27 Refers to Edwin Lawrence Godkin's idealism, Parrington, Vol. III, 167

Nations, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 36 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1991) 485

28 D. Ravitch, Editor, The American Reader (Harper Perennial, 1990) 43

48 World Book, Vol. 19, 141

29 Parrington, Vol. I, 164-177

49 Ravitch, 12

30 J. Pelikan, editor, Modern Religious Thought (Little Brown,1990) 68

50 Parrington, Vol. I, 352-53

31 The New Dictionary of Thoughts (Standard Book, 1955) 665

51 G. R. Morrow, Plato and the Law of Nature, In Essays in Political

32 J. N. Fugii, Introduction to the elements of Mathematics (J. Wiley &

Theory presented to George H. Sabine, Milton R. Konvitz, and Arthur E. Murphy, eds. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1948) 20-25, 29-29

Sons, 1961) 45

33 Parrington, Vol. I, 300-301 34 V. L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, Volume Two, Winds . . . (Harcourt Brace, 1930) 298

35 Pojman, 152 36

T. Honderich, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY (Oxford, 1995) 483

37 Dictionary (1965) 1615 38 R. L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers (Touchstone, 1986) 293 39 See R. L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers (Simon and Schuster, 1986) 216

52 World Book, Vol. 9, 403 53 T. Honderich, Editor, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford, 1995) 511-12

54 Parrington, Vol. III, 152 55 Pojman, 2 56 T. Edwards, The New Dictionary of Thoughts (Standard Book, 1955) 239-40

57 Salt Lake Tribune, April 9, 2008 58

Parrington’s note: “The Bloudy Tenent,” in Narragansett Club Publications, Vol. III, p 349

59 Parrington, Vol. II, 460-472

209.1

ENDNOTES

319

320

209.1 ENDNOTES

60 C. Thomas, There to Here, (Harper Perennial, 1991) 69

77 New Dictionary of Thoughts, 665

61 L. J. Pojman, Philosophy, The Quest for Truth (Wadsworth, 1989) 354

78 C. H. Monson, Jr., 268-70

62 I. Kant, The Critique, Great Books of the Western World (Encyclopedia

79 New Dictionary of Thoughts, 529

Britannica, 1991) Vol. 39, p. 10-12

63 See, I. John 1 64 Morrow, 20-25, 28-29 65 Parrington, Vol. I, 358-359

80 Pojman, 1 81 B. Spinoza, Great Books, Vol. 28, 607-676 82 R. L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers (TouchStone, 1986) 42 83

66 I. Kant, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 39, 10-12

L. J. Pojman, Philosophy, The Quest for Truth (Belmont, CA, Wadsworth, 1989) 1

67 Dictionary, 1531

84 Ravitch, 42

85 Dictionary, 734

L. J. Pojman, Philosophy, The Quest for Truth (Belmont, CA, Wadsworth, 1989) 1

69 World Book Encyclopedia, 1965, Vol. 9, 241

86 Dictionary, 1203 87 I. Kant, The Critique, Great Books of the Western World (Encyclopedia

70 C. Thomas, There to Here, (Harper Perennial, 1991) 69

Britannica, 1991) Vol. 39, p. 10-12

71 Parrington, Vol I, 300-301

88 Parrington, Vol. I, 334-36

72 Parrington, Vol. I, 8-15

89 Parrington, Vol. I, 124-26

73 World Book Encyclopedia (1965) Vol. 9, 386 (Most British and

90 Parrington, Vol. I, 283

American philosophy of the 1900's is closer to Hume than to Kant.)

74 World Book Encyclopedia (1965) Vol. 13, 237 (This idea is called ‘scientific materialism’. According to it, everything that exists now is the result of factors and conditions that existed before, and everything that will exist in the future must develop from some combination or change in the factors and conditions that exist now. This idea is often called ‘mechanism’.) However, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) took issue with this materialist causal idea. His finding of ‘synthetic a priori’ exceptions to ‘mechanism’ (was epoch making because he established the main lines for philosophical developments since his day). ‘Materialist determinism’ simply fails as consistent and necessary reasoning. Therefore, cannot meet the scientific method’s standard. Mechanism is as dogmatic as its foundation of belief in unitary materialism is.

91 Parrington, Vol. III, 20 - 23 92 Belief in inevitable territorial expansion to encompass all of North America. This was first argued in the 1840s and was revived during and after the Spanish-American War. It is of the same philosophic family as Dollar Diplomacy upon which Captains of American enterprise expanded their exploitations beyond the nation’s borders: driving the expansion of the nation’s Foreign Policy. Preemption is also of this family.

93 Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (As furnished by Shelby Steele in his essay The New ty), Harpers Magazine, July, 1992

94 Parrington, Vol. III, 22

75 Parrington, Vol. I, 321

95 Parrington, Vol. III, 21

76 Honderich, 476-77

96 Main Currents . . ., Vol III, Parrington, p. 410-13

209.1

ENDNOTES

321

322

209.1 ENDNOTES

97 Las Vegas Review-Journal, Thursday, June 24, 1999

121 The New Dictionary of Thoughts (Standard Book, 1955) 665

98 Parrington, Vol. I, 179

122 World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 6, 212

99 Main Currents . . ., Vol III, Parrington, p. 410-13

123 Parrington, Vol. I, 359

100 Parrington, Vol. I, 300-301

124 C. A. Wood, A WAR ON THE WEST (The Washington Post), Las

101 Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address summation 102 Parrington’s note: “The Bloudy Tenent,” in Narragansett Club Publications, Vol. III, p 349

103 From An excerpt from ‘About Truth and Organization’ 104 Parrington, Vol. I, 118 105 An except from ‘About Truth and Organization,’ (Not yet published) 106 Parrington, Vol. II, 310-311 107 Parrington, Vol. I, 179 108 Parrington, Vol. I, 308 109 Parrington, Vol. I, 359 110 Parrington, Vol. I, 353 111 States’ Rights, World Book, Vol. 17, 680-681 112 World Book Dictionary (1965), 1202 113 World Book Encyclopedia (1965), Vol. 10, 76 114 Morrow, 20-25, 28-29 115 Parrington, Vol. I, 307 116 Parrington, Vol. I, 312 117

I. Kant, The Critique, Great Books of the Western World (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1991) Vol. 39, p. 10-12

Vegas Review Journal, May 14, 1995

125 World Book, Vol. 1, 722 126 In reference to the Federalist; Constitution of the United States, Grolier Electronic Encyclopedia, 1993

127 World Book, Vol. 13, 237 128 Dictionary, 1042 129 Law, Grolier Electronic Encyclopedia, 1993 130 Honderich (Oxford, 1995) 476-77 131 Materialism, World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, 237 132 Parrington, Vol. I, 283 133 Law, Grolier Electronic Encyclopedia 134 Parrington, Vol. III, 412 135 Thomas, 82-85 136 Thomas, 89, 91 137 Law, Grolier Electronic Encyclopedia 138 Thomas, 89, 91 139 Philosophy of government, Encyclopedia, Vol. 15, 348 140 Thomas, 68-69 141 Thomas, 70

118 Spinoza, Great Books, Vol. 28, 665-666

142 Parrington, Volume II, 298

119 Bennett asked this on Meet the Press, December 27, 1998

143 Parrington, Volume II, 298

120 Honderich, 476-77

144 Thomas, 89, 91

209.1

ENDNOTES

145 Parrington, Vol. I, 300 146 Parrington, Vol. I, 379 147 Parrington, Vol. I, 300-301 148 Main Currents . . ., Vol III, Parrington, p. 410-13 149 Parrington, Vol. I, 281-282 150 Parrington’s note: Elliot’s Debates, Vol. I, p 386 151 Parrington’s note: Quoted in Harding, The Federal Constitution in Massachusetts.

152 Parrington, Vol. I, 66-71 153 Parrington’s note: For much of the material made use of here, I am indebted to The Political Theory of Roger Williams, a dissertation by Dr. James E. Ernst of the University of Washington.

154 Parrington’s note: “Letter to the Town Clerk of Providence,” in Narragansett Club Publications, Vol. VI, p 401

155 Parrington’s note: “The Bloudy Tenent,” in Narragansett Club Publications, Vol. III, p 349

156 Parrington’s note: “The Bloudy Tenent,” Vol. III,, p 398 157

I. Kant, The Critique, Great Books of the Western World (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1991) Vol. 39, p. 10-12

158 Parrington, Vol. II, 12-13 159 Dictionary, 2152 160

In a document called Ethereal Gold, which I prepared during December of 2002, as our second war with Iraq was imminent, I wrote this about State Rignts doctrine: With the presidential election of 2000, the Judiciary neither favored fascism nor democracy when it interdicted the political processes of suffrage, but you tell me which, of nomos or physis was favored. When Treasury Secretary Hamilton fallaciously affirmed nomos-based ‘broad power’ doctrine to justify his vision of government’s Constitutional economic dimension, the Judiciary was overtly apolitically neutral in Hamilton’s debate with Jefferson, but clearly covertly either supported or allowed Hamilton’s fallacious affirmation of The Federalist Agenda as is now fallaciously legally administered.

323

324

209.1 ENDNOTES

[Hamilton’s] notorious comment -- which the American democrat has never forgiven him, “the people! -- the people is a great beast! -- was charactoristically frank. . . . He was at pains, therefore, as a practical statesman, to dress his views in a garb more seemly to plebeian [biases], and like earlier Tories he paraded an ethical justification for his Toryism. The current Federalist dogma of the divine right of justice -- ‘vox justiciae vox dei’ -- was at hand to serve his purpose and he made free use of it. . . . A monarchist, he urged the monarchical principle with Hobbesian logic. “The principle chiefly intended to be established is this -- that there must be a permanent ‘will.” “There ought to be a principle in government capable of resisting the popular current.” [In ‘Works, Vol. II, p 415] The only effective way of keeping democratic factionalism within bounds, . . . lay in the erection of a powerful chief magistrate, who “ought to be hereditary, and have so much power. . .. He devoted himself to . . . providing all possible checks upon the power of the democracy.” . . . As the creative organizer of a political state answering the needs of capitalism -- destined to grow stronger as imperialistic ambitions mount -- he seems the most modern and the most American of our eighteenth-century leaders, one to whom our industrialism owes a very great debt, but from whom our democratic liberalism has recieved nothing. Not until 1819, in McCulloc vs.Maryland, did the Judiciary uphold ‘Broad power’ doctrine. Judicially, this ‘consequent,’ of the Constitution’s ‘ambiguity,’ was the affirmed ‘antecedent’ tenet of ‘States Rights,’ from which, deductively, States routinely license fictitious person corporations, that now to great extent set the nation’s political economy agenda? Nomos-based ‘broad power’ doctrine (the Hobbesian Leviathan-based-separation of powers), is the only ‘marsh-mellow-like’ illogical but a legal cornerstone of separation between the U.S. government’s official Political Economy [Of seeking and accepting campaign donations (bribes) to gain elected positions: of Congress and Administration], and privatized Political Economy [of private business entities (which are legally licensed on the same irrationally deduced cornerstone doctrine)]. In other words, private economy is myth, not fact. While Political Economy is legal, it is as fictitious as the corporations that States now routinely license to act as humans? Government’s only immunity from legal liability, is the Hobbesian fictitious leviathan-based ‘sovereign immunity’ doctrine? sovereign immunity The principle that the federal and state governments cannot be sued without their consent. Based on the idea that the king can do no wrong. For this to be a categorical principle, infers that governments are ‘antecedent kings’ rather than ‘consequents’ of cardinal sovereign consent: This proves the fallacious ‘affirmation of government,’ as the ‘antecedent’ to ‘we the people.’ A nomospersuaded, Judiciary persists irrationally to ‘affirm governments’ are kings, nullifying the naturally antecedent rights of ‘cardinal sovereignty.’ Irrationalism annihilates rationalism. And irrationalism’s cultural nomos also fallaciously ‘affirm’ classical mercantilism as if it were a principle.

209.1

ENDNOTES

Now with the department of ‘Homeland Security,’ our ‘fictitious king’ is affirmed to deny employees’ cardinal sovereignty rights: As John Locke argued, ‘to take natural freedom, must be of design to take all human rights.’ And with ‘Terrorism Insurance,’ taxpayers will systemically reimburse this unbudgeted government’s cost (wage-earners ultimately are the only taxpayers). And when tax-based ‘Social Usage’ (insurance) for business is affirmed while health, long-term care, and other catastrophes that befall individuals are denied, irrationalism’s cultural nomos are evident. The ‘broad powers’ doctrine that founds states’ authority to license business entities, then separates ‘privatized enterprise’ from government, and the definition of Government’s ‘sovereign immunity,’ have no more legal foundation than the biased classical fictions our Federalist-Whigg Judiciary ‘affirmed’ to give fictitious corporate entities legal ‘equal rights’ with humans. Despite reality that mutuality (bilateral or reciprocal) between humans and fiction cannot exist, irrational classical fictions rule the legal decisions: like mixing water and air, they remain dissimilar and particularly unjust, unless fiction can be incarcerated? With Emancipation, did the Judiciary side with democratic interests when, on its own (without supporting legislation), it gave The Bill of Right’s ‘due process’ to fictitious person corporations? And, despite Antitrust Laws and concerns, did the Judiciary favor fascism or antitrust principles in its recent decision with Microsoft? As Supreme Court appointments for life are made, will official political processes support physis-based antecedent values (democratic principles) or nomos-based fallaciously affirmed values (philosophically of fascism ) as legally were made the antecedent economic principles of Political Economy? Since dogma is designed and politics contrives to persuade and control a society’s pseudo philosophy, it behooves those who reason, to clearly understand the philosophic bases of government. Fascism, Democracy, and Communism, are each based on a philosophic position.

Absolute idealism,’ on which fascism is based, stresses the existence of one ‘absolute reality,’ a being or element that is complete in itself and does not depend on anything outside itself. It asserts that there is a principle of authority expressing the will of the absolute. As a political philosophy, ‘absolute idealism’ considers the ‘state,’ or the national government, as the absolute, according to this philosophy, everything in society is a part of the state and subservient to it. From these doctrines follow dictatorship by an absolute ruler, rejection of parliamentary procedures, and submission of the individual to the state.

325

326

209.1 ENDNOTES

The dictionary defines fascism as:

1) A strongly nationalistic movement in favor of government control of industry and labor and opposed to radical socialism and communism. 2) Any system of government in which property is privately owned but all industry and labor are regulated by a strong national government, while all opposition is rigorously suppressed [Embroils employments in Homeland Security?]. 3) The doctrines, principles, or methods of such a government or movement. Definition 3) is important! When a political ‘movement’ espouses fascist doctrines, principles, or methods, and achieve to control the ‘state,’ then the ‘state’ is fascist. Are we now fascist?

1) a government that is run by the people who live under it. 2) a country, state, or community having such a government. 3) The common people, distinguished from the privileged class, or their political power. 4) The treatment of others as one’s equals.

‘Dialectical materialism,’ the basis of communism, asserts that only material things are real. It believes that human nature, human beings, and society as a whole are products of the economic system. This philosophy states that all change occurs through a struggle of opposing forces in society, and comes to a climax by revolution. Accordingly, communism opposes religion because of its spiritual nature. It wishes to destroy the present capitalistic economic system, and to develop a new type of man and a new type of economic and social system. The definition of communism is,

209.1

ENDNOTES

1) A philosophy or system, deriving from Marxism, advocating state ownership of land and property, postulating class conflict, and seeking the overthrow of noncommunist societies in behalf of the proletariat [Russian ‘nihilism,’ a common rejection of authority, must be factored into the pseudo philosophic principles which spawned this definition of communism and the Hindu pseudo philosophy of ‘Siva,’ the Destroyer should be considered as underpinning to the following statements of definition.]. 2) A political, social, and economic system in which the state, governed by an elite party, controls production, labor and distribution, and largely, the social and cultural life and thought of the people. 3) A social order in which property is held in common by the community or the state; communalism. Communism and socialism are systems of social organization under which the means of production and distribution of goods are transferred from private hands to the government. The classic difference between the two systems lies in the different means they take to establish themselves: communism emphasizes the impracticability of replacing the existing social order by any means other than armed force [The values of Hindu god ‘Siva’ put into nihilism’s mix.] or outside intervention; the advocates of socialism seek to establish it by peaceful means, by legislation. Pure philosophical truth : about forms of government Both aspects of human being (material and spiritual) are ‘necessary’ natural philosophic antecedent principles of a democratic ‘state’: Hamilton provided for the material side, Jefferson the spiritual side. Purely, ‘Rational empiricism’ has the only reason-based natural philosophic antecedents. Other government forms are pseudo philosophic, ‘nihilistic’ or ‘positive,’ because they illogically and fallaciously deny that natural antecedent principles of the human logos are of natural noumenon, which reflects God’s Logos: the supreme noumenon. When fictional values are illogically fallaciously affirmed as the antecedent tenets of the philosophic pseudo ‘state,’ human ‘reason’ is saddled to dogma; the fundamental naturally axiomatic sovereign aspect is not only saddled. It is controlled: The only naturally legitimate ‘absolute reality’ is denied! God’s ultimate natural noumenal sovereignty is denied. Irrationalism prevails. Until belief in dogma sponsors individual deliberate reasoning that seeks to understand the axiomatic values of the supreme intelligent noumenon (the Creator’s Logos), belief in ‘divine right’ dogma supplants the only natural source of human fiducial values. The values of human’s belief in dogma supplants truth’s natural axiomatic parameters. Like Baals, (White Rabbits, as in Alice’s wonderland) Brahminists, who formulate supplanting dogma, make the values of dogma the main object of address. And Brahminists are then positioned to manipulate politically, the so-called Pavlovian sychophantic intelligence of ‘belief.’

327

328

209.1 ENDNOTES

Dogma is deliberately made to dominate the cardinal sovereign human aspects which naturally reflect fiducial values: of ‘truth,’ ‘philosophy,’ ‘morality,’ ‘justice.’ As Nietzsche observed, ‘we killed God’! Unfortunately for unsuspecting ‘believers,’ materialist dogma only sponsors fact-based experiences: images of mind, which Plato concluded, are of ‘opinion’ (‘belief’ and ‘illusion’) but not ‘reason.’ In dogmatic belief, the inculcation of values of intelligently reasoned pure truth, ethical morality, justice, . . ., is considered a punishable heresy: And effectively, such dogma denies individual intelligence which, reflecting the necessary fiducial values of nature’s supreme noumenon, naturally is capable, if willful and diligent, to understand purevalue-parameters of God’s Logos. Einstein’s reletivity equation is maybe the most cogent example. Cardinal sovereign reason is the exclusive source of pure truth. Ludowich Allison introduced with these comments the Bible’s translation arranged and edited by Ernest Sutherland Bates.

. . . Man is given free will and his first conscious act is to use it to make himself into God. [His second act, when caught, is to blame somebody else. (both were accomplished by illogical ‘Affirmation’ and ‘Denial’)]: . . . the great covenant of God with Abraham is extended to Israel [and Islam] with Moses and then expanded to include the entire human race through Christ. That message reverberates on many different levels throughout Western thought. It enables us to comprehend the mystery of life as a part of a larger story of sin and redemption. Man is given free will and his first conscious act is to use it to make himself into God. (His second act, when caught, is to blame somebody else.) This is the great Biblical motif that runs from Genesis and the Fall through the impieties and failures of Israel to the final consummation of the Old Testament in the New. It is the tension [antinomy] between man’s aspirations and man’s inadequacies, and it gives rise to the idea of hope. The Bible tells us man’s stories are more than fables, and his oldest myths are more than legends; they are intricately inlaid into the very foundation of the cosmos, and further-more, into a cosmology that plays itself out in the processes of each individual soul. In this, the Bible is the definitive epic of the West. King David had been dead two hundred years when the great Homeric verses of the ‘Iliad’ and the ‘Odyssey’ were first set down. The Biblical epic of which he is a central character was only halfway to completion. This epic moves us from Exodus to Job, from the tribal and collective experience to the individual, which in its singularity is universal in a way the narrowly tribal cannot be. And while this revelation is unfolding, another is moving parallel in the

209.1

ENDNOTES

opposite direction: the great [categorical] Covenant of God with Abraham is extended to Israel [and Islam] with Moses and then expanded to include the entire human race through Christ, so that we move from the individual [cardinal sovereignty] through the tribe to the universal. [Natural antinomy is exacerbated by revelation’s organized dogmatic religious tugs of revelation (nomos) and Christ’s anti-nomos logical pull on individual faculties of reason.] ‘Divine rights’ dogma was traced to Babylon (Hammurabi) in about 2000 B.C. (Shamash, the sun god, is pictographically portrayed as handing authority to Hammurabi). It is also traceable to the Brahman caste of Hinduism. These instances of a human usurping authority by rationalizing to make himself a god, confirms Allison’s comment. The manmade source of enforced hierarchical authority is found. ‘Divine right’ is dogma that fallaciously supplants God, the ultimate axiom of life, which for obvious human contrivances, supplants the first principles of LOGOS upon which human free will is based. Belief in ‘divine right’ dogma, transgresses human sovereignty at its natural source: And transgressions of the great commandments in the name of dogmatic belief, leaves humans bare of Jehovah’s promises. Both communist ‘Dialectical materialism’ and fascist ‘Absolute idealism’ departs starkly from democratic ‘Rational empiricism’; both are founded on the dogma of ‘absolute materialism,’ and, therefore, both are sponsor-advocates of the fallacious dogmatic, affirmed tenet values which nihilistically deny the existence of noumenon, the ‘eternal reality’ of the human soul. Worse, they deny God. Why is it cabalism? Because, classical illogical mysticism is secreted doctrine of the nomos-based cabala, which affirms consequents and denies naturally antecedent cardinal sovereignty: all is intrinsic of the dogma of classical belief. Because government’s sovereignty is ‘truly’ ordinally derived (the sum of individual’s cardinal sovereignty, as consented), individual cardinal sovereignty is truly antecedent. As John Adams said, humans are coeval of government.

Hamilton’s ‘broad power’ interpretation of the Constitution in determining the powers of government, is upheld in the Supreme Court’s ‘States Rights’ doctrine: Ammendment 10 founds both doctrines. But, did they forget ‘the people’?

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.[Don’t forget ‘people.’] Innititive and refforendum actions are necessary to ensure that which cardinal sovereignty finds is a commonweal interest. Maybe, the greatest commonweal concern embroils tautological fallacies of the Judiciary: Government, of the people, for the people, and by the people must be responsible to the people for its actions.

329

330

209.1 ENDNOTES

How can this be accomplished, unless we each are responsible to interpret constitutional rights and show innititive to protect them? And, because cardinal sovereignty has never consented to the authorities of kingdoms, nor to divine rights dogma, my initiative (addenda IV) contests the judiciary’s acts that tautologically fallaciously ‘Affirmeded natural Consequents,’ to define ‘sovereign immunity’ and ‘due process for fictitious entities.’ The natural antecedent of ‘sovereign immunity’ and ‘due process’ is, therefore, neither king nor fiction: It is cardinal sovereignty as consented to government’s ordinal sovereignty. They are not as is now fallaciously based on authorities and powers of a fictional king. Until fictions are of natural reality, ‘due process’ should apply only to living humans: to living individuals that naturally have rights, coeval of government. About cardinal sovereignty, no nation equals the U.S. Cardinal sovereignty is our nation’s Ethereal Gold and it is the only assurance that our nation is democratic. So, let’s exercise it as John Adam’s Liberty and Knowledge entrusted: let our freedoms ring.

Let us dare to read, think, speak, and write. Let every order and degree among the people rouse their attention and animate their resolution. Let them all become attentive to the grounds and principles of government. . . . Let every sluice of knowledge be opened and set a-flowing. 161 J. N. Fugii, Introduction to the elements of Mathematics (J. Wiley & Sons, 1961) 45

162 Parrington, Vol. I, 300-301 163 V. L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, Volume Two, Winds . . . (Harcourt Brace, 1930) 298

164 Parrington’s note: See Charles A Beard, The Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, Chapter XIII.

165 World Book Dictionary (1965), 1202 166 Parrington, Vol. I, 300 167 Parrington, Vol. II, 298 168 World Book Encyclopedia Dictionary (1965) 1603 169 Thomas, 82-83 170 Parrington, Vol. II, 13

209.1

ENDNOTES

171 Monroe Doctrine, World Book, Vol. 13, 617 172 D. Greenwald, Federal Reserve System, History, Encyclopedia of

331

332

209.1 ENDNOTES

their exploitations beyond the nation’s borders: driving the expansion of the nation’s Foreign Policy. Preemption is also of this family.

Economics (McGraw Hill, 1982) 394

191 Encyclopedia, Vol. 11, 200

173 Bank of the United States, World Book, Vol. 2, 60

192 Dictionary, 1042

174 Loco-Foco, World Book, Vol. 12, 369

193 Lawson and Appignanesi, Editors, Dismantling Truth, Reality in The

175 Andrew Jackson, World Book, Vol. 11, 11 176

Lusk, Hewitt, Donnell, Barnes, Nature of Corportation and Incorporation, Busioness Law Principles and Cases (Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1974) 457

177 Parrington, Vol. I, 66-71 178 Parrington, Introduction to Vol. III, iv - vii 179 Parrington, Vol. III, 26

Post-Modern World, (St. Martin’s Press, 1989) Back Cover

194 Ibid. 195 Parrington, Vol. III, 385-86: about literary criticism to World War I. 196 Parrington, Vol. III, 346-47 197 Genesis 2: 4,5 198 Tom Campbell, Seven theories of Human Society, 11 199 Quoted by S. West, What happens After Death? (Abbott Macdonnell

180 Parrington, Vol.II, 298

Winchester, 1977) 62

181 E. H. Gilson, The Intelligence in the Service of Christ [from, J.

200 Pojman, 137

Pelikan, editor, The World Treasury of Modern Religious Thought (Little Brown, 1990) 218-219]

201 W. Greider, Who will tell the People, ( Simon and Shuster, 1992) 281

182 Judith Havemann, U.S. leads wealthy nations in violent deaths of children (The Washington Post), Las Vegas Review-Journal, Feb. 7, 1997

183 C. Woodward, A. P., Las Vegas Review Journal, March 7, 1999 184 Heard on ABC’s ‘This Week’ program, Sunday, October 17, 1999 185 Heard on ‘This Week’, Sunday, October 17, 1999 186 Pojman, 255 187 Pojman, 254-56 188 Parrington, Vol. III, 21

202 From J. Pelikan, editor, The World Treasury of Modern Religious Thought (Little Brown, 1990) 64-71

203 World Book Dictionary (1965) 686 204 W. P. Read, What Freedom is Found in the Local Culture, Great Issues Forum, University of Utah, April 4, 1962

205 Quoted from Eric Fromm in The Lonely Crowd by David Riesman, 5 206 Lawson and Appignanesi, 6 207 World Book, Vol. V, 130 208 C. H. Monson, Jr., Philosophy Religion and Science, (Charles

189 Parrington, Vol. III, 20 - 23

Scribner’s Sons, 1963) 161-167

190 Belief in inevitable territorial expansion to encompass all of North

209 St. John gave the name LOGOS to God, the Creator (Vatican

America. This was first argued in the 1840s and was revived during and after the Spanish-American War. It is of the same philosophic family as Dollar Diplomacy upon which Captains of American enterprise expanded

Manuscript in original Greek. John 1:1, translation to English called the Emphatic Diaglott).

209.1

ENDNOTES

333

210 Edited by C. H. Monson, Jr., LAO-TSE, Philosophy Religion and Science (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1963) 268.

211 E. H. Gilson, The Intelligence in the Service of Christ [from, J. Pelikan, editor, The World Treasury of Modern Religious Thought (Little Brown, 1990) 218-219]

212 Deuteronomy 32: 1-4

100

213 Pojman, 152 214 An inquiry into Meaning . . ., Russell, 1980, p. 123-24 215 J. Pelikan, Strange is our Situation Here upon Earth, 202-205 216 J. Pelikan, The Starred Heaven Above and the Moral Law Within, 178180

217 Parrington, Vol. III, 232-233 (About ‘Skepticism of the House of Adams’)

218 I John 1: 6 219 A. C. Guelzo, Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President (Eerdmans, 516 pages), From article by R. Ostling, AP, New book describes Lincoln’s faith as complex, ewvolving with age, Las Vegas Review Journal, October 23, 1999

220 World Book, Vol., 12, 279 221 Parrington, Vol., II, 152-160 222 Letter to H. L. Prince and Others, April 6, 1859, in Works, Vol. V, pp. 125-126

223 J. Eilperin and D. Morgan, Pork aplenty despite effort to cut budget, (Washington Post). Las Vegas Review Journal, October 25, 1999

200

CONTENTS of OUR FEDERAL SAVINGS PLAN and ETHEREAL-GOLD (the shaded titles) FOREWORD Quintessential Foundations (An Introduction) 101 Security: our Heritage 102 Insurance: our Heritage 103 Political Economy: the foundation of our Heritage (introduces 205) 104 Exercising Sovereignty: a responsibility of Heritage (introduces 208) 109 Truth’s Fiducial Gauges (introduces 209) Substantial Quintessence (Virtuous Knowledge) 201 Life’s enigma and the essential need for philosophy 202 Perceptions of reality and illusions 203 The requirements of self in finding truth 204 Politics for what it is 205 Political Economy 205 Appendix, Petitioning ‘Civitas’ 206 Liberal and Conservative 207 Our "Captains of Industry" 208 Sovereignty 209.1 Truth: The value predicate divisions of 209.2 Truth: The Fiducial Gauges of 210 Truth: Postscript about Organizations 211 Truth: Postscript about Emotion 212 Truth: Postscript about Faith 220 Truth: Postscript about Paradoxs 230 Truth: Postscript about Paradox and Mechanism 240 Truth: Postscript about Deontology without Teleology 250 Virtues of Social Security and Vices of organization

In 2000, wage-earners have a $2 trillion (+) stake in the Economy. Teleologically, this $2 trillion stake (with interest) should have been repaid before the top 20 percent of income earners (who did not contribute to SS) were given a revenue tax refund (top income earners got tax refunds, common wage-earners did not). ABOUT ETHEREAL-GOLD

“It is the uniqueness of individuals, as they are encouraged to develop responsibly, into which the beauties of nations bloom. The American heritage is ETHEREAL-GOLD. The unalienable qualities of individuals are not compatible with anything that we produce, particularly on production lines.” From Petitioning‘Civitas,’ the Appendix to 205 The American System of Political Economy is a mechanism that opposes teleology: It divides the economy and upsets the ethical flux in culture. Our Political Economy locks Americans of the REAL ECONOMY between Americans of the SURREAL ECONOMY and Americans of the NON ECONOMY. Tyrannous Determinism results to compromise the human rights bequeathed by the Constitution. --Are we losing our unique AMERICAN HERITAGE? ---

Do we allow Mechanism to gamble with Teleology?

Increased in 1967 to provide for Medicare, Congress increased Social Security contribution-taxes again in 1984 to fund OUR FEDERAL SAVINGS PLAN for SS (Then spent the money) and (as reported in NEWSWEEK, May 13, 1991, p. 35) "the centrists [in Congress] say the deficit-ridden government needs the money." All attempts to cut SS taxes have failed. Political Economy, however, now calls for general tax reductions. The Administration of 2001 anointed this political objective.