t r a n s c e n d e n ta l l o g i c a n d d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c
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the thing in itself. The transcendental object is one pole of Kant’s theory of objectivity, the one by which the constitutive role of thought is most strongly affirmed. The thing in itself is the other pole, the one by which that constitutive role is recalled to its limits, and the external relation between the thinking subject and the object of thought is maintained, a relation in the context of which alone the Copernican Revolution can be defined. The two poles are complementary to one another, for the transcendental object itself has a negative function, that of recalling the understanding to its limits: it is because the transcendental object is only the transcendental object (the mere thought of an object = X, making possible the representation of any empirical object) that we do not have knowledge of the Thing in itself. The thing in itself is what thought necessarily relates to receptivity, as the non-sensible ground of sensible representations. [I]t [. . .] follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word “appearance” must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself [. . .] must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility. (A251–252)
The thing in itself is what affects sensibility, and what the latter nevertheless prevents us from cognizing, since it presents the thing in itself only according to the a priori forms of sensibility, space and time. But the thing in itself is also, on the other hand, what might be the object of a non-sensible intuition, i.e. what an intuition that did not depend on sensibility would present (cf. A252). We can now see how the thought of the transcendental object can be the beginning of the illusion that we have knowledge of things in themselves. Through the thought of the transcendental object, categories are more than mere logical functions, they are concepts of an object. To forget that these concepts can acquire determinate content only through their relation to sensible intuition is to suppose that the understanding has access on its own to an actually existing object: that it at least approximates an intuitive intellect. By denying that we can even imagine what an intuitive intellect might be, Kant limits the understanding and asserts its dependence on receptivity (sensibility). But at the same time he forcefully affirms the active role of the understanding, its role in synthesis of what is given to